.

Mark D. Wellman

Portrait of Mark D. Wellman

For almost 25 years, Mark has defended general contractors and property owners in New York City on a wide range of statutory liability claims brought pursuant to the New York Labor Law and the New York Industrial Code.  He has also represented numerous subcontractors in high-exposure construction-related premises liability cases.

In addition, Mark has extensive experience defending manufactures and distributors covering a variety of consumer and industrial products. Mark has defended an aviation parts and engine manufacturer in a product liability action in New York.  He has also defended a furniture distributor and a major manufacturer of semi-conductors in a toxic tort matter involving numerous claimants formerly employed at a New York manufacturing facility.

Mark also represents major automobile financing companies in disputes related to ownership, transfer, warranty reimbursement, incentives, as well as franchise concerns.  His experience includes counseling automobile financing companies many types of matters, including dealer related concerns, retail installment contracts, lease agreements, branding concerns, and the development and enforcement of finance performance standards.  These matters also include alleged violations of The Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and New York Fair Debt Collection Statutes.  Furthermore, Mark has represented auto financing companies in bankruptcy proceedings regarding creditor complaints and collection matters.

For almost 10 years, Mark has represented internationally recognized security contractors involved with providing security services at major sporting venues and large commercial centers in New York City and the surrounding suburbs.  Mark has also counseled security companies on a variety of matters including the drafting and modifying of security service agreements and security protocol.

Mark has also represented major movie production companies and news organizations in a large number of premises liability and motor vehicle accident cases, as well as contractual disputes between production companies and subcontractors.

    • The Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University (J.D., 2001)
    • The George Washington University (B.S., cum laude, 1998)
    • Connecticut, 2002
    • New York, 2002
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of New York, 2003
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of New York, 2003
    • Kings County Small Claims Court, Approved Arbitrator
    • New York State Bar Association
    • Claims and Litigation Management Alliance (CLM), Board Member, New York City Chapter
  • Granted a motion for change of venue from Queens County to Westchester County in a motor vehicle accident case. According to the claimant, the accident occurred in Westchester County. Upon information and belief, the plaintiff resided in Westchester County on the date of commencement of this action. The defendant is a resident of Dutchess County, and defendant consolidated company's principal place of business is New York County. The plaintiff argued that Queens County was proper venue based on our client's company's place of business being listed as Astoria, Queens based on the vehicle registration. The plaintiff also argued that if the court decided Queens was not proper, then it should be transferred to New York County. The Second Department held that the sole residence of a domestic corporation for venue purposes is the county designated in its certification of incorporation, despite its maintenance of an office or facility in another county. We served the demand to change venue with our answer, and we moved to change venue within 15 days of service of the demand to change venue according to CPLR 511.

    Successfully granted a motion to compel acceptance of a late answer in a liability matter. The plaintiff suffered injuries after a locker fell on her while she was putting her things away, or taking them out, at the premises owned by our client. The plaintiff rejected our answer after it was eight months late, but never filed a default motion. We filed a motion to compel acceptance of our late answer. In opposition, the plaintiff filed a cross motion for default, citing cases from the judge that was presiding over this case, where he granted default judgments when defendants were less than eight months late in answering. We argued that in those cases, the plaintiff had already moved for default, along with highlighting case law that shows that if it can be proven that the delay in answering was due to the insurance carrier's fault or taking time to appoint counsel, then a delayed answer is acceptable. We had an affidavit from the insured and our insurance adjustor. Our motion was granted, and the answer was deemed timely served. 

    Working with a team, Mark helped to secure a discontinuance for an auto financing company.  The plaintiffs sought over $30 million in damages stemming from breach of contract claims, tortuous interference allegations and a companion declaratory judgment action. The case involved the exchange of over half a million documents and extensive electronic discovery. The settlement with the plaintiff did not involve any contribution by the client.

    Mark obtained summary judgment in favor of a general contractor in a Labor Law matter, by dismissing numerous Labor Law claims and shifting the risk from the general contractor to the plaintiff’s employer.  The decision ultimately placed the responsibility for the accident on the plaintiff’s employer and the employer’s insurance carrier.

    Mark represented the general contractor in a trial involving Labor Law §240(1) and §241(6) in Supreme Court, Queens County, in a high exposure case that settled favorably for his client following the cross examination of the plaintiff’s treating physician.
    Mark successfully defended an airplane engine manufacturer in a products liability claim resulting in a favorable settlement following extensive discovery on the eve of jury selection.

