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Co-Chair, Special Education Law Practice Group

Portrait of Christopher J. Conrad

Results

  • Summary Judgment Obtained for a Homeowners’ Association

    We secured summary judgment for a homeowners’ association. The plaintiff owned an apartment in a planned community and sought to drill a hole through the exterior wall of the building to vent an HVAC unit. The HOA denied his request, and the plaintiff asserted claims of negligence and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealings, alleging that the HOA treated him unfairly by denying his request. Despite providing numerous photos of other holes through the exterior wall of the building, the plaintiff admitted during his deposition that they did not know whether the HOA had ever permitted another unit owner to drill a hole in the exterior wall. We successfully argued that the plaintiff could not put forth any evidence demonstrating unfair treatment, or that the request had been denied in bad faith. 

  • Secured Dismissal of a Suit Against a Dauphin County School District

    We achieved dismissal of a suit against a school district by way of preliminary objections. The Dauphin County case involved allegations that the district deprived the plaintiffs of certain educational rights, premised on procedural due process violations, negligence and subornation of perjury. Preliminary objections were filed to the plaintiffs’ original complaint on both procedural and substantive grounds. Following the filing of an amended complaint and additional preliminary objections on similar grounds, argument was held. As a result, the court agreed with the defendant and dismissed the plaintiffs’ amended complaint with prejudice. 

  • Successfully Defended a School District in a Special Education Case

    We defended a school district in a special education matter involving a high school student identified with a specific learning disability and ADHD. The student sought out a peer during the school day, went into the peer’s classroom and physically attacked her, punching and kicking her several times. After the incident, the student’s Individualized Education Program team determined the conduct was not a manifestation of the student’s disabilities. The student and her parent disagreed with this determination and requested an expedited due process hearing. At the hearing, the parent argued that the student’s conduct was a result of trauma she had experienced from a previous fight she had with her peer and that the student’s decision to fight the other student was on impulse and attributable to her ADHD condition. We presented testimony from the dean of students that she had talked to the student earlier in the school day, and during the conversation, the student expressed to the dean that she wanted to fight her peer to “squash the beef” they had between them. With this, we argued the student’s behavior was not impulsive, and her decision to attack the student was premediated and thought out. The hearing officer agreed and found the school district was correct in concluding the student’s conduct was not a manifestation of her disabilities. The hearing officer permitted the school district to seek further discipline of the student, including expulsion.

  • Motion to Dismiss Granted in Hazing Lawsuit Filed Against a Pennsylvania School District

    We prevailed on a motion to dismiss a hazing lawsuit filed against a school district. The plaintiff, who was a member of his high school football team, alleged he was subject to hazing and physical abuse by several other members of the team while attending a dinner at the home of one of his teammates. The plaintiff claimed that the school district had been aware of the hazing, but failed to prevent it. He asserted claims against the school under Title IX for emotional distress damages and punitive damages. The court eventually agreed with our arguments that emotional distress and punitive damages are nor recoverable under Title IX, and that all other claims were barred by the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

  • Summary Judgment Secured in Fourth Amendment Civil Rights Case

    We secured summary judgment in a Fourth Amendment civil rights claim involving an unlawful search and seizure. The plaintiff, a former social worker employed by a school district, alleged that the assistant superintendent and Right to Know Law officer conducted an illegal search of her work space, who then produced these records to the plaintiff’s estranged husband, with whom she was in the midst of a contentious divorce. The court agreed that the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence to show that either the assistant superintendent or the Right to Know Law officer actually searched her filing cabinet or seized her personal property. All claims, including those under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Rehabilitation Act and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, were previously dismissed on a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion.

  • Successful Defense of a Local School District and Its Board Members in a Lawsuit Filed in Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

    We successfully defended a local school district and its board members in a lawsuit filed in Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. The petitioner is a resident of the school district and a former school board member. At its December 2021 reorganization meeting, the school board voted to appoint a new school district solicitor. The petitioner attempted to make public comment and object to the school board's appointment of the solicitor, but he was not permitted to do so. The petitioner contended the school district and its board members violated the Sunshine Act and his right to free speech under the Pennsylvania Constitution by not allowing him to offer public comment at the meeting. The petitioner filed in Commonwealth Court, seeking to invoke the court's original jurisdiction, and he sought a writ of mandamus as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. Chris filed preliminary objections in response to the petition on various grounds. The Commonwealth Court agreed with our primary argument that it lacked original jurisdiction over the petitioner's claims because the school district (and, by extension, its board members) is a local agency and not an agency of the Commonwealth, and that the court could not assert ancillary jurisdiction because there were no other viable claims within the court's exclusive original jurisdiction. Also, although the court recognized that the petitioner could have challenged the school board's actions by filing a complaint under the Sunshine Act in the Court of Common Pleas, he failed to do so within 30 days of the December 2021 meeting. Thus, his claims by statute were untimely, and the court concluded that the transfer of his suit to Common Pleas Court would be futile. The court dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice.  

