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Christopher J. Conrad

Co-Chair, Special Education Law Practice Group

Portrait of Christopher J. Conrad

Chris is a member of the firm's Professional Liability Department, and he devotes a significant portion of his practice to the representation and defense of school districts, intermediate units, career and technology centers and other academic institutions in all manner of employment, civil rights and special education litigation. As a member of the Professional Liability Defense Federation, Chris currently serves as Vice Chair of the Municipal, School Leaders and Miscellaneous Liability Committee.

Chris is Co-Chair of the firm’s Special Education Law Practice Group, and his special education practice focuses on counseling clients and defending due process litigation involving a wide range of issues including claims of child find violations, denial of a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE), manifestation determinations and student discipline, appropriate educational programming and placement, and parents seeking private school placement at public expense. Chris has presented on a number of special education topics for school districts as well as for PBI’s Exceptional Children Conference, Lehigh University’s Special Education Law Conference and the National Business Institute.

Chris also represents public and private employers and their directors, officers, management and employees, in a variety of employment practices litigation under federal and state law, including defending claims of harassment, discrimination and retaliation, as well as whistleblower claims.

Additionally, Chris represents and defends licensed and certified professionals, including real estate agents and brokers, real estate appraisers, insurance agents and brokers, home inspectors, architects, engineers, surveyors, attorneys and accountants in E&O and related matters throughout Pennsylvania and Maryland.

Chris is a graduate of The Pennsylvania State University and The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law. During law school, Chris clerked for the Hon. Robert J. Woodside in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Chris also served as judicial law clerk for the Hon. Ronald B. Graves in the Civil Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey.

Chris is a certified mediator, and he works as a pro bono mediator for the Middle District of Pennsylvania mediation program and the Cumberland County Bar Association Fee Dispute Committee. For many years, Chris served as an adjunct instructor at the Penn State Dickinson School of Law for its Problem Solving I/ Law Practice I – Critical Skills course, and he assisted Dickinson’s National Mock Trial Team as both a judge and sparring attorney. Chris also devotes a portion of his time as a volunteer for the Wills for Heroes Program. Additionally, Chris is a Member of the Knights of Columbus Council 13100 and Saint Martin’s Assembly 2708.

