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Christopher J. Conrad

Co-Chair, Special Education Law Practice Group

Portrait of Christopher J. Conrad

Chris is a member of the firm's Professional Liability Department, and he devotes a significant portion of his practice to the representation and defense of school districts, intermediate units, career and technology centers and other academic institutions in all manner of employment, civil rights and special education litigation. As a member of the Professional Liability Defense Federation, Chris currently serves as Vice Chair of the Municipal, School Leaders and Miscellaneous Liability Committee.

Chris is Co-Chair of the firm’s Special Education Law Practice Group, and his special education practice focuses on counseling clients and defending due process litigation involving a wide range of issues including claims of child find violations, denial of a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE), manifestation determinations and student discipline, appropriate educational programming and placement, and parents seeking private school placement at public expense. Chris has presented on a number of special education topics for school districts as well as for PBI’s Exceptional Children Conference, Lehigh University’s Special Education Law Conference and the National Business Institute.

Chris also represents public and private employers and their directors, officers, management and employees, in a variety of employment practices litigation under federal and state law, including defending claims of harassment, discrimination and retaliation, as well as whistleblower claims.

Additionally, Chris represents and defends licensed and certified professionals, including real estate agents and brokers, real estate appraisers, insurance agents and brokers, home inspectors, architects, engineers, surveyors, attorneys and accountants in E&O and related matters throughout Pennsylvania and Maryland.

Chris is a graduate of The Pennsylvania State University and The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law. During law school, Chris clerked for the Hon. Robert J. Woodside in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Chris also served as judicial law clerk for the Hon. Ronald B. Graves in the Civil Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey.

Chris is a certified mediator, and he works as a pro bono mediator for the Middle District of Pennsylvania mediation program and the Cumberland County Bar Association Fee Dispute Committee. For many years, Chris served as an adjunct instructor at the Penn State Dickinson School of Law for its Problem Solving I/ Law Practice I – Critical Skills course, and he assisted Dickinson’s National Mock Trial Team as both a judge and sparring attorney. Chris also devotes a portion of his time as a volunteer for the Wills for Heroes Program. Additionally, Chris is a Member of the Knights of Columbus Council 13100 and Saint Martin’s Assembly 2708.

