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Shane Haselbarth

Portrait of Shane Haselbarth

Shane is a member of the firm's Post-Trial and Appellate Advocacy Practice Group.  In this role, he handles all aspects of briefing and argument in federal and state appellate courts, and is also routinely tasked with assisting trial teams with the preparation and presentation of briefing and argument in support of pre-trial motions and post-trial motions.  The appellate team at Marshall Dennehey also provides critical support to attorneys at trial to ensure that pitfalls are avoided and viable appellate issues are preserved.  Serving as appellate lead counsel and trial-level support counsel allows Shane to handle cases of all varieties, including civil rights and municipal liability, negligence, construction accidents, professional malpractice, product liability, toxic torts, and class actions.

In 2021, Shane was named the Assistant General Counsel for the firm.  In this role, and drawing on his litigation experience, he brings a results-oriented perspective to issues as they arise for the firm itself.  Working with firm General Counsel Jay Rothman, Shane is tasked with process development and assisting colleagues navigate routine (and non-routine) issues that legal professionals face today.

Prior to joining the firm, Shane clerked for Judge D. Brooks Smith, former Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and earlier clerked for Judge William J. Zloch of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Shane has been admitted to practice in all state courts of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Florida, as well as the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First, Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits, and the United States District Courts for the Eastern and Middle Districts of Pennsylvania.

