.

Teresa O. Sirianni

Portrait of Teresa O. Sirianni

Teresa is a strong advocate for her employment law, civil rights and municipal liability clients. In her role as an experienced litigator, Teresa represents school districts, school leaders, municipalities, police departments and various non-profit and corporate entities, in claims made and suits brought against them. She appears regularly in both the state and federal courts, representing clients in suits brought against them involving Section 1983 claims, Title VII actions, ADEA, ADA, FMLA and PHRA matters.

When called on to represent and defend school leaders and school districts, Teresa’s experience and understanding in education law serve her clients well. She represents all types of education clients with a focus on Special Education Law, Due Process Student Rights, Bullying and Anti-Bullying Policies and Educator Due Process.

In addition to her experience as a litigator, Teresa represents employers and other professionals in various administrative matters; before the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, the National Labor Relations Board, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and multiple other administrative units including the Pennsylvania Department of Education, the Office for Dispute Resolution, the Office for Civil Rights and the State Ethics Commission. Teresa also consults with employers, school leaders and various types of public entities on matters including auditing, updating and revising personnel manuals and educational policies.

A member of the Allegheny County Bar Association, Teresa is recognized among The Best Lawyers in America® for 2024 and 2025 in the areas of Litigation – Labor and Employment and was recognized as a Best Lawyer in 2025 in the area of Employment Law – Management. Notably, Teresa was also recently inducted as a Fellow of the Academy of Trial Lawyers of Allegheny County, a community of trial lawyers committed to improving the civil trial process, preserving the jury system and enhancing the quality of trial advocacy in Allegheny County. Fellows must have significant trial experience and exhibit the highest levels of ethical standards and professionalism.

Teresa is admitted to practice before the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania and all Pennsylvania state courts.

    • Thomas R. Kline School of Law of Duquesne University (J.D., 2002)
    • The Pennsylvania State University (B.S., 1995)
    • Pennsylvania, 2003
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania, 2003
    • The Best Lawyers in America©, Education Law (2026)
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Employment Law – Management (2025-2026)
    • The Best Lawyers in America©, Litigation – Labor and Employment (2024-2026)
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyer Rising Star (2013)
    • Allegheny County Bar Association
    • Academy of Trial Lawyers of Allegheny County
    • A Primer on Pursuing and Defending Remedies and Damages, The Annual Allegheny County Bar Association's Labor and Employment Symposium, November 14, 2024
    • Employment Claims Involving Law Enforcement: Prepare to Defend, The Western Pennsylvania Chiefs’ of Police Association, November 19, 2021
    • Effective Practices for General Educators in Inclusive Classrooms, November 18, 2018
    • The Role of the General Educator in the Special Education Process, January 15, 2018
    • How A Student Can Make A Successful Return to School – Liabilities and Responsibilities – Concussion Presentation, February 28, 2014
    • Employment Liability in the Cyber Age, Marshall Dennehey / AIG Employment Seminar, Pittsburgh, PA, May 2, 2013
    • Employment in Crisis: Workplace Security & Lessons from the Sandusky Case, Marshall Dennehey, Erie, PA, October 11, 2012
    • Speaker on various topics involving employment claims and federal practice.
    • Successfully obtained a defense verdict following a jury trial in United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  Plaintiff alleged ADA (disability) discrimination and retaliation, ADEA (age) discrimination and ERISA retaliation regarding the elimination of his position in April 2018.  Plaintiff’s position was eliminated for the legitimate and non-discriminatory or retaliatory reason of fulfilling full utilization of the company’s fleet of tankers. Following a three-day trial, including witness testimony from seven individuals, a panel of seven jurors unanimously returned a verdict in favor of our client, a regional trucking company.
    • Defense verdict for municipal employer against a former employee’s claims that he was terminated in violation of the FMLA.
    • Obtained summary judgment in federal court on behalf of a school district employer alleged to have violated the ADA when it terminated plaintiff’s employment in violation of various school policies.
    • Obtained an early dismissal of an employee’s breach of contract claim wherein the employee alleged that the employer terminated his employment in violation of a union contract despite the employee’s status as a probationary employee.
    • Successfully defended a police chief and municipal police department against plaintiff’s claims of violations of his procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and claims of defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Obtained summary judgment on all of plaintiff’s claims following aggressive discovery.
    • Obtained a complete dismissal of plaintiff’s multiple civil rights claims on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and various other federal statutes against multiple police officers wherein Plaintiff claimed that the officers violated the knock and announce rule by not announcing their presence prior to entering plaintiff’s apartment and arresting him.
    • Summary judgment secured for a non-profit corporation against former employee’s claim of constructive discharge and allegations of disparate treatment, hostile work environment and retaliation.

