.

Mark D. Wellman

Portrait of Mark D. Wellman

For almost 25 years, Mark has defended general contractors and property owners in New York City on a wide range of statutory liability claims brought pursuant to the New York Labor Law and the New York Industrial Code.  He has also represented numerous subcontractors in high-exposure construction-related premises liability cases.

In addition, Mark has extensive experience defending manufactures and distributors covering a variety of consumer and industrial products. Mark has defended an aviation parts and engine manufacturer in a product liability action in New York.  He has also defended a furniture distributor and a major manufacturer of semi-conductors in a toxic tort matter involving numerous claimants formerly employed at a New York manufacturing facility.

Mark also represents major automobile financing companies in disputes related to ownership, transfer, warranty reimbursement, incentives, as well as franchise concerns.  His experience includes counseling automobile financing companies many types of matters, including dealer related concerns, retail installment contracts, lease agreements, branding concerns, and the development and enforcement of finance performance standards.  These matters also include alleged violations of The Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and New York Fair Debt Collection Statutes.  Furthermore, Mark has represented auto financing companies in bankruptcy proceedings regarding creditor complaints and collection matters.

For almost 10 years, Mark has represented internationally recognized security contractors involved with providing security services at major sporting venues and large commercial centers in New York City and the surrounding suburbs.  Mark has also counseled security companies on a variety of matters including the drafting and modifying of security service agreements and security protocol.

Mark has also represented major movie production companies and news organizations in a large number of premises liability and motor vehicle accident cases, as well as contractual disputes between production companies and subcontractors.

    • The Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University (J.D., 2001)
    • The George Washington University (B.S., cum laude, 1998)
    • Connecticut, 2002
    • New York, 2002
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of New York, 2003
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of New York, 2003
    • Kings County Small Claims Court, Approved Arbitrator
    • New York State Bar Association
    • Claims and Litigation Management Alliance (CLM), Board Member, New York City Chapter
  • Granted a motion for change of venue from Queens County to Westchester County in a motor vehicle accident case. According to the claimant, the accident occurred in Westchester County. Upon information and belief, the plaintiff resided in Westchester County on the date of commencement of this action. The defendant is a resident of Dutchess County, and defendant consolidated company's principal place of business is New York County. The plaintiff argued that Queens County was proper venue based on our client's company's place of business being listed as Astoria, Queens based on the vehicle registration. The plaintiff also argued that if the court decided Queens was not proper, then it should be transferred to New York County. The Second Department held that the sole residence of a domestic corporation for venue purposes is the county designated in its certification of incorporation, despite its maintenance of an office or facility in another county. We served the demand to change venue with our answer, and we moved to change venue within 15 days of service of the demand to change venue according to CPLR 511.

    Successfully granted a motion to compel acceptance of a late answer in a liability matter. The plaintiff suffered injuries after a locker fell on her while she was putting her things away, or taking them out, at the premises owned by our client. The plaintiff rejected our answer after it was eight months late, but never filed a default motion. We filed a motion to compel acceptance of our late answer. In opposition, the plaintiff filed a cross motion for default, citing cases from the judge that was presiding over this case, where he granted default judgments when defendants were less than eight months late in answering. We argued that in those cases, the plaintiff had already moved for default, along with highlighting case law that shows that if it can be proven that the delay in answering was due to the insurance carrier's fault or taking time to appoint counsel, then a delayed answer is acceptable. We had an affidavit from the insured and our insurance adjustor. Our motion was granted, and the answer was deemed timely served. 

    Working with a team, Mark helped to secure a discontinuance for an auto financing company.  The plaintiffs sought over $30 million in damages stemming from breach of contract claims, tortuous interference allegations and a companion declaratory judgment action. The case involved the exchange of over half a million documents and extensive electronic discovery. The settlement with the plaintiff did not involve any contribution by the client.

    Mark obtained summary judgment in favor of a general contractor in a Labor Law matter, by dismissing numerous Labor Law claims and shifting the risk from the general contractor to the plaintiff’s employer.  The decision ultimately placed the responsibility for the accident on the plaintiff’s employer and the employer’s insurance carrier.

