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Leslie M. Jenny

Office Managing Attorney

Co-Chair, Long-Term Care Liability Practice

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Portrait of Leslie M. Jenny

As a member of the Health Care Department, Leslie focuses her practice on the representation of medical professionals and providers, including physicians, hospitals and nursing home/extended care facilities. She serves as co-chair of the Long-Term Care Liability Practice, defending long-term care facilities and providers against personal injury claims. Leslie is an experienced litigator who has spent her 25-year legal career defending matters related to catastrophic medical malpractice, medical device and pharmaceutical liability, and long-term care. She has also handled veterinary negligence matters and matters before the Ohio Veterinary Medical Licensing Board.

Leslie is a Certified Professional in Healthcare Risk Management (CPHRM). In this role, she counsels and advises clients on the prevention, reduction and control of loss within their organizations. She works together with health care providers to assess, manage and update their risk management programs.

Leslie was recognized as the 2025 Cleveland "Lawyer of the Year" in the area of Litigation - Health Care by the Best Lawyers organization. She is a member of the Claims and Litigation Management Alliance, American Society for Healthcare Risk Management, DRI and several bar associations. She is a frequent speaker at events hosted by hospitals, nursing homes and professional organizations.

    • Cleveland State University College of Law (J.D., 1996)
    • Baldwin Wallace University (B.A., cum laude, 1993)
    • Ohio, 1996
    • U.S. District Court Northern District of Ohio, 2008
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, “Lawyer of the Year,” Cleveland, Litigation - Health Care (2025)
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Litigation - Health Care; Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants (2022-2027)
    • Ohio Super Lawyer Rising Star (2011-2012)
    • American Society for Healthcare Risk Management
    • Claims & Litigation Management Alliance (CLM)
    • Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association
    • Ohio State Bar Association
    • Hot Topics: Regulatory and Related Changes in Healthcare, PLUS Medical PL Symposium, Chicago, IL, March 14, 2017
    • Impact of Affordable Care Act on Future Damages, Health Care Law Seminar, Marshall Dennehey, November 9, 2016
    • Application of ACA to Reduce Future Damages, Medical Liability Insurance ExecuSummit, Uncasville, CT, September 14, 2016
    • The Affordable Care Act: Changing the Health Care System and Medical Malpractice, Health Care and Health Law Seminar, Marshall Dennehey, November 5, 2015
    • Review of Claims and Other Legal Actions Involving Unprofessional Behavior by Physicians and Staff, Risk Management/Patient Safety Seminars for 2012, Lexington Insurance Company/Chartis, 2012
    • "Admissibility of State Survey Results in Long-Term Care Litigation," Defense Digest, Vol 23, No. 4, December 2017
    • "Practical Defense Considerations: Building the Foundation to Apply the ACA to Reduce Future Damages," PLUS Journal, December 2016
    • "Court Ruling Demonstrates ACA's Power to Reduce Future Medical Expenses," Journal of Healthcare Risk Management, Volume 35, Number 4, April 2016
    • Obtained a defense verdict on behalf of a nursing home in Cuyahoga County. The case involved a 75-year-old resident who fell, fracturing his hip, and died. The medical examiner ruled that the death was accidental and due to the fall. The plaintiff claimed inadequate fall precautions and failure to assess appropriately after the fall against the skilled nursing facility, and requested punitive damages. The plaintiff’s Final Pretrial Statement demanded $7 million. After three days of trial, the judge granted a directed verdict for the defense.

Results

Thought Leadership

The Quarterly Dose

Defense Victory: Summary Judgment Granted for Corporate Nursing Home Defendants in Medical Negligence Case