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Special Education Law

Legal Update for Special Education Law – Case Law Update

July 1, 2025

U.S. Supreme Court Clarifies Standard for Disability Discrimination Claims in Education Under Section 504 and ADA A.J.T., by and through her parents, A.T., et al. v. Osseo Area Schools, Independent School District No. 279, et al., 605 U.S. --- , --- S. Ct. ---, 2025 WL 1657415 (June 12, 2025) In a ruling clarifying the rights of students with disabilities, the Supreme Court of the United States unanimously held that schoolchildren bringing claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are not required to show “bad faith or gross misjudgment” to recover damages related to educational services.  This case alleged that a school district refused to provide supplemental instruction during the early evening to a special education student with a rare form of epilepsy that prevented her from attending school until midday. The District Court concluded that the child was entitled to the instruction and compensatory education. In addressing the parents’ suit for money damages under Section 504 and the ADA, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed that claim because the parents had not established that the school district’s refusal amounted to bad faith or gross misjudgment.  The petitioner, A.J.T., a teenager with a rare form of epilepsy that severely limits her physical and cognitive functioning, suffers from seizures that are so frequent in the mornings that she cannot attend school before noon but is alert and able to learn between noon and 6 p.m. For the first few years of her schooling, A.J.T.’s school district accommodated her condition by providing her with afternoon and evening instruction and allowed her to avoid morning activities. In 2015, A.J.T.’s family moved, and her new school district, Osseo Area Public Schools, denied her parents’ request to provide evening instruction in A.J.T.’s IEP. This denial resulted in A.J.T. only receiving 4.25 hours of instruction per day as compared to the standard 6.5 hours of schooling received by nondisabled students in the district. A.J.T.’s parents filed an IDEA complaint with the Minnesota Department of Education, claiming a denial of FAPE. The administrative law judge ruled that the school district had violated the IDEA and ordered the school district to provide compensatory education and evening instruction. Federal courts affirmed the ruling, upholding the award of compensatory education under the IDEA. A.J.T. and her parents then sued the school district in the Federal District Court under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, requesting a permanent injunction, reimbursement of certain costs and compensatory damages. The District Court granted summary judgment to the school district. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment, holding that a school district’s failure to provide a reasonable accommodation was not enough to state a prima facie case of discrimination as established by prior case law. In addition, the Eighth Circuit upheld a requirement that a plaintiff prove that school officials’ conduct rose to the level of bad faith or gross misjudgment in order to recover damages under either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. Certain other courts of appeal have also applied the same heightened standard as the Eighth Circuit, but not all. In reaching its decision resolving the split, the Supreme Court recognized that, outside of the educational services context, courts only require a “deliberate indifference” standard to obtain compensatory damages under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act for intentional discrimination. However, the Court noted that the statutory remedial or substantive protections of Title II of the ADA or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act suggest that claims based on educational services should be subject to a more demanding standard. The Court further referenced the specific statutory language of the IDEA, which provides that nothing in the IDEA “shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under” the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, or other federal laws protecting disabling children’s rights, noting that a heightened standard of “bad faith or gross misjudgment” is irreconcilable with the unambiguous directive of this section of the IDEA. By imposing a heightened standard, the appeals court limited the ability of disabled schoolchildren to assert their independent rights under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, thereby making it more difficult to obtain remedies provided by Congress when it enacted this newer provision of the IDEA. Going forward, claims based on educational services brought pursuant to the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act should be subject to the same standards applied in other disability discrimination contexts.    Legal Update for Special Education Law – July 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Legal Updates for Special Education Law

Legal Update for Special Education Law – Updates from the Pennsylvania Department of Education

