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Long-Term Care Liability

The population is aging, life expectancy is increasing and litigation against long-term care providers, including nursing homes, personal care homes and assisted living facilities, is growing. Nearly 18% of the U.S. population is aged 65 and older, and that number is only expected to increase in the coming years, further taxing an already strained long-term care system.

Our long-term care liability team provides skilled counsel and excellence in representation when it comes to defending long-term care facilities and providers against personal injury claims. Many of our health care attorneys concentrate primarily, if not exclusively, on defending this litigation. We have the experience, knowledge, dedication and geographical capability to efficiently and cost-effectively resolve such matters.

Defending long-term care cases requires an understanding of a unique set of issues different than those found in traditional malpractice cases. Claims can involve allegations of abuse or neglect, or statutory/regulatory non-compliance with state and federal mandates. Additionally, it is not uncommon to see allegations of negligence per se, fraudulent documentation and statutory deficiencies. 

Many cases involve claims for corporate negligence and direct allegations against facility owners and directors for compensatory and punitive damages. They can also involve staffing or budgetary issues which are tied to specific regulations and can require significant motion practice and extensive discovery. These cases are often further complicated by staffing turnover and unsophisticated witnesses.

Our attorneys understand these challenges and are skilled at working together with clients to develop the best defense and accomplish the desired outcome while managing legal spend. Each case is unique and requires its own strategic approach. When it is in our client’s best interests, we will recommend early resolution, but we also will not hesitate to try cases which must be defended.

Results

Summary Judgment Received in a Nursing Home Malpractice Case

We received summary judgment in the defendant’s favor in a nursing home malpractice case. The plaintiff claimed that the facility failed to prevent various conditions and injuries during the resident’s admission—such as UTI/sepsis, acute kidney injury/metabolic encephalopathy, dehydration and failure to thrive/weight loss, and skin breakdown. The plaintiff alleged these developments resulted in numerous damages, including, but not limited to, death. Our motion for summary judgment on behalf of the defendant sought dismissal on the grounds that the facility held immunity pursuant to the Pennsylvania Tort Claims Act. The plaintiff hotly disputed the issue. Ultimately, several rounds of briefing were required to achieve the ruling in the facility’s favor.

Defense Verdict Obtained in Binding Arbitration Involving Medical Malpractice Claims

We obtained a defense verdict in binding arbitration on behalf of a nursing home client. The plaintiff alleged that the nursing staff provided inadequate pressure-reducing devices and negligently cared for his lower extremity, allegedly resulting in a below-the-knee amputation and permanent and total disability. We established that, not only did the nursing staff treat the resident in accordance with the standard of care but, also, the resident’s below-the-knee amputation was caused by the resident’s vascular conditions and comorbidities, not by any alleged actions and/or inactions of the nursing home staff. After a lengthy arbitration, the arbitrator ultimately found in favor of the defense.

Thought Leadership

The Quarterly Dose

New Leverage for Defendants: Burckhardt’s Impact on New Jersey Nursing Home Act Litigation