    Mark represented the general contractor in a trial involving Labor Law §240(1) and §241(6) in Supreme Court, Queens County, in a high exposure case that settled favorably for his client following the cross examination of the plaintiff’s treating physician.
    Mark successfully defended an airplane engine manufacturer in a products liability claim resulting in a favorable settlement following extensive discovery on the eve of jury selection.

    In New York County Civil Court, Mark obtained a verdict in favor of an auto financing company against a defendant that abandoned a motor vehicle in Europe.

    Mark obtained a favorable decision before the Second Department, Appellate Division for a property owner against plaintiff’s employer on a “grave injury” related claim involving Labor Law §240(1) and Workers’ Compensation Law §11 (affirmed by New York Court of Appeals).
    Mark obtained a dismissal of a plaintiff’s Fair Debt Collection claim against an auto financing company in the Eastern District of New York.

    • Risk Transfer, Contractual Indemnification In Labor Law Section 240(1) Cases, Gallagher Bassett Services, Irvine, CA, July 2013

Results

All Claims Dismissed in a Slip and Fall Case at a New York Hospital

We obtained dismissal of all claims against our client in a case involving a slip and fall at a hospital. The plaintiff was employed by a trucking company and was in the process of filling a liquid oxygen tank located in the parking lot of the hospital when he fell on a sheet of ice near the oxygen station evaporators. He sustained numerous injuries, including injuries to his spine, resulting in cervical fusion. As a result of the accident, the plaintiff alleged significant lost wages, in addition to numerous personal injuries. Our client designed, installed and maintained the oxygen station pursuant to a lease agreement with the hospital. We submitted evidence that our client properly inspected and maintained the oxygen station and that the ice was not caused by the operation of the oxygen station. After years of litigation and numerous depositions, our client moved for summary judgment, seeking a dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims and for an order of indemnification against the hospital based on the lease agreement. The court granted our motion in its entirety and dismissed all claims.

Affirmance Achieved in Dismissal of All Claims in New York Labor Law Matter

We successfully achieved affirmance of the trial court’s decision to dismiss all claims against a property owner and designer in a New York labor law matter. The plaintiff was injured when he fell from a ladder stacked atop a bakers scaffold while performing renovation work on a four-story brownstone. The 16-foot ladder and the scaffold were provided by his employer—the general contractor—and set up at his employer’s discretion. The plaintiff filed an action against the owner of the property and the designer, alleging violations of various labor law claims, including labor law Sections 240(1), 241(6) and 200. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment, seeking a dismissal of all claims, was filed after the plaintiff’s depositions but before any of the defendants were deposed and with extensive discovery outstanding. The plaintiff opposed the motion and cross moved to compel further discovery. The Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, dismissing all claims as the property owners qualified for the owner and two-family dwelling exception to the labor law. The trial court held that the defendants did not direct, supervise or control any of the plaintiff’s activities. Therefore, according to the affidavit, the single-family home exception did not apply. After oral argument, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision with costs.

Thought Leadership

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Employer/Carriers Must Explicitly Invoke Right to Deny Claim Under “Pay and Investigate” Statutory Provision; Employes Must Always Prove Medical Necessity of Treatment

