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Christopher J. Conrad

Co-Chair, Special Education Law Practice Group

Portrait of Christopher J. Conrad

Chris is a member of the firm's Professional Liability Department, and he devotes a significant portion of his practice to the representation and defense of school districts, intermediate units, career and technology centers and other academic institutions in all manner of employment, civil rights and special education litigation. As a member of the Professional Liability Defense Federation, Chris currently serves as Vice Chair of the Municipal, School Leaders and Miscellaneous Liability Committee.

Chris is Co-Chair of the firm’s Special Education Law Practice Group, and his special education practice focuses on counseling clients and defending due process litigation involving a wide range of issues including claims of child find violations, denial of a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE), manifestation determinations and student discipline, appropriate educational programming and placement, and parents seeking private school placement at public expense. Chris has presented on a number of special education topics for school districts as well as for PBI’s Exceptional Children Conference, Lehigh University’s Special Education Law Conference and the National Business Institute.

Chris also represents public and private employers and their directors, officers, management and employees, in a variety of employment practices litigation under federal and state law, including defending claims of harassment, discrimination and retaliation, as well as whistleblower claims.

Additionally, Chris represents and defends licensed and certified professionals, including real estate agents and brokers, real estate appraisers, insurance agents and brokers, home inspectors, architects, engineers, surveyors, attorneys and accountants in E&O and related matters throughout Pennsylvania and Maryland.

Chris is a graduate of The Pennsylvania State University and The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law. During law school, Chris clerked for the Hon. Robert J. Woodside in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Chris also served as judicial law clerk for the Hon. Ronald B. Graves in the Civil Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey.

Chris is a certified mediator, and he works as a pro bono mediator for the Middle District of Pennsylvania mediation program and the Cumberland County Bar Association Fee Dispute Committee. For many years, Chris served as an adjunct instructor at the Penn State Dickinson School of Law for its Problem Solving I/ Law Practice I – Critical Skills course, and he assisted Dickinson’s National Mock Trial Team as both a judge and sparring attorney. Chris also devotes a portion of his time as a volunteer for the Wills for Heroes Program. Additionally, Chris is a Member of the Knights of Columbus Council 13100 and Saint Martin’s Assembly 2708.