    • Penn State Dickinson Law (J.D., 2001)
    • The Pennsylvania State University (B.A., 1998)
    • New Jersey, 2001
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2001
    • Pennsylvania, 2006
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2006
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2007
    • Maryland, 2018
    • U.S. District Court District of Maryland, 2018
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania, 2018
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 2021
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • Susquehanna Valley Select Lawyers™ (2014)
    • Cumberland County Bar Association, Member, Fee Dispute Committee
    • Knights of Columbus Council 13100 and Saint Martin’s Assembly 2708
    • Middle District of Pennsylvania Chapter of the Federal Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Assocation, Legal Services for Exceptional Children Committee
    • Professional Liability Defense Federation, Vice Chair, Municipal, School Leaders and Miscellaneous Liability Committee
    • Saint Thomas More Society
    • Certified Mediator, U.S. District Court, Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • Civil Rights Litigation, The Courts and the Community: An Educational Series for the Public, April 1, 2026
    • Left Behind? Today’s U.S. Department of Education and the Potential Impact on Special Education and Disability Services, PBI’s Exceptional Children Conference. October 24, 2025
    • Hot Topics in Employment Law, PBA Law Firm Administrators Conference, April 30, 2025
    • From Complaint to Appeal And Beyond: Litigating a Special Education Due Process Case, PBI Exceptional Children Conference, October 18, 2024.
    • UNcivil Discourse: The 1st Amendment and Regulating Speech at Public School Board Meetings, Professional Liability Defense Federation (PLDF) 2024 Annual Meeting, September 26, 2024
    • Extended School Year – It's Not Summer School, PBI Exceptional Children Conference, October 13, 2023
    • Special Education Litigation: Best Practices for Avoiding Liability, and Strategies for a Successful Defense, Professional Liability Defense Federation Annual Meeting, September 2022
    • Why Schools Need to Be Thinking About Title IX: Effectively Navigating the Evolving Legal Issues Surrounding Gender Identity, Professional Liability Defense Federation Annual Meeting, October 2021
    • Federal Law and the Art of Email Maintenance: When Must Emails Be Produced Under IDEA and FERPA, PBI Exceptional Children Conference, October 2019
    • Navigating the Bermuda Triangle: The Intersection of Workers' Compensation, the FMLA and the ADA, County Commissioners Association of Pennsylvania, March 2019
    • The Risks of Failing to Report School Leaders Liability Claims, Pennsylvania Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, October 2017
    • The Thin Blue Line in School, Lehigh University Special Education Law Conference, May 2017
    • Dyslexia: Much More Than What We Thought, Lehigh University Special Education Law Conference, May 2016 
    • Advanced Functional Behavior Assessments and Behavior Support Plans, PBI Exceptional Children Conference, October 2015
    • Successfully Handling Disciplinary Actions for Special Needs Students, National Business Institute, December 2014
    • Best Practices for Technology and Social Media in the Workplace, Estate Planning Council of Central Pennsylvania, Inc., February 2014
    • Insurance Agents and Brokers Best Claims Practices in Claims Administration and Underwriting, Liberty Mutual Insurance, December 2013
    • Avoiding Liability in Special Education, Central Dauphin School District, August 2013
    • PBA Malpractice Avoidance Program, Perry County Bar Association, April 2013
    • Avoiding Legal Malpractice, PBA Malpractice Avoidance Program, Adams County Bar Association, April 2012
    • Avoiding Liability as Sellers' Agents in Residential Real Estate Transactions, Particularly with Regard to the Disclosure of Material Defects in the Property, Educational Development School of Real Estate, March 2012
    • Malpractice Avoidance Program, PBA Malpractice Avoidance Program, Mifflin and Juniata County Bar Associations, October 2011
    • PBA Malpractice Avoidance Program, Dauphin County Bar Association, August 2011
    • Avoiding Liability in Special Education, Pottsville Area School District, August 2011
    • Avoiding Liability in Special Education, Palmyra Area School District, August 2010
    • “Let’s Give a Cheer for Free Speech: U.S. Supreme Court Holds School District Cannot Discipline Cheerleader for Off-Campus Snapchat Posts,” Professional Liability Defense Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2021
    • "Bullies In the Schoolyard and Beyond: Avoiding and Defending Federal Bullying Claims Against Schools and School Leaders," Professional Liability Defense Quarterly, Vol. 13, Issue 1, 2021
    • "Educating Pa.'s Special Needs Students During the COVID-19 Pandemic," The Legal Intelligencer, May, 2020
    • “This Is Exhausting! Parents of Special Needs Children Who Allege Educational Harm Must Exhaust Administrative Remedies Under the IDEA Before Filing Lawsuit," Lorman, August 2017 
    • “This Is Exhausting! Parents of Special Needs Children Who Allege Educational Harm Must Exhaust Administrative Remedies Under the IDEA Before Filing Lawsuit,” Defense Digest, Vol. 23, No. 1, March 2017
    • "The IDEA Statute of Limitations (Finally!) Explained," Defense Digest, Vol. 21, No. 4, December 2015
    • "Does At-Will Employment Still Exist in Pennsylvania?," The Legal Intelligencer, Labor & Employment Supplement, June 24, 2014
    • "State Courts May Exercise Jurisdiction in Legal Malpractice Actions Arising Out of Patent Litigation," Defense Digest, Vol. 19, No. 2, June 2013
    • "The Third Circuit Holds That Private Employers Are Not Prohibited By Bankruptcy Code From Denying Employment To Individuals Who Previously Filed For Bankruptcy," Defense Digest, Vol. 17, No. 2, June, 2011
    • "Forum The Bell Tolls: Plaintiffs Lose Challenge To Validity Of Forum Selection Clause In Their Auto Insurance Policy," Defense Digest, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2010
    • "Ninth Circuit Holds Private Tuition Is Reimbursable Under IDEA Even Though Student Never Received Special Education From School District," Defense Digest, Vol. 14, No. 4, December, 2008
    • "Remedies for Disabled Students Curtailed," New Jersey Law Journal, Vol. CXCI, No. 2, Jan. 14, 2008
    • "School's Out: The Third Circuit Precludes Use of 42 U.S.C. 1983 to Remedy Violations of IDEA and the Rehabilitation Act," Defense Digest, Vol. 13, No. 3, September, 2007
    • "Pennsylvania Superior Court Limits Duty Of Insurance Brokers," Defense Digest, Vol. 12, No. 4, December, 2006
    • Godfrey v. Southern York County School District, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96736 (M.D. Pa. 2019) (summary judgment in favor of school district dismissing ADEA age discrimination and retaliation claims by former teacher)
    • Defense verdict following jury trial representing insurance agency and its owner in case involving claims of professional negligence.
    • K.E. v. Lincoln Intermediate Unit, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163489 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (summary judgment dismissing claims against intermediate unit by former student alleging Title IX and 1983 civil rights violations)
    • Rohrbaugh v. Lincoln Intermediate Unit, 255 F. Supp. 3d 589 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (dismissal of claims against intermediate unit by student under 504 of Rehabilitation Act of 1973 for failure to exhaust administrative remedies
    • Judge v. Shikellamy School District, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65694 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (summary judgment dismissing claims by former principal alleging violation of Procedural Due Process rights, breach of employment contract and constructive discharge).
    • Defense award at arbitration in declaratory judgment action brought against condominium association.
    • A.V. v. Capital Area Intermediate Unit, ODR File No. 18090-1617 (successful defense of intermediate unit in special education due process hearing)
    • Hollinghead v. York City Sewer Authority, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43202 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (Summary judgment dismissing Title VII, PHRA and 1983 claims by a City employees alleging race discrimination and retaliation).
    • Schuback v. Law Office of Phillip S. VanEmbden, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18379 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (Judgment on the pleadings in favor of attorneys sued for alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act).
    • Thomas v. Thomas, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83320 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (Dismissal of 14th Amendment claims against an attorney for alleged abuse of process and wrongful use of civil proceedings).
    • Munir v. Pottsville Area School District, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82966 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (Summary judgment dismissing action by parent against school district under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and Rehabilitation Act).
    • Hocker v. CitiMortgage, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76867 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (Dismissal of claims against mortgage lender under the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act by alleged victim of a housing fraud scam).
    • Baltimore v. Harrisburg Parking Authority, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59508 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (Summary judgment dismissing action against parking authority by former employee who claimed she was terminated from her employment in violation of her 1st and 14th Amendment rights).
    • Gregory v. Derry Township School District, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1875 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (Summary judgment dismissing claims against school district, administrators and school board members in action by former teacher who alleged she was terminated from her employment in violation of her federal civil rights).
    • Walsh v. Dallastown Area School District, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71266 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (Summary judgment dismissing claims by parent and students against school district, administrators and staff members of claims brought under federal and state wiretap laws and 4th Amendment).
    • Defense award at arbitration in negligence action brought against insurance agency and owners of the agency.

