Michelle is a member of the Professional Liability Department. She focuses her practice on employment law and represents employers in the defense of matters involving allegations of discrimination based upon age, gender, race, and disability, as well as “whistle blowing” claims. Michelle also handles matters involving civil rights and discrimination claims in both federal and state courts.
In 2013, Michelle graduated summa cum laude from Rider University, earning her Bachelor of Arts Degree in Sociology, with minors in Legal Studies and Political Communications. In May 2017, she earned her juris doctor degree from Rutgers Law School.
During law school, Michelle served as the Lead Research & Writing/Communications Editor of the Rutgers Journal of Law and Religion. Michelle was also semi-finalist in the Rutgers Law School Hunter Moot Court Appellate Advocacy Competition and served as a board member of the program during her final year of law school. Additionally, Michelle competed in the Jeffrey G. Miller National Environmental Law Moot Court Competition, serving as captain of her team. Michelle also participated in the Rutgers Law School Civil Practice Clinic.
Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Michelle clerked for the Honorable Richard J. Geiger of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division. Michelle also served as an intern to the Honorable Peter G. Sheridan, United States District Court Judge for the District of New Jersey, during law school.
Results
Obtained a “No Cause” Verdict in an Employment Case in New Jersey
We recently obtained a “no cause” verdict in an employment case in the Superior Court of New Jersey. The plaintiff, an employee of a New Jersey State entity, asserted violations of the Contentious Employee Protection Act (CEPA). According to the plaintiff, after reporting purported deficiencies with an environmental permit, he was subject to a retaliatory and hostile work environment. We successfully argued that the plaintiff did not articulate a violation of law or public policy, nor did he prove that the various employment actions he received created a hostile work environment or were even caused by the alleged whistleblowing.
New Jersey State University Successfully Defended in an Employment Discrimination Case
We obtained a “no cause” verdict in an employment discrimination case for a New Jersey state university. The plaintiff, seeking back pay, front pay, emotional distress, attorney fees, punitive damages and costs, alleged she was terminated from her position as director of the university’s performing arts center due to her age, gender and/or in retaliation for reporting internal complaints of age/gender discrimination. We successfully argued that the plaintiff was not terminated for discriminatory/retaliatory reasons but, instead, was terminated as a result of mandatory COVID-19 closures necessitated by Executive Orders.
Thought Leadership
Case Law Alerts
Appellate Division Rejects Plaintiff’s Belatedly-Added Theory of Disability Discrimination and Finds a One-Time Allergic Reaction to Prescription Medication Does Not Constitute a Disability Under the LAD
April 1, 2026
The plaintiff appealed from the grant of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing her claims of disability discrimination under the LAD. The plaintiff, who was employed as a special education aide, was terminated following a “narcotic drug-induced medical emergency” after taking prescribed medications for sciatica pain. She thereafter filed suit, citing sciatica pain as her alleged disability, contending that her termination was motivated by discriminatory animus. On appeal, the plaintiff argued the trial court erred in failing to find that she established a prima facie case of disability discrimination based on two separate alleged disabilities: (1) her sciatica and (2) her alleged severe allergy to medications, which was not cited as an alleged disability in the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding no evidence that the plaintiff was terminated, nor discriminatorily treated, because of her sciatica. With respect to the allegation that her allergic reaction to medication constituted a disability, the Appellate Division, citing Stewart v. N.J. Tpk. Auth./Garden State Parkway, 249 N.J. 642, 648 (2022), noted that “[g]enerally, parties may not use a motion for summary judgment to introduce new claims or theories.” Nonetheless, in considering whether a one-time allergic reaction constitutes a disability under the LAD, the court found, citing Guzman v. Teixeira Int’l, Inc., 476 N.J. Super. 64, 70 (App. Div. 2023), that a single allergic reaction to medication did not qualify as a disability under the LAD, stating that the plaintiff could not prove that the termination was motivated by discrimination. In light of this decision, defense counsel should be cognizant of the introduction of new theories of liability added at the summary judgment stage, and should also recognize that not every illness will constitute a disability under the LAD.
Case Law Alerts
New Jersey Appellate Division Addresses the Statute of Limitations Accrual Date in a Constructive Discharge Claim Brought Under the NJLAD and CEPA
April 1, 2024
This appeal involved the analysis of the accrual date in the context of a constructive discharge claim brought under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) and the Contentious Employee Protection Act (CEPA). The trial court held the “critical date” for the accrual of claims brought under LAD and CEPA was the start of the plaintiff’s workplace leave period, rather than the date said leave ended. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal, finding the plaintiff’s claims were time barred. The plaintiff filed suit two years and ten months after taking a workplace leave, asserting a claim of constructive discharge in violation of LAD and CEPA. The trial court dismissed the complaint as barred by the applicable statute of limitations. On appeal, the plaintiff argued the cause of action did not accrue until the date the leave ended, rather than when it began. The Appellate Division emphasized the two-year statute of limitations for LAD claims and the one-year statute of limitations for CEPA claims, holding that “[t]he critical date of accrual is the date on which the plaintiff felt compelled to stop working.” In light of this decision, defense counsel should be cognizant of the triggering event pled in a complaint for purposes of asserting statute of limitations-based defenses. Case Law Alerts, 2nd Quarter, April 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.
