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Long-Term Care Liability

The population is aging, life expectancy is increasing and litigation against long-term care providers, including nursing homes, personal care homes and assisted living facilities, is growing. Nearly 18% of the U.S. population is aged 65 and older, and that number is only expected to increase in the coming years, further taxing an already strained long-term care system.

Our long-term care liability team provides skilled counsel and excellence in representation when it comes to defending long-term care facilities and providers against personal injury claims. Many of our health care attorneys concentrate primarily, if not exclusively, on defending this litigation. We have the experience, knowledge, dedication and geographical capability to efficiently and cost-effectively resolve such matters.

Defending long-term care cases requires an understanding of a unique set of issues different than those found in traditional malpractice cases. Claims can involve allegations of abuse or neglect, or statutory/regulatory non-compliance with state and federal mandates. Additionally, it is not uncommon to see allegations of negligence per se, fraudulent documentation and statutory deficiencies. 

Many cases involve claims for corporate negligence and direct allegations against facility owners and directors for compensatory and punitive damages. They can also involve staffing or budgetary issues which are tied to specific regulations and can require significant motion practice and extensive discovery. These cases are often further complicated by staffing turnover and unsophisticated witnesses.

Our attorneys understand these challenges and are skilled at working together with clients to develop the best defense and accomplish the desired outcome while managing legal spend. Each case is unique and requires its own strategic approach. When it is in our client’s best interests, we will recommend early resolution, but we also will not hesitate to try cases which must be defended.

Results

Summary Judgment Received in a Nursing Home Malpractice Case

We received summary judgment in the defendant’s favor in a nursing home malpractice case. The plaintiff claimed that the facility failed to prevent various conditions and injuries during the resident’s admission—such as UTI/sepsis, acute kidney injury/metabolic encephalopathy, dehydration and failure to thrive/weight loss, and skin breakdown. The plaintiff alleged these developments resulted in numerous damages, including, but not limited to, death. Our motion for summary judgment on behalf of the defendant sought dismissal on the grounds that the facility held immunity pursuant to the Pennsylvania Tort Claims Act. The plaintiff hotly disputed the issue. Ultimately, several rounds of briefing were required to achieve the ruling in the facility’s favor.

Defense Verdict Obtained in Binding Arbitration Involving Medical Malpractice Claims

We obtained a defense verdict in binding arbitration on behalf of a nursing home client. The plaintiff alleged that the nursing staff provided inadequate pressure-reducing devices and negligently cared for his lower extremity, allegedly resulting in a below-the-knee amputation and permanent and total disability. We established that, not only did the nursing staff treat the resident in accordance with the standard of care but, also, the resident’s below-the-knee amputation was caused by the resident’s vascular conditions and comorbidities, not by any alleged actions and/or inactions of the nursing home staff. After a lengthy arbitration, the arbitrator ultimately found in favor of the defense.

Thought Leadership

The Quarterly Dose

New Leverage for Defendants: Burckhardt’s Impact on New Jersey Nursing Home Act Litigation

