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Co-Chair, Insurance Services Practice

Co-Chair, Cannabis Law Practice

Portrait of Todd J. Leon

Legal Updates for Insurance Services

Third Circuit Issues Ruling on Insurer’s Broad Duty to Defend

Legal Updates for Insurance Services – January 6, 2022

January 6, 2022

by Todd J. Leon

On January 5, 2022, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals handed down its opinion in Vitamin Energy, LLC v. Evanston Insurance Company, which reaffirmed the broad manner in which Pennsylvania courts will construe an insurer’s duty to defend.

Vitamin Energy arose out of an underlying intellectual property lawsuit filed by the companies that own the trademarks for 5-hour Energy liquid energy shots. Per the complaint, Vitamin Energy engaged in “false and misleading comparative advertising” regarding the benefits of its own products versus 5-hour Energy and misrepresented the effects Vitamin Energy’s products would have on the users’ performance. 5-hour Energy also claimed that Vitamin Energy advertised that its product would provide “up to 7 HOURS of Energy” by using language and a typeface that was confusingly similar to 5-hour Energy’s registered trademarks.

Subsequent to the filing of the underlying action, Vitamin Energy sought a defense and indemnification from its CGL insurer, Evanston, which disclaimed coverage on the basis that the complaint did not assert claims qualifying as “advertising injury” and that, even if such claims were asserted, coverage was otherwise barred by various exclusions. As a result, Vitamin Energy filed a declaratory judgment complaint against Evanston, seeking a declaration of its entitlement to coverage.

In November 2020, Judge Joel H. Slomsky of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment to Evanston, ruling that the allegations of the underlying complaint did not allege “advertising injury” as defined by the subject CGL policy. The Third Circuit, in its recent opinion drafted by Judge Kent A. Jordan (and joined in by Judge David J. Porter and Judge Marjorie O. Rendell), reversed that decision and found that Evanston owed a duty to defend based upon the broad and liberal construction required for determining an insurer’s defense obligation.

In so ruling, the Circuit court engaged in a granular discussion of the allegations set forth in  5-hour Energy’s complaint. Ultimately, it was a single claim—that 5-hour Energy’s products do not contain 100% of the recommended daily value of vitamin B—which the Third Circuit found differentiated the claims against Vitamin Energy from previous cases in which courts found insurers did not owe a duty to defend their insureds and triggered Evanston’s duty to defend. More specifically, the court acknowledged that various aspects of the complaint were outside the scope of the coverage afforded by Evanston’s policy (including those with respect to representations regarding Vitamin Energy’s own products and those involving trademark infringement), but noted that, under Pennsylvania law, “the question for us is whether a claim against an insured is potentially covered, not whether the most salient claim is potentially covered.” (Italics in original.) The Third Circuit also rejected the applicability of various exclusions in Evanston’s policy to excuse the carrier’s duty to defend, as it focused upon their irrelevance to the sole “covered” claim—for allegedly false or misleading representations regarding the contents of 5-hour Energy’s products. 

In the end, the Third Circuit couched its decision in the context of Pennsylvania’s broad construction of an insurer’s duty to defend. Simply put, where a complaint asserts a variety of claims, and any one of them falls within the scope of the coverage provided by a policy, the insurer owes the obligation to defend its insured against the entirety of the action. That said, and as the Third Circuit took pains to note, that preliminary determination does not decide the ultimate issue of whether the insurer will owe a duty to indemnify. The outcome of that question will depend upon the proofs that are adduced through discovery and trial.
 

Legal Updates for Insurance Services – January 6, 2022, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments, and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2022 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.