    • Ave Maria School of Law (J.D., summa cum laude, 2007)
    • Franciscan University of Steubenville (B.A., magna cum laude, 2004)
    • Pennsylvania, 2007
    • New Jersey, 2007
    • Florida, 2014
    • Supreme Court of the United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 1st Circuit
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 4th Circuit
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 11th Circuit
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyer Rising Star (2015-2017)
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Philadelphia Bar Association
    • Highlights in Pennsylvania Medical Malpractice Law, Health Care and Health Law Seminar, Marshall Dennehey, November 7, 2019
    • Highlights in Pennsylvania Medical Malpractice Law, Health Care and Health Law Seminar, Marshall Dennehey, November 5, 2015
    • “The Phantom Vehicle: Prejudice in Delayed UM Claim Not Presumed, But Certainly Demonstrable,”  Defense Digest, Vol. 20, No. 1, March 2014
    • Case Law Alerts, regular contributor, January 2014-present
    • "Pa. Atty Off Hook For Extended Interest on Malpractice Award," Law360, March 31, 2021
    • In a police shooting case involving a fatality, a unanimous Third Circuit panel affirmed the District Court's entry of summary judgment (on Shane's motion as well), holding that the officers violated no Fourth Amendment right of the decedent. Dispatch relayed news of a 911 call for a stabbing, and two police officers approached the scene, where they were informed by multiple bystanders that the suspect had a gun. Converging toward him, and with the benefit of a body-mounted camera recording, the officers ordered the suspect to drop his gun. While the suspect did so, he inexplicably reached down and picked up the gun again. Heroically and utterly selflessly, the officers held their fire and ordered him again to drop his gun—until the suspect raised his gun and aimed it in the direction of one officer and the suspect’s mother, whom the suspect had brutally stabbed (leading to the 911 call from the suspect’s terrorized sister). Because the suspect aimed his gun at his mother and/or the police officer, the officers used deadly force against him, and only did so when the suspect raised his gun as though to shoot it.  Though the suspect died from gunshot wounds, the District Court and Third Circuit ruled that the officers were entitled to judgment on all claims and dismissed the case. The use of deadly force, while tragic, was wholly reasonable given the facts and circumstances which the officers encountered on the night in question. Estate of Paone v. Twp. of Plymouth, 2026 WL 661978 (3d Cir. Mar. 9, 2026).
    • Post-trial victory in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia. The family of a former in-patient resident who died as a result of complications from the Covid-19 virus filed suit raising outrageous claims that the patient was sexually assaulted while in the care of the hospital and a subsidiary ambulance company. Asked to join the defense team just after nonsuit was awarded to one co-defendant, Shane immediately jumped in to assist the defense through the end of trial. Following the jury’s $3.5M verdict against the remaining defendants, Shane succeeded in greatly winnowing the liability exposure. First, Shane convinced the trial judge to deny Plaintiff’s request to reinstate the punitive damages claim dismissed at nonsuit. Next, he succeeded in obtaining the grant of a partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict on one claim, lopping a full $700,000 off the jury’s verdict. Finally, the trial judge outright denied the Plaintiff’s motion for delay damages, which had sought to add $742,000 to the jury’s verdict.  Estate of Quigley v. Pottstown Hospital, LLC, Nos. 210701389 & 221001449 (Phila C.P. June 12, 2025.)
    • Unanimous, precedential opinion from the Pennsylvania Superior Court, throwing out the jury's $5M+ verdict against a general contractor on the basis of statutory employer immunity. The plaintiff, an employee of a roofing subcontractor on a construction project, fell through an uncovered hole in the library roof which the general contractor had contracted with the library to remove and replace. The Superior Court determined that all five elements of the statutory employer test set forth in McDonald v. Levinson Steel Co., 153 A. 424 (Pa. 1930) were satisfied, vacated the $5.6 judgment entered on the jury’s verdict for plaintiff, and remanded for judgment to be entered in favor of the general contractor. On the Plaintiff's appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, another unanimous decision reaffirming the existence and viability of the century-old statutory employer defense under the Workers' Compensation Act.  Yoder v. McCarthy Constr., Inc., 345 A.3d 668 (Pa. 2025), affirming in relevant respect 291 A.3d 1 (Pa. Super. 2023)
    • In a case involving death and serious injuries to the plaintiffs resulting from a car accident, the Superior Court ruled that the original defendants' claims were viable against the additional defendants as joint tortfeasors, as they each negligently repaired the plaintiffs’ hood latch on their car and warranted it was safe to drive, prior to the car’s becoming disabled in the roadway when the hood flew open, where it was struck by the original defendants. While the trial court had dismissed the additional defendants at the summary judgment stage, concluding that the additional defendants could not be liable for the plaintiffs’ injuries and losses, given the substantial evidence of the original defendants’ negligence. On appeal, the Superior Court unanimously agreed that the defendants’ contribution claims against the additional defendants are meritorious under Pennsylvania law and the facts of the case, reversing the trial court’s entry of summary judgment (indeed, for the second time in the life of the case) and remanding for litigation of the contribution claims on the merits. Straw v. Fair, 284 A.3d 899, 2022 WL 3149329 (Pa. Super. Aug. 8, 2022)
    • In a product liability / class action case, a unanimous Third Circuit panel affirmed the District Court's denial of class certification. The individual plaintiffs—property owners claiming defects in yellow-jacketed, corrugated stainless steel tubing used to transport natural gas and allegedly present in their structures—sued on behalf of a putative class. However, both the District Court and Third Circuit agreed with the arguments advanced by the defendants: that the class was not ascertainable without mini-trials and individual inquiries, that questions common to the class did not predominate in the case, that the proofs necessary to establish both liability and damages would differ across the putative class members' claims, and that the various state laws governing their disparate claims included separate, non-overlapping elements—all of which are at cross-purposes with class treatment. Though the Third Circuit granted the plaintiffs' request for interlocutory review of the class certification decision over defendants' objection, nevertheless it affirmed the District Court's denial of class certification.  Adams Pointe I, L.P. v. Tru-Flex Metal Hose Corp., 2021 WL 3612155 (3d Cir. Aug. 16, 2021)
