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Lynne N. Nahmani

Co-Chair, Long-Term Care Liability Practice

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Portrait of Lynne N. Nahmani

As a supervising attorney for the Health Care Liability Practice, Lynne coordinates and oversees the work of the attorneys who handle cases throughout eight New Jersey counties. Lynne's role is vital to ensuring that client matters are handled promptly, professionally and effectively. Lynne also serves as the co-chair of the Long-Term Care Liability Practice Group.

Lynne has been a trial attorney for more than 35 years and has litigated hundreds of cases in the state courts of New Jersey and Pennsylvania, many to verdict and directed verdict in favor of her clients. She has provided legal counsel to physicians, hospitals, nurses, allied health professionals, dentists, nursing homes and physician practices.

Lynne received a Bachelor of Science degree from Sargents College of Health and Rehabilitation Sciences at Boston University in 1985. After completing internships at Thomas Jefferson University Hospital, The Children's Hospital of Philadelphia and Eugenia Hospital, Lynne became a licensed occupational therapist. She later enrolled at Temple University School of Law to pursue a career that combined her health care education with the practice of law.

Lynne has spent her legal career defending practitioners and facilities in the health care industry.

    • Temple University Beasley School of Law (J.D., 1989)
    • Boston University (B.S., 1985)
    • New Jersey, 1989
    • Pennsylvania, 1989
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
      The Martindale-Hubbell rated attorney list is issued by Internet Brands, Inc. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • The Best Lawyers in America©, Litigation – Health Care (2024-2027)
      The Best Lawyers list is issued by Woodward & White. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • New Jersey Super Lawyers (2006-2007)
      The Super Lawyers list is issued by Thomson Reuters. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • South Jersey Magazine, Top Lawyer 2009
    • American Bar Association
    • Camden County Bar Association
    • Diversity Law Institute
    • Federation Allied Jewish Appeal
    • Perelman Jewish Day School, Board Member (2013-2016)
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • The Trial Law Institute
    • Trial Attorneys of New Jersey, Board Member (2012-present)
    • Long Term Care Litigation and the Covid-19 Pandemic: Injury and Immunity, New Jersey Institute for Continuing Legal Education, June 1, 2020
    • What is Your Case Worth?, Marshall Dennehey Health Care and Health Law Seminar, November 9, 2017
    • New Jersey Case Law Update, Health Care Law Seminar, Marshall Dennehey, November 9, 2016
    • Avoiding and Defending Nursing Home Litigation, American College of Health Care Administrators 50th Annual Convocation & Exposition, April 20, 2016
    • Mock Trial: Lessons from the Bar and Risk Management, American Professional Agency, Inc., March 23, 2016
    • Affidavit of Merit, Experts and the Net Opinion Rule Seminar, New Jersey State Bar Association Summer CLEFest, August 14, 2015
    • Sex and the Facility: Understanding and Reducing Liabilities, American Health Care Association/National Center for Assisted Living Annual Conference, October 5, 2014, Washington, D.C.
    • Sex and the Facility - Starring the Defense, 2013 Trends in Health Care and Health Law Seminar, Marshall Dennehey, November 7, 2013 
    • Long-Term Care, Hospicomm, April 4, 2012
    • Nursing Home Litigation – How to Handle and Defend a Case, Allied World Assurance Company, January 2012
    • When You Are First Sued, What to Do and What Not to Do and the Processes of a Medical Negligence Claim, University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, program for medical residents and physicians, Spring 2010
    • Annual Seminar for Clients and Risk Managers, Princeton Insurance Company
    • Risk Management and Dental Claims, Eastern Dentists Insurance Company
    • Mock Trial Demonstration, South Jersey Medical Office Managers Society, Conventus Insurance Company
    • Seminars given at local hospitals for interns and residents, CME credits
    • "Med Mal Litigation and Social Media Records: Where is New Jersey Headed?"New Jersey Law Journal, May 19, 2014
    • "Doctor's Personal Characteristics Not Relevant to Claims of Informed Consent," The Redwoods Group Dentists Insurance Program, Monthly Article, January 2002 and Defense Digest, 2001-10, Vol. 7, No. 5
    • "Defending the Discovery Rule," Defense Digest, Spring 1993
    • Successfully defended a chiropractor with a directed verdict on informed consent and a no cause, 7-0, on standard of care. Plaintiff claimed the defendant was negligent in failing to obtain a MRI before adjusting the lumbar spine with a differential diagnosis which included a herniated or bulging disc. Plaintiff claimed increased risk of harm for foot drop, surgery, pain and suffering and alteration in work and life enjoyment.
    • Secured a directed verdict in a subacute rehab case. The plaintiffs claimed their father, who suffered from dysphagia, was negligently left unattended to choke and die in his room by the nursing staff while eating breakfast. At the close of plaintiff’s case, three motions for directed verdict were made. The court eventually agreed that the plaintiffs had not met their burden on causation with the expert testimony.
    • Represented general surgeon called in to perform emergency laparoscopic appendectomy. Five days after uneventful surgery and discharge, plaintiff is transported via medivac to a tertiary care facility for an emergent splenectomy. Defense successfully utilized literature and expert testimony both on direct and cross examination that, however rare, splenic injury can occur after laparoscopic procedure due to the insufflation of the abdomen in the presence of adhesions. Jury returned a verdict for the defense.
    • Represented mental health institution whereby a depressed and bipolar 28-year-old father and husband was receiving outpatient treatment when he locked himself in his truck, covered himself with gasoline and struck a match, only to survive. Plaintiff suffered second and third degree burns over more than 70 percent of his body. He lived severely disfigured with no facial features and no arms below the elbows. Plaintiff claimed defendant facility failed to recognize plaintiff's suicide risk and was ill-equipped to handle patients with a dual diagnosis. Successfully defended at mediation.
    • Jury returned a defense verdict for general surgeon who took an 89-year-old to surgery for treatment of diverticulitis and made the medical judgment not to remove the affected colon once the patient's vital signs took a turn for the worse during surgery. Decision to get the patient out of surgery and treat with antibiotics was not successful as the patient died within 48 hours. Defense convinced the jury that the surgeon was not negligent, rather, he exercised medical judgment in making this decision.
    • Defendant hospital granted summary judgment in a case where it was alleged the hospital failed to provide an appropriate and complete background check subsequent to employing a nurse who was later accused of killing patients within the institution. Claims dismissed on jurisdiction and lack of patient-physician relationship.
    • Obtained a defense directed verdict in a nursing home trial against a well-known plaintiffs' firm. Allegations included violations of the NJ Nursing Home statute with damages for a Stage IV decubiti, loss of dignity and requests for statutory counsel fees. Testimony from ex-employees and family members was introduced to suggest the resident was left for many hours unattended, double diapered and dirty. Plaintiffs never came off a $1 million dollar demand.