May 1, 2025

Leslie M. Jenny and Gabriella M. Wittbrod, both of our Cleveland, OH office, were granted summary judgment on behalf of their corporate nursing home clients in this medical negligence case. Judge Phillip S. Naumoff of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas granted our request, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish liability, causation or viable claims against individual employees—rendering vicarious liability inapplicable under Ohio law. Sarah Miller, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Mary Holt v. Lexington Court Care Center, et al., Richland County Court of Common Pleas, 24-CV-288N, Judge Phillip S. Naumoff, was originally filed on August 4, 2021, naming corporate nursing home defendants and John Does. The John Does were later dismissed due to the expiration of the statute of limitations. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on May 17, 2023, because the remaining defendants were corporations, thus, incapable of acting on their own behalf.  The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her case and refiled on June 6, 2024. The court again dismissed the John Doe defendants for the same reason. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment for the remaining corporate defendants. In his order, Judge Naumoff held that, pursuant to Clawson v. Heights Chiropractic Physicians, L.L.C., 170 Ohio St.3d 451, 214 N.E.3d 540, 2022-Ohio-4154, an employer cannot be held vicariously liable for an employee’s alleged negligence when all claims against the employee are non-viable or have been extinguished. Judge Naumoff noted: “While it is true, the Plaintiff can file a claim against either the principal of an agent, the plaintiff cannot recover against a principal if she cannot legally recover against an agent.” In her brief in opposition to the defendants’ motion for summary judgement, the plaintiff made several arguments that were rejected by the court. First, the plaintiff claimed this was a “medical claim,” not a medical malpractice claim; thus, Clawson does not apply. The court held that Ohio law and Ohio courts make no distinction between medical claims and medical malpractice. The plaintiff also claimed that Clawson does not apply to nursing home claims, to which the court responded that it apples to any employer/employee relationship.  Judge Naumoff criticized the plaintiff’s complaint for being vague, stating that it “contains ninety-five paragraphs of repetitive allegations that throw a few scant facts and a mass of legal standards and legal conclusions together in a hodge-podge.” Further, he reviewed the plaintiff’s expert report and found the physician who reviewed the case only mentioned the nursing home and its staff—there was no mention of any of the named corporate defendants. The court also found that the plaintiff’s expert report did not address causation whatsoever.  Judge Naumoff dismissed all non-negligence claims for failure to state a claim, and he granted our request for summary judgment in favor of all the defendants on the remaining claim of medical negligence because the plaintiff failed to establish a duty of the defendants and/or causation.    The Quarterly Dose – May 2025, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Legal Updates for Long-Term Care Liability

Defense Victory: Summary Judgment Granted for Corporate Nursing Home Defendants in Medical Negligence Case

April 11, 2025

Leslie M. Jenny and Gabriella M. Wittbrod, both of our Cleveland, OH office, were granted summary judgment on behalf of their corporate nursing home clients in this medical negligence case. Judge Phillip S. Naumoff of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas granted our request, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish liability, causation, or viable claims against individual employees—rendering vicarious liability inapplicable under Ohio law. Sarah Miller, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Mary Holt v. Lexington Court Care Center, et al., Richland County Court of Common Pleas, 24-CV-288N, Judge Phillip S. Naumoff, was originally filed on August 4, 2021, naming corporate nursing home defendants and John Does. The John Does were later dismissed due to the expiration of the statute of limitations, and the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on May 17, 2023, because the remaining defendants were corporations, thus, incapable of acting on their own behalf.  The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her case and refiled on June 6, 2024. The court again dismissed the John Doe defendants for the same reason. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment for the remaining corporate defendants. In his order, Judge Naumoff held that, pursuant to Clawson v. Heights Chiropractic Physicians, L.L.C., 170 Ohio St.3d 451, 214 N.E.3d 540, 2022-Ohio-4154, an employer cannot be held vicariously liable for an employee’s alleged negligence when all claims against the employee are non-viable or have been extinguished. Judge Naumoff noted: “While it is true, the Plaintiff can file a claim against either the principal of an agent, the Plaintiff cannot recover against a principal if she cannot legally recover against an agent.” In her brief in opposition to the defendants’ motion for summary judgement, the plaintiff made several arguments that were rejected by the court. First, the plaintiff claimed this was a “medical claim,” not a medical malpractice claim and, thus, Clawson does not apply. The court held that Ohio law and Ohio courts make no distinction between medical claims and medical malpractice. The plaintiff also claimed that Clawson does not apply to nursing home claims, to which the court responded that Clawson apples to any employer/employee relationship.  Judge Naumoff criticized the plaintiff’s complaint for being vague, stating that it “contains ninety-five paragraphs of repetitive allegations that throw a few scant facts and a mass of legal standards and legal conclusions together in a hodge-podge.” Further, he reviewed the plaintiff’s expert report and found the physician who reviewed the case only mentioned the nursing home and its staff—there was no mention of any of the named corporate defendants. The court also found that the plaintiff’s expert report did not address causation whatsoever.  Judge Naumoff dismissed all non-negligence claims for failure to state a claim, and he granted our request for summary judgment in favor of all the defendants on the remaining claim of medical negligence because the plaintiff failed to establish a duty of the defendants and/or causation.    Legal Updates for Long-Term Care Liability – April 11, 2025, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.