Koren v. City of Kissimmee/PGCS, ___So.3d___(Fla 1st DCA 6/10/26) The majority opinion in Koren holds that the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) properly denied psychiatric treatment because the claimant did not challenge on appeal the JCC’s finding that the requested treatment was not medically necessary. However, Judge K. Thomas authored a detailed concurrence agreeing with the result on the ground that the claimant failed to meet his burden of proving medical necessity. In doing so, Judge K. Thomas also emphasized an important principle: employer/carriers must expressly invoke the 120-day pay-and-investigate provision under Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Act if they intend to preserve their right to deny compensability. Merely authorizing evaluations, without explicitly invoking the 120-day rule, may be insufficient to preserve the right to deny compensability of specific injuries. In Koren, the claimant sustained injuries to his upper lip, tooth, right knee, and right foot when a board gave way on a deck he was repairing for the employer/carrier. The accident was accepted as compensable, and multiple specialists were authorized to treat his physical injuries, including an ear, nose, and throat physician, dentist, orthopedist, and plastic surgeon. The claimant later sought psychiatric treatment and attended an independent medical examination (IME) with a psychiatrist. The IME diagnosed adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood, opining that the condition was caused by “the actual appearance of the scar” resulting from the industrial accident. The IME recommended continued medication, including an antidepressant, as well as follow-up care with a psychiatrist and psychologist. Critically, however, the IME did not offer an opinion regarding the medical necessity of this treatment. The claimant then filed a petition for benefits attaching the IME report and requesting authorization of psychiatric care. The employer/carrier responded by authorizing a psychiatrist, whom the claimant did, in fact, see. However, the employer/carrier neither denied the claim nor issued written notice invoking the 120-day pay-and-investigate provision. The authorized psychiatrist subsequently opined that the claimant’s psychiatric condition was unrelated to the industrial accident and instead attributable to prior employment as a law enforcement officer and volunteer firefighter. The psychiatrist further concluded that the work accident was not the major contributing cause of the condition. Although the employer/carrier stipulated to the authorization of the psychiatrist, it ultimately denied the claimant’s entitlement to psychiatric treatment. The JCC denied the requested benefit. The majority opinion affirmed on the narrow ground that medical necessity had not been established. Judge K. Thomas’s concurrence, however, expands on the legal framework. Under Florida law, an employer/carrier presented with a claim must “pay, pay and investigate, or deny.” To avail itself of the 120-day pay-and-investigate protection, the employer/carrier must affirmatively and explicitly invoke that option, typically through a written 120-day letter. The statutory investigative period does not arise automatically upon the provision of care. Furthermore, an attempt to characterize authorization as a “one-time evaluation” does not avoid waiver, as even a single evaluation may constitute the provision of a compensable benefit. By authorizing psychiatric care without invoking the 120-day provision, the employer/carrier in Koren effectively accepted compensability of the claimant’s PTSD condition. Nonetheless, it retained the ability to contest entitlement to ongoing treatment. While the employer/carrier failed to demonstrate a break in the causal chain, the claimant still bore the burden of proving that the requested treatment was medically necessary. Because the JCC found that the claimant failed to meet this burden, and the claimant did not challenge that finding either below or on appeal, the denial of psychiatric benefits was ultimately affirmed.

Thought Leadership

Mitigating Long-Tail Liability: Delaware Court Reaffirms Five-Year Workers’ Compensation Deadline

Williamson v. Donald F. Deaven, Inc., No. N25A-07-004 FWW, 2026 LX 252526 (Del. Super. Ct. June 2, 2026) Claimant was involved in a compensable industrial work accident on May 12, 1995, for a low back injury.  Following this, he received compensation for temporary total disability benefits from July 1996 to September 1996 and for sustaining a permanent impairment in 1997 and 1998.  For the next 23 years, the claimant continued treatment and paid his own medical bills without submitting them to the employer’s insurer.  In November 2021, the claimant filed a petition seeking payment for medical expenses, including prospective surgery and a resulting period of total disability.  The employer moved to dismiss the petition, arguing it was barred by Delaware’s five-year statute of limitations (19 Del. C. § 2361(b)). Pursuant to 18 Del. C. § 3914, insurers must provide prompt written notice of the applicable statute of limitations to invoke the five-year deadline.  Due to the age of the case, neither party had a comprehensive file of the claim and the Board had archived its file of the matter.  The carrier’s computer system retained only bare information indicating that payments occurred and agreements and receipts were filed with the Board in 1997. While the claimant argued that the employer could not prove it provided the mandatory statutory notice, the Hearing Officer recovered the archived file, which contained two “Receipts for Compensation Paid” signed by the claimant.  The receipts explicitly contained the required five-year limitation language, which the claimant testified to signing at the hearing.  The claimant also attempted to introduce evidence of payments he claimed the employer made, which would have extended the statute of limitations.  As a preliminary matter, the hearing officer excluded the testimony about the payments because the claimant did not produce them to the employer.  The Board found in favor of the employer and dismissed the claimant’s petition as time-barred. The claimant appealed the Board’s decision, arguing that he never received adequate notice of the statute of limitations and that the hearing officer’s evidentiary ruling was an abuse of discretion. The Court held that the archived, signed receipts constituted substantial evidence that the insurer fulfilled its statutory notice requirements.  Therefore,  the claimant’s petition was time-barred under the statute of limitations provisions of 19 Del. C. § 2361(b).  Furthermore, the Court reinforced strict procedural compliance: it rejected the claimant’s attempts to introduce evidence of payment on appeal, ruling the argument was waived for failure to preserve it while the matter was still before the Board. This recent ruling by the Court underscores the importance and necessity of robust data preservation and precise compliance with notice requirements.  For risk managers, employers, and insurers, the decision highlights how tight administrative execution protects against catastrophic long-tail liability.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirmed Workers’ Compensation Order Striking Defenses and Ordering Treatment

