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Shane Haselbarth

Assistant General Counsel

SSHaselbarth@mdwcg.com

Portrait of Shane Haselbarth

Shane is a member of the firm's Post-Trial and Appellate Advocacy Practice Group.  In this role, he handles all aspects of briefing and argument in federal and state appellate courts, and is also routinely tasked with assisting trial teams with the preparation and presentation of briefing and argument in support of pre-trial motions and post-trial motions.  The appellate team at Marshall Dennehey also provides critical support to attorneys at trial to ensure that pitfalls are avoided and viable appellate issues are preserved.  Serving as appellate lead counsel and trial-level support counsel allows Shane to handle cases of all varieties, including civil rights and municipal liability, negligence, construction accidents, professional malpractice, product liability, toxic torts, and class actions.

In 2021, Shane was named the Assistant General Counsel for the firm.  In this role, and drawing on his litigation experience, he brings a results-oriented perspective to issues as they arise for the firm itself.  Working with firm General Counsel Jay Rothman, Shane is tasked with process development and assisting colleagues navigate routine (and non-routine) issues that legal professionals face today.

Prior to joining the firm, Shane clerked for Judge D. Brooks Smith, former Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and earlier clerked for Judge William J. Zloch of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Shane has been admitted to practice in all state courts of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Florida, as well as the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First, Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits, and the United States District Courts for the Eastern and Middle Districts of Pennsylvania.