  • Successful Defense of School District and its Board Members

    The petitioner resides in the school district and is a former school board member. At its December 2021 reorganization meeting, the school board voted to appoint a new school district solicitor. The petitioner attempted to make public comment and object to the school board’s appointment of the solicitor, but he was not permitted to do so. The petitioner contended the school district and its board members violated the Sunshine Act and his right to free speech under the Pennsylvania Constitution by not allowing him to offer public comment at the meeting. The petitioner filed in Commonwealth Court, seeking to invoke the court’s original jurisdiction, and he sought a writ of mandamus as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. We filed preliminary objections in response to the petition on various grounds. The court agreed with our primary argument that it lacked original jurisdiction over the petitioner’s claims because the school district (and, by extension, its board members) is a local agency and not an agency of the Commonwealth, and that the court could not assert ancillary jurisdiction because there were no other viable claims within the court’s exclusive original jurisdiction. Also, although the court recognized that the petitioner could have challenged the school board’s actions by filing a complaint under the Sunshine Act in the Court of Common Pleas, he failed to do so within 30 days of the December 2021 meeting. Thus, his claims by statute were untimely, and the court concluded that the transfer of his suit to Common Pleas Court would be futile. The court dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice.

  • Successful defense of real estate agent investigated by the PA Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs (BPOA).

    The real estate agent represented a buyer in the purchase of a home in Adams County. Prior to closing, the buyer had the property’s septic system inspected, and the system passed the inspection. Several months after closing, the real estate agent’s client decided to sell the property. When the new prospective buyers had the septic system inspected, the system failed the inspection, and they would not agree to close until the client fixed the system. The client then learned after the fact that the original sellers had experienced many issues with the septic system, that the system had failed several prior inspections because the ground would not perc, and that the sellers failed to disclose this information when they sold the property to the client. The client filed a complaint against the real estate agent with the BPOA under the Real Estate Licensing and Registration Act, alleging the agent engaged in misrepresentation and unprofessional conduct, and claimed that the agent allegedly had knowledge of the prior history with the septic system but failed to disclose it to her. We were able to demonstrate to the BPOA investigator that the real estate agent had no knowledge of the prior history with the septic system, that neither the sellers nor their agent ever disclosed information about the system, and that if she was aware, she would have advised the client not to close on the purchase until the septic system was repaired. The BPOA declined to prosecute and closed its investigation.  

  • Claims against real estate agent dismissed.

    We successfully defended a real estate agent in a suit brought by the agent’s former client. Our client represented the plaintiff in connection with her purchase of a residential property with an on-lot septic system in Adams County, Pennsylvania. Prior to her purchase, the plaintiff had the septic system inspected by a home and septic inspection company, and the system passed the inspection. Four months after the plaintiff closed and moved into the property, she decided to sell. The plaintiff’s prospective buyers once again had the septic system inspected, but this time the system failed the inspection. The plaintiff claimed she was advised by a local septic contractor who had serviced the property for years that the system likely failed the inspection because the drain field would not perc (and had failed to perc many times in the past), and that the only remedy was to completely upgrade the septic system with a new holding tank. Because the plaintiff did not want her buyers to walk away from the sale, she decided to pay to upgrade the system at a significant expense. Once the sale was finalized, the plaintiff then sued our client, claiming the defendant knew or should have known that the septic system was faulty and that she should have advised the plaintiff not to purchase the property with the faulty system. After the plaintiff presented her case in chief, we moved to dismiss her complaint, arguing that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient, credible evidence that our client had any knowledge prior to the plaintiff’s purchase of the property that the septic system was faulty. The court agreed, granted the motion and entered judgment in our client’s favor.