Kneezel v. Lambertville House, No. A-2729-24 (June 1, 2026) In Kneezel v. Lambertville House, Lambertville House appealed from a workers’ compensation order to strike its defenses and directing it to authorize knee replacement surgery. By way of background, the petitioner worked as a property manager for Lambertville and injured his back and knee in December 2019. A workers’ compensation claim was filed and the petitioner treated at Rothman Institute. He underwent four injections to his low back and was recommended for surgery. The day before, Lambertville canceled and set up a second opinion exam with Dr. Lawrence Barr. The petitioner filed a motion for medical and temporary benefits (MMT), which was ultimately granted by the workers’ compensation judge. As such, he received authorized treatment for his back. The petitioner was then referred for his left knee pain and treatment was provided by Lambertville. He was recommended for a knee replacement, but the petitioner declined at that time. Approximately two years later, he sought additional treatment, which was denied. After obtaining a report from Dr. Dhimant Balar, the petitioner filed another MMT. In response, Lambertville submitted Dr. Zachwieja’s report and surveillance reports. Dr. Balar opined the left knee injury was related to the work accident, whereas Dr. Zachwieja believed it was due to his advanced degeneration as there was no evidence of acute trauma. A hearing on the MMT began in November 2024, with the petitioner testifying his knee pain never went away and he had a lot of trouble walking, especially for more than five to ten minutes. The surveillance investigators were scheduled to testify after, but had to be rescheduled a couple of times. During a conference in early February 2025, prior to when the investigators were to testify, it was discovered that Lambertville did not provide discovery to the petitioner, including the investigators’ information and surveillance footage. The petitioner moved to strike Lambertville’s defenses and sought an order to authorize the left knee treatment. Petitioner’s counsel pointed to Lambertville’s unreasonable delay in providing the necessary information and Lambertville did not file an opposition. In March 2025, the investigators’ testimonies were set for mid-March. On March 14, 2025, petitioner’s counsel advised she was still waiting for discovery and the judge directed Lambertville’s counsel to provide any missing information by March 17, 2025. Lambertville provided video clips after the petitioner had testified so the judge indicated that if everything was not provided to petitioner’s counsel by the end of March 19, 2025, the judge would sign the order granting the MMT. The next day, the judge entered the order striking Lambertville’s defenses and ordering left knee treatment. Lambertville moved for reconsideration of stay of the order pending appeal. Following oral arguments, the judge denied Lambertville’s motion, citing N.J.A.C. 12:235-3.11 (a)(4)(i) that Lambertville was required to provide surveillance after the petitioner’s testimony and that it had failed to do so even after he testified in November 2024. The judge also noted the investigators’ testimonies were rescheduled multiple times and Lambertville had more than enough time to provide the requested information and failed to do so. The judge also noted Lambertville failed to file a response to the petitioner’s motion to strike. In addition, the judge pointed to the petitioner’s testimony, finding him to be credible and observing him to have to stand and move multiple times during testimony. Lambertville appealed, arguing its due process rights were violated as there was no opportunity to be heard and the order was procedurally and factually defective. However, the Appellate Division disagreed, noting Lambertville had sufficient notice and many opportunities to be heard. It was noted Lambertville’s failure to comply with the judge’s requests led to the order. As for the motion to strike, the Appellate Division indicated Lambertville failed to oppose the motion, which provided the judge with the ability to decide without a hearing for an uncontested motion. Ultimately, the Appellate Division found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the judge’s rulings and order.