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Christopher J. Conrad

Co-Chair, Special Education Law Practice Group

Portrait of Christopher J. Conrad

Chris is a member of the firm's Professional Liability Department, and he devotes a significant portion of his practice to the representation and defense of school districts, intermediate units, career and technology centers and other academic institutions in all manner of employment, civil rights and special education litigation. As a member of the Professional Liability Defense Federation, Chris currently serves as Vice Chair of the Municipal, School Leaders and Miscellaneous Liability Committee.

Chris is Co-Chair of the firm’s Special Education Law Practice Group, and his special education practice focuses on counseling clients and defending due process litigation involving a wide range of issues including claims of child find violations, denial of a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE), manifestation determinations and student discipline, appropriate educational programming and placement, and parents seeking private school placement at public expense. Chris has presented on a number of special education topics for school districts as well as for PBI’s Exceptional Children Conference, Lehigh University’s Special Education Law Conference and the National Business Institute.

Chris also represents public and private employers and their directors, officers, management and employees, in a variety of employment practices litigation under federal and state law, including defending claims of harassment, discrimination and retaliation, as well as whistleblower claims.

Additionally, Chris represents and defends licensed and certified professionals, including real estate agents and brokers, real estate appraisers, insurance agents and brokers, home inspectors, architects, engineers, surveyors, attorneys and accountants in E&O and related matters throughout Pennsylvania and Maryland.

Chris is a graduate of The Pennsylvania State University and The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law. During law school, Chris clerked for the Hon. Robert J. Woodside in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Chris also served as judicial law clerk for the Hon. Ronald B. Graves in the Civil Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey.

Chris is a certified mediator, and he works as a pro bono mediator for the Middle District of Pennsylvania mediation program and the Cumberland County Bar Association Fee Dispute Committee. For many years, Chris served as an adjunct instructor at the Penn State Dickinson School of Law for its Problem Solving I/ Law Practice I – Critical Skills course, and he assisted Dickinson’s National Mock Trial Team as both a judge and sparring attorney. Chris also devotes a portion of his time as a volunteer for the Wills for Heroes Program. Additionally, Chris is a Member of the Knights of Columbus Council 13100 and Saint Martin’s Assembly 2708.