Results

Summary Judgment Obtained for a Homeowners’ Association

We secured summary judgment for a homeowners’ association. The plaintiff owned an apartment in a planned community and sought to drill a hole through the exterior wall of the building to vent an HVAC unit. The HOA denied his request, and the plaintiff asserted claims of negligence and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealings, alleging that the HOA treated him unfairly by denying his request. Despite providing numerous photos of other holes through the exterior wall of the building, the plaintiff admitted during his deposition that they did not know whether the HOA had ever permitted another unit owner to drill a hole in the exterior wall. We successfully argued that the plaintiff could not put forth any evidence demonstrating unfair treatment, or that the request had been denied in bad faith. 

Secured Dismissal of a Suit Against a Dauphin County School District

We achieved dismissal of a suit against a school district by way of preliminary objections. The Dauphin County case involved allegations that the district deprived the plaintiffs of certain educational rights, premised on procedural due process violations, negligence and subornation of perjury. Preliminary objections were filed to the plaintiffs’ original complaint on both procedural and substantive grounds. Following the filing of an amended complaint and additional preliminary objections on similar grounds, argument was held. As a result, the court agreed with the defendant and dismissed the plaintiffs’ amended complaint with prejudice. 

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Special Education Law

The Office for Dispute Resolution’s Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2024 Details Due Process Filings, Bureau of Special Education Complaints

