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Legal Updates for Insurance Services

Third Circuit Holds that Commercial Property Policies Do Not Provide Coverage for Businesses’ COVID-19 Closure Claims

Legal Updates for Insurance Services – Florida Alert – January 9, 2023

January 9, 2023

by Todd J. Leon

On January 6, 2023, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals handed down a unanimous opinion in Law Offices of Rhonda H. Wilson, et al. v. USI Insurance Service, et al., which was drafted by Judge Michael A. Chagares. The case is particularly notable as it involved consolidated claims for coverage by businesses located in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, Maryland, and Delaware and holds that, under both New Jersey and Pennsylvania law, claims by businesses for COVID-19-related business losses are not covered under standard commercial property policies.

The businesses involved in the consolidated litigation spanned multiple industries, including the food service, medical, health and wellness, art, music and legal sectors. However, each of the insureds made the same essential arguments in favor of coverage; namely, that their policies’ business income, extra expense and civil authority provisions were triggered. The Third Circuit rejected each of these arguments and held that the insurers owed no such coverage.

The opinion framed the key issue as “whether the businesses’ inability to use their properties for their intended business purposes constitutes ‘physical loss of’ property as that phrase is used in the policies.” In concluding that the answer to the question was “no,” the Third Circuit focused upon the specific language of the policies at issue, which required that there be a “direct physical loss” in order for coverage to be triggered. In addition, at least some of the policies included “virus exclusions” that precluded coverage for losses caused by or relating to a virus.

The panel began its analysis by acknowledging that the phrase “physical loss of or damage” was not defined in the policies. The court, thus, looked to the plain meaning of the text and concluded that “loss” meant the “failure to keep or maintain possession” or “the state or fact of being destroyed.” “Damage,” in turn, was taken to mean “injury or harm to property.” Taking these two definitions together, the Third Circuit concluded that “the loss of damage must be physical, which means natural, tangible, concrete.”

In looking to its previous jurisprudence, the panel noted that physical damage to property has typically been defined to mean “a distinct, demonstrable, and physical alteration of its structure.” However, the court also recognized that there may be circumstances where a building suffers physical damage that is unnoticeable to the naked eye. On these occasions, insureds seeking to trigger coverage must show that the “contamination of the property [is] such that its function is nearly eliminated or destroyed, or the structure is made useless or uninhabitable.”

The Third Circuit concluded that, in the context of a COVID-19 business interruption claim, the Supreme Courts of both Pennsylvania and New Jersey would apply a similar standard in order to ensure that “any insured will have lost tangible possession of property sufficient to constitute physical loss or damage.” As such, the businesses were required to “show that the functionalities of their properties were nearly eliminated or destroyed, that the structures were made useless or uninhabitable, or that there was an imminent risk of either of those things happening.”

In an effort to meet that stringent test, the businesses argued that their loss of the ability to use their properties for their intended business purposes was sufficient. The Third Circuit rejected that position, holding that the “argument is completely divorced from the physical condition of the premises. The businesses lost the ability to use their properties for their intended business purposes because the governors of the states in which they operate issued orders closing or limiting the activities of nonessential businesses, not because there was anything wrong with their properties.”

The court continued by noting that “the loss of the ability to use property in certain ways does not render the properties useless or uninhabitable. The properties could certainly be used or inhabited, just not in the way the businesses would have liked. Restaurants remained open for carry out, and medical providers could perform emergency procedures…. No one was ‘physically restrained’ from entering the businesses’ properties.” Ultimately, the Third Circuit concluded that “loss of use caused by government edict and untethered to the physical condition of the premises is not a physical loss or damage to the properties.”

The Third Circuit also rejected arguments by those businesses that sought coverage under the civil authority coverage afforded by their policies. In so holding, the panel noted that coverage under civil authority provisions requires physical loss or damage to a property other than the insured premises and that an action of civil authority prohibited access to the insured premises because of that loss or damage. The opinion found that the businesses failed to meet both requirements, as there were no claims of damage or loss to other properties, nor did the closure orders prohibit access to the businesses’ properties.

The Third Circuit’s ruling is, thus, another strong pronouncement that COVID-19-related business losses are not covered under the standard language of commercial property policies. Of note, the panel acknowledged in a footnote the recent decisions by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in MacMiles, LLC v. Erie Insurance Exchange and Ungarean v. CNA and Valley Forge Insurance Company and observed its belief that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, if called upon to decide the issue, would decide the coverage questions in a manner consistent with the opinion in Law Offices of Rhonda H. Wilson.

We will continue to monitor the various cases involving issues of COVID-19-related business losses as the various courts considering the issues weigh in on the question of whether coverage should be afforded for such claims.

 

The material in Legal Updates for Insurance Services – Florida Alert – January 9, 2023, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

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Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.