  • Successful Defense of School District in a Special Education Due Process Matter

    The case involved a middle school student diagnosed with epilepsy and ADHD. Throughout middle school, the student was accommodated for his medical conditions through a 504 Service Agreement, and was provided intensive, small group instruction in reading and math as he struggled in those areas. The student was evaluated for special education twice by the school district, at the parents’ request, because they believed he might have a learning disability. The school district concluded both times that the student did not have a learning disability; however, the district also determined in the second evaluation that the student was eligible for special education with an Other Health Impairment, in light of his medical diagnoses. The school district presented the parents with an Individualized Education Plan (IEP) for the student, which they initially approved. Before the school district had a chance to implement the plan, however, the parents unilaterally withdrew the student from public school and placed him at a private school for children with special needs. In their complaint, the parents claimed the school district conducted inadequate evaluations and, therefore, failed to timely identify the student as eligible for special education (and to recognize his alleged learning disability), and that the school district denied the student a Free Appropriate Public Education by offering him an inadequate IEP. The parents also claimed the school district failed to take appropriate measures to prevent the student from being bullied by his peers. The family sought, among other relief, reimbursement for the cost of the private school at the school district’s expense, reimbursement for the cost of a private educational evaluation and a finding of intentional discrimination because of the school district’s response to the alleged bullying. After nine hearing sessions, the Hearing Officer found in favor of the school district on all claims. Preliminarily, the Hearing Officer agreed with our argument that the complaint was not timely filed and, therefore, much of the parents’ claim was precluded by the IDEA statute of limitations. The Hearing Officer also found that the school district’s evaluations were appropriate and that the family was not entitled to tuition reimbursement because there was insufficient evidence to show the private school was an appropriate placement. Additionally, the Hearing Officer concluded that the school district responded promptly and appropriately to the parents’ reports of alleged bullying and, therefore, the school district did not discriminate against the student. 

  • Successful defense of real estate agency and its agents.

    We obtained summary judgment on behalf of a Bedford County real estate agency and its agents, who represented the buyers/plaintiffs in their purchase of a home in Bedford, PA. Prior to closing, the plaintiffs waived their contractual right to a home inspection. After they closed and moved into the home, the plaintiffs became aware of several issues with the home, including a leaking metal roof, a defective heat pump and flooding in the crawlspace after a heavy rain. The plaintiffs claimed the sellers/defendants were aware of these conditions but knowingly failed to disclose them on the sellers’ disclosure statement. The plaintiffs also claimed our clients were negligent in failing to advise them about the alleged material omissions in the sellers’ disclosure statement and by not taking steps to try to ascertain whether there were any undisclosed defects in the property in light of the information that was omitted from the disclosure statement. The plaintiffs conceded during their deposition testimony that they reviewed and signed the disclosure statement, even though they did not ask any questions of our clients about its contents or the sections of the statement that were not completed by the sellers. The plaintiffs also acknowledged that our clients did not prepare the disclosure statement and that they had no actual knowledge of any of the alleged defects in the property at issue. In granting summary judgment, the court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to produce sufficient evidence in support of their negligence claim, and dismissed the claim, with prejudice.

  • Defense verdict in Pennsylvania Sunshine Act case.

    We obtained a defense verdict following a non-jury trial. This case was brought under Pennsylvania’s Sunshine Act, which governs the meetings of Commonwealth public agencies, including school boards. The plaintiffs were residents of a Centre County school district, and they sued the school board and its president, claiming they violated the Act in the manner by which they conducted public meetings. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged the board failed to state with sufficient specificity during the open portion of its meetings the reasons why it was convening privately in executive session, and because the board did not allow public comment at, or keep minutes of, its executive session meetings. After trial and post-trial briefing, the court, in a written opinion found for the defendants, concluding the board complied with the Act as it routinely and appropriately announced, in general terms, when it was convening in executive session to discuss contract, personnel and non-litigation legal matters. Finally, the trial court found as matter of law that the board was not required to allow public comment at, or keep minutes of, its work sessions because the work sessions are non-voting meetings at which the board does not “deliberate” or take any “official action,” as those terms are specifically defined by the Act.

  • School District Prevails Against Special Education Due Process Complaint

    We successfully defended a local school district in a special education due process complaint by the parent of a former student who was diagnosed with autism, learning disabilities and ADHD. ​The student had graduated from high school, completed all credits and earned a regular diploma. Yet, the parent claimed that while the student was still attending high school, the school district failed to provide the student with sufficient learning support in reading and math, appropriate social skills training, and adequate vocational and transition services to help the student with life after graduation. Also, the parent claimed the school district failed to take appropriate measures to protect the student from alleged bullying by his peers, including fellow members of the varsity football team. The hearing officer found for the school district on all issues and concluded the school district had provided the student with a free appropriate public education during all times in dispute. The hearing officer also found there was no evidence to suggest the school district had failed to respond appropriately to the parent’s and student’s reports of bullying.