March 5, 2026

In late November 2025, the Office for Dispute Resolution (ODR) released its annual report for fiscal year 2024 (July 1, 2024 - June 30, 2025).  In the report, the ODR provided detailed information about due process litigation in Pennsylvania for the entire fiscal year. In all, there were 900 requests for due process filed with ODR, a slight decrease from fiscal year 2023, which saw 958 cases filed. A majority of the cases were filed on behalf of parents/guardians/students by legal counsel, although 112 cases were filed pro se. Most of the 900 cases involved claims under the IDEA/Chapter 14 for school-age/non-gifted students. Only 14 cases were filed solely under Section 504/Chapter 15. As has been the case for the past 20 years, due process litigation was most active in the City of Philadelphia and the southeastern Pennsylvania counties approximate to the city. There were 236 requests for due process filed within Philadelphia Intermediate Unit 26 alone.  More than 50 requests for due process were filed within Montgomery County Intermediate Unit 23 (84), Delaware County Intermediate Unit 25 (76), and Bucks County Intermediate Unit 22 (53). The only other intermediate units outside southeastern Pennsylvania that saw more than 50 due process filings were the Northeastern Educational Intermediate Unit 19 (65) and the Allegheny Intermediate Unit 3 (53). For all school-age/non-gifted cases, the most predominant issue raised in the due process filings involved the IEP (development/implementation), with 442 occurrences. The next most prevalent issue was compensatory education (425 occurrences) followed by school evaluations (192 occurrences). Although 900 due process cases were filed during fiscal year 2024, only 55 resulted in a written hearing officer decision. Most of the cases ended in a negotiated resolution, either outside of the IDEA resolution period (357 cases) or during the resolution period (214 cases).  Nearly 150 cases were either dismissed outright (24 cases) or voluntarily withdrawn (123 cases).  A significant number of cases filed in fiscal year 2024 remained active at of the end of the fiscal year and carried over into the next fiscal year (127 cases).  Causes of the 24 case dismissals included a lack of hearing officer jurisdiction (10 cases), improper party name (4), res judicata/mootness (4), a case being consolidated with another case (4) or no response from the parent (2). As to the 55 cases in which a hearing officer issued a written decision, the hearing officer found for the LEA in 21 cases, for the parent in 18 cases, and for both the parent and LEA in 16 cases. Notably, of these 55 cases, 21 involved pro se litigants.  The hearing officer found for the LEA in 14 of the pro se cases and for the parent/ guardian in 4 of the cases. In three of the pro se cases, the hearing officer found for the parent in part and the LEA in part. Also of note, during fiscal year 2024,19 cases were appealed to federal court, and only one case was appealed to state court. Only four of these appeals involved due process requests filed during fiscal year 2024, as the balance of the due process cases at issue were filed prior to 2024. Of the appeals filed during fiscal year 2024, parents were responsible for 75% of the filings.  Three of the appeals dealt solely with the issue of attorney fees. At the close of fiscal year 2024, 17 of the 20 cases were still pending on appeal. One case was dismissed following a settlement, another based upon the final resolution of a separate but related matter, and a third following a court-approved settlement. In that instance, the case was marked settled on the docket, and the court vacated its prior order remanding the case to the hearing officer.  Thirteen of the federal court appeals were filed with the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, three with the Middle District of Pennsylvania, and three with the Western District of Pennsylvania. ODR also reported on compliance complaints filed with the Bureau of Special Education (BSE), including complaints under Section 504/Chapter 15. In all, 179 complaints were filed with BSE.  Of these cases, 50 resolved with a finding by BSE of LEA non-compliance. Seven complaints were dismissed or held in abeyance as the issues were being addressed in a due process complaint and 68 of the complaints were either resolved, withdrawn, or dismissed for not falling within the jurisdiction of the BSE. For more information on ODR’s Annual Report, see: https://odr-pa.us12.list-manage.com/track/click?u=e6553c8850beb32e3c7ea9c8c&id=a1449490fc&e=bf4ea9f318

Legal Updates for Real Estate E&O Liability

When Is a Symbol of Hate Not a Material Defect in Property?