    • The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled no unfair trade practices claim was stated against licensed unclaimed proper finder who assisted plaintiff in retrieving his own lost money. The plaintiff, after entering into a contract with the property finder service (the terms and language of which are regulated by the Pennsylvania Department of the Treasury), and actually receiving his funds before they escheated to the state, sued under the Unfair Trade Practices Act on the theory that the service failed to disclose that the plaintiff could retrieve his lost funds for free on his own.  The Third Circuit rejected the plaintiff's "unreasonable presumption" that the pre-printed forms gave the impression that the finder's services were the only way he could retrieve his money. Instead, "those forms disclose all the information [the plaintiff] would need to recover the property himself and further inform him of the services it provides in exchange for the fee, none of which indicate or even suggest that [the plaintiff] could not otherwise recover his property or that [the finder service's] assistance was necessary."  Thus, it affirmed dismissal of the case at the pleading stage, seeing no merit worthy of discovery and trial.  DeSimone v. U.S. Claims Servs. Inc., ___ Fed. App'x ___, 2021 WL 1662779 (3d Cir. Apr. 28, 2021).
    • The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal, at the motion to dismiss stage, of this civil rights action against a county Children & Youth Agency and its staff attorneys and caseworkers. The Plaintiffs brought their 5-month-old child to the hospital, where he was diagnosed with a spiral fracture mid-shaft on his right humerus.  The hospital team collectively concluded that the injury was probably accidental in nature, but a nurse reported the injury to C&A, concerned that it might have been caused by abuse. C&A initiated its state-mandated investigation, wherein a judge approved the request for a safety plan that required chaperone to be with the parents and child while the merits of the abuse investigation continued. At the end of the investigation, the judge concluded the injury was accidental, and the safety plan was terminated. The Plaintiffs then filed this action, alleging that the safety plan violated their Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights. The federal district court dismissed the case, concluding that the Plaintiffs’ allegations of interference with the family unit, even if true, do not rise to the level of “shocking to the conscience,” necessary for a due process violation. On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed, agreeing with Shane’s argument that the nurse’s report of possible child abuse, in conjunction with other evidence to support even the suspicion of the same, make the municipal Defendants’ actions not “shocking to the conscience,” and so no substantive due process claim was stated.  A.J. v. Lancaster County, 826 Fed. App’x 248 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2020).
    • The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts in favor of Shane’s client. In this FINRA arbitration case, the Claimant retired from his job and invested his entire savings through an individual advisor. The advisor moved from broker-dealer to broker-dealer over the next fourteen years, as is typical in the industry. However, atypically, the individual advisor lied to Claimant, telling him his withdrawals from the account were from the interest only. In reality, they came from the principal, and steadily depleted the account to zero. Suit was filed, and a FINRA arbitration panel ruled in favor of Shane’s broker-dealer client, because the individual advisor’s improper conduct was not only undiscoverable by the broker-dealer but outside the scope of employment. After the defense arbitration award, the Claimant appealed first to the District Court, and then again to the Court of Appeals. In both courts, Shane briefed and orally argued the case, advocating for a judgment confirming the defense award. Both courts ruled in Shane’s client’s favor, with the First Circuit in particular being swayed by Shane’s argument, and ruling in a way that strengthened and buttressed the rationale of the award, and completely exonerating the broker-dealer from any accusation of wrongdoing. Ebbe v. Concorde Inv. Servs., LLC, 953 F.3d 172 (1st Cir. 2020), affirming 392 F. Supp. 3d 228 (D. Mass. 2019).
    • Shane convinced the Superior Court that Pennsylvania lacks general personal jurisdiction over his national client because it is not "at home" here, even though it is a limited liability company whose sole member is a Pennsylvania corporation.  While that corporation is "at home" in the Commonwealth, the Superior Court agreed that the LLC is not, because it lacks sufficient business operations here.  It concluded that suit arising from a tractor trailer crash outside Pennsylvania—even involving a plaintiff who lives in Pennsylvania—must be filed elsewhere, because Pennsylvania's jurisdiction does not reach this not-at-home defendant.  Ismail v. Volvo Group North America, LLC, No. 1231 EDA 2017 (Pa. Super. Mar. 2, 2018)
    • In this civil rights case the District Court denied qualified immunity to several individual Pittsburgh police officers, holding that a jury could find their conduct was unconstitutional. The plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle that sped from Homestead into neighboring Pittsburgh's bar and restaurant district on Carson Street, at a time when it was flooded with pedestrians and other law abiding citizens. Reacting quickly to the rapidly increasing threat, the officers fired on the vehicle as it swerved in and out of its appropriate travel lane and crashed into cars parked along the street. In the process, the plaintiff-passenger was struck by a bullet. On appeal from the denial of qualified immunity, Shane obtained a unanimous, precedential decision from the Third Circuit, holding that the officers did not violate any constitutional right of the plaintiff. The Court held that the officers shot at the vehicle with knowledge that it engaged in such reckless and unlawful conduct, and their actions were objectively reasonable as a matter of law. The case was remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment for the officers. Davenport v. Borough of Homestead, 870 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2017).
    • The Second District Court of Appeal of Florida unanimously affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of Shane's client in this declaratory judgment action, involving homeowners' association obligations.  In the 1980s, a property developer erected a club to administer common amenities such as clubhouses, a private beach, and exercise facilities, with membership in the club designated as the owners of properties in four separate, later-developed communities.  The four communities thereafter erected their own homeowners' associations.  This suit began with a slim majority of one homeowners' association purporting to exempt its members from membership in the club via an amendment passed in 2014.  The trial court rejected this improper attempt to alter membership in the club, which is tied to the land, because it was attempted by one-half-of-one-quarter of the club's membership and contrary to the club's governing documents.  Under well-established Florida law, the attempted change in membership came from the wrong voting members, via an improper procedure, inequitably, and too late.  After plenary briefing and oral argument, the DCA saw no issue and issued a per curiam order affirming judgment for Shane's client.  Placida Pointe Home Owners Ass'n v. Placida Harbour Club, Inc., No. 2D16-413, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 3065 (Fla. 2d DCA Mar. 8, 2017).