Results

Thought Leadership

The Quarterly Dose

From Bedside to Bar

August 26, 2026

Lynne N. Nahmani, Esq. Former Occupational Therapist For the Love of Medicine! After more than three decades defending health care professionals in medical malpractice cases, I still harken back to my undergraduate education as an occupational therapist. My education focused on anatomy, physiology, human behavior, and physical and cognitive development; disciplines that have shaped every single legal case I have defended. The competencies acquired are closely aligned, as the scientific analysis reflected in a S.O.A.P. note parallels the legal reasoning process. As lawyers, we must recognize the Subjective and Objective case facts, perform a legal Assessment, and develop a Plan for defense. Both professions require critical thinking, careful investigation, and a commitment to solving complex problems. Whether serving a patient or a client, the goal is the same: provide guidance and support for their particular problem. Each problem requires a scientific exercise into the underlying medicine. By understanding the medical issues involved, we are better equipped to build a strong defense, explain complex concepts to a jury, and help our clients make informed decisions about the risks, options, and strategies available for achieving the best possible outcome. Susan A. Kostkas, Esq. Registered Nurse When people ask what I do for a living, I often describe myself as a “nurse who went to law school.” Caring for others has always been a natural part of who I am. Inspired by my mother, a nurse, I began working in nursing homes as a dietary aide during high school and later as a nurse’s assistant while in college. I went on to practice as a nurse at the bedside for ten years, primarily in cardiac care, including time before, during and after law school. My nursing experience continues to influence the way I practice law every day. As a nurse, I learned to assess complex situations, prioritize competing demands, solve problems under pressure, and collaborate effectively with multidisciplinary teams. Those same skills are invaluable in litigation, where strategic decision-making, careful analysis, and teamwork are critical to achieving successful outcomes. My health care background also gives me a unique perspective when reviewing medical records and evaluating clinical issues. Being able to understand medical conditions and health care concepts helps me identify key issues related to liability, causation, and damages. Most importantly, nursing taught me the value of the human side of advocacy. The skills of active listening, empathy, and conflict resolution remind me to slow down amid the demands of litigation and focus on my client. Often, the most important insights into a case come directly from them. These same skills also help me better understand the motivations of plaintiffs and their counsel, allowing me to develop thoughtful, effective defense strategies.