    • Ave Maria School of Law (J.D., summa cum laude, 2007)
    • Franciscan University of Steubenville (B.A., magna cum laude, 2004)
    • Pennsylvania, 2007
    • New Jersey, 2007
    • Florida, 2014
    • Supreme Court of the United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 1st Circuit
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 4th Circuit
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 11th Circuit
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyer Rising Star (2015-2017)
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Philadelphia Bar Association
    • Highlights in Pennsylvania Medical Malpractice Law, Health Care and Health Law Seminar, Marshall Dennehey, November 7, 2019
    • Highlights in Pennsylvania Medical Malpractice Law, Health Care and Health Law Seminar, Marshall Dennehey, November 5, 2015
    • “The Phantom Vehicle: Prejudice in Delayed UM Claim Not Presumed, But Certainly Demonstrable,”  Defense Digest, Vol. 20, No. 1, March 2014
    • Case Law Alerts, regular contributor, January 2014-present
    • "Pa. Atty Off Hook For Extended Interest on Malpractice Award," Law360, March 31, 2021
    • In a police shooting case involving a fatality, a unanimous Third Circuit panel affirmed the District Court's entry of summary judgment (on Shane's motion as well), holding that the officers violated no Fourth Amendment right of the decedent. Dispatch relayed news of a 911 call for a stabbing, and two police officers approached the scene, where they were informed by multiple bystanders that the suspect had a gun. Converging toward him, and with the benefit of a body-mounted camera recording, the officers ordered the suspect to drop his gun. While the suspect did so, he inexplicably reached down and picked up the gun again. Heroically and utterly selflessly, the officers held their fire and ordered him again to drop his gun—until the suspect raised his gun and aimed it in the direction of one officer and the suspect’s mother, whom the suspect had brutally stabbed (leading to the 911 call from the suspect’s terrorized sister). Because the suspect aimed his gun at his mother and/or the police officer, the officers used deadly force against him, and only did so when the suspect raised his gun as though to shoot it.  Though the suspect died from gunshot wounds, the District Court and Third Circuit ruled that the officers were entitled to judgment on all claims and dismissed the case. The use of deadly force, while tragic, was wholly reasonable given the facts and circumstances which the officers encountered on the night in question. Estate of Paone v. Twp. of Plymouth, 2026 WL 661978 (3d Cir. Mar. 9, 2026).
    • Post-trial victory in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia. The family of a former in-patient resident who died as a result of complications from the Covid-19 virus filed suit raising outrageous claims that the patient was sexually assaulted while in the care of the hospital and a subsidiary ambulance company. Asked to join the defense team just after nonsuit was awarded to one co-defendant, Shane immediately jumped in to assist the defense through the end of trial. Following the jury’s $3.5M verdict against the remaining defendants, Shane succeeded in greatly winnowing the liability exposure. First, Shane convinced the trial judge to deny Plaintiff’s request to reinstate the punitive damages claim dismissed at nonsuit. Next, he succeeded in obtaining the grant of a partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict on one claim, lopping a full $700,000 off the jury’s verdict. Finally, the trial judge outright denied the Plaintiff’s motion for delay damages, which had sought to add $742,000 to the jury’s verdict.  Estate of Quigley v. Pottstown Hospital, LLC, Nos. 210701389 & 221001449 (Phila C.P. June 12, 2025.)
    • Unanimous, precedential opinion from the Pennsylvania Superior Court, throwing out the jury's $5M+ verdict against a general contractor on the basis of statutory employer immunity. The plaintiff, an employee of a roofing subcontractor on a construction project, fell through an uncovered hole in the library roof which the general contractor had contracted with the library to remove and replace. The Superior Court determined that all five elements of the statutory employer test set forth in McDonald v. Levinson Steel Co., 153 A. 424 (Pa. 1930) were satisfied, vacated the $5.6 judgment entered on the jury’s verdict for plaintiff, and remanded for judgment to be entered in favor of the general contractor. On the Plaintiff's appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, another unanimous decision reaffirming the existence and viability of the century-old statutory employer defense under the Workers' Compensation Act.  Yoder v. McCarthy Constr., Inc., 345 A.3d 668 (Pa. 2025), affirming in relevant respect 291 A.3d 1 (Pa. Super. 2023)
    • In a case involving death and serious injuries to the plaintiffs resulting from a car accident, the Superior Court ruled that the original defendants' claims were viable against the additional defendants as joint tortfeasors, as they each negligently repaired the plaintiffs’ hood latch on their car and warranted it was safe to drive, prior to the car’s becoming disabled in the roadway when the hood flew open, where it was struck by the original defendants. While the trial court had dismissed the additional defendants at the summary judgment stage, concluding that the additional defendants could not be liable for the plaintiffs’ injuries and losses, given the substantial evidence of the original defendants’ negligence. On appeal, the Superior Court unanimously agreed that the defendants’ contribution claims against the additional defendants are meritorious under Pennsylvania law and the facts of the case, reversing the trial court’s entry of summary judgment (indeed, for the second time in the life of the case) and remanding for litigation of the contribution claims on the merits. Straw v. Fair, 284 A.3d 899, 2022 WL 3149329 (Pa. Super. Aug. 8, 2022)
    • In a product liability / class action case, a unanimous Third Circuit panel affirmed the District Court's denial of class certification. The individual plaintiffs—property owners claiming defects in yellow-jacketed, corrugated stainless steel tubing used to transport natural gas and allegedly present in their structures—sued on behalf of a putative class. However, both the District Court and Third Circuit agreed with the arguments advanced by the defendants: that the class was not ascertainable without mini-trials and individual inquiries, that questions common to the class did not predominate in the case, that the proofs necessary to establish both liability and damages would differ across the putative class members' claims, and that the various state laws governing their disparate claims included separate, non-overlapping elements—all of which are at cross-purposes with class treatment. Though the Third Circuit granted the plaintiffs' request for interlocutory review of the class certification decision over defendants' objection, nevertheless it affirmed the District Court's denial of class certification.  Adams Pointe I, L.P. v. Tru-Flex Metal Hose Corp., 2021 WL 3612155 (3d Cir. Aug. 16, 2021)