February 1, 2026

Daniel and Lynn Rae Wentworth purchased a home in Beaver County, Pennsylvania from Juergen Steinmetz. According to their complaint, after moving into the home, the Wentworths discovered a swastika under rugs in the basement and what they perceived to be a Nazi eagle incorporated into the floor tile pattern. The Wentworths claimed that had they previously known about the symbols in the floor tile, they would not have purchased the home. They also alleged that they could not be expected to live in the home in that condition, nor could they sell the home, and that it would cost $30,000.00 to remove the symbols and replace the floor tile. The Wentworths filed suit against Steinmetz under the Pennsylvania Real Estate Seller Disclosure Law (RESDL), alleging he failed to disclose a “material defect” in the property prior to closing, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Steinmetz filed preliminary objections in response to the complaint denying creating the floor pattern in support of Nazism. Steinmetz argued that the swastika is an ancient symbol embraced by various world cultures, and that its existence predates use by the Nazis. Yet, the Wentworths argued that since the swastika in the floor, “styled in the fashion that [was] used by the Nazis,” was situated in such close proximity to the German eagle, no reasonable person could believe the symbols were intended to be imagery referencing any other culture. For purposes of resolving the preliminary objections, the court set aside Steinmetz’s “subjective intent” and accepted the Wentworths’ allegations that these were indeed pro-Nazi symbols, and would be viewed as such to guests in the home or to prospective buyers. Steinmetz also argued that even accepting the Wentworths’ allegations as true, the symbols in the floor tile were not a “material defect” that he was required to disclose to prospective buyers. Relying in part on Milliken v. Jacono, 103 A. 3d 806 (Pa. 2014), he argued that attributes of a property giving rise to a psychological stigma, like the alleged Nazi symbols in the floor, are not material defects required to be disclosed under the RESDL. The trial court agreed, and found that Milliken foreclosed the Wentworths’ claims. Although the trial court recognized the imagery in the floor was “disturbing,” it was still merely a cosmetic flaw that could be covered up, and it was not a physical or structural property that posed an unreasonable risk or an impediment to the use and enjoyment of the property. The trial court sustained the preliminary objections and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court revisited Milliken, considering whether the occurrence of a murder and suicide in a home was an undisclosed material defect justifying a cause of action. The Supreme Court in Milliken concluded it was not, reasoning the deaths did “not constitute an actionable material defect,” and in so holding noted the myriad “traumatizing events that could occur on a property” and that “[e]fforts to define those that warrant mandatory disclosure would be a Sisyphean task.” Milliken, 103 A. 3d at 807, 810. The Superior Court agreed and concluded the Wentworths’ claims failed “because they suffer from the same lack of an objectively-quantifiable flaw as the one alleged in Milliken.” The Superior Court further reasoned: In each scenario, the existence, and degree, of the defect is in the eye of the beholder. Certainly, a significant portion of homebuyers would eschew a house with a crude mosaic of Nazi iconography in its basement. Yet there is, sadly but undeniably, a segment of the population who would deem it an asset to the property. Further, even among the majority of prospective buyers who would not welcome having hate symbols adorning their basement floor, the degree to which the images impacted the value of the property would inevitably vary from person to person. Relying on Milliken, the Superior Court noted, “that condition of the property constituting a material defect must be one that not only substantially impacts the value of the real estate, but lends itself to recognition and quantification by objective standards.” Although the Superior Court was sensitive to “the Wentworths’ outrage [and] their concern that the existence of the images could taint them as Nazi supporters,” still the court found “that that the symbols on the Wentworths’ otherwise sound and functional tile floor do not constitute a material defect that Steinmetz had a duty to disclose.” The decision of the trial court was affirmed.  Although the seller in Wentworth was successful in defending the lawsuit, real estate professionals should still discuss with their seller clients whether there may be a hidden aesthetic characteristic in the home that a potential buyer might find to be offensive, particularly if it is not discovered until after closing. While such a characteristic ultimately may not arise to a “material defect” under the RESDL, it still could lead to costly litigation that the seller (and perhaps the seller’s agent and broker) might have to defend.  Real estate professionals may wish to advise their seller clients to remove any such hidden characteristic even before the property is listed for sale. This will help to avoid needless litigation down the road and also likely will expand the pool of potential buyers. For further reading, see: Wentworth v. Steinmetz, 2025 PA Super 253, --- A. 3d --- (2025).

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Court Reaffirms That Actual Cash Value Includes Labor and Overhead, Not Just Materials