June 11, 2026

In a unanimous, unpublished opinion issued on February 24, 2026, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the dismissal of claims against a rehabilitation facility based on the plaintiffs’ failure to prove proximate causation—an essential element of negligence claims as well as claims brought under New Jersey’s Nursing Home Act (NHA). Although unpublished, Burckhardt v. Advanced Subacute Rehabilitation Center at Sewell, LLC provides important guidance for defendants facing nursing home malpractice and Resident-Rights Act litigation. Background of the Case The decedent, Burckhardt, was a 72-year-old resident at Advanced Subacute Rehabilitation Center at Sewell (Advanced). He had numerous medical conditions, including encephalopathy, diabetes mellitus, hypertension, urinary tract infection, respiratory failure, dysphagia, and required assistance with activities of daily living, including eating. The plaintiffs alleged that Advanced failed to follow Burckhardt’s care plan by leaving him alone in his room while eating and failing to follow his care plan.  During that time, he choked and required emergency medical intervention and was hospitalized.  Burckhardt suffered cardiac arrest and died two days later. His children, the Estate representatives, filed suit against Advanced, alleging negligence and violations of the NHA based on the alleged failure to appropriately “monitor” him during meals as care planned for. Trial Court’s Ruling After five days of testimony, the trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of Advanced, dismissing all claims. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence of proximate causation. Specifically, Advanced argued, previously via summary judgment and again at trial, that neither of the plaintiffs’ medical experts offered sufficient testimony establishing that the alleged lack of staff presence was a “but-for” or “substantial factor” cause of Burckhardt’s injuries and death, as required under New Jersey law. The trial court agreed. It emphasized that the plaintiffs’ nursing expert, Bonnie Tadrick, testified only as to the applicable standard of care and an alleged failure to monitor, but admittedly did not offer an opinion on causation. The plaintiffs’ physician expert, Dr. Hood,  testified about the mechanics of choking and identified choking as the cause of death. However, Dr. Hood failed to opine that any conduct by the Advanced staff caused, increased the risk or worsened the choking episode. Without expert testimony linking the alleged breach of care to the outcome, the court found the plaintiffs’ proofs legally insufficient and dismissed the case. Appellate Division’s Analysis The Appellate Division affirmed, carefully analyzing the causation requirements for both negligence and NHA claims. The court held that the Estate failed to establish the essential causal link between any alleged lapse in care and Burckhardt’s injury. With respect to Nurse Tadrick, the court noted that while she testified about the standard of care and the need for monitoring, she admitted she was not offering a causation opinion—and could not do so under New Jersey law, which prohibits nurses from testifying about medical causation. Her testimony did not explain how staff presence in the room would have prevented the choking, altered its severity or the ultimate outcome. As to Dr. Hood, the Appellate Division acknowledged that he was qualified to testify on causation but found his testimony inadequate. Although he explained how choking occurs and identified it as the cause of death, he never testified that the alleged absence of staff caused the choking or was a substantial factor in producing the injury. He also never opined that the staff failed to timely respond to the alleged incident. The court stressed that to reach a jury, plaintiffs were required to present evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that the absence of staff increased the risk of harm and that earlier intervention would likely have changed the outcome. In this case, the plaintiffs failed to meet that minimal threshold. Nursing Home Act Claims and Causation The Appellate Division also squarely addressed whether NHA claims require proof of causation. The Estate argued they did not. The court rejected that argument, holding that causation is required even though the NHA does not explicitly use the word. The court reasoned that damages are, by definition, compensation for harm, and recovery without a causal connection would make little sense. The court further held that the NHA claims failed for an additional reason: the Estate did not establish a separate or distinct injury attributable to the alleged resident-rights violation. Even if causation had been established, the absence of proof that the alleged NHA violation resulted in an independent injury was fatal to the claim. Significance of Burckhardt Although unpublished, Burckhardt is a meaningful decision for defendants in nursing home litigation. The Appellate Division’s clear statement that NHA claims require proof of proximate causation—and an identifiable injury tied to the alleged statutory violation—provides defendants with a powerful basis for early motion practice. The decision supports dispositive motions at the summary judgment stage where plaintiffs’ experts fail to connect alleged care deficiencies to a specific injury. It also serves as a lesson to defense counsel to renew the dispositive motion grounds at the end of a plaintiff’s case, where appropriate.

The Quarterly Dose

Long-Term Care Liability

February 25, 2026

As the U.S. population ages and life expectancy rises, long‑term care providers face increasing pressure—not only from growing demand, but also from a sharp rise in litigation. Nursing homes, personal care homes, and assisted living facilities are navigating heightened scrutiny and an already strained care system. Our long‑term care liability team is dedicated to defending these providers, offering deep experience, broad geographic reach, and a focused understanding of the unique challenges inherent in this type of litigation. Long‑term care cases often involve complex allegations ranging from abuse, neglect and regulatory non‑compliance, to claims of corporate negligence, fraudulent documentation and punitive damages. These matters can be further complicated by staffing issues, extensive discovery needs, and the involvement of inexperienced witnesses. Our attorneys work closely with clients to craft tailored defense strategies that balance strong advocacy with cost‑effective decision‑making. Whether pursuing early resolution or taking a case to trial, we are committed to achieving the best possible outcome for every client. Our practice co-chairs, Leslie Jenny and Lynne Nahmani, lead a talented team of trial lawyers who concentrate on defending long-term care litigation. Their philosophy: “As the long‑term care landscape grows more complex, our mission remains simple: deliver smart, strategic, and unwavering defense for the providers who care for our aging population. Every case presents its own challenges, and we take pride in partnering closely with our clients to navigate them with clarity, efficiency, and confidence.” The Quarterly Dose – February 2026, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2026 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive this publication in error, please send a note to MEDesatnick@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.