    • Penn State Dickinson Law (J.D., 2001)
    • The Pennsylvania State University (B.A., 1998)
    • New Jersey, 2001
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2001
    • Pennsylvania, 2006
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2006
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2007
    • Maryland, 2018
    • U.S. District Court District of Maryland, 2018
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania, 2018
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 2021
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • Susquehanna Valley Select Lawyers™ (2014)
    • Cumberland County Bar Association, Member, Fee Dispute Committee
    • Knights of Columbus Council 13100 and Saint Martin’s Assembly 2708
    • Middle District of Pennsylvania Chapter of the Federal Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Assocation, Legal Services for Exceptional Children Committee
    • Professional Liability Defense Federation, Vice Chair, Municipal, School Leaders and Miscellaneous Liability Committee
    • Saint Thomas More Society
    • Certified Mediator, U.S. District Court, Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • Exploring Immunity Defenses in Government Liability Cases, Professional Liability Defense Federation (PLDF) 2026 Annual Meeting, September 24, 2026
    • Civil Rights Litigation, The Courts and the Community: An Educational Series for the Public, April 1, 2026
    • Left Behind? Today’s U.S. Department of Education and the Potential Impact on Special Education and Disability Services, PBI’s Exceptional Children Conference. October 24, 2025
    • Hot Topics in Employment Law, PBA Law Firm Administrators Conference, April 30, 2025
    • From Complaint to Appeal And Beyond: Litigating a Special Education Due Process Case, PBI Exceptional Children Conference, October 18, 2024.
    • UNcivil Discourse: The 1st Amendment and Regulating Speech at Public School Board Meetings, Professional Liability Defense Federation (PLDF) 2024 Annual Meeting, September 26, 2024
    • Extended School Year – It's Not Summer School, PBI Exceptional Children Conference, October 13, 2023
    • Special Education Litigation: Best Practices for Avoiding Liability, and Strategies for a Successful Defense, Professional Liability Defense Federation Annual Meeting, September 2022
    • Why Schools Need to Be Thinking About Title IX: Effectively Navigating the Evolving Legal Issues Surrounding Gender Identity, Professional Liability Defense Federation Annual Meeting, October 2021
    • Federal Law and the Art of Email Maintenance: When Must Emails Be Produced Under IDEA and FERPA, PBI Exceptional Children Conference, October 2019
    • Navigating the Bermuda Triangle: The Intersection of Workers' Compensation, the FMLA and the ADA, County Commissioners Association of Pennsylvania, March 2019
    • The Risks of Failing to Report School Leaders Liability Claims, Pennsylvania Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, October 2017
    • The Thin Blue Line in School, Lehigh University Special Education Law Conference, May 2017
    • Dyslexia: Much More Than What We Thought, Lehigh University Special Education Law Conference, May 2016 
    • Advanced Functional Behavior Assessments and Behavior Support Plans, PBI Exceptional Children Conference, October 2015
    • Successfully Handling Disciplinary Actions for Special Needs Students, National Business Institute, December 2014
    • Best Practices for Technology and Social Media in the Workplace, Estate Planning Council of Central Pennsylvania, Inc., February 2014
    • Insurance Agents and Brokers Best Claims Practices in Claims Administration and Underwriting, Liberty Mutual Insurance, December 2013
    • Avoiding Liability in Special Education, Central Dauphin School District, August 2013
    • PBA Malpractice Avoidance Program, Perry County Bar Association, April 2013
    • Avoiding Legal Malpractice, PBA Malpractice Avoidance Program, Adams County Bar Association, April 2012
    • Avoiding Liability as Sellers' Agents in Residential Real Estate Transactions, Particularly with Regard to the Disclosure of Material Defects in the Property, Educational Development School of Real Estate, March 2012
    • Malpractice Avoidance Program, PBA Malpractice Avoidance Program, Mifflin and Juniata County Bar Associations, October 2011
    • PBA Malpractice Avoidance Program, Dauphin County Bar Association, August 2011
    • Avoiding Liability in Special Education, Pottsville Area School District, August 2011
    • Avoiding Liability in Special Education, Palmyra Area School District, August 2010
    • “Let’s Give a Cheer for Free Speech: U.S. Supreme Court Holds School District Cannot Discipline Cheerleader for Off-Campus Snapchat Posts,” Professional Liability Defense Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2021
    • "Bullies In the Schoolyard and Beyond: Avoiding and Defending Federal Bullying Claims Against Schools and School Leaders," Professional Liability Defense Quarterly, Vol. 13, Issue 1, 2021
    • "Educating Pa.'s Special Needs Students During the COVID-19 Pandemic," The Legal Intelligencer, May, 2020
    • “This Is Exhausting! Parents of Special Needs Children Who Allege Educational Harm Must Exhaust Administrative Remedies Under the IDEA Before Filing Lawsuit," Lorman, August 2017 
    • “This Is Exhausting! Parents of Special Needs Children Who Allege Educational Harm Must Exhaust Administrative Remedies Under the IDEA Before Filing Lawsuit,” Defense Digest, Vol. 23, No. 1, March 2017