Greenaker v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., Case No. 2D2024-1964, (Fla. 2nd DCA May 8, 2026). The plaintiffs filed a breach of contract suit against Universal for refusal to pay for all of plaintiffs’ damages from a storm in November 2020. Universal filed a motion in limine to prevent the plaintiffs from introducing evidence concerning both actual cash value and replacement cost value of the loss. They argued that the plaintiffs did not complete repairs or incur any expenses in repairing the damaged property, thus being limited to actual cash value as their measure of damage and the plaintiffs’ submitted estimate of damages contained labor costs necessary for repair and, therefore, not an actual cash value estimate. Universal further asked for a directed verdict at the hearing because the plaintiffs would have no evidence to support the claim for damages. The trial court agreed and granted Universal’s motion, entering a final judgment in Universal’s favor.  The plaintiffs filed a motion for rehearing and reconsideration due to the court improperly converting Universal’s motion in limine to a motion for final summary judgment. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion and the plaintiffs appealed. The Second District Court of Appeal agreed with the plaintiffs and determined that the trial court improperly entered a final judgment based on a pretrial ruling in limine, advising there was recognized procedures, including summary judgment, judgment on the pleadings, and default judgment that could have been exercised. Further, the court continued that the improper procedure was not the only reason for the judgment to be reversed. They noted the insurance policy did not provide a definition of actual cash value nor how to calculate it, and the parties disputed the definition and calculation of such.  Universal argued that actual cash value is defined as the value of the property that suffered the direct physical loss less depreciation and deductible, i.e. costs of physical materials that were damaged.  The plaintiffs argued that actual cash value includes the amount of repair costs in addition to the value of the property that suffered direct physical loss because it is calculated as the replacement cost minus depreciation.  The court agreed with the plaintiffs, noting that Universal’s definition was not supported by the insurance contract, the statute governing replacement value insurance contracts, nor decisional authority.  The court noted that Universal “cherry-picked” the phrase “direct physical loss” from the perils insured against provision and applied it to the loss settlement provision, which doesn’t state “direct physical loss,” but instead states “insured loss.”  Further, the court conveyed that application of “direct physical loss” would be used on both actual cash value and replacement cost value, as they are both present in the loss settlement provision, which would mean insureds never got payments beyond costs of physically damaged material, which is contradictory to the replacement cost value definition.  The court advised that the Florida Supreme Court had approved the court’s interpretation of actual cash value as including costs other than damaged physical property, including overhead and profit, noting that these costs can be included in actual cash value to which a portion, like all other costs, could be depreciated. The court noted the difference between actual cash value and replacement cost value is not between types of costs, i.e. materials vs. labor, but between the valuation of the costs with the distinction of being a depreciated vs. undepreciated value. The court refused to exclude intangible costs such as labor, profit and overhead from actual cash value, finding these costs inclusions were consistent with statutory and contractual language as well as Florida Supreme Court precedent. The court reversed the judgment and remanded the case back to the trial court.

News

Marshall Dennehey’s John J. Hare Brings Home Attorney of the Year Honors; Firm Named Litigation Department of the Year in Two Categories

Marshall Dennehey took home top honors in three categories at the The Legal Intelligencer’s 2026 Pennsylvania Legal Awards, held June 11 in Philadelphia. The first place awards include: Attorney of the Year: John J. Hare, Chair of the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post-Trial Practice Group and Executive Committee member, together with Charles “Chip” Becker of Kline & Specter Litigation Department of the Year, Appellate – Third Win in a Row! Litigation Department of the Year, Product Liability/Mass Torts “There is no one more deserving of Attorney of the Year honors than John. This award is a testament to his exceptional skill, dedication, and leadership—qualities that truly exemplify the very best of our firm,” said G. Mark Thompson, Marshall Dennehey’s President & CEO. “These honors also reflect the strength and depth of our product liability, mass torts, and appellate practices across Pennsylvania and beyond, underscoring our ongoing commitment to delivering outstanding results for our clients.” Attorney of the Year – John J. Hare, Marshall Dennehey, together with Charles “Chip” Becker, Kline & Specter Over the past year, John and Charles were opposing counsel in many of the highest-profile civil appeals in Pennsylvania. John is renowned as a preeminent appellate lawyer on the defense side, and Chip on the plaintiff's side. They have opposed each other repeatedly, exhibiting peerless professionalism and exceptional civility, while zealously litigating under the unremitting pressure of high-profile litigation and record-setting verdicts totaling more than $3.5 billion. They have also collaborated, outside of litigation, on many commissions, committees, and projects of importance to the Pennsylvania judiciary and legal community. Litigation Department of the Year – Appellate Law, Winner (previous winner, 2025 and 2024) 2025 was another standout year for the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post‑Trial Practice Group, led by John J. Hare, which was retained to challenge many of Pennsylvania’s “nuclear” verdicts—awards exceeding $10 million. Notably, the department persuaded the Pennsylvania Superior Court to reverse a Philadelphia judgment of $1.09 billion, the largest judgment ever overturned by a Pennsylvania appellate court. The group’s 11 full‑time Pennsylvania‑based appellate lawyers are at the center of Pennsylvania’s most high-profile matters, bringing more than 150 years of combined appellate experience. They routinely handle post‑trial and appellate matters and are frequently engaged to participate in and monitor trials in high‑exposure cases to ensure that critical legal issues are properly raised and preserved for appeal. Litigation Department of the Year – Product Liability/Mass Torts, Winner This marks the first win for the firm’s Pennsylvania Product Liability and Mass Torts practices, which operate within our Casualty Department, managed by Matthew Schorr and Jeff Rapattoni. For almost five decades, Fortune 500 product manufacturers/distributors and their insurers have turned to these groups to defend their litigation. Led by Bradley D. Remick and Vlada Tasich, our Product Liability group’s success can be attributed to its commitment to keeping abreast of ever-changing legal theories, judicial viewpoints, and evolving technology impacting the product liability landscape. Our attorneys have successfully handled thousands of product liability matters in all jurisdictions across the state. Likewise, our mass tort litigation practice – divided into Asbestos & Mass Tort, and Environmental & Toxic Tort Litigation –  has defended manufacturers, distributors, contractors, and premises owners in thousands of personal injury and other claims. Led by Kevin E. Hexstall and Patrick T. Reilly, most attorneys in these groups have more than 20 years of experience, and our seasoned trial team has tried hundreds of cases to verdict, consistently achieving strong results through both trials and settlements. In addition to these awards, Marshall Dennehey was a Litigation Department of the Year finalist for Professional Liability.

