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The Quarterly Dose

New Leverage for Defendants: Burckhardt’s Impact on New Jersey Nursing Home Act Litigation

The Quarterly Dose – June 2026

June 11, 2026

by Lynne N. Nahmani

In a unanimous, unpublished opinion issued on February 24, 2026, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the dismissal of claims against a rehabilitation facility based on the plaintiffs’ failure to prove proximate causation—an essential element of negligence claims as well as claims brought under New Jersey’s Nursing Home Act (NHA). Although unpublished, Burckhardt v. Advanced Subacute Rehabilitation Center at Sewell, LLC provides important guidance for defendants facing nursing home malpractice and Resident-Rights Act litigation.

Background of the Case

The decedent, Burckhardt, was a 72-year-old resident at Advanced Subacute Rehabilitation Center at Sewell (Advanced). He had numerous medical conditions, including encephalopathy, diabetes mellitus, hypertension, urinary tract infection, respiratory failure, dysphagia, and required assistance with activities of daily living, including eating.

The plaintiffs alleged that Advanced failed to follow Burckhardt’s care plan by leaving him alone in his room while eating and failing to follow his care plan.  During that time, he choked and required emergency medical intervention and was hospitalized.  Burckhardt suffered cardiac arrest and died two days later. His children, the Estate representatives, filed suit against Advanced, alleging negligence and violations of the NHA based on the alleged failure to appropriately “monitor” him during meals as care planned for.

Trial Court’s Ruling

After five days of testimony, the trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of Advanced, dismissing all claims. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence of proximate causation. Specifically, Advanced argued, previously via summary judgment and again at trial, that neither of the plaintiffs’ medical experts offered sufficient testimony establishing that the alleged lack of staff presence was a “but-for” or “substantial factor” cause of Burckhardt’s injuries and death, as required under New Jersey law.

The trial court agreed. It emphasized that the plaintiffs’ nursing expert, Bonnie Tadrick, testified only as to the applicable standard of care and an alleged failure to monitor, but admittedly did not offer an opinion on causation. The plaintiffs’ physician expert, Dr. Hood,  testified about the mechanics of choking and identified choking as the cause of death. However, Dr. Hood failed to opine that any conduct by the Advanced staff caused, increased the risk or worsened the choking episode. Without expert testimony linking the alleged breach of care to the outcome, the court found the plaintiffs’ proofs legally insufficient and dismissed the case.

Appellate Division’s Analysis

The Appellate Division affirmed, carefully analyzing the causation requirements for both negligence and NHA claims. The court held that the Estate failed to establish the essential causal link between any alleged lapse in care and Burckhardt’s injury.

With respect to Nurse Tadrick, the court noted that while she testified about the standard of care and the need for monitoring, she admitted she was not offering a causation opinion—and could not do so under New Jersey law, which prohibits nurses from testifying about medical causation. Her testimony did not explain how staff presence in the room would have prevented the choking, altered its severity or the ultimate outcome.

As to Dr. Hood, the Appellate Division acknowledged that he was qualified to testify on causation but found his testimony inadequate. Although he explained how choking occurs and identified it as the cause of death, he never testified that the alleged absence of staff caused the choking or was a substantial factor in producing the injury. He also never opined that the staff failed to timely respond to the alleged incident.

The court stressed that to reach a jury, plaintiffs were required to present evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that the absence of staff increased the risk of harm and that earlier intervention would likely have changed the outcome. In this case, the plaintiffs failed to meet that minimal threshold.

Nursing Home Act Claims and Causation

The Appellate Division also squarely addressed whether NHA claims require proof of causation. The Estate argued they did not. The court rejected that argument, holding that causation is required even though the NHA does not explicitly use the word. The court reasoned that damages are, by definition, compensation for harm, and recovery without a causal connection would make little sense.

The court further held that the NHA claims failed for an additional reason: the Estate did not establish a separate or distinct injury attributable to the alleged resident-rights violation. Even if causation had been established, the absence of proof that the alleged NHA violation resulted in an independent injury was fatal to the claim.

Significance of Burckhardt

Although unpublished, Burckhardt is a meaningful decision for defendants in nursing home litigation. The Appellate Division’s clear statement that NHA claims require proof of proximate causation—and an identifiable injury tied to the alleged statutory violation—provides defendants with a powerful basis for early motion practice. The decision supports dispositive motions at the summary judgment stage where plaintiffs’ experts fail to connect alleged care deficiencies to a specific injury. It also serves as a lesson to defense counsel to renew the dispositive motion grounds at the end of a plaintiff’s case, where appropriate.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.