    • The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled no unfair trade practices claim was stated against licensed unclaimed proper finder who assisted plaintiff in retrieving his own lost money. The plaintiff, after entering into a contract with the property finder service (the terms and language of which are regulated by the Pennsylvania Department of the Treasury), and actually receiving his funds before they escheated to the state, sued under the Unfair Trade Practices Act on the theory that the service failed to disclose that the plaintiff could retrieve his lost funds for free on his own.  The Third Circuit rejected the plaintiff's "unreasonable presumption" that the pre-printed forms gave the impression that the finder's services were the only way he could retrieve his money. Instead, "those forms disclose all the information [the plaintiff] would need to recover the property himself and further inform him of the services it provides in exchange for the fee, none of which indicate or even suggest that [the plaintiff] could not otherwise recover his property or that [the finder service's] assistance was necessary."  Thus, it affirmed dismissal of the case at the pleading stage, seeing no merit worthy of discovery and trial.  DeSimone v. U.S. Claims Servs. Inc., ___ Fed. App'x ___, 2021 WL 1662779 (3d Cir. Apr. 28, 2021).
    • The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal, at the motion to dismiss stage, of this civil rights action against a county Children & Youth Agency and its staff attorneys and caseworkers. The Plaintiffs brought their 5-month-old child to the hospital, where he was diagnosed with a spiral fracture mid-shaft on his right humerus.  The hospital team collectively concluded that the injury was probably accidental in nature, but a nurse reported the injury to C&A, concerned that it might have been caused by abuse. C&A initiated its state-mandated investigation, wherein a judge approved the request for a safety plan that required chaperone to be with the parents and child while the merits of the abuse investigation continued. At the end of the investigation, the judge concluded the injury was accidental, and the safety plan was terminated. The Plaintiffs then filed this action, alleging that the safety plan violated their Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights. The federal district court dismissed the case, concluding that the Plaintiffs’ allegations of interference with the family unit, even if true, do not rise to the level of “shocking to the conscience,” necessary for a due process violation. On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed, agreeing with Shane’s argument that the nurse’s report of possible child abuse, in conjunction with other evidence to support even the suspicion of the same, make the municipal Defendants’ actions not “shocking to the conscience,” and so no substantive due process claim was stated.  A.J. v. Lancaster County, 826 Fed. App’x 248 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2020).
    • The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts in favor of Shane’s client. In this FINRA arbitration case, the Claimant retired from his job and invested his entire savings through an individual advisor. The advisor moved from broker-dealer to broker-dealer over the next fourteen years, as is typical in the industry. However, atypically, the individual advisor lied to Claimant, telling him his withdrawals from the account were from the interest only. In reality, they came from the principal, and steadily depleted the account to zero. Suit was filed, and a FINRA arbitration panel ruled in favor of Shane’s broker-dealer client, because the individual advisor’s improper conduct was not only undiscoverable by the broker-dealer but outside the scope of employment. After the defense arbitration award, the Claimant appealed first to the District Court, and then again to the Court of Appeals. In both courts, Shane briefed and orally argued the case, advocating for a judgment confirming the defense award. Both courts ruled in Shane’s client’s favor, with the First Circuit in particular being swayed by Shane’s argument, and ruling in a way that strengthened and buttressed the rationale of the award, and completely exonerating the broker-dealer from any accusation of wrongdoing. Ebbe v. Concorde Inv. Servs., LLC, 953 F.3d 172 (1st Cir. 2020), affirming 392 F. Supp. 3d 228 (D. Mass. 2019).
    • Shane convinced the Superior Court that Pennsylvania lacks general personal jurisdiction over his national client because it is not "at home" here, even though it is a limited liability company whose sole member is a Pennsylvania corporation.  While that corporation is "at home" in the Commonwealth, the Superior Court agreed that the LLC is not, because it lacks sufficient business operations here.  It concluded that suit arising from a tractor trailer crash outside Pennsylvania—even involving a plaintiff who lives in Pennsylvania—must be filed elsewhere, because Pennsylvania's jurisdiction does not reach this not-at-home defendant.  Ismail v. Volvo Group North America, LLC, No. 1231 EDA 2017 (Pa. Super. Mar. 2, 2018)
    • In this civil rights case the District Court denied qualified immunity to several individual Pittsburgh police officers, holding that a jury could find their conduct was unconstitutional. The plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle that sped from Homestead into neighboring Pittsburgh's bar and restaurant district on Carson Street, at a time when it was flooded with pedestrians and other law abiding citizens. Reacting quickly to the rapidly increasing threat, the officers fired on the vehicle as it swerved in and out of its appropriate travel lane and crashed into cars parked along the street. In the process, the plaintiff-passenger was struck by a bullet. On appeal from the denial of qualified immunity, Shane obtained a unanimous, precedential decision from the Third Circuit, holding that the officers did not violate any constitutional right of the plaintiff. The Court held that the officers shot at the vehicle with knowledge that it engaged in such reckless and unlawful conduct, and their actions were objectively reasonable as a matter of law. The case was remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment for the officers. Davenport v. Borough of Homestead, 870 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2017).
    • The Second District Court of Appeal of Florida unanimously affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of Shane's client in this declaratory judgment action, involving homeowners' association obligations.  In the 1980s, a property developer erected a club to administer common amenities such as clubhouses, a private beach, and exercise facilities, with membership in the club designated as the owners of properties in four separate, later-developed communities.  The four communities thereafter erected their own homeowners' associations.  This suit began with a slim majority of one homeowners' association purporting to exempt its members from membership in the club via an amendment passed in 2014.  The trial court rejected this improper attempt to alter membership in the club, which is tied to the land, because it was attempted by one-half-of-one-quarter of the club's membership and contrary to the club's governing documents.  Under well-established Florida law, the attempted change in membership came from the wrong voting members, via an improper procedure, inequitably, and too late.  After plenary briefing and oral argument, the DCA saw no issue and issued a per curiam order affirming judgment for Shane's client.  Placida Pointe Home Owners Ass'n v. Placida Harbour Club, Inc., No. 2D16-413, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 3065 (Fla. 2d DCA Mar. 8, 2017).
