.

Defense Digest

Delaware ‘Meet and Confer’ Rule Requires Human Contact??!

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 2, June 2023

June 1, 2023

by Lisa M. Grubb

Key Points:

  • The Superior Court of Delaware’s “meet and confer” requirement is mandated by the notice provision articulated in Del. R. Civ. P. Super. Ct. 37(a).
  • The Rule has long been interpreted by counsel to require only an email or letter to opposing counsel attempting to quash a discovery dispute prior to filing motions and a request for court resolution of same.
  • More recently, the Superior Court of Delaware is trending toward requiring actual in-person and/or telephonic communications amongst counsel in an attempt to resolve discovery disputes before agreeing to intervene to hear and decide such matters on behalf of the litigants.
  • It is unclear whether this new trend is due to more recent docket backlogs and, therefore, temporary or if it will be adopted by other members of the Superior Court of Delaware judiciary.

Delaware courts have long recognized the obligation of the parties to a civil action to engage in a meaningful “meet and confer” conference in an attempt to resolve discovery disputes prior to such issues being heard and decided upon by the bench. Historically, the “meet and confer” obligation has been vigorously enforced and adopted by the Delaware Court of Chancery, See Danenberg v. Fitracks, Inc., 58 A.3d 991, 1003 (Del. Ch. 2012) (Delaware lawyers “have a duty to meet and confer in a good faith effort to resolve differences.”), while the Superior Court of Delaware has made only passing reference to the same, without fully defining the obligations of the parties. The primary source of guidance for litigants in the Superior Court is enumerated in the language set forth in Delaware Rule of Civil Procedure for the Superior Court of Delaware, Rule 37, which states, in pertinent part:

Rule 37 - Failure to make discovery: Sanctions; 
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. - A party, upon reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order compelling discovery as follows…” 

Del. R. Civ. P. Super. Ct. 37(a) (emphasis added).

Previously, counsel for a party involved in a discovery dispute were considered to have met their “meet and confer” obligation by simply attempting communication with opposing counsel by letter, email, or other correspondence setting forth the alleged discovery deficiencies. In Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. AIU Ins. Co., 2014 WL 4724571, at *1 (Del. Super. Sept. 19, 2014), for example, the Superior Court held that a party’s mere attempt to discuss deposition dates with opposing counsel satisfied their “meet and confer” requirement. However, more recently, the Superior Court seems to be making a case for more substantial communications on the part of the litigants in an effort to resolve discovery disputes on their own as a prerequisite to being heard by the court.

In Megen Cummings v. Ronald James Landry, et al., C.A. No. N18C-07-266 ALR (Del. Super. June 28, 2021), the plaintiff filed a motion to compel certain requested documents, as well as more sufficient answers to her formal written discovery demands. In conjunction with her motion, the plaintiff also filed a notice of hearing, scheduling the motion to be presented to the court via oral argument. In a letter opinion, dated June 28, 2021, the court declined to hear oral argument on the plaintiff’s motion and the defendant’s response in opposition thereto, stating:

[i]t is plain from the record that the parties have not satisfied their obligation to engage in a meaningful meet and confer before resorting to motion practice. To be clear: a meet and confer does not mean sending an email or a letter. Meeting and conferring requires counsel to communicate by phone or in person. The parties’ written submissions reflect that a candid discussion between counsel may resolve most, if not all, of the outstanding issues. If, after complying with the obligation to meet and confer, there are discovery issues that remain in dispute, the Plaintiff may refile her Motion. At this time, the Motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and the hearing scheduled for July 1, 2021, is CANCELLED. Id.

The court’s sentiments represent the first time in the history of Superior Court of Delaware jurisprudence where the court specifically outlined that the “meet and confer” obligation requires more than just an email or letter attempt. The court required a communication by phone or in person wherein meaningful discussions must be had. 

In reviewing decisions of the Superior Court of Delaware in certain discovery disputes since Cummings, it seems that the holding set forth therein is one that is gaining traction. In De Lage Landen Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Spinal Techs., LLC, 2021 WL 3520629, at *7 (Del. Super. Aug. 10, 2021) court declined to hear oral argument on a party’s motion to quash and a motion for protective order until such time as the parties had had the opportunity to “meet and confer” to discuss the scope of certain discovery demands. In Tijanna Richardson v. Stanley Access Technologies, C.A. No. N21C-10-115 AML (Del. Super. March 3, 2022), the court declined to hear oral argument on the sufficiency of a party’s answers and responses to demands for formal written discovery until after such time as the parties could “meet and confer” to discuss same. The court in Legion Partners Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Underwriters at Lloyds London, 2022 WL 289940, at *2 (Del. Super. Jan. 31, 2022) issued a similar ruling. It held that the issue as to whether or not an award of attorney’s fees was appropriate was not yet ripe because the parties had yet to engage in a meaningful “meet and confer” conference to discuss the potential award.

It is evident that the Superior Court bench is trending toward interpreting Rule 37 to require more than a simple written attempt to contact opposing counsel regarding a discovery dispute prior to involving the court. What remains to be seen is whether this required “human contact” will continue as the docket (hopefully) becomes less congested and whether this interpretation will be adopted by other members of the Superior Court.
 
*Lisa is a shareholder in our Wilmington, Delaware, office. She can be reached at 302.552.4339 or lmgrubb@mdwcg.com.

 

 

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 2, June 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.