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Thomas J. McKenzie is a litigation and trial lawyer with more than 20 years of experience. He concentrates his practice on the defense of casualty, transportation and product liability cases. Tom has tried cases in numerous courts in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. He defends clients on a variety of matters, including product liability, class action claims, construction claims, civil rights, premises liability, motor vehicle and transportation. Tom has also handled breach of contract, Federal Employer Liability Act and toxic tort claims. He has recovered millions of dollars in defense costs and indemnity for his clients based on contractual and additional insured claims against contractors. Tom has successfully defended numerous wrongful death and catastrophic loss claims.

Tom serves as a Judge Pro Temp in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas and an Arbitrator for the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas Compulsory Arbitration Program. He is licensed in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the State of New Jersey. Tom has been admitted pro hac vice in the State of Delaware and the United States District Court for the District of Delaware.

Outside of his practice Tom coaches youth basketball, baseball and soccer.

    • University of Baltimore School of Law (J.D., 1999)
    • Loyola University Maryland (B.A., 1995)
    • New Jersey, 1999
    • Pennsylvania, 1999
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 1999
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2000
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyer Rising Star (2008, 2010-2013)
    • Brehon Law Society
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Philadelphia Association of Defense Counsel
    • Philadelphia Bar Association
    • The Lawyers Club of Philadelphia
    • Lights, Camera, Evidence, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, Philadelphia, PA, July 21, 2015
    • An Overview of Pennsylvania Law & Effective Strategies for Litigation Management, Client Seminar, King of Prussia, PA, June 2015
    • “The Fair Share Act in Spencer Is Not the Law, But It Just Might Become the Law,” Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 5, December 2021
    • Dismissal of Class Action putative claims for uninsured motorist benefits and first party benefits in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas.
    • Summary Judgment granted for Defendants in a motor vehicle accident in a motor vehicle accident based on Plaintiff’s failure to adduce evidence of Defendant’s negligence.
    • Judgment on the Pleadings in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware for a transportation company allegedly involved in a multiple vehicle accident.
    • Dismissal of Islamic prisoner’s equal protection and expression of religion claims pursuant to the 1st and 14th Amendments in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
    • Defense verdict in a claim for subrogation of first party benefits.
    • Dismissal of defendant in a claim for injuries of 5-year-old who darted into street into company’s car on city street.
    • Settled numerous million-dollar wrongful death claims and severe disfigurement claims.
    • Successfully defended at trial a claim of brachial plexopathy and back and neck injuries. Plaintiff was a nurse employed by a hospital who had escorted a patient in the Defendant’s ambulance. The ambulance struck a rock formation which enters the roadway at a height over 7 feet and the ambulance was over 8 feet high. Result: Jury Verdict for Defendants ambulance company and its employee driver as the driver was not negligent. The demand at trial was $950,000.
    • Successfully defended at trial, claim for disc herniations to lumbar spine and cervical spine.  Plaintiff underwent two spinal fusions and recommendation for third surgery. Result: Jury verdict for Client, Construction Supply Company.
    • Successfully defended at trial, claim for multiple herniated discs resulting from accident between client's Trolley and Plaintiff's car. Result: Jury verdict for Client, Transportation Company. 
    • Jury verdict for client defendant in passenger's motor vehicle accident claim resulting in multiple alleged herniated discs.
    • Successfully defended at trial, claim for multiple disc herniations and sprained ankle allegedly resulting from trip and fall down client's outdoor steps. Result: Jury verdict for Client, premises owner.
    • Represented paver in a negligence action in which an elderly woman fell in a parking lot and claimed hazardous condition. Jury concluded no defect in pavement. Verdict for defense.
    • Obtained Judgment on the pleadings dismissing wrongful death claim against Commonwealth party defendant as violative of the Tort Claims Act.
    • Summary Judgment granted in a wrongful death product liability suit due to plaintiff's failure to provide evidence to establish that a tractor was defective when it left the hands of the manufacturer.
    • Dismissal at trial of a slip and fall claim due to plaintiff's repeated discovery violations.
    • Dismissal at trial of a multiple-plaintiff automobile claim based on the failure of all plaintiffs to pass the limited tort threshold.
    • Dismissal of a fire loss claim based on theories of product defect and construction defect.
    • Successfully argued before the Pennsylvania Superior Court which affirmed trial court's ruling.
    • Obtained voluntary dismissal without payment of wrongful death and survival claims of Plaintiff who was hit by a bus, owned and operated by client, transportation company.
    • Obtained voluntary dismissal without payment of wrongful death and survival claims of Plaintiff who was electrocuted after falling onto subway tracks of client, transportation company.
    • Summary Judgment granted in Fourteenth Amendment claim by Muslim prisoner demanding Halal food.
    • Obtained Summary Judgment in injury claims arising from accident between a train and a passenger on the platform. The accident was allegedly caused by the alleged failure to warn and prevent the destabilizing slipstream effect of trains travelling through the station on the nearest track to the platform of client, transportation company.
    • Obtained Summary Judgment in slip and fall resulting in fractured patella for plaintiff's failure to prove that accident occurred inside the demised premises of corporate lessee.
    • Summary Judgment granted in a slip and fall claim for plaintiff's failure to articulate the mechanics of the fall in a manner that suggested the fall was due to the alleged defect.
    • Summary judgment granted in a case claiming negligent maintenance of a door.
    • Obtained Summary Judgment granted for client in slip and fall claim on client's property resulting in fractured ankle requiring open reduction internal fixation surgery based on  Commonwealth immunity from accidents caused by a defect which originates from a source outside of the Commonwealth real estate.
    • Summary judgment granted in a case claiming negligent maintenance of a sidewalk.
    • Obtained Summary Judgment for food service provider in equal protection claim by Muslim prisoner related to vegetarian religious diet.
    • Obtained Summary Judgment for an employer in motor vehicle accident, due to plaintiff's failure to prove negligent entrustment, wherein Plaintiff alleged back and neck injuries from minor collision with client's employee.
    • Dismissal for Prejudicial Late Joinder in a FELA claim, where the original defendant alleged product liability and negligence claims against our client/corporation.