    • Penn State Dickinson Law (J.D., 2001)
    • The Pennsylvania State University (B.A., 1998)
    • New Jersey, 2001
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2001
    • Pennsylvania, 2006
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2006
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2007
    • Maryland, 2018
    • U.S. District Court District of Maryland, 2018
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania, 2018
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 2021
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • Susquehanna Valley Select Lawyers™ (2014)
    • Cumberland County Bar Association, Member, Fee Dispute Committee
    • Knights of Columbus Council 13100 and Saint Martin’s Assembly 2708
    • Middle District of Pennsylvania Chapter of the Federal Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Assocation, Legal Services for Exceptional Children Committee
    • Professional Liability Defense Federation, Vice Chair, Municipal, School Leaders and Miscellaneous Liability Committee
    • Saint Thomas More Society
    • Certified Mediator, U.S. District Court, Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • Exploring Immunity Defenses in Government Liability Cases, Professional Liability Defense Federation (PLDF) 2026 Annual Meeting, September 24, 2026
    • Civil Rights Litigation, The Courts and the Community: An Educational Series for the Public, April 1, 2026
    • Left Behind? Today’s U.S. Department of Education and the Potential Impact on Special Education and Disability Services, PBI’s Exceptional Children Conference. October 24, 2025
    • Hot Topics in Employment Law, PBA Law Firm Administrators Conference, April 30, 2025
    • From Complaint to Appeal And Beyond: Litigating a Special Education Due Process Case, PBI Exceptional Children Conference, October 18, 2024.
    • UNcivil Discourse: The 1st Amendment and Regulating Speech at Public School Board Meetings, Professional Liability Defense Federation (PLDF) 2024 Annual Meeting, September 26, 2024
    • Extended School Year – It's Not Summer School, PBI Exceptional Children Conference, October 13, 2023
    • Special Education Litigation: Best Practices for Avoiding Liability, and Strategies for a Successful Defense, Professional Liability Defense Federation Annual Meeting, September 2022
    • Why Schools Need to Be Thinking About Title IX: Effectively Navigating the Evolving Legal Issues Surrounding Gender Identity, Professional Liability Defense Federation Annual Meeting, October 2021
    • Federal Law and the Art of Email Maintenance: When Must Emails Be Produced Under IDEA and FERPA, PBI Exceptional Children Conference, October 2019
    • Navigating the Bermuda Triangle: The Intersection of Workers' Compensation, the FMLA and the ADA, County Commissioners Association of Pennsylvania, March 2019
    • The Risks of Failing to Report School Leaders Liability Claims, Pennsylvania Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, October 2017
    • The Thin Blue Line in School, Lehigh University Special Education Law Conference, May 2017
    • Dyslexia: Much More Than What We Thought, Lehigh University Special Education Law Conference, May 2016 
    • Advanced Functional Behavior Assessments and Behavior Support Plans, PBI Exceptional Children Conference, October 2015
    • Successfully Handling Disciplinary Actions for Special Needs Students, National Business Institute, December 2014
    • Best Practices for Technology and Social Media in the Workplace, Estate Planning Council of Central Pennsylvania, Inc., February 2014
    • Insurance Agents and Brokers Best Claims Practices in Claims Administration and Underwriting, Liberty Mutual Insurance, December 2013
    • Avoiding Liability in Special Education, Central Dauphin School District, August 2013
    • PBA Malpractice Avoidance Program, Perry County Bar Association, April 2013
    • Avoiding Legal Malpractice, PBA Malpractice Avoidance Program, Adams County Bar Association, April 2012
    • Avoiding Liability as Sellers' Agents in Residential Real Estate Transactions, Particularly with Regard to the Disclosure of Material Defects in the Property, Educational Development School of Real Estate, March 2012
    • Malpractice Avoidance Program, PBA Malpractice Avoidance Program, Mifflin and Juniata County Bar Associations, October 2011
    • PBA Malpractice Avoidance Program, Dauphin County Bar Association, August 2011
    • Avoiding Liability in Special Education, Pottsville Area School District, August 2011
    • Avoiding Liability in Special Education, Palmyra Area School District, August 2010
    • “Let’s Give a Cheer for Free Speech: U.S. Supreme Court Holds School District Cannot Discipline Cheerleader for Off-Campus Snapchat Posts,” Professional Liability Defense Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2021
    • "Bullies In the Schoolyard and Beyond: Avoiding and Defending Federal Bullying Claims Against Schools and School Leaders," Professional Liability Defense Quarterly, Vol. 13, Issue 1, 2021
    • "Educating Pa.'s Special Needs Students During the COVID-19 Pandemic," The Legal Intelligencer, May, 2020
    • “This Is Exhausting! Parents of Special Needs Children Who Allege Educational Harm Must Exhaust Administrative Remedies Under the IDEA Before Filing Lawsuit," Lorman, August 2017 
    • “This Is Exhausting! Parents of Special Needs Children Who Allege Educational Harm Must Exhaust Administrative Remedies Under the IDEA Before Filing Lawsuit,” Defense Digest, Vol. 23, No. 1, March 2017