    • The Pennsylvania Superior Court unanimously affirmed a dismissal of a complaint with prejudice, filed by an insured against his home and auto insurer.  The suit alleged that the issuance of a homeowner's policy with a $1 million liability limit required the insurer to advise its insured to purchase more than the $100,000 auto policy he had.  The dispute arose after the insured's spouse caused a fatal car accident, and the wrongful death suit settled for $300,000, with the insurer tendering the full value of the auto policy.  The Superior Court rejected the insured's arguments that the insurer was bound to advise the insured to purchase greater levels of auto liability insurance, or to equalize the disparate liability policies.  The Court also affirmed that the insurer's commercial advertising campaign did not render it liable under the Unfair Trade Practices Act in light of its clearly stated policy limits.  Cohan v. United Services Automobile Association, 683 EDA 2016 (Pa. Super. Jan. 5, 2017).
    • In this data breach suit, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the Plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice.  Plaintiffs, on behalf of a class of employees and customers of Shane's clients, medical and dental benefit providers, sued following a breach of the providers' computer network by non-party, criminal hackers.  The class members' personal identifying information was stolen and used to file fraudulent tax returns, causing them monetary harm.  The Third Circuit agreed that Pennsylvania law barred the tort claim, as the economic loss doctrine requires allegations of personal injury or property damage to assert a cause of action for negligence.  In addition, the Third Circuit held that the dismissal of the contract claim was proper, because the complaint failed plausibly to state a claim that the Defendants agreed contractually to protect the class members' data from breach by hackers. Longenecker-Wells v. Benecard Services, No. 15-3538, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 15696 (3d Cir. Aug, 25, 2016).
    • The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit unanimously vacated the District Court's denial of qualified immunity to Shane's client, a police officer.  The complaint asserted that the officer initiated a chase of the now-convicted co-defendant, and reached speeds exceeding 110 miles per hour before the co-defendant crashed into the innocent plaintiff.  The District Court denied a qualified immunity motion to dismiss, filed in response to the 14th Amendment due process claim asserted against the officer, concluding that fact issues remained that required a trial.  Shane persuaded the Third Circuit that the District Court failed to analyze the pure question of law whether the right alleged by the Plaintiff was clearly established on the date of the incident.  The Third Circuit vacated the denial of qualified immunity, and remanded.  Conte v. Rios, No. 15-3361, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 13915 (3d Cir. Aug. 1, 2016).
    • The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed by unanimous opinion a verdict in favor of Shane's insurer client in this first-party breach of contract action.  The plaintiff suffered damages to his retail inventory caused by smoke and soot infiltration from a nearby fire, and made a claim for remediation under the policy. The insurer adjusted the loss and issued a check per the terms of the policy for the whole loss amount.  After depositing the check, the plaintiff filed suit seeking additional damage, represented as additional cleaning and restoration costs.  At trial, the plaintiff presented the testimony of its owner, who justified the claim for additional damages by the ongoing cleaning costs for the inventory.  The defense relied on the expert testimony of a certified restoration company, who could perform the job at a fraction of the cost.  The trial court found that the defense figure was the true cost of damages, and the Superior Court rejected the plaintiff's argument on appeal.  The Classic Lighting Emporium, Inc. v. Erie Insurance Exchange, No. 3158 EDA 2014 (Pa. Super. Nov. 17, 2015).
    • A unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the entry of judgment in favor of Shane's client, an employer with a healthcare plan governed by ERISA.  The plaintiff sought statutory damages of up to $110 per day going back years, plus attorney's fees, against the employer and the co-defendant third-party administrator, asserting that she was unable to obtain requested documents from both parties, which were necessary to appeal the termination of her long-term disability benefits.  Against the employer specifically, the plaintiff asserted that it had a duty to amend historical plan documents to update its address, as she relied on an old address in seeking documents without success.  The Eleventh Circuit rejected the claim, holding that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award statutory penalties, especially where the Plaintiff not only had the document she later requested, but also had the means of knowing the proper address to which to send requests.  Smiley v. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company, 610 Fed. Appx. 8, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 12334 (11th Cir. Jul. 17, 2015).
    • In this tortious interference/civil conspiracy matter, the trial court dismissed the case for failure of the plaintiff to timely serve original process.  Shane defended against the appeal by plaintiff, which argued that plaintiff's good faith efforts and mere mistake easily satisfied Pennsylvania's service rules. The Superior Court unanimously decided against plaintiff, and affirmed the dismissal of the case for failure to make timely service.  Smash PA, Inc. v. Lehigh Valley Restaurant Group, Inc., 1811 EDA 2014 (Pa. Super. April 14, 2015).
    • In an underinsured motorist case, the federal Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld summary judgment granted in favor of Shane's client.  The plaintiff, carrying UM coverage on top of applicable policy limits of $100,000, sued and settled with the other driver for $41,715, the number recommended by an arbitrator.  The plaintiff then proceeded against her UM carrier, asserting that her actual damages exceeded the coverage threshold, despite the settlement.  The Third Circuit rejected that contention, and affirmed the District Court's holding that the evidence did not support her entitlement to UM benefits—that her damages went beyond the level of applicable third-party coverage.  The case drew amicus support from the Pennsylvania Association for Justice in support of Plaintiff.  Gallagher v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 1426 (3d Cir. Jan. 29, 2015).
    • A unanimous panel of the Superior Court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of Shane's client, a heavy construction equipment manufacturer and dealer.  Despite being the lone deep pocket in a case with large exposure due to the catastrophic and permanent injuries, the Superior Court agreed that the deposition testimony could not allow the claim to survive summary judgment, because there was no evidence that the design of the product caused the accident and injuries to the plaintiff.  Williams v. Anderson Equip. Co., Komatsu American Corporation, 1454 WDA 2013 (Pa. Super. Oct 7, 2014).
    • In a premises liability case involving severe head and cognitive injuries, Shane successfully defended against suit in Pennsylvania against a California golf resort.  The Third Circuit agreed with the District Court that no basis for personal jurisdiction over the resort was demonstrated from the record, but remanded for jurisdictional discovery.  After a round of written discovery and depositions, Shane assisted the trial attorney in a new briefing on the jurisdictional issue.  The Eastern District of Pennsylvania renewed its conclusion that no basis for jurisdiction could be demonstrated and dismissed the case a second time.  There was no appeal.  Rocke v. Pebble Beach Company, 541 Fed. Appx. 208 (3d Cir. Oct 10, 2013) & 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60218 (E.D. Pa. April 28, 2014).