    • Penn State Dickinson Law (J.D., 2001)
    • The Pennsylvania State University (B.A., 1998)
    • New Jersey, 2001
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2001
    • Pennsylvania, 2006
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2006
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2007
    • Maryland, 2018
    • U.S. District Court District of Maryland, 2018
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania, 2018
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 2021
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • Susquehanna Valley Select Lawyers™ (2014)
    • Cumberland County Bar Association, Member, Fee Dispute Committee
    • Knights of Columbus Council 13100 and Saint Martin’s Assembly 2708
    • Middle District of Pennsylvania Chapter of the Federal Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Assocation, Legal Services for Exceptional Children Committee
    • Professional Liability Defense Federation, Vice Chair, Municipal, School Leaders and Miscellaneous Liability Committee
    • Saint Thomas More Society
    • Certified Mediator, U.S. District Court, Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • Civil Rights Litigation, The Courts and the Community: An Educational Series for the Public, April 1, 2026
    • Left Behind? Today’s U.S. Department of Education and the Potential Impact on Special Education and Disability Services, PBI’s Exceptional Children Conference. October 24, 2025
    • Hot Topics in Employment Law, PBA Law Firm Administrators Conference, April 30, 2025
    • From Complaint to Appeal And Beyond: Litigating a Special Education Due Process Case, PBI Exceptional Children Conference, October 18, 2024.
    • UNcivil Discourse: The 1st Amendment and Regulating Speech at Public School Board Meetings, Professional Liability Defense Federation (PLDF) 2024 Annual Meeting, September 26, 2024
    • Extended School Year – It's Not Summer School, PBI Exceptional Children Conference, October 13, 2023
    • Special Education Litigation: Best Practices for Avoiding Liability, and Strategies for a Successful Defense, Professional Liability Defense Federation Annual Meeting, September 2022
    • Why Schools Need to Be Thinking About Title IX: Effectively Navigating the Evolving Legal Issues Surrounding Gender Identity, Professional Liability Defense Federation Annual Meeting, October 2021
    • Federal Law and the Art of Email Maintenance: When Must Emails Be Produced Under IDEA and FERPA, PBI Exceptional Children Conference, October 2019
    • Navigating the Bermuda Triangle: The Intersection of Workers' Compensation, the FMLA and the ADA, County Commissioners Association of Pennsylvania, March 2019
    • The Risks of Failing to Report School Leaders Liability Claims, Pennsylvania Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, October 2017
    • The Thin Blue Line in School, Lehigh University Special Education Law Conference, May 2017
    • Dyslexia: Much More Than What We Thought, Lehigh University Special Education Law Conference, May 2016 
    • Advanced Functional Behavior Assessments and Behavior Support Plans, PBI Exceptional Children Conference, October 2015
    • Successfully Handling Disciplinary Actions for Special Needs Students, National Business Institute, December 2014
    • Best Practices for Technology and Social Media in the Workplace, Estate Planning Council of Central Pennsylvania, Inc., February 2014
    • Insurance Agents and Brokers Best Claims Practices in Claims Administration and Underwriting, Liberty Mutual Insurance, December 2013
    • Avoiding Liability in Special Education, Central Dauphin School District, August 2013
    • PBA Malpractice Avoidance Program, Perry County Bar Association, April 2013
    • Avoiding Legal Malpractice, PBA Malpractice Avoidance Program, Adams County Bar Association, April 2012
    • Avoiding Liability as Sellers' Agents in Residential Real Estate Transactions, Particularly with Regard to the Disclosure of Material Defects in the Property, Educational Development School of Real Estate, March 2012
    • Malpractice Avoidance Program, PBA Malpractice Avoidance Program, Mifflin and Juniata County Bar Associations, October 2011
    • PBA Malpractice Avoidance Program, Dauphin County Bar Association, August 2011
    • Avoiding Liability in Special Education, Pottsville Area School District, August 2011
    • Avoiding Liability in Special Education, Palmyra Area School District, August 2010
    • “Let’s Give a Cheer for Free Speech: U.S. Supreme Court Holds School District Cannot Discipline Cheerleader for Off-Campus Snapchat Posts,” Professional Liability Defense Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2021
    • "Bullies In the Schoolyard and Beyond: Avoiding and Defending Federal Bullying Claims Against Schools and School Leaders," Professional Liability Defense Quarterly, Vol. 13, Issue 1, 2021
    • "Educating Pa.'s Special Needs Students During the COVID-19 Pandemic," The Legal Intelligencer, May, 2020
    • “This Is Exhausting! Parents of Special Needs Children Who Allege Educational Harm Must Exhaust Administrative Remedies Under the IDEA Before Filing Lawsuit," Lorman, August 2017 
    • “This Is Exhausting! Parents of Special Needs Children Who Allege Educational Harm Must Exhaust Administrative Remedies Under the IDEA Before Filing Lawsuit,” Defense Digest, Vol. 23, No. 1, March 2017
    • "The IDEA Statute of Limitations (Finally!) Explained," Defense Digest, Vol. 21, No. 4, December 2015
    • "Does At-Will Employment Still Exist in Pennsylvania?," The Legal Intelligencer, Labor & Employment Supplement, June 24, 2014
    • "State Courts May Exercise Jurisdiction in Legal Malpractice Actions Arising Out of Patent Litigation," Defense Digest, Vol. 19, No. 2, June 2013
    • "The Third Circuit Holds That Private Employers Are Not Prohibited By Bankruptcy Code From Denying Employment To Individuals Who Previously Filed For Bankruptcy," Defense Digest, Vol. 17, No. 2, June, 2011
    • "Forum The Bell Tolls: Plaintiffs Lose Challenge To Validity Of Forum Selection Clause In Their Auto Insurance Policy," Defense Digest, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2010
    • "Ninth Circuit Holds Private Tuition Is Reimbursable Under IDEA Even Though Student Never Received Special Education From School District," Defense Digest, Vol. 14, No. 4, December, 2008
    • "Remedies for Disabled Students Curtailed," New Jersey Law Journal, Vol. CXCI, No. 2, Jan. 14, 2008
    • "School's Out: The Third Circuit Precludes Use of 42 U.S.C. 1983 to Remedy Violations of IDEA and the Rehabilitation Act," Defense Digest, Vol. 13, No. 3, September, 2007
    • "Pennsylvania Superior Court Limits Duty Of Insurance Brokers," Defense Digest, Vol. 12, No. 4, December, 2006
    • Godfrey v. Southern York County School District, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96736 (M.D. Pa. 2019) (summary judgment in favor of school district dismissing ADEA age discrimination and retaliation claims by former teacher)
    • Defense verdict following jury trial representing insurance agency and its owner in case involving claims of professional negligence.
    • K.E. v. Lincoln Intermediate Unit, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163489 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (summary judgment dismissing claims against intermediate unit by former student alleging Title IX and 1983 civil rights violations)
    • Rohrbaugh v. Lincoln Intermediate Unit, 255 F. Supp. 3d 589 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (dismissal of claims against intermediate unit by student under 504 of Rehabilitation Act of 1973 for failure to exhaust administrative remedies
    • Judge v. Shikellamy School District, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65694 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (summary judgment dismissing claims by former principal alleging violation of Procedural Due Process rights, breach of employment contract and constructive discharge).
    • Defense award at arbitration in declaratory judgment action brought against condominium association.
    • A.V. v. Capital Area Intermediate Unit, ODR File No. 18090-1617 (successful defense of intermediate unit in special education due process hearing)
    • Hollinghead v. York City Sewer Authority, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43202 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (Summary judgment dismissing Title VII, PHRA and 1983 claims by a City employees alleging race discrimination and retaliation).
    • Schuback v. Law Office of Phillip S. VanEmbden, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18379 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (Judgment on the pleadings in favor of attorneys sued for alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act).
    • Thomas v. Thomas, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83320 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (Dismissal of 14th Amendment claims against an attorney for alleged abuse of process and wrongful use of civil proceedings).
    • Munir v. Pottsville Area School District, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82966 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (Summary judgment dismissing action by parent against school district under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and Rehabilitation Act).
    • Hocker v. CitiMortgage, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76867 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (Dismissal of claims against mortgage lender under the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act by alleged victim of a housing fraud scam).
    • Baltimore v. Harrisburg Parking Authority, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59508 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (Summary judgment dismissing action against parking authority by former employee who claimed she was terminated from her employment in violation of her 1st and 14th Amendment rights).
    • Gregory v. Derry Township School District, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1875 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (Summary judgment dismissing claims against school district, administrators and school board members in action by former teacher who alleged she was terminated from her employment in violation of her federal civil rights).
    • Walsh v. Dallastown Area School District, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71266 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (Summary judgment dismissing claims by parent and students against school district, administrators and staff members of claims brought under federal and state wiretap laws and 4th Amendment).
    • Defense award at arbitration in negligence action brought against insurance agency and owners of the agency.