    • "The IDEA Statute of Limitations (Finally!) Explained," Defense Digest, Vol. 21, No. 4, December 2015
    • "Does At-Will Employment Still Exist in Pennsylvania?," The Legal Intelligencer, Labor & Employment Supplement, June 24, 2014
    • "State Courts May Exercise Jurisdiction in Legal Malpractice Actions Arising Out of Patent Litigation," Defense Digest, Vol. 19, No. 2, June 2013
    • "The Third Circuit Holds That Private Employers Are Not Prohibited By Bankruptcy Code From Denying Employment To Individuals Who Previously Filed For Bankruptcy," Defense Digest, Vol. 17, No. 2, June, 2011
    • "Forum The Bell Tolls: Plaintiffs Lose Challenge To Validity Of Forum Selection Clause In Their Auto Insurance Policy," Defense Digest, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2010
    • "Ninth Circuit Holds Private Tuition Is Reimbursable Under IDEA Even Though Student Never Received Special Education From School District," Defense Digest, Vol. 14, No. 4, December, 2008
    • "Remedies for Disabled Students Curtailed," New Jersey Law Journal, Vol. CXCI, No. 2, Jan. 14, 2008
    • "School's Out: The Third Circuit Precludes Use of 42 U.S.C. 1983 to Remedy Violations of IDEA and the Rehabilitation Act," Defense Digest, Vol. 13, No. 3, September, 2007
    • "Pennsylvania Superior Court Limits Duty Of Insurance Brokers," Defense Digest, Vol. 12, No. 4, December, 2006
    • Godfrey v. Southern York County School District, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96736 (M.D. Pa. 2019) (summary judgment in favor of school district dismissing ADEA age discrimination and retaliation claims by former teacher)
    • Defense verdict following jury trial representing insurance agency and its owner in case involving claims of professional negligence.
    • K.E. v. Lincoln Intermediate Unit, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163489 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (summary judgment dismissing claims against intermediate unit by former student alleging Title IX and 1983 civil rights violations)
    • Rohrbaugh v. Lincoln Intermediate Unit, 255 F. Supp. 3d 589 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (dismissal of claims against intermediate unit by student under 504 of Rehabilitation Act of 1973 for failure to exhaust administrative remedies
    • Judge v. Shikellamy School District, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65694 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (summary judgment dismissing claims by former principal alleging violation of Procedural Due Process rights, breach of employment contract and constructive discharge).
    • Defense award at arbitration in declaratory judgment action brought against condominium association.
    • A.V. v. Capital Area Intermediate Unit, ODR File No. 18090-1617 (successful defense of intermediate unit in special education due process hearing)
    • Hollinghead v. York City Sewer Authority, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43202 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (Summary judgment dismissing Title VII, PHRA and 1983 claims by a City employees alleging race discrimination and retaliation).
    • Schuback v. Law Office of Phillip S. VanEmbden, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18379 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (Judgment on the pleadings in favor of attorneys sued for alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act).
    • Thomas v. Thomas, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83320 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (Dismissal of 14th Amendment claims against an attorney for alleged abuse of process and wrongful use of civil proceedings).
    • Munir v. Pottsville Area School District, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82966 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (Summary judgment dismissing action by parent against school district under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and Rehabilitation Act).
    • Hocker v. CitiMortgage, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76867 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (Dismissal of claims against mortgage lender under the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act by alleged victim of a housing fraud scam).
    • Baltimore v. Harrisburg Parking Authority, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59508 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (Summary judgment dismissing action against parking authority by former employee who claimed she was terminated from her employment in violation of her 1st and 14th Amendment rights).
    • Gregory v. Derry Township School District, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1875 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (Summary judgment dismissing claims against school district, administrators and school board members in action by former teacher who alleged she was terminated from her employment in violation of her federal civil rights).
    • Walsh v. Dallastown Area School District, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71266 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (Summary judgment dismissing claims by parent and students against school district, administrators and staff members of claims brought under federal and state wiretap laws and 4th Amendment).
    • Defense award at arbitration in negligence action brought against insurance agency and owners of the agency.

