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Federal District Court Comments on Fair Share Act’s Applicability in Cases Involving a “Faultless” Plaintiff in Light of Spencer v. Johnson

Presented by the Casualty Department

July 13, 2022

by Brad E. Haas

While clarification on the Fair Share Act in light of the Superior Court case of Spencer v. Johnson has yet to be directly addressed by the appellate courts, other courts have weighed in on the argument that traditional joint and several liability may apply in cases involving “faultless” plaintiffs. The most recent example comes from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in Anderson v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2:21-CV-00493-CCW (W.D. Pa. June 22, 2022 Wiegand, J.). As part of its holding, the court discussed whether the Fair Share Act would apply given that the decedent in Anderson was not comparatively negligent. Of note, the portion of the Anderson opinion which discussed the Fair Share Act appears to be dicta, similar to the Spencer opinion.

Anderson v. Motorists arose out of a fatal motor vehicle accident. Following the accident, the plaintiffs brought suit against the third-party tortfeasors and subsequently filed a claim for UIM benefits with Motorists Mutual. Motorists Mutual denied the claim, arguing the value did not exceed the $5.1 million credit it would receive based on the liability limits of the third-party tortfeasors. 

The decedent was a passenger in a vehicle at the time of the accident. The vehicle was insured with liability limits of $100,000. The other vehicle involved was owned by a trucking company, with liability limits of $1 million and an umbrella policy of $4 million. The plaintiffs had settled the third-party claim with the driver for the policy limits of $100,000. The plaintiffs also settled with the trucking company for $550,000. Motorists Mutual, thus, argued it was entitled to a credit of $5.1 million, a total of the available liability limits of the third-party tortfeasors. However, the plaintiffs argued that Motorists Mutual was only entitled to a $650,000 credit, the sum of the amounts actually paid by the third-party tortfeasors, unless Motorists Mutual could prove that the trucking company’s percentage of fault equaled or exceeded 60%. The plaintiffs claimed Motorists Mutual was required to establish proof that the trucking company was at least 60% at fault; otherwise, they were not entitled to the $5.1 million credit because the plaintiffs would not have been able to recover the full amount of damages from the trucking company under the Pennsylvania Fair Share Act.

The court, citing Boyle v. Erie, held that the UIM carrier was entitled to the full amount of any available liability limits from all third-party defendants. The plaintiffs countered that Boyle was no longer applicable due to the passage of the Fair Share Act. The Anderson Court noted it did not need to decide whether the Pennsylvania Fair Share Act changed the holding in Boyle because, assuming arguendo the Fair Share Act did alter the Boyle decision, the plaintiffs’ argument would still fail because “it is not clear that the Pennsylvania Fair Share Act applies where the plaintiff’s negligence is not in question, as is the case here.” The opinion discussed the Spencer decision, and stated the Spencer Court found that in order for the “Fair Share Act to apply, the plaintiff’s negligence must be an issue in the case.” The Anderson Court went on to predict that “because the decedent’s negligence is not at issue in this case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would find that the Fair Share Act does not apply in cases such as this one, where the plaintiff’s negligence is not an issue, and, as a result, that the traditional principles of joint and several liability would control." The court ultimately concluded that the UIM carrier was, in fact, entitled to a credit for the full amount of the liability limits available from the third-party defendants.

The opinion in Anderson will be another case plaintiffs’ attorneys may cite in order to argue for the application of traditional joint and several liability in cases involving “faultless” plaintiffs. It will be argued that, in such instances, the Fair Share Act does not apply. 

As noted above, the Fair Share Act discussion in Anderson was dicta as the court ultimately held that Boyle was the controlling precedent upon which the court based its decision. The fact that the Spencer and Anderson Courts’ discussions of the Fair Share Act appear to be dicta can be raised as a counter to arguments from plaintiffs’ attorneys attempting to argue for traditional joint and several liability. Defense counsel can further contend that the legislative history of the Fair Share Act supports an argument that no exception was intended for situations where a plaintiff is not apportioned any fault. 

A more detailed discussion of the legislative history can be found in an article previously published by the Pennsylvania Defense Institute.
 

 

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New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Legislation Updates