    • The Pennsylvania Superior Court unanimously affirmed a dismissal of a complaint with prejudice, filed by an insured against his home and auto insurer.  The suit alleged that the issuance of a homeowner's policy with a $1 million liability limit required the insurer to advise its insured to purchase more than the $100,000 auto policy he had.  The dispute arose after the insured's spouse caused a fatal car accident, and the wrongful death suit settled for $300,000, with the insurer tendering the full value of the auto policy.  The Superior Court rejected the insured's arguments that the insurer was bound to advise the insured to purchase greater levels of auto liability insurance, or to equalize the disparate liability policies.  The Court also affirmed that the insurer's commercial advertising campaign did not render it liable under the Unfair Trade Practices Act in light of its clearly stated policy limits.  Cohan v. United Services Automobile Association, 683 EDA 2016 (Pa. Super. Jan. 5, 2017).
    • In this data breach suit, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the Plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice.  Plaintiffs, on behalf of a class of employees and customers of Shane's clients, medical and dental benefit providers, sued following a breach of the providers' computer network by non-party, criminal hackers.  The class members' personal identifying information was stolen and used to file fraudulent tax returns, causing them monetary harm.  The Third Circuit agreed that Pennsylvania law barred the tort claim, as the economic loss doctrine requires allegations of personal injury or property damage to assert a cause of action for negligence.  In addition, the Third Circuit held that the dismissal of the contract claim was proper, because the complaint failed plausibly to state a claim that the Defendants agreed contractually to protect the class members' data from breach by hackers. Longenecker-Wells v. Benecard Services, No. 15-3538, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 15696 (3d Cir. Aug, 25, 2016).
    • The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit unanimously vacated the District Court's denial of qualified immunity to Shane's client, a police officer.  The complaint asserted that the officer initiated a chase of the now-convicted co-defendant, and reached speeds exceeding 110 miles per hour before the co-defendant crashed into the innocent plaintiff.  The District Court denied a qualified immunity motion to dismiss, filed in response to the 14th Amendment due process claim asserted against the officer, concluding that fact issues remained that required a trial.  Shane persuaded the Third Circuit that the District Court failed to analyze the pure question of law whether the right alleged by the Plaintiff was clearly established on the date of the incident.  The Third Circuit vacated the denial of qualified immunity, and remanded.  Conte v. Rios, No. 15-3361, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 13915 (3d Cir. Aug. 1, 2016).
    • The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed by unanimous opinion a verdict in favor of Shane's insurer client in this first-party breach of contract action.  The plaintiff suffered damages to his retail inventory caused by smoke and soot infiltration from a nearby fire, and made a claim for remediation under the policy. The insurer adjusted the loss and issued a check per the terms of the policy for the whole loss amount.  After depositing the check, the plaintiff filed suit seeking additional damage, represented as additional cleaning and restoration costs.  At trial, the plaintiff presented the testimony of its owner, who justified the claim for additional damages by the ongoing cleaning costs for the inventory.  The defense relied on the expert testimony of a certified restoration company, who could perform the job at a fraction of the cost.  The trial court found that the defense figure was the true cost of damages, and the Superior Court rejected the plaintiff's argument on appeal.  The Classic Lighting Emporium, Inc. v. Erie Insurance Exchange, No. 3158 EDA 2014 (Pa. Super. Nov. 17, 2015).
    • A unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the entry of judgment in favor of Shane's client, an employer with a healthcare plan governed by ERISA.  The plaintiff sought statutory damages of up to $110 per day going back years, plus attorney's fees, against the employer and the co-defendant third-party administrator, asserting that she was unable to obtain requested documents from both parties, which were necessary to appeal the termination of her long-term disability benefits.  Against the employer specifically, the plaintiff asserted that it had a duty to amend historical plan documents to update its address, as she relied on an old address in seeking documents without success.  The Eleventh Circuit rejected the claim, holding that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award statutory penalties, especially where the Plaintiff not only had the document she later requested, but also had the means of knowing the proper address to which to send requests.  Smiley v. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company, 610 Fed. Appx. 8, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 12334 (11th Cir. Jul. 17, 2015).
    • In this tortious interference/civil conspiracy matter, the trial court dismissed the case for failure of the plaintiff to timely serve original process.  Shane defended against the appeal by plaintiff, which argued that plaintiff's good faith efforts and mere mistake easily satisfied Pennsylvania's service rules. The Superior Court unanimously decided against plaintiff, and affirmed the dismissal of the case for failure to make timely service.  Smash PA, Inc. v. Lehigh Valley Restaurant Group, Inc., 1811 EDA 2014 (Pa. Super. April 14, 2015).
    • In an underinsured motorist case, the federal Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld summary judgment granted in favor of Shane's client.  The plaintiff, carrying UM coverage on top of applicable policy limits of $100,000, sued and settled with the other driver for $41,715, the number recommended by an arbitrator.  The plaintiff then proceeded against her UM carrier, asserting that her actual damages exceeded the coverage threshold, despite the settlement.  The Third Circuit rejected that contention, and affirmed the District Court's holding that the evidence did not support her entitlement to UM benefits—that her damages went beyond the level of applicable third-party coverage.  The case drew amicus support from the Pennsylvania Association for Justice in support of Plaintiff.  Gallagher v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 1426 (3d Cir. Jan. 29, 2015).
    • A unanimous panel of the Superior Court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of Shane's client, a heavy construction equipment manufacturer and dealer.  Despite being the lone deep pocket in a case with large exposure due to the catastrophic and permanent injuries, the Superior Court agreed that the deposition testimony could not allow the claim to survive summary judgment, because there was no evidence that the design of the product caused the accident and injuries to the plaintiff.  Williams v. Anderson Equip. Co., Komatsu American Corporation, 1454 WDA 2013 (Pa. Super. Oct 7, 2014).
    • In a premises liability case involving severe head and cognitive injuries, Shane successfully defended against suit in Pennsylvania against a California golf resort.  The Third Circuit agreed with the District Court that no basis for personal jurisdiction over the resort was demonstrated from the record, but remanded for jurisdictional discovery.  After a round of written discovery and depositions, Shane assisted the trial attorney in a new briefing on the jurisdictional issue.  The Eastern District of Pennsylvania renewed its conclusion that no basis for jurisdiction could be demonstrated and dismissed the case a second time.  There was no appeal.  Rocke v. Pebble Beach Company, 541 Fed. Appx. 208 (3d Cir. Oct 10, 2013) & 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60218 (E.D. Pa. April 28, 2014).