Thought Leadership

Appeals Court Reverses Trial Court Order Striking Complaint as Sanction for Violating Discovery Order

All Dry USA v. Savell, 2026 WL 816093 (Fla. 1st DCA 2026) The First District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order denying All Dry USA’s complaint as a sanction for violating a discovery order. The appellate court found that All Dry USA’s failure to comply with the trial court’s case management order did not give the trial court the authority to strike All Dry USA’s pleadings. All Dry USA provided water mitigation, mold remediation, and a restorative tarp at the property owned by the Savells. The property had been damaged by Hurricane Sally. All Dry USA provided invoices for the three services it performed in the amount of $90,130.61. The Savells refused to pay the invoices, stating that while they had retained All Dry USA, there was no agreement reached regarding the cost of the services. All Dry USA proceeded to file a lawsuit against the Savells, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The Savells answered the lawsuit and served discovery upon All Dry USA. All Dry USA failed to respond to the discovery requests and the Savells moved for an order compelling discovery. The trial court issued an order compelling All Dry USA to respond to Savells discovery requests and comply with all outstanding discovery deadlines per the case management order. On the day its responses were due, All Dry USA filed a motion to extend the deadline to comply with the court’s order. Before the motion was ruled upon, the Savells filed a motion to have All Dry USA’s complaint stricken for violating the trial court’s order compelling All Dry USA’s responses. The trial court granted the motion to strike, and then granted the Savell’s request for entry of default final judgment, based upon there no longer being an operative complaint. The First District Court of Appeal reversed, ruling that an order striking pleadings is justified if it is found that a party has violated numerous discovery orders, or has shown a “deliberate and contumacious disregard of the court's authority.” Mercer v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944, 946 (Fla. 1983). The appellate court stated that a trial court’s authority to strike pleadings is not unbridled and that the situation before the court did not justify the striking of All Dry USA’s pleadings. In reaching its decision, the First District focused on the fact that the trial court only addressed the potential prejudice to Savell by All Dry USA failing to respond to discovery and seeking an extension of the deadline. The appellate court stated that prejudice is not the only factor to be considered and that the trial court needed to address if All Dry USA’s behavior in failing to comply with the discovery order was willful and deliberate.  The First District also stated that nothing in rule 1.200 or 1.380 grants a trial court the authority to strike a pleading because certain case management deadlines are not met. The appellate court held that the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure allow trial courts to bring the parties in, order them to comply with the case management discovery deadlines, and then strike pleadings if the subsequent discovery orders are disobeyed. This ruling shows the importance of understanding the authority that is binding on the trial court a party is appearing in front of. The First District’s view on a trial court’s ability to strike pleadings is in contrast with other appellate court’s throughout Florida.