    • "The IDEA Statute of Limitations (Finally!) Explained," Defense Digest, Vol. 21, No. 4, December 2015
    • "Does At-Will Employment Still Exist in Pennsylvania?," The Legal Intelligencer, Labor & Employment Supplement, June 24, 2014
    • "State Courts May Exercise Jurisdiction in Legal Malpractice Actions Arising Out of Patent Litigation," Defense Digest, Vol. 19, No. 2, June 2013
    • "The Third Circuit Holds That Private Employers Are Not Prohibited By Bankruptcy Code From Denying Employment To Individuals Who Previously Filed For Bankruptcy," Defense Digest, Vol. 17, No. 2, June, 2011
    • "Forum The Bell Tolls: Plaintiffs Lose Challenge To Validity Of Forum Selection Clause In Their Auto Insurance Policy," Defense Digest, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2010
    • "Ninth Circuit Holds Private Tuition Is Reimbursable Under IDEA Even Though Student Never Received Special Education From School District," Defense Digest, Vol. 14, No. 4, December, 2008
    • "Remedies for Disabled Students Curtailed," New Jersey Law Journal, Vol. CXCI, No. 2, Jan. 14, 2008
    • "School's Out: The Third Circuit Precludes Use of 42 U.S.C. 1983 to Remedy Violations of IDEA and the Rehabilitation Act," Defense Digest, Vol. 13, No. 3, September, 2007
    • "Pennsylvania Superior Court Limits Duty Of Insurance Brokers," Defense Digest, Vol. 12, No. 4, December, 2006
    • Godfrey v. Southern York County School District, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96736 (M.D. Pa. 2019) (summary judgment in favor of school district dismissing ADEA age discrimination and retaliation claims by former teacher)
    • Defense verdict following jury trial representing insurance agency and its owner in case involving claims of professional negligence.
    • K.E. v. Lincoln Intermediate Unit, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163489 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (summary judgment dismissing claims against intermediate unit by former student alleging Title IX and 1983 civil rights violations)
    • Rohrbaugh v. Lincoln Intermediate Unit, 255 F. Supp. 3d 589 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (dismissal of claims against intermediate unit by student under 504 of Rehabilitation Act of 1973 for failure to exhaust administrative remedies
    • Judge v. Shikellamy School District, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65694 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (summary judgment dismissing claims by former principal alleging violation of Procedural Due Process rights, breach of employment contract and constructive discharge).
    • Defense award at arbitration in declaratory judgment action brought against condominium association.
    • A.V. v. Capital Area Intermediate Unit, ODR File No. 18090-1617 (successful defense of intermediate unit in special education due process hearing)
    • Hollinghead v. York City Sewer Authority, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43202 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (Summary judgment dismissing Title VII, PHRA and 1983 claims by a City employees alleging race discrimination and retaliation).
    • Schuback v. Law Office of Phillip S. VanEmbden, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18379 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (Judgment on the pleadings in favor of attorneys sued for alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act).
    • Thomas v. Thomas, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83320 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (Dismissal of 14th Amendment claims against an attorney for alleged abuse of process and wrongful use of civil proceedings).
    • Munir v. Pottsville Area School District, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82966 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (Summary judgment dismissing action by parent against school district under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and Rehabilitation Act).
    • Hocker v. CitiMortgage, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76867 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (Dismissal of claims against mortgage lender under the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act by alleged victim of a housing fraud scam).
    • Baltimore v. Harrisburg Parking Authority, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59508 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (Summary judgment dismissing action against parking authority by former employee who claimed she was terminated from her employment in violation of her 1st and 14th Amendment rights).
    • Gregory v. Derry Township School District, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1875 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (Summary judgment dismissing claims against school district, administrators and school board members in action by former teacher who alleged she was terminated from her employment in violation of her federal civil rights).
    • Walsh v. Dallastown Area School District, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71266 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (Summary judgment dismissing claims by parent and students against school district, administrators and staff members of claims brought under federal and state wiretap laws and 4th Amendment).
    • Defense award at arbitration in negligence action brought against insurance agency and owners of the agency.

