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New York

Marshall Dennehey's New York City office is located in Manhattan's Financial District. The office is close to the City's Supreme and Civil Courts. New York City is the nation's largest metropolitan area and a world leader in business as well as the arts.

The office is staffed with long-time New Yorkers who have worked in the legal profession in the City for many years. Our attorneys are regularly involved in various types of cargo defense, cargo subrogation, maritime-related personal injury litigation, including Jones Act and Long Shore Harbor Workers' Compensation Act cases, marine casualties, such as collisions and oil spills as well as charter party disputes and insurance coverage. These attorneys also handle transactional maritime matters including ship financing and represent a range of clients from insurance companies to vessel owners and individuals on both a large and small scale.

These attorneys also represent many major underwriters in the United States and foreign markets, as well as a variety of publicly traded and privately held corporations. They have extensive trial and appellate experience in the federal and state courts throughout the United States and internationally, as well as in arbitration and mediation matters. Often they are called upon by our clients to appear in complex multi-state litigation and conduct investigations and supervise local counsel in foreign jurisdictions.

Thought Leadership

Case Law Alerts

Labor Law § 241(6) Claim Fails as Court Finds Excavator‑Safety Provision Not Sufficiently Specific

July 20, 2026

In order to successfully invoke liability pursuant to Labor Law § 241(6), the plaintiff must plead and prove a violation of a specific conduct-regulating provision of the Industrial Code of the State of New York.  This statute imposes a non-delegable duty upon owners and contractors regardless of whether they exercise control. While the plaintiff does not have to prove actual negligence, they must show that a specific conduct-regulating provision of the Industrial Code was violated and that the violation constituted a departure from reasonable care and was a proximate cause of the accident. Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 N.Y.2d 494, 503-55 (1993). In Mann v. Mezuyon, LLC, et al., 2026 WL 1462931, 2026 N.Y. Slip. Op. 03257 (Court of Appeals May 26, 2026), the plaintiff was struck by the boom of a nearby excavator and alleged a violation of Section 23-4.2(k) of the Industrial Code. This Section states: “[p]ersons shall not be suffered or permitted to work in any area where they may be struck or endangered by any excavation equipment or by any material being dislodged or falling from such equipment.” The Appellate Divisions were spilt as to whether section was sufficiently specific to support a 241(6) claim- the First, Third and Fourth Departments held it was not specific enough while the Second Department held otherwise. The Court of Appeals in Mann eliminated this split and held that the section is not specific enough. The court’s rationale was that the section did not provide any action to address the safety concern in the provision. This decision is significant because it eliminates Labor Law 241(6) liability based upon an alleged violation of Section 23-4.2(k) of the Industrial Code.

Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers

New York Court Rejects Tolling Argument in Negligent‑Procurement Suit Filed After Coverage Litigation

May 7, 2026

Johnson v. Northeast Agencies, Inc., 242 A.D.3d 414 (1st Dep’t 2025) One of the recurring challenges in professional liability litigation—especially in claims against insurance brokers—is determining exactly when a claim “accrues” for purposes of the statute of limitations. The case of Johnson v. Northeast Agencies, Inc., 242 A.D.3d 414 (1st Dep’t 2025), presented a twist on this familiar issue. It raised the question of when the statute of limitations began to run on a negligent‑procurement claim against an insurance broker. In this case, a claim under a general liability policy was made in March 2018, following the commencement of a personal injury action against the owner of a rental property. A month later, the insurer issued a disclaimer of coverage, explaining that, among other reasons, the property where the injury occurred was not listed as an “insured location” under the policy. Ordinarily, such a disclaimer would start the clock on any negligent‑procurement claim against the broker, but here, despite disclaiming coverage, the insured was not immediately negatively impacted by the coverage disclaimer because the insurer agreed to provide a defense to the insured while the parties litigated the validity of the disclaimer in a separate declaratory judgment action. Eventually, the court in the declaratory judgment action upheld the insurer’s disclaimer, confirming that the property was indeed not an insured location under the policy. Only after that ruling—more than five years after the original disclaimer—did the insured file suit against the broker for negligent failure to procure the requested coverage.  However, the statute of limitations for negligent failure to procure claims in New York State is three years. The insured argued that the insurer’s continued defense during the declaratory judgment action effectively masked the significance of the disclaimer and should be treated as tolling the statute of limitations. The insured contended that it was reasonable to wait for the outcome of the coverage litigation before pursuing a claim against the broker, because the insurer’s defense created uncertainty about whether the disclaimer would ultimately stand. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected this argument. The courts held that the claim accrued when the disclaimer letter was issued, because that was the moment the insured was placed on notice of the broker’s alleged negligence. The insurer’s voluntary defense during the declaratory judgment action did not create ambiguity about the disclaimer or delay the accrual of the claim.  Going forward, insureds will likely not wait for a final coverage determination before pursuing a negligent‑procurement claim against insurance brokers. Insureds who prefer to wait for the outcome of a coverage dispute will need to secure tolling agreements to avoid losing their claims against brokers due to expired statute of limitations periods.

Results

All Claims Dismissed in a Slip and Fall Case at a New York Hospital

We obtained dismissal of all claims against our client in a case involving a slip and fall at a hospital. The plaintiff was employed by a trucking company and was in the process of filling a liquid oxygen tank located in the parking lot of the hospital when he fell on a sheet of ice near the oxygen station evaporators. He sustained numerous injuries, including injuries to his spine, resulting in cervical fusion. As a result of the accident, the plaintiff alleged significant lost wages, in addition to numerous personal injuries. Our client designed, installed and maintained the oxygen station pursuant to a lease agreement with the hospital. We submitted evidence that our client properly inspected and maintained the oxygen station and that the ice was not caused by the operation of the oxygen station. After years of litigation and numerous depositions, our client moved for summary judgment, seeking a dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims and for an order of indemnification against the hospital based on the lease agreement. The court granted our motion in its entirety and dismissed all claims.

New York Appellate Division Dismisses Appeal, Upholding Summary Judgment Victory

We successfully defended against the plaintiff’s appeal in the Appellate Division, Second Department. The appeal challenged an order that adhered to a prior ruling by the Supreme Court, Westchester County, which had granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint. In our brief, we argued that the appeal should be dismissed due to the plaintiff’s failure to assemble a proper record on appeal. The plaintiff omitted critical documents relied upon by the motion court, including submissions supporting and opposing the defendant’s motion. At oral argument, we persuasively presented the case before a panel of four justices. The Appellate Division ruled in favor of the defendant, dismissing the appeal without reaching the merits. The court reaffirmed that it is the appellant’s responsibility to provide a complete record containing all relevant materials from the lower court. The plaintiff’s failure to do so, the court held, made meaningful appellate review impossible. The decision was unanimous, and no further appeal is available—securing a decisive victory for our client.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.