Results

Summary Judgment Obtained for a Homeowners’ Association

We secured summary judgment for a homeowners’ association. The plaintiff owned an apartment in a planned community and sought to drill a hole through the exterior wall of the building to vent an HVAC unit. The HOA denied his request, and the plaintiff asserted claims of negligence and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealings, alleging that the HOA treated him unfairly by denying his request. Despite providing numerous photos of other holes through the exterior wall of the building, the plaintiff admitted during his deposition that they did not know whether the HOA had ever permitted another unit owner to drill a hole in the exterior wall. We successfully argued that the plaintiff could not put forth any evidence demonstrating unfair treatment, or that the request had been denied in bad faith. 

Secured Dismissal of a Suit Against a Dauphin County School District

We achieved dismissal of a suit against a school district by way of preliminary objections. The Dauphin County case involved allegations that the district deprived the plaintiffs of certain educational rights, premised on procedural due process violations, negligence and subornation of perjury. Preliminary objections were filed to the plaintiffs’ original complaint on both procedural and substantive grounds. Following the filing of an amended complaint and additional preliminary objections on similar grounds, argument was held. As a result, the court agreed with the defendant and dismissed the plaintiffs’ amended complaint with prejudice. 

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Special Education Law

The Office for Dispute Resolution’s Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2024 Details Due Process Filings, Bureau of Special Education Complaints

March 5, 2026

In late November 2025, the Office for Dispute Resolution (ODR) released its annual report for fiscal year 2024 (July 1, 2024 - June 30, 2025).  In the report, the ODR provided detailed information about due process litigation in Pennsylvania for the entire fiscal year. In all, there were 900 requests for due process filed with ODR, a slight decrease from fiscal year 2023, which saw 958 cases filed. A majority of the cases were filed on behalf of parents/guardians/students by legal counsel, although 112 cases were filed pro se. Most of the 900 cases involved claims under the IDEA/Chapter 14 for school-age/non-gifted students. Only 14 cases were filed solely under Section 504/Chapter 15. As has been the case for the past 20 years, due process litigation was most active in the City of Philadelphia and the southeastern Pennsylvania counties approximate to the city. There were 236 requests for due process filed within Philadelphia Intermediate Unit 26 alone.  More than 50 requests for due process were filed within Montgomery County Intermediate Unit 23 (84), Delaware County Intermediate Unit 25 (76), and Bucks County Intermediate Unit 22 (53). The only other intermediate units outside southeastern Pennsylvania that saw more than 50 due process filings were the Northeastern Educational Intermediate Unit 19 (65) and the Allegheny Intermediate Unit 3 (53). For all school-age/non-gifted cases, the most predominant issue raised in the due process filings involved the IEP (development/implementation), with 442 occurrences. The next most prevalent issue was compensatory education (425 occurrences) followed by school evaluations (192 occurrences). Although 900 due process cases were filed during fiscal year 2024, only 55 resulted in a written hearing officer decision. Most of the cases ended in a negotiated resolution, either outside of the IDEA resolution period (357 cases) or during the resolution period (214 cases).  Nearly 150 cases were either dismissed outright (24 cases) or voluntarily withdrawn (123 cases).  A significant number of cases filed in fiscal year 2024 remained active at of the end of the fiscal year and carried over into the next fiscal year (127 cases).  Causes of the 24 case dismissals included a lack of hearing officer jurisdiction (10 cases), improper party name (4), res judicata/mootness (4), a case being consolidated with another case (4) or no response from the parent (2). As to the 55 cases in which a hearing officer issued a written decision, the hearing officer found for the LEA in 21 cases, for the parent in 18 cases, and for both the parent and LEA in 16 cases. Notably, of these 55 cases, 21 involved pro se litigants.  The hearing officer found for the LEA in 14 of the pro se cases and for the parent/ guardian in 4 of the cases. In three of the pro se cases, the hearing officer found for the parent in part and the LEA in part. Also of note, during fiscal year 2024,19 cases were appealed to federal court, and only one case was appealed to state court. Only four of these appeals involved due process requests filed during fiscal year 2024, as the balance of the due process cases at issue were filed prior to 2024. Of the appeals filed during fiscal year 2024, parents were responsible for 75% of the filings.  Three of the appeals dealt solely with the issue of attorney fees. At the close of fiscal year 2024, 17 of the 20 cases were still pending on appeal. One case was dismissed following a settlement, another based upon the final resolution of a separate but related matter, and a third following a court-approved settlement. In that instance, the case was marked settled on the docket, and the court vacated its prior order remanding the case to the hearing officer.  Thirteen of the federal court appeals were filed with the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, three with the Middle District of Pennsylvania, and three with the Western District of Pennsylvania. ODR also reported on compliance complaints filed with the Bureau of Special Education (BSE), including complaints under Section 504/Chapter 15. In all, 179 complaints were filed with BSE.  Of these cases, 50 resolved with a finding by BSE of LEA non-compliance. Seven complaints were dismissed or held in abeyance as the issues were being addressed in a due process complaint and 68 of the complaints were either resolved, withdrawn, or dismissed for not falling within the jurisdiction of the BSE. For more information on ODR’s Annual Report, see: https://odr-pa.us12.list-manage.com/track/click?u=e6553c8850beb32e3c7ea9c8c&id=a1449490fc&e=bf4ea9f318

Legal Updates for Real Estate E&O Liability

When Is a Symbol of Hate Not a Material Defect in Property?