Results

Summary Judgment Obtained for a Homeowners’ Association

We secured summary judgment for a homeowners’ association. The plaintiff owned an apartment in a planned community and sought to drill a hole through the exterior wall of the building to vent an HVAC unit. The HOA denied his request, and the plaintiff asserted claims of negligence and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealings, alleging that the HOA treated him unfairly by denying his request. Despite providing numerous photos of other holes through the exterior wall of the building, the plaintiff admitted during his deposition that they did not know whether the HOA had ever permitted another unit owner to drill a hole in the exterior wall. We successfully argued that the plaintiff could not put forth any evidence demonstrating unfair treatment, or that the request had been denied in bad faith. 

Secured Dismissal of a Suit Against a Dauphin County School District

We achieved dismissal of a suit against a school district by way of preliminary objections. The Dauphin County case involved allegations that the district deprived the plaintiffs of certain educational rights, premised on procedural due process violations, negligence and subornation of perjury. Preliminary objections were filed to the plaintiffs’ original complaint on both procedural and substantive grounds. Following the filing of an amended complaint and additional preliminary objections on similar grounds, argument was held. As a result, the court agreed with the defendant and dismissed the plaintiffs’ amended complaint with prejudice. 

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Special Education Law

The Office for Dispute Resolution’s Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2024 Details Due Process Filings, Bureau of Special Education Complaints