Results

Summary Judgment Obtained for a Homeowners’ Association

We secured summary judgment for a homeowners’ association. The plaintiff owned an apartment in a planned community and sought to drill a hole through the exterior wall of the building to vent an HVAC unit. The HOA denied his request, and the plaintiff asserted claims of negligence and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealings, alleging that the HOA treated him unfairly by denying his request. Despite providing numerous photos of other holes through the exterior wall of the building, the plaintiff admitted during his deposition that they did not know whether the HOA had ever permitted another unit owner to drill a hole in the exterior wall. We successfully argued that the plaintiff could not put forth any evidence demonstrating unfair treatment, or that the request had been denied in bad faith. 

Secured Dismissal of a Suit Against a Dauphin County School District

We achieved dismissal of a suit against a school district by way of preliminary objections. The Dauphin County case involved allegations that the district deprived the plaintiffs of certain educational rights, premised on procedural due process violations, negligence and subornation of perjury. Preliminary objections were filed to the plaintiffs’ original complaint on both procedural and substantive grounds. Following the filing of an amended complaint and additional preliminary objections on similar grounds, argument was held. As a result, the court agreed with the defendant and dismissed the plaintiffs’ amended complaint with prejudice. 

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Special Education Law

The Office for Dispute Resolution’s Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2024 Details Due Process Filings, Bureau of Special Education Complaints

March 5, 2026

In late November 2025, the Office for Dispute Resolution (ODR) released its annual report for fiscal year 2024 (July 1, 2024 - June 30, 2025).  In the report, the ODR provided detailed information about due process litigation in Pennsylvania for the entire fiscal year. In all, there were 900 requests for due process filed with ODR, a slight decrease from fiscal year 2023, which saw 958 cases filed. A majority of the cases were filed on behalf of parents/guardians/students by legal counsel, although 112 cases were filed pro se. Most of the 900 cases involved claims under the IDEA/Chapter 14 for school-age/non-gifted students. Only 14 cases were filed solely under Section 504/Chapter 15. As has been the case for the past 20 years, due process litigation was most active in the City of Philadelphia and the southeastern Pennsylvania counties approximate to the city. There were 236 requests for due process filed within Philadelphia Intermediate Unit 26 alone.  More than 50 requests for due process were filed within Montgomery County Intermediate Unit 23 (84), Delaware County Intermediate Unit 25 (76), and Bucks County Intermediate Unit 22 (53). The only other intermediate units outside southeastern Pennsylvania that saw more than 50 due process filings were the Northeastern Educational Intermediate Unit 19 (65) and the Allegheny Intermediate Unit 3 (53). For all school-age/non-gifted cases, the most predominant issue raised in the due process filings involved the IEP (development/implementation), with 442 occurrences. The next most prevalent issue was compensatory education (425 occurrences) followed by school evaluations (192 occurrences). Although 900 due process cases were filed during fiscal year 2024, only 55 resulted in a written hearing officer decision. Most of the cases ended in a negotiated resolution, either outside of the IDEA resolution period (357 cases) or during the resolution period (214 cases).  Nearly 150 cases were either dismissed outright (24 cases) or voluntarily withdrawn (123 cases).  A significant number of cases filed in fiscal year 2024 remained active at of the end of the fiscal year and carried over into the next fiscal year (127 cases).  Causes of the 24 case dismissals included a lack of hearing officer jurisdiction (10 cases), improper party name (4), res judicata/mootness (4), a case being consolidated with another case (4) or no response from the parent (2). As to the 55 cases in which a hearing officer issued a written decision, the hearing officer found for the LEA in 21 cases, for the parent in 18 cases, and for both the parent and LEA in 16 cases. Notably, of these 55 cases, 21 involved pro se litigants.  The hearing officer found for the LEA in 14 of the pro se cases and for the parent/ guardian in 4 of the cases. In three of the pro se cases, the hearing officer found for the parent in part and the LEA in part. Also of note, during fiscal year 2024,19 cases were appealed to federal court, and only one case was appealed to state court. Only four of these appeals involved due process requests filed during fiscal year 2024, as the balance of the due process cases at issue were filed prior to 2024. Of the appeals filed during fiscal year 2024, parents were responsible for 75% of the filings.  Three of the appeals dealt solely with the issue of attorney fees. At the close of fiscal year 2024, 17 of the 20 cases were still pending on appeal. One case was dismissed following a settlement, another based upon the final resolution of a separate but related matter, and a third following a court-approved settlement. In that instance, the case was marked settled on the docket, and the court vacated its prior order remanding the case to the hearing officer.  Thirteen of the federal court appeals were filed with the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, three with the Middle District of Pennsylvania, and three with the Western District of Pennsylvania. ODR also reported on compliance complaints filed with the Bureau of Special Education (BSE), including complaints under Section 504/Chapter 15. In all, 179 complaints were filed with BSE.  Of these cases, 50 resolved with a finding by BSE of LEA non-compliance. Seven complaints were dismissed or held in abeyance as the issues were being addressed in a due process complaint and 68 of the complaints were either resolved, withdrawn, or dismissed for not falling within the jurisdiction of the BSE. For more information on ODR’s Annual Report, see: https://odr-pa.us12.list-manage.com/track/click?u=e6553c8850beb32e3c7ea9c8c&id=a1449490fc&e=bf4ea9f318

Legal Updates for Real Estate E&O Liability

When Is a Symbol of Hate Not a Material Defect in Property?