Results

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

The Fair Share Act in Spencer Is Not the Law, But It Just Might Become the Law

December 1, 2021

Key Points: The Fair Share Act limits a judgment against a defendant to its proportionate share of an award if it is determined to be less than 60% negligent. Dicta in Spencer v. Johnson, 249 A.3d 529 (Pa. Super. 2021) may create headaches for defense practitioners in that it suggests that the proportionate share limitation of the Fair Share Act does not apply if a plaintiff is not negligent. The Fair Share Act was welcomed by defendants and insurance companies in 2011. For the past ten years, the Fair Share Act has been used to limit judgments against defendants to the defendant’s proportionate share of the damages award if they were determined to be less than 60% negligent. Under the previous joint and several liability, “the 1% negligence” strategy was used against “deep pocket” defendants to obtain a full recovery. It did not matter that other defendants were more liable for the accident. It only mattered that the “deep pocket” defendant, who could pay the entire award was found at least 1% negligent. An example of the 1% negligence issue for joint and several liability, before 2011 is as follows: Car A disregards a red light and drives into an intersection. Commercial Bus B is proceeding through the intersection on a steady green light and hits the passenger side rear of Car A. The passenger in Car A and several passengers in Bus B are injured. One of the passengers has a claim worth more than $1 million. The driver/owner of Car A purchased the mandatory minimum insurance policy, which covers claims in the amount of $15,000 per injury and $30,000 in the aggregate for general liability, and has no recoverable assets. Commercial Bus B has a primary policy of $1 million and has a $10 million excess insurance policy.  Generally speaking, most people would agree that the above accident was caused by Car A. The driver of Bus B could not anticipate that Car A would enter the intersection. However, when the injury claims of the individual plaintiff exceed $15,000 or the collective injury claims exceed $30,000 in exposure, then each plaintiff cannot obtain full compensation from Car A’s insurance or from the operator of Car A’s assets. The passengers in each vehicle are not negligent.  Before the Fair Share Act, personal injury attorneys would develop a claim against the driver of Bus B. The plaintiff’s attorney would investigate whether the driver of Bus B did anything wrong leading up to the accident. When we examine anyone’s conduct thoroughly enough, we typically can find flaws, which may be minimal or even infinitesimal, but they are still flaws. Flaws can be used to obtain a finding of negligence. How long did it take the driver of Bus B to notice that Car A was running the red light? How fast was Bus B traveling when it first noticed the vehicle running the red light? When did Bus B’s driver apply the brakes? Did Bus B driver attempt to steer around the car running the red light and, if not, why not? The answers to these questions may be used to develop a claim of negligence against the driver of Bus B. For instance, if Bus B was traveling at 10 mph over the speed limit but applied the brakes immediately after seeing that the other vehicle was not stopping, then it is possible that Bus B may be assigned some negligence, but probably not more than 50%. Introducing the opinion of a liability expert, who opines that Bus B would have avoided the accident had it been travelling under the speed limit, could cause a jury to find some percentage of negligence against the driver of Bus B. An expert report would typically assist the plaintiff in defeating a summary judgment motion by Bus B. If Bus B’s driver was found 10% negligent, then Commercial Bus B and its insurance carriers could be required to pay the entire jury award for each injured passenger after the $30,000 recoverable from Car A’s insurance, which was found 90% negligent. This strategy also had a significant impact on settlement negotiations. If a damages claim is potentially worth millions of dollars and the argument against the defendant is that they should have been able to avoid the accident, prior to the Fair Share Act, the defendant had to consider their level of certainty that a jury would find the defendant 0.0% negligent. The question was not whether a jury would find the defendant to be primarily responsible for the accident, but whether the jury would assign any negligence to the driver of Bus B. Certainly, defendants and insurance companies would not be willing to pay the full sum of the exposure in this scenario. However, the defendant and the insurance company would be remiss if they neglected to attempt to avoid responsibility for the full award, which could potentially be foisted upon them, after a finding of 1% negligence relative to the accident. In the recent case of Spencer v. Johnson, 249 A.3d 529 (Pa. Super. 