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Adam C. Calvert

Shareholder

ACCalvert@mdwcg.com

Portrait of Adam C. Calvert

Adam Calvert is a shareholder in the firm's Casualty Department where he represents clients in the fields of construction injury litigation, retail liability, automobile litigation, trucking and transportation litigation, product liability actions, and amusements, sports and recreation liability.  His clients include retail stores, construction companies, maintenance companies, amusement parks, theaters and product retailers, among other clients.  

Adam has extensive experience representing clients in labor law cases, including those involving Labor Law 240(1) claims. Many of the plaintiffs in these cases allege serious debilitating injuries that prevent them from working again and the settlement demands are often in the multi-million-dollar range.  In addition to defending these claims, Adam has also successfully brought third-party actions against subcontractors to defend and indemnify his clients.

Adam also has experience defending clients against claims involving staged accidents, often linked to organized fraud rings. He works closely with the firm’s special investigations unit (SIU) and industry experts to uncover patterns of fraud, challenge questionable claims, and mitigate risk for clients. Adam also represents a variety of automobile clients.  He has handled numerous commercial and personal trucking and vehicle accidents from investigation through trial.  In addition to representing these automobile clients, he has also represented rideshare companies, obtaining some of the first summary judgment decisions in their favor in New York.

Adam also handles a large amount of retail and premises liability cases.  These cases involve everything from slip and falls to design and construction defects to assaults and inadequate security claims. He regularly works with experts and investigators to present the best defense for his client, but in doing so, he always takes a practical approach to the litigation by not needlessly retaining these experts and always does so with a purpose.

Since joining the firm, Adam has handled many high-exposure cases where the plaintiff's alleged damages have the potential for a seven-figure recovery.  For example, he has handled multi-fatality automobile accidents, construction site falls and traumatic product liability injuries.  In these, and in all of his cases, he conducted site inspections and investigations, conducted all parts of discovery, drafted and argued summary judgment motions, and successfully settled cases at mediation.  Throughout his cases, Adam always works closely with his clients to guide their cases to a successful resolution.  He also prides himself on maintaining good relationships with opposing counsel to avoid needless disputes that waste time and money and do nothing to resolve the case.  

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Adam worked at a New York City law firm where he represented one of the country's largest construction management companies and the area's largest cable television company.

Adam is a graduate of Fordham University School of Law where he was a competitor on the Moot Court Team, the chairman of the Unemployment Action Committee, and a member of the International Law Journal and Federal Litigation Clinic.  He received a Bachelor of Arts from the University of Maryland-College Park.

    • Fordham University School of Law (J.D., 2009)
    • University of Maryland (B.A., 2004)
    • New York, 2009
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of New York, 2010
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of New York, 2010
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • New York Metro Super Lawyer Rising Star (2015-2023)

  • Successfully obtained summary judgment in a multi-vehicle collision case before the Kings County Supreme Court. Our client was stopped at a red light when their vehicle was hit from behind, causing it to propel into another vehicle directly in front of it. We filed for summary judgment, which was granted after the court found that the vehicle that rear-ended our client was responsible creating a chain reaction, resulting in the damage of multiple vehicles.

    Successfully defended a Labor Law 240(1) case where the demand was reduced from $750,000 to a settlement of $150,000. The plaintiff was a roofer who fell after improperly using his retractable harness.  The plaintiff suffered debilitating back injuries requiring several surgeries. 
    Successfully settled a case for a nuisance value where the plaintiff's demand was over $500,000.  The plaintiff alleged that our client negligently built a handicapped ramp.  Neither the plaintiff nor the other codefendants realized that the ramp that the plaintiff fell over had been rebuilt since Adam's client had built the original ramp.  Adam was the only attorney to realize this fact after careful inspection of the ramp with his expert.  When this fact was revealed at mediation, the plaintiff and codefendants were left without any claim against Adam's client, and he was able to obtain an easy settlement.