June 1, 2024

Commonwealth Court voids Pennsylvania Department of Education’s newly imposed Age-Out Plan for failure to implement it in accordance with Pennsylvania Laws.* PSBA, Inc., et al. v. Dr. Khalid N. Mumin, Secretary of Education of the Pa. Dept. of Ed., et al., 2024 WL 2195545 (Pa. Cmwlth. May 16, 2024) On May 16, 2024, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court issued an en banc decision granting the petitioners’ Application for Summary Relief and denying the Pennsylvania Department of Education’s (PDE) cross Application for Summary Relief. In its petition, the petitioners asserted that the PDE illegally implemented a new regulation requiring Pennsylvania Local Educational Agencies (LEA) to provide a Free and Appropriate Education (FAPE) until a student’s 22nd birthday—rather than through the end of the school term in which the student reaches 21 years of age—otherwise known as the “Age-Out Plan.” More specifically, the petitioners—the Pennsylvania School Boards Association (PSBA) and three school districts across Pennsylvania—alleged the PDE did not follow the required rulemaking procedures to implement the new Age-Out Plan, which would have included public and timely notice prior to implementing the regulation. Without timely notice of the new Plan, the petitioners, including PSBA members, could not budget to account for the new, additional services to eligible students and, in turn, were required to educate students with unbudgeted funds. The lack of timely notice made the petitioners also ineligible for related funding. The Commonwealth Court sided with the PSBA and the school districts, finding that the New Age-Out Plan was a binding regulation with the effect of law, thus requiring the PDE to promulgate it in accordance with applicable Pennsylvania laws. Finding that the PDE did not do so, the Commonwealth Court ruled that the New Age-Out Plan was void ab initio and unenforceable. The underlying facts giving rise to the cross petitions were largely stipulated by the parties. In July 2023, a student, through his parents, filed a class action complaint in the Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania alleging that the PDE’s Age-Out Plan violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) by prematurely cutting off special education services of 21-year-old students. On August 30, 2023, the PDE entered into a settlement agreement with the student and his parents to end the litigation. In the settlement agreement, PDE agreed, beginning with the 2023–2024 school year, to change its Age-Out Plan expiration from the end of the school year in which a child with disabilities turns age 21 to his/her 22nd birthday.  The written settlement agreement specifically outlined the terms of the “New Age-Out Plan” providing that:  the PDE will rescind and cease implementing and enforcing the Age-Out Plan as it exists in its Model Policy at Section 300.101;  the PDE “has amended Section 300.101” to reflect that the IDEA requires Pennsylvania to provide a FAPE to children with disabilities until their 22nd birthday (New Age-Out Plan);  immediately upon execution of the settlement agreement, the PDE will implement, publish and enforce the New Age-Out Plan to be effective no later than September 5, 2023; and  the New Age-Out Plan will apply to all children with disabilities as defined in the U.S. Department of Education’s Regulations including those who turned 21 during or after the 2022–2023 school term. Further, the settlement agreement required the PDE, within 24 hours, to post online and to send a notice letter via several different means of communication to parents of children with disabilities who turned 21 during the 2022-2023 school year of their potential eligibility to re-enroll.  On August 30, 2023, the PDE also, in accordance with the settlement agreement, immediately revised its Model Policy to reflect the new policy and otherwise followed the terms of the settlement agreement. Importantly, the court noted that the PDE never notified the LEAs before entering into the settlement agreement on August 30, 2023, or before revising its policy, both of which occurred after the LEAs had adopted their budgets and set their taxes on or before June 30 of each year. The court rejected all of the PDE’s arguments in its cross petition, including that there was no actual controversy since the LEAs had yet to implement the new regulation, that the petitioners lacked standing, and that the petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies before going directly to the Commonwealth Court. In its ruling in favor of the petitioners, the court noted that the petitioners were not challenging the IDEA and were not skirting any of its legal obligations to provide a FAPE to students with disabilities. Rather, the court noted that the petitioners merely sought to have the court declare whether the PDE could implement and enforce the New Age-Out Plan via the settlement agreement instead of complying with Pennsylvania laws that specifically require certain rulemaking procedures, including providing notice to the public of its proposed rulemaking and an opportunity for the public to comment, along with legislative scrutiny. Without such compliance and a “mere six days’ notice” to comply with the New Age-Out Plan, the PDE put the LEAs in the position of having to provide a FAPE to eligible students until their 22nd birthday with unbudgeted funds and to risk losing federal funding for a failure to comply. Accordingly, the court found that the petitioners had a substantial, direct, immediate interest and imminent harm relative to the implementation of the new regulation, thereby declaring the new regulation unenforceable.  *The PDE has appealed the Commonwealth Court’s ruling invalidating the New Age-Out Plan to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. This appeal remains pending. The appeal effectively stays the Commonwealth Court’s decision pending the outcome in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which means that the New Age-Out Plan remains in full force and effect at this time.    Legal Update for Special Education Law – June 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court Holds That Personal Emails of Public Employees and Officials are Subject to OPRA

