.

Mark D. Wellman

Portrait of Mark D. Wellman

For almost 25 years, Mark has defended general contractors and property owners in New York City on a wide range of statutory liability claims brought pursuant to the New York Labor Law and the New York Industrial Code.  He has also represented numerous subcontractors in high-exposure construction-related premises liability cases.

In addition, Mark has extensive experience defending manufactures and distributors covering a variety of consumer and industrial products. Mark has defended an aviation parts and engine manufacturer in a product liability action in New York.  He has also defended a furniture distributor and a major manufacturer of semi-conductors in a toxic tort matter involving numerous claimants formerly employed at a New York manufacturing facility.

Mark also represents major automobile financing companies in disputes related to ownership, transfer, warranty reimbursement, incentives, as well as franchise concerns.  His experience includes counseling automobile financing companies many types of matters, including dealer related concerns, retail installment contracts, lease agreements, branding concerns, and the development and enforcement of finance performance standards.  These matters also include alleged violations of The Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and New York Fair Debt Collection Statutes.  Furthermore, Mark has represented auto financing companies in bankruptcy proceedings regarding creditor complaints and collection matters.

For almost 10 years, Mark has represented internationally recognized security contractors involved with providing security services at major sporting venues and large commercial centers in New York City and the surrounding suburbs.  Mark has also counseled security companies on a variety of matters including the drafting and modifying of security service agreements and security protocol.

Mark has also represented major movie production companies and news organizations in a large number of premises liability and motor vehicle accident cases, as well as contractual disputes between production companies and subcontractors.

    • The Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University (J.D., 2001)
    • The George Washington University (B.S., cum laude, 1998)
    • Connecticut, 2002
    • New York, 2002
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of New York, 2003
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of New York, 2003
    • Kings County Small Claims Court, Approved Arbitrator
    • New York State Bar Association
    • Claims and Litigation Management Alliance (CLM), Board Member, New York City Chapter
  • Granted a motion for change of venue from Queens County to Westchester County in a motor vehicle accident case. According to the claimant, the accident occurred in Westchester County. Upon information and belief, the plaintiff resided in Westchester County on the date of commencement of this action. The defendant is a resident of Dutchess County, and defendant consolidated company's principal place of business is New York County. The plaintiff argued that Queens County was proper venue based on our client's company's place of business being listed as Astoria, Queens based on the vehicle registration. The plaintiff also argued that if the court decided Queens was not proper, then it should be transferred to New York County. The Second Department held that the sole residence of a domestic corporation for venue purposes is the county designated in its certification of incorporation, despite its maintenance of an office or facility in another county. We served the demand to change venue with our answer, and we moved to change venue within 15 days of service of the demand to change venue according to CPLR 511.

    Successfully granted a motion to compel acceptance of a late answer in a liability matter. The plaintiff suffered injuries after a locker fell on her while she was putting her things away, or taking them out, at the premises owned by our client. The plaintiff rejected our answer after it was eight months late, but never filed a default motion. We filed a motion to compel acceptance of our late answer. In opposition, the plaintiff filed a cross motion for default, citing cases from the judge that was presiding over this case, where he granted default judgments when defendants were less than eight months late in answering. We argued that in those cases, the plaintiff had already moved for default, along with highlighting case law that shows that if it can be proven that the delay in answering was due to the insurance carrier's fault or taking time to appoint counsel, then a delayed answer is acceptable. We had an affidavit from the insured and our insurance adjustor. Our motion was granted, and the answer was deemed timely served. 

    Working with a team, Mark helped to secure a discontinuance for an auto financing company.  The plaintiffs sought over $30 million in damages stemming from breach of contract claims, tortuous interference allegations and a companion declaratory judgment action. The case involved the exchange of over half a million documents and extensive electronic discovery. The settlement with the plaintiff did not involve any contribution by the client.

    Mark obtained summary judgment in favor of a general contractor in a Labor Law matter, by dismissing numerous Labor Law claims and shifting the risk from the general contractor to the plaintiff’s employer.  The decision ultimately placed the responsibility for the accident on the plaintiff’s employer and the employer’s insurance carrier.

    Mark represented the general contractor in a trial involving Labor Law §240(1) and §241(6) in Supreme Court, Queens County, in a high exposure case that settled favorably for his client following the cross examination of the plaintiff’s treating physician.
    Mark successfully defended an airplane engine manufacturer in a products liability claim resulting in a favorable settlement following extensive discovery on the eve of jury selection.

    In New York County Civil Court, Mark obtained a verdict in favor of an auto financing company against a defendant that abandoned a motor vehicle in Europe.

    Mark obtained a favorable decision before the Second Department, Appellate Division for a property owner against plaintiff’s employer on a “grave injury” related claim involving Labor Law §240(1) and Workers’ Compensation Law §11 (affirmed by New York Court of Appeals).
    Mark obtained a dismissal of a plaintiff’s Fair Debt Collection claim against an auto financing company in the Eastern District of New York.

    • Risk Transfer, Contractual Indemnification In Labor Law Section 240(1) Cases, Gallagher Bassett Services, Irvine, CA, July 2013

Results

All Claims Dismissed in a Slip and Fall Case at a New York Hospital

We obtained dismissal of all claims against our client in a case involving a slip and fall at a hospital. The plaintiff was employed by a trucking company and was in the process of filling a liquid oxygen tank located in the parking lot of the hospital when he fell on a sheet of ice near the oxygen station evaporators. He sustained numerous injuries, including injuries to his spine, resulting in cervical fusion. As a result of the accident, the plaintiff alleged significant lost wages, in addition to numerous personal injuries. Our client designed, installed and maintained the oxygen station pursuant to a lease agreement with the hospital. We submitted evidence that our client properly inspected and maintained the oxygen station and that the ice was not caused by the operation of the oxygen station. After years of litigation and numerous depositions, our client moved for summary judgment, seeking a dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims and for an order of indemnification against the hospital based on the lease agreement. The court granted our motion in its entirety and dismissed all claims.

Affirmance Achieved in Dismissal of All Claims in New York Labor Law Matter

We successfully achieved affirmance of the trial court’s decision to dismiss all claims against a property owner and designer in a New York labor law matter. The plaintiff was injured when he fell from a ladder stacked atop a bakers scaffold while performing renovation work on a four-story brownstone. The 16-foot ladder and the scaffold were provided by his employer—the general contractor—and set up at his employer’s discretion. The plaintiff filed an action against the owner of the property and the designer, alleging violations of various labor law claims, including labor law Sections 240(1), 241(6) and 200. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment, seeking a dismissal of all claims, was filed after the plaintiff’s depositions but before any of the defendants were deposed and with extensive discovery outstanding. The plaintiff opposed the motion and cross moved to compel further discovery. The Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, dismissing all claims as the property owners qualified for the owner and two-family dwelling exception to the labor law. The trial court held that the defendants did not direct, supervise or control any of the plaintiff’s activities. Therefore, according to the affidavit, the single-family home exception did not apply. After oral argument, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision with costs.

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Firm Highlights

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Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

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Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

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The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.