    Obtained a summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's case against an out-of-possession owner of a building where the plaintiff was injured on an elevator.

    Obtained a summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's labor law claims where a pry bar broke, causing a wall to fall on the plaintiff.

    Obtained a summary judgment and indemnity from a subcontractor on behalf of a construction management company in a case where the plaintiff's settlement demand was over $2,000,000.

    Obtained summary judgment in the New York State Supreme Court, Kings County. Adam represented a maintenance company that provided management of the janitorial services for the codefendant hospital. The plaintiff was a patient in the hospital who slipped and fell on water outside of her room. Adam was able to have the plaintiff's direct claims dismissed because a contractor does not owe a duty to the plaintiff under the New York Court of Appeals case Espinal v. Melville Snow Contractors. He was also able to have the hospital's crossclaims for contribution and indemnity dismissed because he was able to show that the hospital also had some involvement with maintenance and janitorial services at the hospital.

    Obtained summary judgment in the United States District Court, Southern District of New York.  Adam represented a grocery store.  The plaintiff testified that she slipped and fell on smashed and dirty vegetables in the frozen food aisle.  She also testified that there were cart tracks near the vegetables.  She argued that this description of the vegetables and cart tracks was sufficient to show constructive notice to the store.  At the beginning of oral argument, the judge commented that he viewed it as a “very close” case.  Adam was ultimately able to convince the court to dismiss the case by arguing that the plaintiff’s description of the vegetables was just as consistent with the plaintiff slipping on the vegetables or someone creating the defect just before the plaintiff’s accident.  Therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiff’s constructive notice argument was speculative and dismissed the case.

    Successfully settled wrongful death and survival claims for millions less than value suggested by the mediator.  Adam's client allegedly caused a fire at the decedent's home, causing the decedent to suffer severe burns and a three-month hospital stay before she passed away.  Adam performed a site inspection with a cause and origin expert a few days after the fire, coordinated with investigators in obtaining statements from eyewitnesses and the local fire departments, and participated in a mediation that ultimately settled the case. 
     
    Adam obtained summary judgment in New York State Supreme Court, Bronx County on behalf of the owner of high-rise residential building that was undergoing a construction project.  The plaintiff worked for a company that would clean each apartment after construction was completed in that particular unit.  The plaintiff was injured and required multiple surgeries after falling from a kitchen counter while cleaning the top of a cabinet. The main issue in the case was whether the plaintiff’s work qualified for protection under Labor Law 240(1), which imposes absolute liability upon the owner of a construction projects for workers who fall from height.  Based upon a recent Court of Appeals case, Soto v. J. Crew, Inc., 21 N.Y.3d 562 (2013), whether plaintiff was protected rested on 4 factors: (1) whether the work is routine, in that it is done on a recurring basis as part of the ordinary maintenance of the premises; (2) requires neither specialized equipment or expertise; (3) generally involves insignificant elevation risks comparable to those in typical household cleaning; and (4) in light of the core purpose of Labor Law 240(1), to protect construction workers, is unrelated to any ongoing construction project.  There are very few post-Soto decisions.  However, Adam was successful in convincing the court that plaintiff did not qualify for protection of the statute.  The court felt that factors 2 & 3 clearly weighed in favor of the defense and also found relevant plaintiff’s deposition testimony that she performed similar cleaning work in her own home.  In distinguishing the 4th  and final factor, the court  noted that although cleaning was related to the building’s construction, it was a separate phase of the project.  

    Obtained summary judgment in the New York State Supreme Court, Richmond County on behalf of an amusement park.  The plaintiff claimed that he was injured on a water slide because of an improperly inflated inner tube. The court found the defendant did not have notice of any alleged inflation issue   based upon plaintiff’s own testimony that he held the tube for 15-20 minutes before the accident without noticing a problem.  The court was further influenced by the fact that numerous safety checks were performed by the park and that plaintiff could not establish a specific defect with the tube or how the tube’s inflation caused his accident. The court also found that plaintiff’s claims were barred by assumption of the risk, particularly given the plaintiff’s age (in his 40s) and past experience with water rides.
      