In Rosetti v. Ramapo-Indian Hills Regional High School Board of Education, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held that government-related emails, which are contained within personal email accounts, are government records under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), and a log of those emails must be produced when requested. In reaching this decision, the court conducted an analysis of the OPRA and cited previous cases that held that emails do in fact fall within OPRA’s definition of a record and must be produced when requested pursuant to the Act. The court in Rosetti then had to answer the question as to whether public officials’ personal email accounts that are used for government purposes are subject to OPRA, and found that they are. Rosetti made an OPRA request to the Board of Education seeking email logs from Board members’ personal email accounts. The Board refused to produce the logs and indicated that it was not under any obligation to produce personal email account logs, only from government-related email accounts. The issue was whether a log had to be produced for Board members’ personal email accounts, which they used to conduct Board business. The Board argued that while it was possible to create a log for government-related email accounts through its IT Department, it was not possible to do so for personal email accounts. The court rejected this argument and ruled that Board members are required to search their personal email accounts and create a log of government-related emails housed in those accounts. Once completed, each Board member then must submit a certification detailing the searches that were conducted. The court went one step further with a suggestion to government employees and officials, stating, “[g]overnment agencies should strongly advise their employees, elected officials, and others engaged in government-related business to refrain from using their personal email accounts when conducting government-related business.”  Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions regarding this case and others pertaining to the OPRA. 