March 5, 2026

In late November 2025, the Office for Dispute Resolution (ODR) released its annual report for fiscal year 2024 (July 1, 2024 - June 30, 2025).  In the report, the ODR provided detailed information about due process litigation in Pennsylvania for the entire fiscal year. In all, there were 900 requests for due process filed with ODR, a slight decrease from fiscal year 2023, which saw 958 cases filed. A majority of the cases were filed on behalf of parents/guardians/students by legal counsel, although 112 cases were filed pro se. Most of the 900 cases involved claims under the IDEA/Chapter 14 for school-age/non-gifted students. Only 14 cases were filed solely under Section 504/Chapter 15. As has been the case for the past 20 years, due process litigation was most active in the City of Philadelphia and the southeastern Pennsylvania counties approximate to the city. There were 236 requests for due process filed within Philadelphia Intermediate Unit 26 alone.  More than 50 requests for due process were filed within Montgomery County Intermediate Unit 23 (84), Delaware County Intermediate Unit 25 (76), and Bucks County Intermediate Unit 22 (53). The only other intermediate units outside southeastern Pennsylvania that saw more than 50 due process filings were the Northeastern Educational Intermediate Unit 19 (65) and the Allegheny Intermediate Unit 3 (53). For all school-age/non-gifted cases, the most predominant issue raised in the due process filings involved the IEP (development/implementation), with 442 occurrences. The next most prevalent issue was compensatory education (425 occurrences) followed by school evaluations (192 occurrences). Although 900 due process cases were filed during fiscal year 2024, only 55 resulted in a written hearing officer decision. Most of the cases ended in a negotiated resolution, either outside of the IDEA resolution period (357 cases) or during the resolution period (214 cases).  Nearly 150 cases were either dismissed outright (24 cases) or voluntarily withdrawn (123 cases).  A significant number of cases filed in fiscal year 2024 remained active at of the end of the fiscal year and carried over into the next fiscal year (127 cases).  Causes of the 24 case dismissals included a lack of hearing officer jurisdiction (10 cases), improper party name (4), res judicata/mootness (4), a case being consolidated with another case (4) or no response from the parent (2). As to the 55 cases in which a hearing officer issued a written decision, the hearing officer found for the LEA in 21 cases, for the parent in 18 cases, and for both the parent and LEA in 16 cases. Notably, of these 55 cases, 21 involved pro se litigants.  The hearing officer found for the LEA in 14 of the pro se cases and for the parent/ guardian in 4 of the cases. In three of the pro se cases, the hearing officer found for the parent in part and the LEA in part. Also of note, during fiscal year 2024,19 cases were appealed to federal court, and only one case was appealed to state court. Only four of these appeals involved due process requests filed during fiscal year 2024, as the balance of the due process cases at issue were filed prior to 2024. Of the appeals filed during fiscal year 2024, parents were responsible for 75% of the filings.  Three of the appeals dealt solely with the issue of attorney fees. At the close of fiscal year 2024, 17 of the 20 cases were still pending on appeal. One case was dismissed following a settlement, another based upon the final resolution of a separate but related matter, and a third following a court-approved settlement. In that instance, the case was marked settled on the docket, and the court vacated its prior order remanding the case to the hearing officer.  Thirteen of the federal court appeals were filed with the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, three with the Middle District of Pennsylvania, and three with the Western District of Pennsylvania. ODR also reported on compliance complaints filed with the Bureau of Special Education (BSE), including complaints under Section 504/Chapter 15. In all, 179 complaints were filed with BSE.  Of these cases, 50 resolved with a finding by BSE of LEA non-compliance. Seven complaints were dismissed or held in abeyance as the issues were being addressed in a due process complaint and 68 of the complaints were either resolved, withdrawn, or dismissed for not falling within the jurisdiction of the BSE. For more information on ODR’s Annual Report, see: https://odr-pa.us12.list-manage.com/track/click?u=e6553c8850beb32e3c7ea9c8c&id=a1449490fc&e=bf4ea9f318

Legal Updates for Real Estate E&O Liability

When Is a Symbol of Hate Not a Material Defect in Property?