June 11, 2026

In a unanimous, unpublished opinion issued on February 24, 2026, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the dismissal of claims against a rehabilitation facility based on the plaintiffs’ failure to prove proximate causation—an essential element of negligence claims as well as claims brought under New Jersey’s Nursing Home Act (NHA). Although unpublished, Burckhardt v. Advanced Subacute Rehabilitation Center at Sewell, LLC provides important guidance for defendants facing nursing home malpractice and Resident-Rights Act litigation. Background of the Case The decedent, Burckhardt, was a 72-year-old resident at Advanced Subacute Rehabilitation Center at Sewell (Advanced). He had numerous medical conditions, including encephalopathy, diabetes mellitus, hypertension, urinary tract infection, respiratory failure, dysphagia, and required assistance with activities of daily living, including eating. The plaintiffs alleged that Advanced failed to follow Burckhardt’s care plan by leaving him alone in his room while eating and failing to follow his care plan.  During that time, he choked and required emergency medical intervention and was hospitalized.  Burckhardt suffered cardiac arrest and died two days later. His children, the Estate representatives, filed suit against Advanced, alleging negligence and violations of the NHA based on the alleged failure to appropriately “monitor” him during meals as care planned for. Trial Court’s Ruling After five days of testimony, the trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of Advanced, dismissing all claims. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence of proximate causation. Specifically, Advanced argued, previously via summary judgment and again at trial, that neither of the plaintiffs’ medical experts offered sufficient testimony establishing that the alleged lack of staff presence was a “but-for” or “substantial factor” cause of Burckhardt’s injuries and death, as required under New Jersey law. The trial court agreed. It emphasized that the plaintiffs’ nursing expert, Bonnie Tadrick, testified only as to the applicable standard of care and an alleged failure to monitor, but admittedly did not offer an opinion on causation. The plaintiffs’ physician expert, Dr. Hood,  testified about the mechanics of choking and identified choking as the cause of death. However, Dr. Hood failed to opine that any conduct by the Advanced staff caused, increased the risk or worsened the choking episode. Without expert testimony linking the alleged breach of care to the outcome, the court found the plaintiffs’ proofs legally insufficient and dismissed the case. Appellate Division’s Analysis The Appellate Division affirmed, carefully analyzing the causation requirements for both negligence and NHA claims. The court held that the Estate failed to establish the essential causal link between any alleged lapse in care and Burckhardt’s injury. With respect to Nurse Tadrick, the court noted that while she testified about the standard of care and the need for monitoring, she admitted she was not offering a causation opinion—and could not do so under New Jersey law, which prohibits nurses from testifying about medical causation. Her testimony did not explain how staff presence in the room would have prevented the choking, altered its severity or the ultimate outcome. As to Dr. Hood, the Appellate Division acknowledged that he was qualified to testify on causation but found his testimony inadequate. Although he explained how choking occurs and identified it as the cause of death, he never testified that the alleged absence of staff caused the choking or was a substantial factor in producing the injury. He also never opined that the staff failed to timely respond to the alleged incident. The court stressed that to reach a jury, plaintiffs were required to present evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that the absence of staff increased the risk of harm and that earlier intervention would likely have changed the outcome. In this case, the plaintiffs failed to meet that minimal threshold. Nursing Home Act Claims and Causation The Appellate Division also squarely addressed whether NHA claims require proof of causation. The Estate argued they did not. The court rejected that argument, holding that causation is required even though the NHA does not explicitly use the word. The court reasoned that damages are, by definition, compensation for harm, and recovery without a causal connection would make little sense. The court further held that the NHA claims failed for an additional reason: the Estate did not establish a separate or distinct injury attributable to the alleged resident-rights violation. Even if causation had been established, the absence of proof that the alleged NHA violation resulted in an independent injury was fatal to the claim. Significance of Burckhardt Although unpublished, Burckhardt is a meaningful decision for defendants in nursing home litigation. The Appellate Division’s clear statement that NHA claims require proof of proximate causation—and an identifiable injury tied to the alleged statutory violation—provides defendants with a powerful basis for early motion practice. The decision supports dispositive motions at the summary judgment stage where plaintiffs’ experts fail to connect alleged care deficiencies to a specific injury. It also serves as a lesson to defense counsel to renew the dispositive motion grounds at the end of a plaintiff’s case, where appropriate.

The Quarterly Dose

Long-Term Care Liability

February 25, 2026

As the U.S. population ages and life expectancy rises, long‑term care providers face increasing pressure—not only from growing demand, but also from a sharp rise in litigation. Nursing homes, personal care homes, and assisted living facilities are navigating heightened scrutiny and an already strained care system. Our long‑term care liability team is dedicated to defending these providers, offering deep experience, broad geographic reach, and a focused understanding of the unique challenges inherent in this type of litigation. Long‑term care cases often involve complex allegations ranging from abuse, neglect and regulatory non‑compliance, to claims of corporate negligence, fraudulent documentation and punitive damages. These matters can be further complicated by staffing issues, extensive discovery needs, and the involvement of inexperienced witnesses. Our attorneys work closely with clients to craft tailored defense strategies that balance strong advocacy with cost‑effective decision‑making. Whether pursuing early resolution or taking a case to trial, we are committed to achieving the best possible outcome for every client. Our practice co-chairs, Leslie Jenny and Lynne Nahmani, lead a talented team of trial lawyers who concentrate on defending long-term care litigation. Their philosophy: “As the long‑term care landscape grows more complex, our mission remains simple: deliver smart, strategic, and unwavering defense for the providers who care for our aging population. Every case presents its own challenges, and we take pride in partnering closely with our clients to navigate them with clarity, efficiency, and confidence.” The Quarterly Dose – February 2026, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2026 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive this publication in error, please send a note to MEDesatnick@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.