Results

Superior Court of Pennsylvania Vacates $1.09 Billion Verdict, Orders New Trial Over Crashworthiness Jury Instructions

We convinced the Superior Court of Pennsylvania to vacate a $1.09 billion jury verdict and remand for a new trial.  The court held that the jury had not been properly instructed on the elements of a crashworthiness claim under Pennsylvania law. The court's ruling received press coverage in both The Legal Intelligencer and The Philadelphia Inquirer.

Successfully Dismantled a Complex Claim Against a Major Health Care Corporation

We succeeded in partially dismantling a complex claim against a major health care client. The family of a former in-patient resident who died as a result of complications from the COVID-19 virus filed suit, raising claims that the patient was sexually assaulted while in the care of the hospital and a subsidiary ambulance company. Asked to join the defense team shortly before trial, we effectively discredited the plaintiff’s witnesses throughout the plaintiff’s case-in-chief. At the nonsuit stage, we wholly extricated our client—sealing off any exposure to liability for the large, corporate parent company. Following the jury’s $3.5 million verdict against the remaining defendants, we were engaged as appellate counsel and succeeded in further winnowing the liability exposure. We convinced the trial judge to: (1) deny the plaintiff’s request to reinstate the punitive damages claim based on the trial record; (2) grant a partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict on one claim, lopping a full $700,000 off the jury’s verdict; and (3) outright deny the plaintiff’s motion for delay damages, which had sought to add $742,000 to the jury’s verdict.

Thought Leadership

Case Law Alerts

New York Court Reaffirms Internal Affairs Doctrine, Denies Standing in Derivative Suit Against English Corporation

July 1, 2025

“Few principles are more firmly entrenched in corporate law than the internal affairs doctrine, a choice-of-law rule providing that, with rare exception, the substantive law of the place of incorporation governs disputes relating to the rights and relationships of corporate shareholders and managers.” Thus opened the court’s opinion—but that did not stop the challenge mounted against it in this case. Ezrasons, the plaintiff, is a New York corporation that is the beneficial owner of shares in Barclays PLC, a bank holding company incorporated under the laws of England and Wales with its principal office in London. Ezrasons filed suit “on behalf of Barclays” against directors and an affiliated company, alleging various breaches of fiduciary duty. Those defendants moved to dismiss for lack of standing because Ezrasons is not “a registered member of Barclays,” a substantive limitation on the right to maintain derivative actions under English law. With seemingly no dispute as to the requirements of English law, Ezrasons argued, instead, that New York’s Business Corporation Law gave it the right to maintain its action in New York. On appeal, the question was whether the New York statute (BCL) displaced the internal affairs doctrine in New York common law. The answer—spread over 24 pages, and over the 57-page dissent of two dissenting Justices who accuse the majority of working to impress Marty McFly and Doc Brown with their ability to travel back in time—was no. But while the genesis of the doctrine is the nineteenth century’s corporate boom and expansion of interstate corporate operations, the rationale for upholding the rule is decidedly timeless. Like the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its stance that “only one state should have the authority to regulate a corporation’s internal affairs,” lest a company “be faced with conflicting demands.” Thus, the court held that the Business Corporation Law, which allows suits to be brought in the name of domestic or foreign corporations, does not unequivocally displace the substantive applicability of English law as regards suits in the name of English corporations. Instead, the BCL establishes the minimum predicate for New York courts to entertain the suit, without bestowing standing contrary to the law of the foreign corporation’s home. Thus, companies with operations in the Empire State can rest assured that their internal operations and “disputes relating to the rights and relationships of corporate shareholders and managers” will remain governed by the substantive law of their state of incorporation.    Case Law Alerts, 3rd Quarter, July 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

The Quarterly Dose

LEGAL ROUNDUP – Pennsylvania

November 1, 2024

Supreme Court to Decide Pair of Mental Health Procedures Act Cases, Outlining the Contours of Claims Against Treatment Providers Matos v. Geisinger Med. Ctr., No. 192 MAL 2023; and Wunderly v. Saint Luke’s Hosp., 369 MAL 2023 “One of the purposes of the Mental Health Procedures Act is to provide limited protection from civil and criminal liability to mental health personnel and their employers in rendering treatment in this unscientific and inexact field.” Farago v. Sacred Heart Gen. Hosp., 562 A.2d 300, 304 (Pa. 1989) (citing 50 P.S. § 7114). Every so often, a tragic incident breaks through the bulwark of Pennsylvania’s intermediate, error-correcting courts, calling out for resolution by the High Court. Matos and Wunderly are two such currently pending cases. Matos v. Geisinger involves a situation in which an individual with a record of psychiatric issues submitted himself for voluntary inpatient examination at two treatment centers but was not accepted for treatment at either. He, shortly thereafter, murdered his girlfriend, whose estate now claims the treatment providers were grossly negligent under the MHPA. The Supreme Court has agreed to decide whether evidence that treatment has been formally initiated (rather than just considered) is a condition for the exposure to liability under the MHPA for voluntary treatment as it has been ruled to be for involuntary treatment. See 314 A.3d 512 (Pa. 2023) (allocatur grant). Wunderly v. St. Luke’s Hospital involves a situation of a residential patient who experienced pressure-related skin breakdown and deterioration of existing wounds. Following the patient’s death, the estate claims that medical negligence led to his demise. In defense, the treatment providers assert the patient was admitted to the facility for mental health treatment on an involuntary basis under Section 302 of the MHPA, and, therefore, the ancillary medical treatment given to this mental health patient brings any liability claim within the strictures of the MHPA. The Supreme Court has agreed to decide whether the Superior Court erred in affirming the dismissal of the case or, instead, whether the MHPA does not apply to the case at all. See 310 A.3d 715 (Pa. 2023) (allocatur grant). Mental health treatment is often its own reward, and something many of us might rather not have a role in. But the General Assembly has enshrined in law a strict and strong policy of “assuring the availability of adequate treatment to those who are mentally ill.” Leight v. University of Pittsburgh Physicians, 243 A.3d 126, 130 (Pa. 2020) (citing 50 P.S. § 7102). The Supreme Court is again called upon to guide the bench, bar, and emergency department on the contours of civil liability for treatment providers for those suffering from mental illness. Matos and Wunderly will help define the rights and responsibilities of all involved in this inexact and sometimes thankless field. These are definitely two cases to keep an eye on.    The Quarterly Dose – November 2024, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