Thought Leadership

Perlmutter Provides Predictability for Punitive Damages Claims in Florida

In a much anticipated decision, the Florida Supreme Court provided clarity for the standards of proof for punitive damages claims in Perlmutter v. Federal Insurance Company, SC2024-0058 (Fla. June 11, 2026). Litigants and trial judges must be mindful of the standards laid out by the Court. And, defense practitioners must be prepared to alter their strategies to defend against such claims. Perlmutter came to the Court from the Fourth District, based on conflict jurisdiction with decisions from the Second and Fifth District and on certification of a question of great public importance as to the standard of proof for punitive damages claims at the pleading stage. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Perlmutter, 376 So. 3d 24, 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). In the underlying case, the Fourth District made two conclusions. First, it held that a “trial court must consider the evidentiary showing by all parties at the hearing on the motion to amend, that is, evidence ‘in the record’ and evidence ‘proffered by the claimant.’”  376 So. 3d at 33. Second, the Fourth held that it “interpreted section 768.72(1) and (2) to require the trial court to make a preliminary determination of whether a reasonable jury, viewing the totality of proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the movant, could find by clear and convincing evidence that punitive damages are warranted.  Id. at 34 (underscoring in the original). In making these conclusions, the court cautioned trial courts that the “preliminary determination” analysis did not entitle the trial court to decide whether the evidence is clear and convincing and noted that the trial court should not weigh evidence and should not determine witness credibility. Id. The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction and answered the certified question in the negative. It quashed the decision below and remanded the case for application of the following standards: The trial court should consider only the evidence identified or proffered by the claimant; it should not entertain an evidentiary counter-submission from the opponent. The trial court should consider whether a reasonable person could conclude based on the claimant’s evidence, that the defendant committed “intentional misconduct” or “gross negligence” as defined in section 768.72(2) or section 768.72(3). The trial court must review the request for punitive damages in the context of the underlying claims. The trial court should not apply the clear and convincing standard of proof in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence at the pleading stage. The trial court does not act as a fact-finder; the trial court must not weigh the claimant’s evidence—it cannot decide the truth of the matter. The trial court must consider the record evidence and the proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but the allegations in the proposed amended complaint are not themselves evidence. Perlmutter, SC2024-0058 at 13-15 (emphasis added). In explaining these standards, the Court interpreted the text of the statute and compared it to a related statute which governs punitive damages in the nursing home context. The nursing home statute expressly calls for evidentiary submissions by “the parties” and expressly tells the trial court to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant could satisfy the “clear and convincing evidence” standard at trial. Id. at 17-18 (comparing the text of section 768.72(1), Florida Statutes, with section 400.0237, Florida Statutes). Without that express language in section 768.72, the statute could not be applied in the same manner. With these standards specially delineated for the trial courts, the Court is “confident that its interpretation of section 768.72(1) will not frustrate the effectiveness of the statute in accomplishing the Legislature’s textually evident purposes.” Id.  at 22 (cleaned up). This remains to be seen. While Perlmutter provides predictability and clarity for trial courts when reviewing the evidentiary submissions in support of a punitive damages claim, the decision will not likely impact the numbers of punitive damages motions filed. Rather, these new parameters will change the way claims are defended, reminiscent of a time when rulings on punitive damages were only subject to certiorari review and appellate courts were limited in reviewing procedural errors. This decision will likely deflate the level-playing field that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(G) addressed by allowing appeals of orders granting and denying punitive damages amendments. Further, Perlmutter may have impliedly created a call to action for the Legislature to amend section 768.72(1) in the same manner it amended section 400.0237 to allow the courts to analyze “admissible evidence submitted by the parties” and determine at a hearing whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant at trial would be able to demonstrate by “clear and convincing evidence” that the recovery of punitive damages is warranted. Until then, defendants must adjust their strategies. To adapt to these new standards, defense practitioners will need to tailor their strategy for defending punitive damages claims since they can no longer submit a counter-proffer or urge a court to apply the clear and convincing standard at the pleading phase. Instead, defendants will need to attack the deficiencies in the claimant’s pleadings and proffer. If the trial court fails to serve as a gatekeeper, and does not apply the above standards, then defendants can pursue an interlocutory appeal under Rule 9.130(a)(3)(G). If a nonfinal appeal is taken, then defendants should move to stay any intrusive financial discovery while the appellate court analyzes the issues on appeal. Finally, defendants should utilize Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510 to serve as a screening device to allow the trial court to analyze all evidence and prevent nonmeritorious punitive damages claims from proceeding to a jury.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Holds Self-Referral Prohibition Does Not Cover Prescriptions Written by Physicians with Ownership Interests in Dispensing Pharmacies

700 Pharmacy v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office (State Workers’ Insurance Fund); Nos. 97, 98, 99, 100, 101 MAP 2024; decided June 16, 2026; by Justice Mundy.   In this case, Drs. Miteswar Purewal and Shailen Jalali, treating physicians for workers’ compensation claimants, wrote prescriptions for various medications that were filled by 700 Pharmacy. The worker’s compensation insurer refused to pay for the prescriptions on the basis that they were illegal self-referrals under the Act. 700 Pharmacy subsequently filed fee review applications with The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Medical Fee Review Office. At a fee review hearing, both physicians stipulated they had a financial interest in the pharmacy.  The physicians argued that the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act does not bar self-referrals on prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services, since the provision does not specifically identify prescription drugs. The Fee Review Hearing Officer rejected this argument and found that prescriptions for medications are prohibited under the “goods or services” language included in the provision. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Commonwealth Court, and the court affirmed, agreeing with the Hearing Officer’s interpretation of “goods and services” as encompassing prescriptions. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Hearing Officer and the Commonwealth Court, holding that the term “goods and services” in the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act did not include prescriptions. According to the Court, “goods and services” was not a catch-all, but simply explanatory as to the eight enumerated categories in the provision. The provision (Section 306(f.1)(3)(iii)) reads, in pertinent part: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it is unlawful for a provider to refer a person for laboratory, physical therapy, rehabilitation, chiropractic, radiation oncology, psychometric, home infusion therapy  or diagnostic imaging, goods or services pursuant to this section if the provider has a financial interest with the person or in the entity that receives the referral. The Court said that if the General Assembly wanted to specifically include prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services in the Anti-Referral Provision, they would have done so. They pointed out that prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services were included by the legislature in Section 306 (f.1)(3)(vi) of the Act as to reimbursement, and claimed that their omission from the Anti-Referral Provision supports the conclusion that those services are not included in the Anti-Referral Provision’s self-referral prohibition.