February 1, 2026

Daniel and Lynn Rae Wentworth purchased a home in Beaver County, Pennsylvania from Juergen Steinmetz. According to their complaint, after moving into the home, the Wentworths discovered a swastika under rugs in the basement and what they perceived to be a Nazi eagle incorporated into the floor tile pattern. The Wentworths claimed that had they previously known about the symbols in the floor tile, they would not have purchased the home. They also alleged that they could not be expected to live in the home in that condition, nor could they sell the home, and that it would cost $30,000.00 to remove the symbols and replace the floor tile. The Wentworths filed suit against Steinmetz under the Pennsylvania Real Estate Seller Disclosure Law (RESDL), alleging he failed to disclose a “material defect” in the property prior to closing, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Steinmetz filed preliminary objections in response to the complaint denying creating the floor pattern in support of Nazism. Steinmetz argued that the swastika is an ancient symbol embraced by various world cultures, and that its existence predates use by the Nazis. Yet, the Wentworths argued that since the swastika in the floor, “styled in the fashion that [was] used by the Nazis,” was situated in such close proximity to the German eagle, no reasonable person could believe the symbols were intended to be imagery referencing any other culture. For purposes of resolving the preliminary objections, the court set aside Steinmetz’s “subjective intent” and accepted the Wentworths’ allegations that these were indeed pro-Nazi symbols, and would be viewed as such to guests in the home or to prospective buyers. Steinmetz also argued that even accepting the Wentworths’ allegations as true, the symbols in the floor tile were not a “material defect” that he was required to disclose to prospective buyers. Relying in part on Milliken v. Jacono, 103 A. 3d 806 (Pa. 2014), he argued that attributes of a property giving rise to a psychological stigma, like the alleged Nazi symbols in the floor, are not material defects required to be disclosed under the RESDL. The trial court agreed, and found that Milliken foreclosed the Wentworths’ claims. Although the trial court recognized the imagery in the floor was “disturbing,” it was still merely a cosmetic flaw that could be covered up, and it was not a physical or structural property that posed an unreasonable risk or an impediment to the use and enjoyment of the property. The trial court sustained the preliminary objections and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court revisited Milliken, considering whether the occurrence of a murder and suicide in a home was an undisclosed material defect justifying a cause of action. The Supreme Court in Milliken concluded it was not, reasoning the deaths did “not constitute an actionable material defect,” and in so holding noted the myriad “traumatizing events that could occur on a property” and that “[e]fforts to define those that warrant mandatory disclosure would be a Sisyphean task.” Milliken, 103 A. 3d at 807, 810. The Superior Court agreed and concluded the Wentworths’ claims failed “because they suffer from the same lack of an objectively-quantifiable flaw as the one alleged in Milliken.” The Superior Court further reasoned: In each scenario, the existence, and degree, of the defect is in the eye of the beholder. Certainly, a significant portion of homebuyers would eschew a house with a crude mosaic of Nazi iconography in its basement. Yet there is, sadly but undeniably, a segment of the population who would deem it an asset to the property. Further, even among the majority of prospective buyers who would not welcome having hate symbols adorning their basement floor, the degree to which the images impacted the value of the property would inevitably vary from person to person. Relying on Milliken, the Superior Court noted, “that condition of the property constituting a material defect must be one that not only substantially impacts the value of the real estate, but lends itself to recognition and quantification by objective standards.” Although the Superior Court was sensitive to “the Wentworths’ outrage [and] their concern that the existence of the images could taint them as Nazi supporters,” still the court found “that that the symbols on the Wentworths’ otherwise sound and functional tile floor do not constitute a material defect that Steinmetz had a duty to disclose.” The decision of the trial court was affirmed.  Although the seller in Wentworth was successful in defending the lawsuit, real estate professionals should still discuss with their seller clients whether there may be a hidden aesthetic characteristic in the home that a potential buyer might find to be offensive, particularly if it is not discovered until after closing. While such a characteristic ultimately may not arise to a “material defect” under the RESDL, it still could lead to costly litigation that the seller (and perhaps the seller’s agent and broker) might have to defend.  Real estate professionals may wish to advise their seller clients to remove any such hidden characteristic even before the property is listed for sale. This will help to avoid needless litigation down the road and also likely will expand the pool of potential buyers. For further reading, see: Wentworth v. Steinmetz, 2025 PA Super 253, --- A. 3d --- (2025).