The Quarterly Dose

New Leverage for Defendants: Burckhardt’s Impact on New Jersey Nursing Home Act Litigation

June 11, 2026

In a unanimous, unpublished opinion issued on February 24, 2026, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the dismissal of claims against a rehabilitation facility based on the plaintiffs’ failure to prove proximate causation—an essential element of negligence claims as well as claims brought under New Jersey’s Nursing Home Act (NHA). Although unpublished, Burckhardt v. Advanced Subacute Rehabilitation Center at Sewell, LLC provides important guidance for defendants facing nursing home malpractice and Resident-Rights Act litigation. Background of the Case The decedent, Burckhardt, was a 72-year-old resident at Advanced Subacute Rehabilitation Center at Sewell (Advanced). He had numerous medical conditions, including encephalopathy, diabetes mellitus, hypertension, urinary tract infection, respiratory failure, dysphagia, and required assistance with activities of daily living, including eating. The plaintiffs alleged that Advanced failed to follow Burckhardt’s care plan by leaving him alone in his room while eating and failing to follow his care plan.  During that time, he choked and required emergency medical intervention and was hospitalized.  Burckhardt suffered cardiac arrest and died two days later. His children, the Estate representatives, filed suit against Advanced, alleging negligence and violations of the NHA based on the alleged failure to appropriately “monitor” him during meals as care planned for. Trial Court’s Ruling After five days of testimony, the trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of Advanced, dismissing all claims. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence of proximate causation. Specifically, Advanced argued, previously via summary judgment and again at trial, that neither of the plaintiffs’ medical experts offered sufficient testimony establishing that the alleged lack of staff presence was a “but-for” or “substantial factor” cause of Burckhardt’s injuries and death, as required under New Jersey law. The trial court agreed. It emphasized that the plaintiffs’ nursing expert, Bonnie Tadrick, testified only as to the applicable standard of care and an alleged failure to monitor, but admittedly did not offer an opinion on causation. The plaintiffs’ physician expert, Dr. Hood,  testified about the mechanics of choking and identified choking as the cause of death. However, Dr. Hood failed to opine that any conduct by the Advanced staff caused, increased the risk or worsened the choking episode. Without expert testimony linking the alleged breach of care to the outcome, the court found the plaintiffs’ proofs legally insufficient and dismissed the case. Appellate Division’s Analysis The Appellate Division affirmed, carefully analyzing the causation requirements for both negligence and NHA claims. The court held that the Estate failed to establish the essential causal link between any alleged lapse in care and Burckhardt’s injury. With respect to Nurse Tadrick, the court noted that while she testified about the standard of care and the need for monitoring, she admitted she was not offering a causation opinion—and could not do so under New Jersey law, which prohibits nurses from testifying about medical causation. Her testimony did not explain how staff presence in the room would have prevented the choking, altered its severity or the ultimate outcome. As to Dr. Hood, the Appellate Division acknowledged that he was qualified to testify on causation but found his testimony inadequate. Although he explained how choking occurs and identified it as the cause of death, he never testified that the alleged absence of staff caused the choking or was a substantial factor in producing the injury. He also never opined that the staff failed to timely respond to the alleged incident. The court stressed that to reach a jury, plaintiffs were required to present evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that the absence of staff increased the risk of harm and that earlier intervention would likely have changed the outcome. In this case, the plaintiffs failed to meet that minimal threshold. Nursing Home Act Claims and Causation The Appellate Division also squarely addressed whether NHA claims require proof of causation. The Estate argued they did not. The court rejected that argument, holding that causation is required even though the NHA does not explicitly use the word. The court reasoned that damages are, by definition, compensation for harm, and recovery without a causal connection would make little sense. The court further held that the NHA claims failed for an additional reason: the Estate did not establish a separate or distinct injury attributable to the alleged resident-rights violation. Even if causation had been established, the absence of proof that the alleged NHA violation resulted in an independent injury was fatal to the claim. Significance of Burckhardt Although unpublished, Burckhardt is a meaningful decision for defendants in nursing home litigation. The Appellate Division’s clear statement that NHA claims require proof of proximate causation—and an identifiable injury tied to the alleged statutory violation—provides defendants with a powerful basis for early motion practice. The decision supports dispositive motions at the summary judgment stage where plaintiffs’ experts fail to connect alleged care deficiencies to a specific injury. It also serves as a lesson to defense counsel to renew the dispositive motion grounds at the end of a plaintiff’s case, where appropriate.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.