    In New York County Civil Court, Mark obtained a verdict in favor of an auto financing company against a defendant that abandoned a motor vehicle in Europe.

    Mark obtained a favorable decision before the Second Department, Appellate Division for a property owner against plaintiff’s employer on a “grave injury” related claim involving Labor Law §240(1) and Workers’ Compensation Law §11 (affirmed by New York Court of Appeals).
    Mark obtained a dismissal of a plaintiff’s Fair Debt Collection claim against an auto financing company in the Eastern District of New York.

    • Risk Transfer, Contractual Indemnification In Labor Law Section 240(1) Cases, Gallagher Bassett Services, Irvine, CA, July 2013

Results

All Claims Dismissed in a Slip and Fall Case at a New York Hospital

We obtained dismissal of all claims against our client in a case involving a slip and fall at a hospital. The plaintiff was employed by a trucking company and was in the process of filling a liquid oxygen tank located in the parking lot of the hospital when he fell on a sheet of ice near the oxygen station evaporators. He sustained numerous injuries, including injuries to his spine, resulting in cervical fusion. As a result of the accident, the plaintiff alleged significant lost wages, in addition to numerous personal injuries. Our client designed, installed and maintained the oxygen station pursuant to a lease agreement with the hospital. We submitted evidence that our client properly inspected and maintained the oxygen station and that the ice was not caused by the operation of the oxygen station. After years of litigation and numerous depositions, our client moved for summary judgment, seeking a dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims and for an order of indemnification against the hospital based on the lease agreement. The court granted our motion in its entirety and dismissed all claims.

Affirmance Achieved in Dismissal of All Claims in New York Labor Law Matter

We successfully achieved affirmance of the trial court’s decision to dismiss all claims against a property owner and designer in a New York labor law matter. The plaintiff was injured when he fell from a ladder stacked atop a bakers scaffold while performing renovation work on a four-story brownstone. The 16-foot ladder and the scaffold were provided by his employer—the general contractor—and set up at his employer’s discretion. The plaintiff filed an action against the owner of the property and the designer, alleging violations of various labor law claims, including labor law Sections 240(1), 241(6) and 200. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment, seeking a dismissal of all claims, was filed after the plaintiff’s depositions but before any of the defendants were deposed and with extensive discovery outstanding. The plaintiff opposed the motion and cross moved to compel further discovery. The Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, dismissing all claims as the property owners qualified for the owner and two-family dwelling exception to the labor law. The trial court held that the defendants did not direct, supervise or control any of the plaintiff’s activities. Therefore, according to the affidavit, the single-family home exception did not apply. After oral argument, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision with costs.

Thought Leadership

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Takes Up the Gist of the Action Doctrine

The gist of the action doctrine has been a hot topic in legal malpractice cases in Pennsylvania over the last several years.  Beginning in 2014, the Pennsylvania courts applied the gist of the action doctrine to professional liability actions, following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 106 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014).  In Bruno, the court applied the gist of the action doctrine to a professional negligence claim, and found that a negligence claim was not barred simply because the parties were in a contractual relationship where the gist of the claim sounded in negligence. Thereafter, courts in Pennsylvania applied the gist of the action doctrine to breach of contract claims as well, finding that where the allegations sounded in negligence, a plaintiff could not recast a negligence claim as one for breach of contract. This was important because of the distinction between statutes of limitations: negligence claims must be brought within two (2) years, while breach of contract claims can be brought within four (4) years.  Then, last year, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the gist of the action doctrine does not apply to breach of contract claims as seen through two opinions. These opinions were Swatt v. Nottingham Village, 342 A.3d 23 (Pa. Super. 2025) and Poteat v. Asteak, et al., 350 A.3d 198 (Pa. Super. 2025). That is, the gist of the action doctrine can bar a negligence claim but it cannot bar a breach of contract claim.  This month, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the petition for allowance of appeal in Poteat.  The Supreme Court phrased the issue for consideration as follows: Whether the Superior Court majority’s holding conflicts with this Court’s holding in Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co., 160 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014), as well as Superior Court opinions that applied Bruno, and departs from almost 200 years of controlling precedent that distinguishes between causes of action in contract and tort based upon the nature of the duty that was allegedly breached? Attorneys on both sides of legal malpractice matters no doubt look forward to clarification on these issues from our Supreme Court.