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Legal Updates for Employment Law

New Jersey Supreme Court Establishes Specifics for Employers When It Comes to Protections for Pregnant Employees

Legal Updates for Employment Law - March 16, 2021

March 16, 2021

by Michelle N. Michael

Delanoy v. Township of Ocean (decided March 9, 2021) marks the New Jersey Supreme Court’s first interpretation of the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA), N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(s). The PWFA, passed in 2014, amended the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination to add specific protections for “pregnant or breastfeeding” employees. Pursuant to the Act, employers in New Jersey are prohibited from treating pregnant or breastfeeding employees in a manner less favorable than other employees who are similar in their ability or inability to work.

Delanoy involved a pregnant police officer who challenged the light-duty Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) of her employer. The “maternity SOP” applied to pregnant workers, and the employer’s “light-duty SOP” applied to non-pregnant workers. Both SOPS required employees to obtain a physician’s note recommending a light-duty assignment and required employees to exhaust all accumulated leave. However, the light-duty SOP provided a waiver of the accumulated leave requirement, whereas the maternity SOP did not. Additionally, the maternity SOP required a projected return date “no more than 45 calendar days past the expected due date,” whereas the light-duty SOP permitted the employee’s physician to determine the projected return date. As part of her light-duty assignments, the plaintiff was assigned to “walk-in” duty and claimed she was treated detrimentally following her request for an accommodation. She thereafter filed suit, challenging her employer’s SOPs under the PWFA.

The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal of summary judgment in favor of the employer and confirmed that the PWFA creates three distinct theories of liability: (1) unequal or unfavorable treatment; (2) failure to accommodate; and (3) unlawful penalization. The court determined the maternity SOP amounted to a per se violation of the unfavorable treatment theory of the PWFA because it “treated pregnant employees less favorably than non-pregnant employees who were similar in their ability or inability to work.” Further, the court determined that the plaintiff met the statutory criteria for a failure-to-accommodate claim and remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the employer can establish “undue hardship,” which is its burden to prove. Interestingly, the court recognized that an employee’s temporary inability to perform an essential job function is “one of several factors to be considered” and “the PWFA may require, in specific circumstances, that an employer provide a reasonable accommodation that entails temporarily permitting a pregnant employee to transfer to work that omits an essential function of her job.” Finally, the court also recognized an “unlawful penalization” theory under the PWFA, which prohibits “employer-imposed conditions on accommodations that are especially harsh” or retaliatory.

This case is important to note because it clearly identifies the theories under which a claim can be brought under the PWFA. Employers should be be alert to PWFA claims which fail to assert any of the required theories. With respect to reasonable accommodation claims, it is imperative that defense counsel assert any undue hardship arguments as part of an affirmative defense to matters brought under the PWFA.

 

 

Legal Updates for Employment Law - March 16, 2021, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments, and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

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Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.