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

United State District Court for the Middle District of Florida finds Evidence of Replacement Cost Value is Admissible and Recoverable Even When Repairs Have Not Been Made

The plaintiff filed a claim for damage as a result of Hurricane Ian. It claimed damages were over $24 million, but the carrier accepted partial coverage and paid $8,307.49 for secondary components. The carrier found hurricane damage to the building, but it was below the insurance policy’s $3.6 million deductible. The plaintiff sued for breach of the insurance policy. The carrier argued in a motion for summary judgment that plaintiff could not recover replacement cost value (RCV) because the property repairs had not been effectuated. The policy provided for RCV, but only after the repairs were completed. The carrier argued that because the repairs were not completed, the plaintiff was not entitled to RCV damages. The plaintiff argued the carrier could not withhold the actual cost value (ACV) due, which was the main allegation of the lawsuit, then fault it for not making the repairs to unlock the RCV. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida rejected the carrier’s argument, finding that when an insurer allegedly breached the policy by withholding coverage, it could not hide behind a repair-contingent provision to block the insured from RCV damages at trial. The court found the issue to be whether the contractual language designed to preclude certain coverage until after repairs are completed barred an insured from seeking those damages at trial when repairs were not complete. The court noted the Eleventh Circuit had not resolved this issue and neither side pointed to a definitive answer from the Florida Supreme Court. The court reasoned that it must look to the Sixth District Court of Appeal (6th DCA), which is the court which would have heard this case if it was in state court. The court noted the 6th DCA recently addressed this issue in Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez, 427 So. 3d 676 (Fla. 6th DCA 2026). The Rodriguez Court found that a breach of contract action is designed to adjudicate not only whether the contract was breached, but also evaluate the damages incurred had the breach not occurred, which the Rodriguez court found to be recovery of the RCV. This court also noted basic Florida contract principles compelled the same result, as a material breach frees the nonbreaching party to suspend its own performance and can demand the full benefit of its bargain, including RCV damages. Finally, the court found the distinction between a full denial and partial denial did not compel a different result. It found the policy required the carrier to acknowledge coverage and pay ACV for all covered damages, and the failure to do that is a material breach, entitling the insured to all of the damages available under the contract, which included the RCV.

Thought Leadership

Appeals Court Reverses Trial Court Order Awarding Attorney’s Fees Due to Lack of Evidence to Support Fee Awarded

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order awarding appellate fees to People’s Trust Insurance Company based upon a lack of evidence to support the attorney’s fee award in RM & Assocs. Consulting, Inc. v. People's Trust Ins. Co., 2026 Fla. App. LEXIS 4654 (Fla. 4th DCA 2026). People’s Trust was the insurer of a residential property that had sustained water damage. RM & Associates Consulting was hired by the homeowner to perform mitigation services at the property. The homeowner assigned post-loss benefits to RM and RM subsequently filed suit against People’s Trust alleging that it had not been paid the money it was owed for the mitigation services. People’s Trust defended the lawsuit on the ground that the policy required the insured to notify the insurer before authorizing repairs so People's Trust could elect to use its preferred contractor. Because the owner did not comply with that provision, People's Trust asserted its liability was limited to the amount that its preferred contractor would have charged for the work, which People's Trust contended was $2,000. People's Trust paid that amount to RM before RM filed suit. People’s Trust filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted. RM appealed the summary judgment ruling and the ruling was upheld by the Fourth District Court of Appeal. The appellate court also granted People’s Trust’s entitlement to appellate attorney’s fees, subject to the trial court’s determination of the amount of fees, based upon an offer of judgment made by People's Trust. On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of attorney’s fees People’s Trust was entitled to. At the hearing, People’s Trust presented testimony from it’s fee expert, supervising trial counsel and appellate counsel. People’s Trust sought recovery of $24,866.17 for work performed by appellate counsel. The request primarily consisted of work performed in preparation of the answer brief. The fee expert testified that more than ninety hours spent preparing the answer brief was reasonable given the complexity and significance of the underlying issue. The appellate court found that the fee expert’s testimony fell short of meeting the necessary standard of demonstrating that the hours expended were necessary. The appellate court found that the billing records did not serve to cure the deficient testimony, as the billing records did not contain adequate details regarding the specific tasks performed. Rather the records contained entries such as “answer brief” which the appellate court found to be insufficient. The appellate court noted that neither the fee expert or counsel addressed how the prior research and briefing in the parallel litigation informed the work in the instant matter. The appellate court noted this was significant in that a court's attorney's fees award must exclude excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary hours, citing Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985). Based upon the record failing to support the finding of the trial court, the 4th DCA remanded the case to the trial court for a reconsideration and redetermination of reasonable appellate attorney’s fees supported by competent substantial evidence. The 4th DCA reiterated that the fee expert’s focus on the quality of the work and the importance of the work to People’s Trust did not make up for the perceived deficiencies in the position that spending over ninety hours on a single answer brief was reasonable. Whether moving for attorney’s fees or challenging the amount of fees being sought by an opposing party, practitioners should be mindful of the evidence being used to support the claims being made. Parties should pay close attention to whether the hours being sought may be impacted by prior litigation either party may have engaged in. A party must be prepared to address how prior litigation efforts did or did not impact the amount of hours being claimed in current litigation. Lastly, billing records must be sufficiently detailed so as to support any potential future fee claim.