First DCA Reverses Excessive Jury Award Unsupported by the Evidence

In December 2019, the plaintiffs filed a claim with Universal for damages caused by a water and sewage back up through the plumbing system and existing through multiple fixtures including the washing machine drain, kitchen sink, dishwasher, bathtub and toilet. Universal investigated the claim, issued payment for resulting water damage totaling $7,000.00 in actual cash value ($12,000.00 in replacement cost value). The plaintiffs sought additional benefits for work needed to access the below-slab cast iron plumbing system due to the failure of the system from rust, deterioration, corrosion and breaks in the line. Universal denied any additional benefits for access. In 2021, the plaintiffs filed suit. During litigation, Universal sent a plumber to inspect the home and the plumber concluded the pipes were clogged but could be cleaned. The plaintiffs’ plumber testified that the plumbing system needed to be replaced due to holes and openings in the pipes. The plaintiffs introduced two estimates prepared by Triad Restoration services totaling $79,680.22 in replacement cost value and $50,219.97 in actual cash value and an executed contract with another company for repairs with the amounts of repair redacted. Since the insurance policy did not provide coverage for repair or replacement of the plumbing system, the jury only had to decide whether the plumbing system needed to be replaced, and if it did, Universal would owe for the access costs; the jury verdict form required the jury to determine both the replacement cost value and actual cash value amounts. The jury asked if it had to rely on the Triad estimates for their amounts. The trial court advised the amount awarded had to be based on the evidence presented at trial and the law given by the trial court. The jury awarded $335,000.00 in replacement cost value or $305,000.00 in actual cash value. Universal motioned for a new trial arguing the amount awarded was unsupported by the evidence and then moved for remittitur. The trial court denied both motions and this appeal followed. The court found that while a jury’s verdict should only be disturbed with caution and discretion, the trial court must give the properly challenged award close scrutiny and determine whether it bears a reasonable relation to the damaged provided, is supported by the evidence, and could have been reached in a logical manner by reasonable means §768.74(3), (5)(d)-(e), Fla. Stat. The court found the trial court did consider the statutory requirements at the hearing on Universal’s remittitur motion and was concerned about a reasonable relation to the amount of damages proved and injury suffered and whether the award was supported by the evidence, but ultimately denied the motion, reasoning that the jury had been properly instructed to fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiffs. The court noted the only evidence providing the basis for the jury verdict was Triad’s estimates and those valued the plaintiffs' claimed loss at $79,680.22 in replacement cost value and $50,219.97 in actual cash value; no valuation evidence reasonably supported the jury verdict. The plaintiffs argued that the jury was entitled to consider more than the estimates, but the court conveyed the evidence provided did not give the jury a way to reach the amounts they awarded. The court was also not swayed by the plaintiffs’ argument regarding inflation and later price increases, but the court noted that no evidence via the contract, nor testimony regarding increase in labor, material, fuel or construction costs were entered into the record.  The court concluded the jury may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, but it may not supply a damages number by speculation. The court did not find any of the plaintiffs’ remaining argument persuasive either. The court reversed the denial of Universal’s remittitur motion and motion for new trial as to damaged and remanded the case. The court ended its opinion with advising the trial court must determine whether replacement cost value or actual cash value is the property measure of damages under the policy and order remittitur in an amount consistent with that determination and the evidence.

Thought Leadership

United State District Court for the Middle District of Florida finds Evidence of Replacement Cost Value is Admissible and Recoverable Even When Repairs Have Not Been Made

The plaintiff filed a claim for damage as a result of Hurricane Ian. It claimed damages were over $24 million, but the carrier accepted partial coverage and paid $8,307.49 for secondary components. The carrier found hurricane damage to the building, but it was below the insurance policy’s $3.6 million deductible. The plaintiff sued for breach of the insurance policy. The carrier argued in a motion for summary judgment that plaintiff could not recover replacement cost value (RCV) because the property repairs had not been effectuated. The policy provided for RCV, but only after the repairs were completed. The carrier argued that because the repairs were not completed, the plaintiff was not entitled to RCV damages. The plaintiff argued the carrier could not withhold the actual cost value (ACV) due, which was the main allegation of the lawsuit, then fault it for not making the repairs to unlock the RCV. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida rejected the carrier’s argument, finding that when an insurer allegedly breached the policy by withholding coverage, it could not hide behind a repair-contingent provision to block the insured from RCV damages at trial. The court found the issue to be whether the contractual language designed to preclude certain coverage until after repairs are completed barred an insured from seeking those damages at trial when repairs were not complete. The court noted the Eleventh Circuit had not resolved this issue and neither side pointed to a definitive answer from the Florida Supreme Court. The court reasoned that it must look to the Sixth District Court of Appeal (6th DCA), which is the court which would have heard this case if it was in state court. The court noted the 6th DCA recently addressed this issue in Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez, 427 So. 3d 676 (Fla. 6th DCA 2026). The Rodriguez Court found that a breach of contract action is designed to adjudicate not only whether the contract was breached, but also evaluate the damages incurred had the breach not occurred, which the Rodriguez court found to be recovery of the RCV. This court also noted basic Florida contract principles compelled the same result, as a material breach frees the nonbreaching party to suspend its own performance and can demand the full benefit of its bargain, including RCV damages. Finally, the court found the distinction between a full denial and partial denial did not compel a different result. It found the policy required the carrier to acknowledge coverage and pay ACV for all covered damages, and the failure to do that is a material breach, entitling the insured to all of the damages available under the contract, which included the RCV.

