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Kevin J. Connors

Portrait of Kevin J. Connors

As a member of the casualty department, Kevin handles catastrophic injury and damages claims involving product liability, construction defect, motor vehicle, fire and property claims, liquor liability, premises liability and toxic tort litigation. In addition to his extensive experience in casualty insurance defense litigation, Kevin has defended numerous defamation, commercial libel and professional malpractice cases.

Kevin also dedicates part of his practice to defending of municipal liability cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He frequently represents police officers, police departments and municipalities in police liability claims, including claims for false arrest, malicious prosecution, excessive force, as well as non-police employees in claims based upon their work on behalf of the municipality. Kevin defends municipalities and government agencies against premises liability, automobile accident, property damage and related tort claims arising under state law. 

Additionally, Kevin has significant experience handling employment discrimination and wrongful discharge cases under federal and state law. He routinely appears before the Delaware Human Relations Commission, the Delaware Department of Labor and in the Delaware Court of Chancery in matters of equity. 

Kevin is the former longtime managing attorney of the firm's Wilmington, Delaware office. Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey in 1993, Kevin was a partner with the firm of Liebert, Short and Hirshland in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where he practiced law for 11 years. After graduating from law school, Kevin served as a law clerk to former Associate Justice John J. McNeilly of the Delaware Supreme Court, Delaware's highest appellate court.

    • Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law (J.D., 1981)
    • Temple Law School Academy of Advocacy (1992)
      • Fellow
    • Rotary International Graduate Fellow, University of Vienna, Austria
      • 1977-1978
    • University of Virginia (B.A., with high distinction, 1977)
    • Delaware, 1982
    • Pennsylvania, 1982
    • U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, 1982
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 1982
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 1983
    • Defense Counsel of Delaware
    • Defense Research Institute
    • Delaware Bar Association
    • Delaware Claims Association
    • Trial Attorneys of America
    • Taught seminars: strict liability, motor vehicle, and Pennsylvania and Delaware insurance law (1990-2007)
    • "The Admissibility of Vehicle Photographs and the Correlation of Minimal Damages with Minimal Injuries," Defense Digest, Vol. 9, No. 4, December, 2003
    • "Note, Commonwealth v. Bussey," 26 Villanova Law Review 205, 1981
    • Successfully represented publisher of magazine in commercial trade libel case. Major insurer of podiatrists sued rival insurance company and publisher for advertisement claiming plaintiff would be unable to meet coverage obligations in the future. Plaintiff's claims were predicated upon interference with contracts and violation of the federal Lanham Act. Following a week-long trial, jury determined publisher was not liable under any theory. Defense verdict was upheld on appeal to Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
    • Jury verdict for defense in product liability action alleging manufacturing defect in electric timer caused significant property damage. Plaintiffs sought to support claim of product defect with fire cause and origin experts. Defense successfully presented independent electrical engineers and in-house experts who proved fire was caused by device not associated with the timer.
    • Summary judgment and affirmance on appeal by Delaware Supreme Court in wrongful death case wherein decedent's representative sought to bring a direct cause of action against plaintiff's employer. Delaware Supreme Court, in affirming matter, clarified permissible basis for bringing and supporting a direct cause of action against a plaintiff's employer. This case is often cited by defense counsel in matters involving the workers' compensation exclusivity bar.
    • Summary judgment entered in favor of defendant. Represented tenant store in large outlet shopping mall from which an allegedly false alarm was emitted. A police officer, attempting to respond to alarm, struck a motor vehicle, flipping it over several times. One child was killed, and there were other significant injuries to other vehicle occupants. The basis for Motion for Summary Judgment was absence of a duty of care under the factual circumstances of the case as a matter of law. Decision upheld by the Delaware Supreme Court.
    • Represented excavator in case wherein a gas explosion occurred and most of a city block was leveled with serious injuries to certain individuals, lesser injuries to others and questionable injuries to multiple other parties. Basis for the litigation was failure to properly mark underground utilities prior to excavation. Key issue was employment status of a particular individual. During trial, the matter successfully settled.
    • Jury returned verdict for defense in product liability case against power tool manufacturer. Trial featured testimony by engineering experts concerning an on/off switch on a power saw. First trial resulted in hung jury. Second trial resulted in non-suit in favor of defense. Defense demonstrated that plaintiff's expert had mixed up critical pieces of power saw, establishing that the factual basis for his opinions were invalid.
    • Jury verdict in favor of defendant escalator manufacturer in product liability action alleging design defect in end plate/comb plate configuration, causing plaintiff to have toes amputated. Plaintiff's expert opined that comb plate was defective in not being designed to break off in a wedge-in contact. The defense successfully demonstrated that plaintiff misused escalator and illustrated safety features of comb plate/end plate and escalator in general.
    • Summary judgment obtained in claim by prisoner that corporate health care provider in the state's prison system was deliberately indifferent in violation of 1983 civil rights and medically negligent in failing to afford plaintiff treatment for an allegedly serious medical condition. Plaintiff claimed he suffered from number of distinct medical conditions and had exhausted all administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Summary judgment was awarded on the grounds that plaintiff received proper medical care and failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.
    • Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Motion to Dismiss in favor of councilpersons against whom a political candidate filed a 1983 civil rights claim alleging violations of his civil rights by making defamatory remarks against him in retaliation for exercising his first amendment rights to free speech and petition. Plaintiff sought restrictions for election signs during political campaigns and spoke to defendant councilpersons opposed to proposed legislative restrictions. Plaintiff's complaint alleged that a newspaper reported that defendant councilpersons said plaintiff had made threatening remarks to them, which caused plaintiff to suffer damages and injury to his reputation. Defendants asserted plaintiff failed to demonstrate it was clearly established that an individual had a constitutional right not to be subjected to defamatory remarks in retaliation for engaging in constitutionally protected first amendment activity. The Court engaged in extended discussion of client councilpersons' defense of qualified immunity and granted their Motion to Dismiss on theory of qualified immunity.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.