Thought Leadership

First DCA Reverses Excessive Jury Award Unsupported by the Evidence

In December 2019, the plaintiffs filed a claim with Universal for damages caused by a water and sewage back up through the plumbing system and existing through multiple fixtures including the washing machine drain, kitchen sink, dishwasher, bathtub and toilet. Universal investigated the claim, issued payment for resulting water damage totaling $7,000.00 in actual cash value ($12,000.00 in replacement cost value). The plaintiffs sought additional benefits for work needed to access the below-slab cast iron plumbing system due to the failure of the system from rust, deterioration, corrosion and breaks in the line. Universal denied any additional benefits for access. In 2021, the plaintiffs filed suit. During litigation, Universal sent a plumber to inspect the home and the plumber concluded the pipes were clogged but could be cleaned. The plaintiffs’ plumber testified that the plumbing system needed to be replaced due to holes and openings in the pipes. The plaintiffs introduced two estimates prepared by Triad Restoration services totaling $79,680.22 in replacement cost value and $50,219.97 in actual cash value and an executed contract with another company for repairs with the amounts of repair redacted. Since the insurance policy did not provide coverage for repair or replacement of the plumbing system, the jury only had to decide whether the plumbing system needed to be replaced, and if it did, Universal would owe for the access costs; the jury verdict form required the jury to determine both the replacement cost value and actual cash value amounts. The jury asked if it had to rely on the Triad estimates for their amounts. The trial court advised the amount awarded had to be based on the evidence presented at trial and the law given by the trial court. The jury awarded $335,000.00 in replacement cost value or $305,000.00 in actual cash value. Universal motioned for a new trial arguing the amount awarded was unsupported by the evidence and then moved for remittitur. The trial court denied both motions and this appeal followed. The court found that while a jury’s verdict should only be disturbed with caution and discretion, the trial court must give the properly challenged award close scrutiny and determine whether it bears a reasonable relation to the damaged provided, is supported by the evidence, and could have been reached in a logical manner by reasonable means §768.74(3), (5)(d)-(e), Fla. Stat. The court found the trial court did consider the statutory requirements at the hearing on Universal’s remittitur motion and was concerned about a reasonable relation to the amount of damages proved and injury suffered and whether the award was supported by the evidence, but ultimately denied the motion, reasoning that the jury had been properly instructed to fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiffs. The court noted the only evidence providing the basis for the jury verdict was Triad’s estimates and those valued the plaintiffs' claimed loss at $79,680.22 in replacement cost value and $50,219.97 in actual cash value; no valuation evidence reasonably supported the jury verdict. The plaintiffs argued that the jury was entitled to consider more than the estimates, but the court conveyed the evidence provided did not give the jury a way to reach the amounts they awarded. The court was also not swayed by the plaintiffs’ argument regarding inflation and later price increases, but the court noted that no evidence via the contract, nor testimony regarding increase in labor, material, fuel or construction costs were entered into the record.  The court concluded the jury may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, but it may not supply a damages number by speculation. The court did not find any of the plaintiffs’ remaining argument persuasive either. The court reversed the denial of Universal’s remittitur motion and motion for new trial as to damaged and remanded the case. The court ended its opinion with advising the trial court must determine whether replacement cost value or actual cash value is the property measure of damages under the policy and order remittitur in an amount consistent with that determination and the evidence.