Since June 1, 2026, there have been no new New Jersey workers’ compensation related cases from the Appellate or Supreme Courts. As such, below will highlight any new legislative updates since February. A1023 | S3984 - Medical Use of Cannabis Under Certain Circumstances This requires workers’ compensation, PIP, and health insurance coverage for the medical use of cannabis under certain circumstances. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Financial Institutions and Insurance Committee. It was also introduced on March 19, 2026 and referred to the Senate Commerce Committee. A1045  - Certain Injuries to Volunteer and Professional Public Safety and Law Enforcement Personnel This revises workers’ compensation coverage for certain injuries to volunteer and professional public safety and law enforcement personnel. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A1384 | S2757 - Reduce Statute of Limitations in Medical Fee Disputes This reduces statute of limitations from six years to two years in medical fee disputes in workers’ compensation matters. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A1870 | S1379 - Workers' Compensation Benefits For Certain Workers Due to September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks This provides workers’ compensation benefits for certain public safety workers who developed illness or injury as result of responding to September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. On February 5, 2026, it was reported from the Senate Committee, 2nd Reading, and referred to the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee. A2779 | S1521 - Excludes Certain Illegal Aliens This excludes certain illegal aliens from workers’ compensation and temporary disability benefits. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A2792 | S1555 -  Prevent Intoxicated Employees from Workers’ Compensation This prevents intoxicated employees from receiving workers’ compensation. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A3167 | S2372 - Workers’ Compensation Insurance Requirements for Certain Corporations and Partnerships This concerns workers’ compensation insurance requirements for certain corporations and partnerships. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A3548 | S3571 – Maximum Benefits for Certain Volunteers This provides certain volunteer and other workers with maximum compensation benefit for workers' compensation claim regardless of outside employment. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. On March 2, 2026, it was reported from the Senate Committee, 2nd Reading, and referred to the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. On May 7, 2026, it was reported and referred to Assembly State and Local Government Committee. A3724 - Personal Liability to Employer Officers for Failure to Pay for Coverage This provides personal liability for owner, executive officer, or executive director of employer for failure to pay for workers' compensation coverage. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. On May 7, 2026, it was reported and referred to Assembly Judiciary Committee. A4617  - Certain Workers' Compensation Supplemental Benefits and Funding Method This concerns certain workers' compensation supplemental benefits and funding method. For a permanently and totally disabled worker or surviving dependents after December 31, 1979, with some exceptions, this bill provides for an annual cost of living adjustment in the weekly workers’ compensation benefit rate. It was introduced on March 10, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. S241 - Inclusion in Database of Appointed Officials This requires that workers’ compensation judges and administrative law judges be included in database of appointed officials. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 to the Senate, Referred to Senate State Government, Wagering, Tourism & Historic Preservation Committee. S2290 -  Mandatory Retirement Age This increases statutory mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Superior Court Judges, Tax Court Judges, Administrative Law Judges, and Workers’ Compensation Judges from 70 to 72. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. S3144 - Testimony in Workers’ Compensation This concerns submission of testimony in workers’ compensation claims. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. S3342  - Increase Mandatory Retirement Age This increases statutory mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Superior Court Judges, Tax Court Judges, Administrative Law Judges, and Workers’ Compensation Judges from 70 to 75. It was introduced on February 5, 2026 and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee.

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Appellate Court Rejects Horizontal Immunity Defense to Company Not Acting as Statutory Subcontractor

The First District Court of Appeal held that a property management company was not entitled to horizontal immunity under section 440.10(1)(e), Florida Statutes, in a negligence action brought by an employee of another company working on the property. The claimant was injured while servicing a swimming pool at an apartment complex. His employer had contracted with the property owner to maintain the pool. Following the accident, the claimant received workers' compensation benefits through his employer’s carrier. The claimant subsequently filed a negligence action against the property management company, alleging that it failed to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition and failed to warn him of a dangerous condition that caused his injuries. The property management company had been retained by the property owner to maintain the complex in good operating condition and to perform routine maintenance and repair work. The property management company argued that it was immune from suit under section 440.10(1)(e) of Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Law. That provision grants immunity to a subcontractor providing services in conjunction with a contractor on the same project or contract work from civil actions brought by employees of another subcontractor, subject to limited exceptions. According to the property management company, it qualified as a subcontractor working on the same project as the claimant’s employer and was therefore entitled to horizontal immunity. The trial court agreed and entered summary judgment in its favor. On appeal, however, the claimant argued, and the appellate court agreed, that horizontal immunity applies only when a contractor has sublet work arising from a contractual obligation owed to a third party. The court noted that prior decisions consistently held that an entity acting solely on its own behalf as the owner of property, rather than pursuant to a contract with a third party, is not a “contractor” under section 440.10(1), even when it hires other companies to perform work on the property. In Teed, the property management company could not establish that the property owner had a primary contractual obligation to a third party to maintain either the apartment complex or the swimming pool, which it then delegated to the claimant’s employer or the property management company. As a result, the property owner did not qualify as a statutory contractor, and the property management company was not a subcontractor entitled to horizontal immunity under section 440.10(1)(e). The First District therefore reversed the lower court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings on the claimant’s negligence claim.

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Commonwealth Court Holds That a Claimant Who Was Struck By a Car While Crossing the Street During an Unpaid Break Was In the Course and Scope of Employment

This case involved a claim petition filed by a claimant who sustained injuries after being struck by a vehicle while crossing the street in front of the employer’s premises. The employer denied the claim based on course and scope, as the accident occurred during one of two mandatory fifteen (15) minute breaks provided to the claimant. The claimant would punch out at the beginning of a break and punch back in when the break was over.  On the date of the incident, the claimant punched out and left the building to get lunch at a restaurant, which required her to cross the employer’s parking lot, and then a public street, where the injury occurred. The Workers Compensation Judge (WCJ) dismissed the petition, noting that that during the two mandatory fifteen-minute breaks per shift allowed by the employer, the claimant was free to leave the employer’s premises, and during breaks, permitted to engage in whatever activity she desired. The WCJ found that at the time of the accident, the claimant was on her own time, in the middle of the street, and going to get lunch.   The claimant filed an appeal with the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board (Board), and the Board reversed.  According to the Board, the claimant’s location was still on the employer’s premises, as the claimant was taking her customary route while using a reasonable ingress/egress from the employer.  Further, the Board found that the “Personal Comfort Doctrine” applied, as the claimant was on a momentary departure to take care of her personal comfort, within the window of time she was allotted for her break.  The Board remanded the case, and a WCJ granted the claim petition.  The Board affirmed, and the employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. Before the Court, the employer argued that the claimant was not in the course and scope of her employment, because the injury did not occur on its premises, and the claimant was outside the bounds of the Personal Comfort Doctrine. The Court, however, rejected these arguments, and dismissed the employer’s appeal.  The Court noted that the break given to the claimant was so cursory, when she set out to relieve her hunger for her own personal comfort,  she remained in the course of her employment when she sustained her injuries.  A Petition for Allowance of Appeal in the Supreme Court has been filed by the Employer, Giant Eagle.