February 1, 2026

Daniel and Lynn Rae Wentworth purchased a home in Beaver County, Pennsylvania from Juergen Steinmetz. According to their complaint, after moving into the home, the Wentworths discovered a swastika under rugs in the basement and what they perceived to be a Nazi eagle incorporated into the floor tile pattern. The Wentworths claimed that had they previously known about the symbols in the floor tile, they would not have purchased the home. They also alleged that they could not be expected to live in the home in that condition, nor could they sell the home, and that it would cost $30,000.00 to remove the symbols and replace the floor tile. The Wentworths filed suit against Steinmetz under the Pennsylvania Real Estate Seller Disclosure Law (RESDL), alleging he failed to disclose a “material defect” in the property prior to closing, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Steinmetz filed preliminary objections in response to the complaint denying creating the floor pattern in support of Nazism. Steinmetz argued that the swastika is an ancient symbol embraced by various world cultures, and that its existence predates use by the Nazis. Yet, the Wentworths argued that since the swastika in the floor, “styled in the fashion that [was] used by the Nazis,” was situated in such close proximity to the German eagle, no reasonable person could believe the symbols were intended to be imagery referencing any other culture. For purposes of resolving the preliminary objections, the court set aside Steinmetz’s “subjective intent” and accepted the Wentworths’ allegations that these were indeed pro-Nazi symbols, and would be viewed as such to guests in the home or to prospective buyers. Steinmetz also argued that even accepting the Wentworths’ allegations as true, the symbols in the floor tile were not a “material defect” that he was required to disclose to prospective buyers. Relying in part on Milliken v. Jacono, 103 A. 3d 806 (Pa. 2014), he argued that attributes of a property giving rise to a psychological stigma, like the alleged Nazi symbols in the floor, are not material defects required to be disclosed under the RESDL. The trial court agreed, and found that Milliken foreclosed the Wentworths’ claims. Although the trial court recognized the imagery in the floor was “disturbing,” it was still merely a cosmetic flaw that could be covered up, and it was not a physical or structural property that posed an unreasonable risk or an impediment to the use and enjoyment of the property. The trial court sustained the preliminary objections and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court revisited Milliken, considering whether the occurrence of a murder and suicide in a home was an undisclosed material defect justifying a cause of action. The Supreme Court in Milliken concluded it was not, reasoning the deaths did “not constitute an actionable material defect,” and in so holding noted the myriad “traumatizing events that could occur on a property” and that “[e]fforts to define those that warrant mandatory disclosure would be a Sisyphean task.” Milliken, 103 A. 3d at 807, 810. The Superior Court agreed and concluded the Wentworths’ claims failed “because they suffer from the same lack of an objectively-quantifiable flaw as the one alleged in Milliken.” The Superior Court further reasoned: In each scenario, the existence, and degree, of the defect is in the eye of the beholder. Certainly, a significant portion of homebuyers would eschew a house with a crude mosaic of Nazi iconography in its basement. Yet there is, sadly but undeniably, a segment of the population who would deem it an asset to the property. Further, even among the majority of prospective buyers who would not welcome having hate symbols adorning their basement floor, the degree to which the images impacted the value of the property would inevitably vary from person to person. Relying on Milliken, the Superior Court noted, “that condition of the property constituting a material defect must be one that not only substantially impacts the value of the real estate, but lends itself to recognition and quantification by objective standards.” Although the Superior Court was sensitive to “the Wentworths’ outrage [and] their concern that the existence of the images could taint them as Nazi supporters,” still the court found “that that the symbols on the Wentworths’ otherwise sound and functional tile floor do not constitute a material defect that Steinmetz had a duty to disclose.” The decision of the trial court was affirmed.  Although the seller in Wentworth was successful in defending the lawsuit, real estate professionals should still discuss with their seller clients whether there may be a hidden aesthetic characteristic in the home that a potential buyer might find to be offensive, particularly if it is not discovered until after closing. While such a characteristic ultimately may not arise to a “material defect” under the RESDL, it still could lead to costly litigation that the seller (and perhaps the seller’s agent and broker) might have to defend.  Real estate professionals may wish to advise their seller clients to remove any such hidden characteristic even before the property is listed for sale. This will help to avoid needless litigation down the road and also likely will expand the pool of potential buyers. For further reading, see: Wentworth v. Steinmetz, 2025 PA Super 253, --- A. 3d --- (2025).

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Holds That Public Policy Does Not Prevent Insurance Coverage for Sex Trafficking Claims

