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Martin is a member of the Casualty Department where he handles construction accident cases involving New York Labor Law and Industrial Code. Martin has over twenty-five years of experience in handling Labor Law litigation, having represented owners, contractors, architects and engineers in defense of these types of claims. Additionally, he represents owners, architects, engineers and elevator maintenance companies in cases involving alleged elevator malfunctions due to claimed issues with the design, installation and maintenance of the elevators in question. Additionally, his experience includes handling insurance fraud and Special Investigations Unit (SIU) matters involving the investigation, evaluation, and defense of suspected fraudulent claims.

An experienced litigator who has handled cases from inception through trial, Martin has counseled and defended architects, engineers, landscape architects, land surveyors and construction firms in claims and lawsuits brought against them for professional malpractice, breach of contract, construction delays, construction defects, personal injury and property damage. He has also defended design professionals in disciplinary actions brought by governmental authorities.

In addition to his significant experience in the defense of design and building professionals, Martin has also represented and defended other entities such as municipalities and property owners in premises liability matters. He has handled several personal injury mold exposure cases representing a professional engineering firm that was brought to the premises to perform mold testing. Martin shares his broad knowledge of risk and liability in numerous lectures and presentations he has made to various groups of design and construction professionals.

Martin attended the State University of New York at Binghamton and received his Bachelor of Arts in Political Science in 1986. He then went on to earn his juris doctor from Hofstra University School of Law in 1989. He is a member of the New York State Bar Association and is admitted to practice in New York and Connecticut, and before the United States District Courts for both the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York.

    • Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University (J.D., 1989)
    • State University of New York at Binghamton (B.A., 1986)
    • Connecticut, 1989
    • New York, 1989
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of New York
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of New York
    • Ethics for Engineers, American Council of Engineering Companies (ACEC), Long Island Chapter, April 2022
    • Ethics for Engineers, American Council of Engineering Companies (ACEC), Long Island Chapter, January 2016
    • Handling Potential Spoliation of Evidence Issues When Representing the Design Professional, CNA's 54th Annual Meeting of Invited Attorneys, 2015
    • "Spoliation Issues When Representing the Design Professional," New York Law Journal, July 14, 2015
    • Legal Update for Insurance Agents & Brokers, contributor, July 2018 - present

Results

Dismissal of Breach of Contract and Professional Malpractice Claims Achieved at Trial

We achieved dismissal of a breach of contract and professional malpractice claim against a professional engineering firm that provided construction monitoring services for a lender. When the project went south (for a multitude of reasons unrelated to the engineer's services), the project developer, who had obtained an assignment of rights from the lender, sought to hold the engineer responsible for project cost overruns. After a seven-day bench trial and testimony from nine witnesses, the court dismissed the complaint in its entirety. In dismissing the breach of contract claim, the court held that the plaintiff failed to establish any breach of contract by the engineer, finding that the reports prepared by the engineer during the course of the project complied with its contractual obligations, with the terms of the contract being clear and unambiguous. This included a contract provision which stated that the engineer was not responsible for the malfeasance of others, including the general contractor, or the errors and/or omissions of the project architect. The court further found that, even had the plaintiff proven that there was a breach of contract by the engineer, the plaintiff still failed to prove that the lender sustained any actual damages. In dismissing the professional malpractice cause of action, the court found that the expert testimony by the plaintiff was insufficient to establish a prima facie case. Specifically, the trial testimony on the plaintiff's direct case failed to establish any deviation from the accepted standards of practice in the services the engineer provided as the lender's representative.

NY Labor Law Case Won by Motion for Summary Judgement

Obtained summary judgment on behalf of an owner and tenant where plaintiff alleged violation of Labor Law §§ 240(1), 241(6) and 200 when he fell off a ladder at the premises. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants violated these Labor Law sections in failing to provide him with a secure ladder and adequate safety devices while he was working on the alarm system at the premises. Defendants contended that the activity that the plaintiff was performing constituted maintenance and not repair of the alarm system and therefore was not an activity covered under the Labor Law. Defendants further contended that the plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of the accident by taking and using a ladder from the premises without the permission of the owner or tenant instead of using a ladder from the service truck that he brought to the premises Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment under Labor Law §240(1) was denied and the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing all Labor Law and common law claims was granted.  

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.