2021), the Pennsylvania Superior Court examined the Fair Share Act in “dicta.” Dicta basically means that the court is making statements which are not central to the ruling in the case. The ruling in Spencer becomes binding law for lower courts. The facts in Spencer involve an accident between a pedestrian and an unlicensed driver (husband) driving a company vehicle that was entrusted to an employee (wife) by her employer. There was a finding of negligence against the driver-husband in the amount of 36%, the driver’s wife in the amount of 19% and the driver’s wife’s employer in the amount of 45%.  The actual ruling of the Superior Court in Spencer is that the trial court should have molded the verdict against the employer-defendant because the jury likely separately found vicarious liability for wife and primary liability for employer based on the “general verdict rule.” The finding of vicarious liability for the wife made the employer liable for the entirety of the award because the Superior Court combined it with a finding of primary negligence by the employer. The Superior Court decided that the finding against the wife and the employer should be combined against the employer for a total share of 64% negligence. Therefore, the entirety of the award could be collected against the employer under the Fair Share Act as the wife’s and the employer’s share combined was over 60%.  The Superior Court did not stop there. Instead, the court created a hypothetical situation which was different than the findings upon which the court based its ruling. This portion of the court’s opinion begins, “Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that the jury’s verdict did not demonstrate PJB was vicariously liable, we would have found the court erred in failing to grant the motion to mold the verdict as the question of whether the Fair Share Act applies to this present matter remains.” “Nevertheless, assuming arguendo” means you are about to read dicta. The Superior Court proceeded to engage in a lengthy statutory interpretation and stated: As noted, the general rule of the Fair Share Act continues to be focused on cases where plaintiff is found to have negligently contributed to her own injuries. The addition of subsection (a.1) does not clearly or explicitly expand the scope of the Fair Share Act to include cases where the plaintiff has not been found to be contributorily negligent. Therefore, for the minimum finding of 60% negligence portion of the Fair Share Act to apply, the plaintiff’s negligence must be an issue in the case. Spencer, 249 A.3d at 559 (emphasis added). These statements will be used to argue that, in situations such as the above hypothetical of Car A and Bus B, all injured passengers may potentially recover the entirety of any awards from Bus B.  Defense counsel will argue that since this was “dicta,” and was not the decision in Spencer, it is not binding on trial courts. Plaintiffs’ attorneys will argue that it is the law. Plaintiffs will also argue that, even if it is not the law, it is the proper way to interpret the Fair Share Act because it is how the Superior Court interprets the statute. It is also how the Superior Court will rule on the issue on appeal. Therefore, the lower courts should interpret the statute the same way to avoid an unnecessary appeal.  Therefore, from a settlement posture, defendants may once again have to consider whether they could potentially be responsible for the entire award, even if they are found to be less than 60% negligent. Plaintiff attorneys will also consider this when they determine whether or not to file a lawsuit against Commercial Bus B. It is not the law, but it may become the law, which may cause litigants (and courts) to treat it as if it is the law. *Tom is a shareholder in our Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, office. He can be reached at 215.575.3562 or tjmckenzie@mdwcg.com.   Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 5, December 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.

Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.