  • Successful defense of real estate agency and its agents.

    The agents/agency represented the buyer/plaintiff in his purchase of a home in Dauphin County. ​The plaintiff claimed the agents failed to disclose to him prior to settlement that there were alleged defects in the A/C system and heat pump, and that the roof was old and needed to be replaced. The plaintiff paid for a home inspection report of the property, which noted the age and condition of the A/C, heat pump and roof, but the plaintiff claimed he never received the report, even though he discussed the report with one of the agents and authorized the agent to reply to the report on his behalf. The reply specifically asked the sellers to make repairs to the roof. As part of the defense, we argued that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by the release language in the agreement of sale, which specifically stated that the plaintiff agreed to release the agency and its agents from claims relating to any defects or conditions on the property, and that the release by its terms survived settlement. In addition, we argued that the plaintiff waived his claims, at least as to the costs to replace the A/C and heat pump, when he declined in writing a home warranty plan that was offered to him prior to settlement by the agents. By signing the home warranty application form stating he was declining the plan, the plaintiff agreed in writing not to hold the agency and agents liable for the repair or replacement of a system that would otherwise have been covered by the plan. We introduced testimony that that the A/C and heat pump would have been covered if they did need to be repaired or replaced. The court found for the agency and agents and entered judgment in their favor.

  • Successful Defense of Financial Planning/Investment Firm

    We were successful on a motion to dismiss an action against a financial planning and investment firm and its employee, a certified financial planner, filed in Federal District Court in Maryland. The plaintiffs claimed that the financial planner advised them to purchase a life insurance policy that was indexed to the stock market and that he made certain representations about the expected return on investment, which never came to fruition. Instead, according to the plaintiffs, the value of the policy plummeted, and they lost significantly on their investment. The court dismissed all claims against the firm, agreeing that the company could not be liable for the alleged advice given to the plaintiffs by the financial planner, inasmuch as the firm did not exist at the time the alleged advice was given. Also, the court dismissed a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against the financial planner, agreeing that both federal and state courts in Maryland do not recognize a standalone cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty when only monetary damages are sought. As well, the court dismissed a conversion claim against the financial planner, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to plausibly demonstrate the financial planner wrongfully exercised ownership or dominion over their finances.

  • Ex-Teacher’s Age Discrimination Claims Dismissed

    The defense prevailed on a motion for summary judgment in the Middle District of Pennsylvania on behalf of a local school district. The plaintiff, a former teacher, asserted claims of age discrimination and retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The defense argued in their motion that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie age discrimination claim or retaliation claim because she could not establish that she suffered from an adverse employment action. The court agreed and determined that the plaintiff's transfer to a new grade level, placement on an improvement plan, and voluntary resignation did not constitute adverse employment actions in order to establish her claims. Consequently, the court granted the school district's motion and dismissed all claims.

  • Successful Defense of School District Superintendent

    We successfully defended a superintendent of a Pennsylvania School District. The elementary teacher plaintiff was disciplined following an investigation into allegations that she struck a student. The plaintiff raised claims against the superintendent for intentional infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium, and violation of procedural due process. The defense argued that, as a superintendent, he was afforded high public official immunity and, therefore, the court dismissed the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The court also dismissed the loss of consortium claim as it was a derivative claim of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The court further held that the plaintiff was not deprived of her procedural due process rights, as she was given the opportunity through the teacher's union to arbitrate a grievance over her suspension. Consequently, the court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, with prejudice. 

  • Successful Defense of Real Estate Broker in Residential Transaction

    Successfully defended a Pennsylvania real estate broker who represented the seller in a residential real estate transaction. ​The homeowner-plaintiffs claimed that the seller and our client failed to disclose certain material defects in the property prior to closing. The plaintiffs’ complaint consisted of claims against our client for negligent misrepresentation and alleged violations of Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL) and Real Estate Sellers Disclosure Law (RESDL). In preliminary objections, the defense argued that the plaintiffs’ claims should fail as a matter of law because the complaint did not allege that our client had actual knowledge of any material defects or that our client made any misrepresentations concerning the property. The plaintiffs’ UTPCPL claim was premised primarily upon the Seller’s Property Disclosure Statement, which the court agreed did not apply to our client as our client did not prepare or sign the document, and because our client was not identified in the document as a source of any information about the property. The court dismissed the RESDL claim on similar grounds and held that the Disclosure Statement failed to identify any misrepresentation made by our client. Furthermore, the court emphasized the clear language in the RESDL, which provides that a seller’s agent shall not be liable for any violation of the RESDL unless the agent had actual knowledge of a material defect. 