February 1, 2026

Daniel and Lynn Rae Wentworth purchased a home in Beaver County, Pennsylvania from Juergen Steinmetz. According to their complaint, after moving into the home, the Wentworths discovered a swastika under rugs in the basement and what they perceived to be a Nazi eagle incorporated into the floor tile pattern. The Wentworths claimed that had they previously known about the symbols in the floor tile, they would not have purchased the home. They also alleged that they could not be expected to live in the home in that condition, nor could they sell the home, and that it would cost $30,000.00 to remove the symbols and replace the floor tile. The Wentworths filed suit against Steinmetz under the Pennsylvania Real Estate Seller Disclosure Law (RESDL), alleging he failed to disclose a “material defect” in the property prior to closing, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Steinmetz filed preliminary objections in response to the complaint denying creating the floor pattern in support of Nazism. Steinmetz argued that the swastika is an ancient symbol embraced by various world cultures, and that its existence predates use by the Nazis. Yet, the Wentworths argued that since the swastika in the floor, “styled in the fashion that [was] used by the Nazis,” was situated in such close proximity to the German eagle, no reasonable person could believe the symbols were intended to be imagery referencing any other culture. For purposes of resolving the preliminary objections, the court set aside Steinmetz’s “subjective intent” and accepted the Wentworths’ allegations that these were indeed pro-Nazi symbols, and would be viewed as such to guests in the home or to prospective buyers. Steinmetz also argued that even accepting the Wentworths’ allegations as true, the symbols in the floor tile were not a “material defect” that he was required to disclose to prospective buyers. Relying in part on Milliken v. Jacono, 103 A. 3d 806 (Pa. 2014), he argued that attributes of a property giving rise to a psychological stigma, like the alleged Nazi symbols in the floor, are not material defects required to be disclosed under the RESDL. The trial court agreed, and found that Milliken foreclosed the Wentworths’ claims. Although the trial court recognized the imagery in the floor was “disturbing,” it was still merely a cosmetic flaw that could be covered up, and it was not a physical or structural property that posed an unreasonable risk or an impediment to the use and enjoyment of the property. The trial court sustained the preliminary objections and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court revisited Milliken, considering whether the occurrence of a murder and suicide in a home was an undisclosed material defect justifying a cause of action. The Supreme Court in Milliken concluded it was not, reasoning the deaths did “not constitute an actionable material defect,” and in so holding noted the myriad “traumatizing events that could occur on a property” and that “[e]fforts to define those that warrant mandatory disclosure would be a Sisyphean task.” Milliken, 103 A. 3d at 807, 810. The Superior Court agreed and concluded the Wentworths’ claims failed “because they suffer from the same lack of an objectively-quantifiable flaw as the one alleged in Milliken.” The Superior Court further reasoned: In each scenario, the existence, and degree, of the defect is in the eye of the beholder. Certainly, a significant portion of homebuyers would eschew a house with a crude mosaic of Nazi iconography in its basement. Yet there is, sadly but undeniably, a segment of the population who would deem it an asset to the property. Further, even among the majority of prospective buyers who would not welcome having hate symbols adorning their basement floor, the degree to which the images impacted the value of the property would inevitably vary from person to person. Relying on Milliken, the Superior Court noted, “that condition of the property constituting a material defect must be one that not only substantially impacts the value of the real estate, but lends itself to recognition and quantification by objective standards.” Although the Superior Court was sensitive to “the Wentworths’ outrage [and] their concern that the existence of the images could taint them as Nazi supporters,” still the court found “that that the symbols on the Wentworths’ otherwise sound and functional tile floor do not constitute a material defect that Steinmetz had a duty to disclose.” The decision of the trial court was affirmed.  Although the seller in Wentworth was successful in defending the lawsuit, real estate professionals should still discuss with their seller clients whether there may be a hidden aesthetic characteristic in the home that a potential buyer might find to be offensive, particularly if it is not discovered until after closing. While such a characteristic ultimately may not arise to a “material defect” under the RESDL, it still could lead to costly litigation that the seller (and perhaps the seller’s agent and broker) might have to defend.  Real estate professionals may wish to advise their seller clients to remove any such hidden characteristic even before the property is listed for sale. This will help to avoid needless litigation down the road and also likely will expand the pool of potential buyers. For further reading, see: Wentworth v. Steinmetz, 2025 PA Super 253, --- A. 3d --- (2025).

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.