News

Marshall Dennehey’s John J. Hare Brings Home Attorney of the Year Honors; Firm Named Litigation Department of the Year in Two Categories

Marshall Dennehey took home top honors in three categories at the The Legal Intelligencer’s 2026 Pennsylvania Legal Awards, held June 11 in Philadelphia. The first place awards include: Attorney of the Year: John J. Hare, Chair of the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post-Trial Practice Group and Executive Committee member, together with Charles “Chip” Becker of Kline & Specter Litigation Department of the Year, Appellate – Third Win in a Row! Litigation Department of the Year, Product Liability/Mass Torts “There is no one more deserving of Attorney of the Year honors than John. This award is a testament to his exceptional skill, dedication, and leadership—qualities that truly exemplify the very best of our firm,” said G. Mark Thompson, Marshall Dennehey’s President & CEO. “These honors also reflect the strength and depth of our product liability, mass torts, and appellate practices across Pennsylvania and beyond, underscoring our ongoing commitment to delivering outstanding results for our clients.” Attorney of the Year – John J. Hare, Marshall Dennehey, together with Charles “Chip” Becker, Kline & Specter Over the past year, John and Charles were opposing counsel in many of the highest-profile civil appeals in Pennsylvania. John is renowned as a preeminent appellate lawyer on the defense side, and Chip on the plaintiff's side. They have opposed each other repeatedly, exhibiting peerless professionalism and exceptional civility, while zealously litigating under the unremitting pressure of high-profile litigation and record-setting verdicts totaling more than $3.5 billion. They have also collaborated, outside of litigation, on many commissions, committees, and projects of importance to the Pennsylvania judiciary and legal community. Litigation Department of the Year – Appellate Law, Winner (previous winner, 2025 and 2024) 2025 was another standout year for the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post‑Trial Practice Group, led by John J. Hare, which was retained to challenge many of Pennsylvania’s “nuclear” verdicts—awards exceeding $10 million. Notably, the department persuaded the Pennsylvania Superior Court to reverse a Philadelphia judgment of $1.09 billion, the largest judgment ever overturned by a Pennsylvania appellate court. The group’s 11 full‑time Pennsylvania‑based appellate lawyers are at the center of Pennsylvania’s most high-profile matters, bringing more than 150 years of combined appellate experience. They routinely handle post‑trial and appellate matters and are frequently engaged to participate in and monitor trials in high‑exposure cases to ensure that critical legal issues are properly raised and preserved for appeal. Litigation Department of the Year – Product Liability/Mass Torts, Winner This marks the first win for the firm’s Pennsylvania Product Liability and Mass Torts practices, which operate within our Casualty Department, managed by Matthew Schorr and Jeff Rapattoni. For almost five decades, Fortune 500 product manufacturers/distributors and their insurers have turned to these groups to defend their litigation. Led by Bradley D. Remick and Vlada Tasich, our Product Liability group’s success can be attributed to its commitment to keeping abreast of ever-changing legal theories, judicial viewpoints, and evolving technology impacting the product liability landscape. Our attorneys have successfully handled thousands of product liability matters in all jurisdictions across the state. Likewise, our mass tort litigation practice – divided into Asbestos & Mass Tort, and Environmental & Toxic Tort Litigation –  has defended manufacturers, distributors, contractors, and premises owners in thousands of personal injury and other claims. Led by Kevin E. Hexstall and Patrick T. Reilly, most attorneys in these groups have more than 20 years of experience, and our seasoned trial team has tried hundreds of cases to verdict, consistently achieving strong results through both trials and settlements. In addition to these awards, Marshall Dennehey was a Litigation Department of the Year finalist for Professional Liability.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.