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appeals Court Reverses Trial Court Order Awarding Attorney’s Fees Due to Lack of Evidence to Support Fee Awarded

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order awarding appellate fees to People’s Trust Insurance Company based upon a lack of evidence to support the attorney’s fee award in RM & Assocs. Consulting, Inc. v. People's Trust Ins. Co., 2026 Fla. App. LEXIS 4654 (Fla. 4th DCA 2026). People’s Trust was the insurer of a residential property that had sustained water damage. RM & Associates Consulting was hired by the homeowner to perform mitigation services at the property. The homeowner assigned post-loss benefits to RM and RM subsequently filed suit against People’s Trust alleging that it had not been paid the money it was owed for the mitigation services. People’s Trust defended the lawsuit on the ground that the policy required the insured to notify the insurer before authorizing repairs so People's Trust could elect to use its preferred contractor. Because the owner did not comply with that provision, People's Trust asserted its liability was limited to the amount that its preferred contractor would have charged for the work, which People's Trust contended was $2,000. People's Trust paid that amount to RM before RM filed suit. People’s Trust filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted. RM appealed the summary judgment ruling and the ruling was upheld by the Fourth District Court of Appeal. The appellate court also granted People’s Trust’s entitlement to appellate attorney’s fees, subject to the trial court’s determination of the amount of fees, based upon an offer of judgment made by People's Trust. On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of attorney’s fees People’s Trust was entitled to. At the hearing, People’s Trust presented testimony from it’s fee expert, supervising trial counsel and appellate counsel. People’s Trust sought recovery of $24,866.17 for work performed by appellate counsel. The request primarily consisted of work performed in preparation of the answer brief. The fee expert testified that more than ninety hours spent preparing the answer brief was reasonable given the complexity and significance of the underlying issue. The appellate court found that the fee expert’s testimony fell short of meeting the necessary standard of demonstrating that the hours expended were necessary. The appellate court found that the billing records did not serve to cure the deficient testimony, as the billing records did not contain adequate details regarding the specific tasks performed. Rather the records contained entries such as “answer brief” which the appellate court found to be insufficient. The appellate court noted that neither the fee expert or counsel addressed how the prior research and briefing in the parallel litigation informed the work in the instant matter. The appellate court noted this was significant in that a court's attorney's fees award must exclude excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary hours, citing Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985). Based upon the record failing to support the finding of the trial court, the 4th DCA remanded the case to the trial court for a reconsideration and redetermination of reasonable appellate attorney’s fees supported by competent substantial evidence. The 4th DCA reiterated that the fee expert’s focus on the quality of the work and the importance of the work to People’s Trust did not make up for the perceived deficiencies in the position that spending over ninety hours on a single answer brief was reasonable. Whether moving for attorney’s fees or challenging the amount of fees being sought by an opposing party, practitioners should be mindful of the evidence being used to support the claims being made. Parties should pay close attention to whether the hours being sought may be impacted by prior litigation either party may have engaged in. A party must be prepared to address how prior litigation efforts did or did not impact the amount of hours being claimed in current litigation. Lastly, billing records must be sufficiently detailed so as to support any potential future fee claim.