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Perlmutter Provides Predictability for Punitive Damages Claims in Florida

In a much anticipated decision, the Florida Supreme Court provided clarity for the standards of proof for punitive damages claims in Perlmutter v. Federal Insurance Company, SC2024-0058 (Fla. June 11, 2026). Litigants and trial judges must be mindful of the standards laid out by the Court. And, defense practitioners must be prepared to alter their strategies to defend against such claims. Perlmutter came to the Court from the Fourth District, based on conflict jurisdiction with decisions from the Second and Fifth District and on certification of a question of great public importance as to the standard of proof for punitive damages claims at the pleading stage. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Perlmutter, 376 So. 3d 24, 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). In the underlying case, the Fourth District made two conclusions. First, it held that a “trial court must consider the evidentiary showing by all parties at the hearing on the motion to amend, that is, evidence ‘in the record’ and evidence ‘proffered by the claimant.’”  376 So. 3d at 33. Second, the Fourth held that it “interpreted section 768.72(1) and (2) to require the trial court to make a preliminary determination of whether a reasonable jury, viewing the totality of proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the movant, could find by clear and convincing evidence that punitive damages are warranted.  Id. at 34 (underscoring in the original). In making these conclusions, the court cautioned trial courts that the “preliminary determination” analysis did not entitle the trial court to decide whether the evidence is clear and convincing and noted that the trial court should not weigh evidence and should not determine witness credibility. Id. The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction and answered the certified question in the negative. It quashed the decision below and remanded the case for application of the following standards: The trial court should consider only the evidence identified or proffered by the claimant; it should not entertain an evidentiary counter-submission from the opponent. The trial court should consider whether a reasonable person could conclude based on the claimant’s evidence, that the defendant committed “intentional misconduct” or “gross negligence” as defined in section 768.72(2) or section 768.72(3). The trial court must review the request for punitive damages in the context of the underlying claims. The trial court should not apply the clear and convincing standard of proof in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence at the pleading stage. The trial court does not act as a fact-finder; the trial court must not weigh the claimant’s evidence—it cannot decide the truth of the matter. The trial court must consider the record evidence and the proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but the allegations in the proposed amended complaint are not themselves evidence. Perlmutter, SC2024-0058 at 13-15 (emphasis added). In explaining these standards, the Court interpreted the text of the statute and compared it to a related statute which governs punitive damages in the nursing home context. The nursing home statute expressly calls for evidentiary submissions by “the parties” and expressly tells the trial court to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant could satisfy the “clear and convincing evidence” standard at trial. Id. at 17-18 (comparing the text of section 768.72(1), Florida Statutes, with section 400.0237, Florida Statutes). Without that express language in section 768.72, the statute could not be applied in the same manner. With these standards specially delineated for the trial courts, the Court is “confident that its interpretation of section 768.72(1) will not frustrate the effectiveness of the statute in accomplishing the Legislature’s textually evident purposes.” Id.  at 22 (cleaned up). This remains to be seen. While Perlmutter provides predictability and clarity for trial courts when reviewing the evidentiary submissions in support of a punitive damages claim, the decision will not likely impact the numbers of punitive damages motions filed. Rather, these new parameters will change the way claims are defended, reminiscent of a time when rulings on punitive damages were only subject to certiorari review and appellate courts were limited in reviewing procedural errors. This decision will likely deflate the level-playing field that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(G) addressed by allowing appeals of orders granting and denying punitive damages amendments. Further, Perlmutter may have impliedly created a call to action for the Legislature to amend section 768.72(1) in the same manner it amended section 400.0237 to allow the courts to analyze “admissible evidence submitted by the parties” and determine at a hearing whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant at trial would be able to demonstrate by “clear and convincing evidence” that the recovery of punitive damages is warranted. Until then, defendants must adjust their strategies. To adapt to these new standards, defense practitioners will need to tailor their strategy for defending punitive damages claims since they can no longer submit a counter-proffer or urge a court to apply the clear and convincing standard at the pleading phase. Instead, defendants will need to attack the deficiencies in the claimant’s pleadings and proffer. If the trial court fails to serve as a gatekeeper, and does not apply the above standards, then defendants can pursue an interlocutory appeal under Rule 9.130(a)(3)(G). If a nonfinal appeal is taken, then defendants should move to stay any intrusive financial discovery while the appellate court analyzes the issues on appeal. Finally, defendants should utilize Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510 to serve as a screening device to allow the trial court to analyze all evidence and prevent nonmeritorious punitive damages claims from proceeding to a jury.