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106 Marshall Dennehey Attorneys Recognized in the 2027 Editions of The Best Lawyers in America® and the Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch® in America

Marshall Dennehey is proud to highlight the firm’s 106 attorneys who have been recognized in the 2027 editions of The Best Lawyers in America® and the Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch® in America. Less than 6% of all practicing lawyers in the U.S. were selected by their peers for this recognition. Additionally, four of the firm’s attorneys received the Best Lawyers® 2027 “Lawyer of the Year” awards in their respective practice areas and demographic regions. Since it was first published in 1983, Best Lawyers® has become universally regarded as the definitive guide to legal excellence. Best Lawyers lists are compiled based on an exhaustive peer-review evaluation. For more information, please visit https://www.bestlawyers.com/. OUR 2027 LAWYERS OF THE YEAR Harrisburg, PA Christopher Reeser, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Kacey Wiedt, Workers Compensation Law - Employers Roseland, NJ Justin F. Johnson, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Leonard Leicht, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants   OUR 2026 BEST LAWYERS IN AMERICA Philadelphia, PA Nicholas D. Bowers, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Josh J. T. Byrne, Professional Malpractice Law - Defendants Jefferey J. Chomko, Insurance Law James H. Cole, Insurance Law John J. Delany III, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Laurianne Falcone, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants John P. Gonzales, Employment Law - Management John Hare, Appellate Practice Daniel D. Krebbs, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Michele Punturi, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Bradley D. Remick, Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Andrea Cicero Rock, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Robin M. Romano, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Daniel J. Ryan, Jr., Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Gary M. Samms, Professional Malpractice Law - Defendants Christopher N. Santoro, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation -Defendants Josh D. Scheets, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Robert P. Schenk, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Robert E. Smith, Insurance Law Robin Snyder, Litigation - Health Care Michael L. Turner, Commercial Litigation; Criminal Defense: White-Collar; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions - Defendants Claire Breaux Ventola, Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Pittsburgh, PA Melissa Devich Cochran, Commercial Litigation; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants  John F. Deasy, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Daniel W. Deitrick, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Douglas C. LaSota, Litigation - Construction; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions - Defendants Joseph V. Lesinski, Product Liability Litigation – Defendants   Christian D. Marquis, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Patricia A. Monahan, Insurance Law; Litigation - Insurance Patrick T. Reilly, Commercial Litigation; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Brett C. Shear, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Teresa O. Sirianni, Education Law; Employment Law – Management; Litigation - Labor and Employment Stuart Sostmann, Product Liability Litigation – Defendants Danielle M. Vugrinovich, Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions - Defendants Scranton, PA Sarah E. Argo, Litigation - Insurance Michael J. Connolly, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Professional Malpractice Law - Defendants Matthew Keris, Litigation - Health Care; Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants John T. McGrath, Jr., Insurance Law; Medical Malpractice Law – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants William J. McPartland, Insurance Law John R. Nealon, Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Victoria Scanlon, Health Care Law; Litigation - Health Care; Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Michael A. Sebastian, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Thomas A. Specht, Insurance Law; Litigation - Insurance Suzanne Tighe, Litigation Insurance Harrisburg , PA Casey Alan Coyle, Administrative/Regulatory Law; Appellate Practice; Commercial Litigation Brittany E. Bakshi, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Shannon P. Fellin, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Allison Krupp, Insurance Law John R. Ninosky, Litigation – Insurance; Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Christopher Reeser, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Kacey Wiedt, Workers' Compensation Law – Employers King of Prussia, PA  Michael L. Detweiler, Construction Law Joseph L. Hoynoski III, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Gregory J. Kelley, Construction Law, Litigation - Construction Anthony Natale III, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Francis X. Wickersham, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers A. Judd Woytek, Workers' Compensation Law – Employers Erie, PA Patrick M. Carey, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Joel M. Snavely, Health Care Law; Insurance Law New Haven, CT Michael Wrona, Commercial Litigation, Litigation - Bankruptcy  Mount Laurel, NJ David D. Blake, Litigation - Insurance Barbara Davis, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Lynne Nahmani, Litigation - Health Care John H. Osorio, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants John L. Slimm, Legal Malpractice Law – Defendants; Professional Malpractice Law – Defendants Roseland, NJ Robert T. Evers, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Justin F. Johnson, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Julia Klubenspies, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Leonard C. Leicht, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Patricia M. McDonagh, Appellate Practice Sunny Sparano, Litigation - Construction Randall S. Watts, Health Care Law New York, NY Tonya M. Lindsey, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Tampa, FL Michael Archibald, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Lindsay G. McCormick, Litigation – Construction Orlando, FL Thomas F. Brown, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Dante C. Rohr, Commercial Litigation Fort Lauderdale, FL Kimberly Kanoff Berman, Appellate Practice Patrick M. Delong, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants Jacksonville, FL  Heather Byrer Carbone, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Linda Wagner Farrell, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Elizabeth B. Ferguson, Litigation - Construction James P. Hanratty, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants Wilmington, DE Sarah B. Cole, Litigation - Insurance Benjamin K. Durstein, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Maria R. Granaudo, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants  Keri L. Morris-Johnston, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Cincinnati, OH Timothy B. Schenkel, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants David E. Williamson, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Cleveland, OH Vincent E. Cononico, Litigation – Insurance, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Jillian L. Dinehart, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants David J. Fagnilli, Insurance Law Jason P. Ferrante, Health Care Law, Litigation - Health Care Andrew H. Isakoff, Transportation Law Leslie M. Jenny, Litigation - Health Care; Medical Malpractice Law – Defendant OUR 2026 BEST LAWYERS: ONES TO WATCH Jacksonville, FL Sean J. Reeves, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Orlando, FL Carolin A. Pacheco, Insurance Law Mount Laurel Stacey Gorin, Insurance Law Melville, NY Kimberly Gitlin, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants Matthew A. Gray, Insurance Law; Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Philadelphia, PA Holli K. Archer, Health Care Law; Medical Malpractice Law – Defendants; Professional Malpractice Law Emily Pritchyk, Commercial Litigation; Product Liability Litigation – Defendants Pittsburgh, PA Taylor E. Kosko, Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Defendants; Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Alana Staniszewski, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Michael D. Winsko, Product Liability Litigation – Defendants; Transportation Law King of Prussia, PA Richard Lechette, Commercial Litigation; Insurance Law, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants