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Superior Court of Pennsylvania Vacates $1.09 Billion Verdict, Orders New Trial Over Crashworthiness Jury Instructions

We convinced the Superior Court of Pennsylvania to vacate a $1.09 billion jury verdict and remand for a new trial.  The court held that the jury had not been properly instructed on the elements of a crashworthiness claim under Pennsylvania law. The court's ruling received press coverage in both The Legal Intelligencer and The Philadelphia Inquirer.

Successfully Dismantled a Complex Claim Against a Major Health Care Corporation

We succeeded in partially dismantling a complex claim against a major health care client. The family of a former in-patient resident who died as a result of complications from the COVID-19 virus filed suit, raising claims that the patient was sexually assaulted while in the care of the hospital and a subsidiary ambulance company. Asked to join the defense team shortly before trial, we effectively discredited the plaintiff’s witnesses throughout the plaintiff’s case-in-chief. At the nonsuit stage, we wholly extricated our client—sealing off any exposure to liability for the large, corporate parent company. Following the jury’s $3.5 million verdict against the remaining defendants, we were engaged as appellate counsel and succeeded in further winnowing the liability exposure. We convinced the trial judge to: (1) deny the plaintiff’s request to reinstate the punitive damages claim based on the trial record; (2) grant a partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict on one claim, lopping a full $700,000 off the jury’s verdict; and (3) outright deny the plaintiff’s motion for delay damages, which had sought to add $742,000 to the jury’s verdict.