Thought Leadership

First DCA Reverses Excessive Jury Award Unsupported by the Evidence

In December 2019, the plaintiffs filed a claim with Universal for damages caused by a water and sewage back up through the plumbing system and existing through multiple fixtures including the washing machine drain, kitchen sink, dishwasher, bathtub and toilet. Universal investigated the claim, issued payment for resulting water damage totaling $7,000.00 in actual cash value ($12,000.00 in replacement cost value). The plaintiffs sought additional benefits for work needed to access the below-slab cast iron plumbing system due to the failure of the system from rust, deterioration, corrosion and breaks in the line. Universal denied any additional benefits for access. In 2021, the plaintiffs filed suit. During litigation, Universal sent a plumber to inspect the home and the plumber concluded the pipes were clogged but could be cleaned. The plaintiffs’ plumber testified that the plumbing system needed to be replaced due to holes and openings in the pipes. The plaintiffs introduced two estimates prepared by Triad Restoration services totaling $79,680.22 in replacement cost value and $50,219.97 in actual cash value and an executed contract with another company for repairs with the amounts of repair redacted. Since the insurance policy did not provide coverage for repair or replacement of the plumbing system, the jury only had to decide whether the plumbing system needed to be replaced, and if it did, Universal would owe for the access costs; the jury verdict form required the jury to determine both the replacement cost value and actual cash value amounts. The jury asked if it had to rely on the Triad estimates for their amounts. The trial court advised the amount awarded had to be based on the evidence presented at trial and the law given by the trial court. The jury awarded $335,000.00 in replacement cost value or $305,000.00 in actual cash value. Universal motioned for a new trial arguing the amount awarded was unsupported by the evidence and then moved for remittitur. The trial court denied both motions and this appeal followed. The court found that while a jury’s verdict should only be disturbed with caution and discretion, the trial court must give the properly challenged award close scrutiny and determine whether it bears a reasonable relation to the damaged provided, is supported by the evidence, and could have been reached in a logical manner by reasonable means §768.74(3), (5)(d)-(e), Fla. Stat. The court found the trial court did consider the statutory requirements at the hearing on Universal’s remittitur motion and was concerned about a reasonable relation to the amount of damages proved and injury suffered and whether the award was supported by the evidence, but ultimately denied the motion, reasoning that the jury had been properly instructed to fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiffs. The court noted the only evidence providing the basis for the jury verdict was Triad’s estimates and those valued the plaintiffs' claimed loss at $79,680.22 in replacement cost value and $50,219.97 in actual cash value; no valuation evidence reasonably supported the jury verdict. The plaintiffs argued that the jury was entitled to consider more than the estimates, but the court conveyed the evidence provided did not give the jury a way to reach the amounts they awarded. The court was also not swayed by the plaintiffs’ argument regarding inflation and later price increases, but the court noted that no evidence via the contract, nor testimony regarding increase in labor, material, fuel or construction costs were entered into the record.  The court concluded the jury may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, but it may not supply a damages number by speculation. The court did not find any of the plaintiffs’ remaining argument persuasive either. The court reversed the denial of Universal’s remittitur motion and motion for new trial as to damaged and remanded the case. The court ended its opinion with advising the trial court must determine whether replacement cost value or actual cash value is the property measure of damages under the policy and order remittitur in an amount consistent with that determination and the evidence.

Thought Leadership

United State District Court for the Middle District of Florida finds Evidence of Replacement Cost Value is Admissible and Recoverable Even When Repairs Have Not Been Made

The plaintiff filed a claim for damage as a result of Hurricane Ian. It claimed damages were over $24 million, but the carrier accepted partial coverage and paid $8,307.49 for secondary components. The carrier found hurricane damage to the building, but it was below the insurance policy’s $3.6 million deductible. The plaintiff sued for breach of the insurance policy. The carrier argued in a motion for summary judgment that plaintiff could not recover replacement cost value (RCV) because the property repairs had not been effectuated. The policy provided for RCV, but only after the repairs were completed. The carrier argued that because the repairs were not completed, the plaintiff was not entitled to RCV damages. The plaintiff argued the carrier could not withhold the actual cost value (ACV) due, which was the main allegation of the lawsuit, then fault it for not making the repairs to unlock the RCV. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida rejected the carrier’s argument, finding that when an insurer allegedly breached the policy by withholding coverage, it could not hide behind a repair-contingent provision to block the insured from RCV damages at trial. The court found the issue to be whether the contractual language designed to preclude certain coverage until after repairs are completed barred an insured from seeking those damages at trial when repairs were not complete. The court noted the Eleventh Circuit had not resolved this issue and neither side pointed to a definitive answer from the Florida Supreme Court. The court reasoned that it must look to the Sixth District Court of Appeal (6th DCA), which is the court which would have heard this case if it was in state court. The court noted the 6th DCA recently addressed this issue in Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez, 427 So. 3d 676 (Fla. 6th DCA 2026). The Rodriguez Court found that a breach of contract action is designed to adjudicate not only whether the contract was breached, but also evaluate the damages incurred had the breach not occurred, which the Rodriguez court found to be recovery of the RCV. This court also noted basic Florida contract principles compelled the same result, as a material breach frees the nonbreaching party to suspend its own performance and can demand the full benefit of its bargain, including RCV damages. Finally, the court found the distinction between a full denial and partial denial did not compel a different result. It found the policy required the carrier to acknowledge coverage and pay ACV for all covered damages, and the failure to do that is a material breach, entitling the insured to all of the damages available under the contract, which included the RCV.