On July 21, 2026, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an opinion emphasizing the limited circumstances in which courts may invoke public policy to bar insurance coverage, holding in Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (U.S. Branch) v. RI Settlement Trust that Pennsylvania public policy does not preclude coverage for claims alleging that insureds enabled or profited from human sex trafficking. The decision rejects a line of federal district court decisions predicting otherwise and reinforces that Pennsylvania courts will invoke the public policy doctrine only in the clearest of circumstances. RI Settlement is particularly significant because it arose on certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, giving the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve an issue on which federal courts had predicted Pennsylvania law differently. RI Settlement arose out of four separate civil complaints in which the underlying plaintiffs alleged that, as minors, they were the victims of human sex trafficking at various hotels in Philadelphia. The plaintiffs claimed that the hotel owners were negligent in failing to stop the sex trafficking from happening at their hotels. After the filing of the lawsuits, the hotel owners sought coverage under their Commercial General Liability policies. The insurers initially defended the hotels under Reservation of Rights letters, though the carriers later filed Declaratory Judgment actions seeking declarations that they did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify. In short, the insurers argued in the alternative that they did not owe any obligation to provide coverage based upon Pennsylvania public policy (because the claims violated the Human Trafficking Law – 18 Pa.C.S. § 3011) and the terms and conditions of the policy. On motions for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court found for the insurers on the basis of public policy: There is no duty to defend or indemnify against actions arising out of an insured's criminal conduct related to the sex trafficking of minors. The Court appreciates that it may make public policy the basis of a judicial decision only in “the clearest of cases.” See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 589 A.2d 854, 868 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1994)). Yet, the Court strains to imagine a clearer case than the one presented here in which the facts alleged indicate that Policyholders engaged in criminal conduct in violation of Pennsylvania's Human Trafficking Law. The hotel owners appealed the matter to the Third Circuit, which petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to grant review of two certified questions of law: (1) whether Pennsylvania law had an “overriding public policy” against sex trafficking, such that an insurer’s duty to defend and/or indemnify is abrogated when an insured is alleged to have enabled or profited from such trafficking; and (2) if yes, is that duty abrogated whenever the insured’s alleged conduct would constitute a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Trafficking statute. Importantly, the certified questions did not ask the Supreme Court to determine whether the policies afforded coverage under their terms. Rather, the court was asked only whether Pennsylvania public policy independently barred coverage. As a result, the court assumed for purposes of answering the certified questions that the insurers otherwise owed a duty to defend and addressed only the public policy issue, leaving all policy-based coverage defenses for further proceedings. Because the court concluded that the answer to the first certified question was “no”, it did not reach the second issue. In reaching its determination that Pennsylvania public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for sex trafficking claims, the court limited the impact of its decision in Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A. 2d 854, 855 (Pa. 2004), which the RI Settlement opinion emphasized as having been an “Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court” – or a plurality opinion. In Greenfield, the insured homeowner was sued by the estate of his houseguest who overdosed from heroin that he sold to her. The matter wound its way to the Supreme Court, which determined that the insurer did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify based upon Pennsylvania public policy, which criminalized the sale and use of heroin as a Schedule I narcotic. In RI Settlement, the court “decline[d] the invitation” to extend the rationale of the three-justice plurality in Greenfield beyond cases involving Schedule I controlled substances. In so holding, the justices in RI Settlement refused to “divine an overriding public policy pronouncement by the General Assembly by virtue of its enactment of the Human Trafficking Law.” The opinion further states that it is not “within the purview of this Court to rank the magnitude of the public policy underlying the various crimes defined in the Crimes Code. It is sufficient for the work of the courts to know that the General Assembly has identified conduct it deems harmful and dangerous to the maintenance of an orderly society and criminalized it.” While the court declined to declare that Pennsylvania public policy prohibits coverage for sex trafficking claims, the opinion in RI Settlement expressly states that insurers are free to include appropriate exclusionary language for such causes of actions in their policies if they desire to do so. It will certainly be interesting to see whether the insurance industry accepts the court’s invitation, or perhaps whether the Pennsylvania legislature steps in to clarify that sex trafficking claims are indeed of the type or magnitude that they should not be covered by insurance. In any event, we will, of course, continue to monitor this and other insurance coverage issues that arise before courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and throughout our firm’s geographic footprint and around the country.

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Court Allows Recklessness and Punitive Damages Claims to Proceed After Work‑Zone Crash

In a case where a defendant filed preliminary objections against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas denied these preliminary objections. This case stems from a motor vehicle accident, where the defendants car struck the plaintiffs car after the defendant allegedly fell asleep at the wheel, going at a high rate of speed, through a construction work zone. Defendant first objected to the general allegations throughout the plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to “reckless” conduct contending that there were insufficient factual allegations to support the claim of reckless conduct. Defendant next objected to the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, as punitive damages may only be assessed against a motorist for falling asleep while driving if there is further evidence to prove driver was aware of their drowsiness and risk of falling asleep. Lastly, defendant objected to plaintiffs complaint, claiming it lacked specificity. The court here found that the plaintiff had included in the complaint specific allegations related to the defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone, almost striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and striking the plaintiffs vehicle which was stopped. Additionally, the court noted that falling asleep does not come without warning. The court found that these allegations were sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.