    Adam obtained the first summary judgment decision in New York for a prominent rideshare company. He successfully argued that the rideshare company could not be liable to the plaintiff because it did not own the vehicle in question. This was done at the early stages of litigation to save the client significant time and expense.

    Adam obtained several dismissals for out-of-state clients based on lack of personal jurisdiction. These dismissals were based on recent Supreme Court and Court of Appeals decisions that altered personal jurisdiction in New York. By staying up to date on these recent cases, Adam was able to win dismissal for his clients.

Results

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Summary Judgment Obtained in New York Ridesharing Case

We won summary judgment for an online car sharing platform that connects vehicle owners (hosts) with travelers and locals (guests) seeking to book those vehicles for a fee in New York. The plaintiff alleged that he sustained serious injuries when he was involved in an automobile accident that collided with a vehicle listed on our client’s website. The Bronx County Supreme Court granted summary judgment in favor of our client, ruling that the defendant demonstrated that it is a peer-to-peer car sharing service; it does not provide rental services; it does not own, maintain or repair any of the vehicles on its platform; it is not responsible for the acts and omissions of the hosts or guests; and there is no agency relationship between defendant and the hosts or guests.

Summary Judgment Secured in New York Motor Vehicle Accident Case

We obtained summary judgment after oral argument with Judge Anne Swern in Kings County Supreme Court in New York. This case involved a motor vehicle accident where the plaintiff was a backseat passenger in an Uber that rear-ended a vehicle owned and operated by our clients. We established that our clients were stopped for 10-15 seconds at a light when they were rear-ended by the Uber driver, who was precluded and could not submit any testimony in this matter. Further, by establishing that the plaintiff was asleep at the time, she could not offer any evidence of how the accident happened. 

Thought Leadership

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New York Law Journal

New York Appellate Court Clears Path for Disclosure of Third‑Party Litigation Funding in Personal Injury Lawsuits

January 7, 2026

For the first time, a New York appellate court has held that the defendants in a personal injury lawsuit are entitled to third-party litigation funding discovery. In Lituma v. Liberty Coca-Cola Beverages LLC, 243 AD3d 504 (1st Dept. 2025), the Appellate Division, First Department, established critical legal precedent in allowing this discovery that the defense bar has been seeking for years.

Case Law Alerts

New York First Department Issues First Decision Addressing Litigation Funding Agreements

January 1, 2026

In a ruling that establishes critical legal precedent, appellate attorney Diane Toner, Special Counsel in our New York City office, obtained the first-ever appellate decision granting the discovery of third-party litigation funding material in New York, which had previously been protected from discovery for public policy reasons. Lituma involved a personal injury claim stemming from a motor vehicle accident. The defendants, Liberty Coca-Cola Beverages, LLC, argued that the accident was staged, alleging that the plaintiff deliberately sped up, cut in front of them and then slammed on the brakes to cause a collision. The defendants argued for various discovery related to the fraud. With respect to the specific issue of the discovery of litigation funding material, the appellate court held that the defendants established that the information sought is “material and necessary” as it could reveal a financial motive for fabricating the accident. In addition to establishing legal precedent for the discovery of third-party litigation funding, the Lituma decision sets forth a standard for maintaining a counterclaim for fraud, by citing to the insurance agent’s detailed chronology and specific evidence of connections to other suspicious individuals. In contrast, in Linares v. City of New York, 233 A.D.3d 479 (1st Dept. 2024), the appellate court dismissed a counterclaim for fraud where the defendants relied solely on “unproven allegations of fraud” in their RICO complaint.

News

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Firm Highlights

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

News

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Result

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

business meeting photo

Result

Summary Judgment Obtained in Insurance Coverage Case

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Result

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

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News

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 New Jersey Super Lawyers And Rising Stars

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

News

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.