Thought Leadership

Appeals Court Reverses Trial Court Order Awarding Attorney’s Fees Due to Lack of Evidence to Support Fee Awarded

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order awarding appellate fees to People’s Trust Insurance Company based upon a lack of evidence to support the attorney’s fee award in RM & Assocs. Consulting, Inc. v. People's Trust Ins. Co., 2026 Fla. App. LEXIS 4654 (Fla. 4th DCA 2026). People’s Trust was the insurer of a residential property that had sustained water damage. RM & Associates Consulting was hired by the homeowner to perform mitigation services at the property. The homeowner assigned post-loss benefits to RM and RM subsequently filed suit against People’s Trust alleging that it had not been paid the money it was owed for the mitigation services. People’s Trust defended the lawsuit on the ground that the policy required the insured to notify the insurer before authorizing repairs so People's Trust could elect to use its preferred contractor. Because the owner did not comply with that provision, People's Trust asserted its liability was limited to the amount that its preferred contractor would have charged for the work, which People's Trust contended was $2,000. People's Trust paid that amount to RM before RM filed suit. People’s Trust filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted. RM appealed the summary judgment ruling and the ruling was upheld by the Fourth District Court of Appeal. The appellate court also granted People’s Trust’s entitlement to appellate attorney’s fees, subject to the trial court’s determination of the amount of fees, based upon an offer of judgment made by People's Trust. On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of attorney’s fees People’s Trust was entitled to. At the hearing, People’s Trust presented testimony from it’s fee expert, supervising trial counsel and appellate counsel. People’s Trust sought recovery of $24,866.17 for work performed by appellate counsel. The request primarily consisted of work performed in preparation of the answer brief. The fee expert testified that more than ninety hours spent preparing the answer brief was reasonable given the complexity and significance of the underlying issue. The appellate court found that the fee expert’s testimony fell short of meeting the necessary standard of demonstrating that the hours expended were necessary. The appellate court found that the billing records did not serve to cure the deficient testimony, as the billing records did not contain adequate details regarding the specific tasks performed. Rather the records contained entries such as “answer brief” which the appellate court found to be insufficient. The appellate court noted that neither the fee expert or counsel addressed how the prior research and briefing in the parallel litigation informed the work in the instant matter. The appellate court noted this was significant in that a court's attorney's fees award must exclude excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary hours, citing Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985). Based upon the record failing to support the finding of the trial court, the 4th DCA remanded the case to the trial court for a reconsideration and redetermination of reasonable appellate attorney’s fees supported by competent substantial evidence. The 4th DCA reiterated that the fee expert’s focus on the quality of the work and the importance of the work to People’s Trust did not make up for the perceived deficiencies in the position that spending over ninety hours on a single answer brief was reasonable. Whether moving for attorney’s fees or challenging the amount of fees being sought by an opposing party, practitioners should be mindful of the evidence being used to support the claims being made. Parties should pay close attention to whether the hours being sought may be impacted by prior litigation either party may have engaged in. A party must be prepared to address how prior litigation efforts did or did not impact the amount of hours being claimed in current litigation. Lastly, billing records must be sufficiently detailed so as to support any potential future fee claim.