Thought Leadership

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Case Law Alerts

New York Court Reaffirms Internal Affairs Doctrine, Denies Standing in Derivative Suit Against English Corporation

July 1, 2025

“Few principles are more firmly entrenched in corporate law than the internal affairs doctrine, a choice-of-law rule providing that, with rare exception, the substantive law of the place of incorporation governs disputes relating to the rights and relationships of corporate shareholders and managers.” Thus opened the court’s opinion—but that did not stop the challenge mounted against it in this case. Ezrasons, the plaintiff, is a New York corporation that is the beneficial owner of shares in Barclays PLC, a bank holding company incorporated under the laws of England and Wales with its principal office in London. Ezrasons filed suit “on behalf of Barclays” against directors and an affiliated company, alleging various breaches of fiduciary duty. Those defendants moved to dismiss for lack of standing because Ezrasons is not “a registered member of Barclays,” a substantive limitation on the right to maintain derivative actions under English law. With seemingly no dispute as to the requirements of English law, Ezrasons argued, instead, that New York’s Business Corporation Law gave it the right to maintain its action in New York. On appeal, the question was whether the New York statute (BCL) displaced the internal affairs doctrine in New York common law. The answer—spread over 24 pages, and over the 57-page dissent of two dissenting Justices who accuse the majority of working to impress Marty McFly and Doc Brown with their ability to travel back in time—was no. But while the genesis of the doctrine is the nineteenth century’s corporate boom and expansion of interstate corporate operations, the rationale for upholding the rule is decidedly timeless. Like the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its stance that “only one state should have the authority to regulate a corporation’s internal affairs,” lest a company “be faced with conflicting demands.” Thus, the court held that the Business Corporation Law, which allows suits to be brought in the name of domestic or foreign corporations, does not unequivocally displace the substantive applicability of English law as regards suits in the name of English corporations. Instead, the BCL establishes the minimum predicate for New York courts to entertain the suit, without bestowing standing contrary to the law of the foreign corporation’s home. Thus, companies with operations in the Empire State can rest assured that their internal operations and “disputes relating to the rights and relationships of corporate shareholders and managers” will remain governed by the substantive law of their state of incorporation.    Case Law Alerts, 3rd Quarter, July 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

The Quarterly Dose

LEGAL ROUNDUP – Pennsylvania

November 1, 2024

Supreme Court to Decide Pair of Mental Health Procedures Act Cases, Outlining the Contours of Claims Against Treatment Providers Matos v. Geisinger Med. Ctr., No. 192 MAL 2023; and Wunderly v. Saint Luke’s Hosp., 369 MAL 2023 “One of the purposes of the Mental Health Procedures Act is to provide limited protection from civil and criminal liability to mental health personnel and their employers in rendering treatment in this unscientific and inexact field.” Farago v. Sacred Heart Gen. Hosp., 562 A.2d 300, 304 (Pa. 1989) (citing 50 P.S. § 7114). Every so often, a tragic incident breaks through the bulwark of Pennsylvania’s intermediate, error-correcting courts, calling out for resolution by the High Court. Matos and Wunderly are two such currently pending cases. Matos v. Geisinger involves a situation in which an individual with a record of psychiatric issues submitted himself for voluntary inpatient examination at two treatment centers but was not accepted for treatment at either. He, shortly thereafter, murdered his girlfriend, whose estate now claims the treatment providers were grossly negligent under the MHPA. The Supreme Court has agreed to decide whether evidence that treatment has been formally initiated (rather than just considered) is a condition for the exposure to liability under the MHPA for voluntary treatment as it has been ruled to be for involuntary treatment. See 314 A.3d 512 (Pa. 2023) (allocatur grant). Wunderly v. St. Luke’s Hospital involves a situation of a residential patient who experienced pressure-related skin breakdown and deterioration of existing wounds. Following the patient’s death, the estate claims that medical negligence led to his demise. In defense, the treatment providers assert the patient was admitted to the facility for mental health treatment on an involuntary basis under Section 302 of the MHPA, and, therefore, the ancillary medical treatment given to this mental health patient brings any liability claim within the strictures of the MHPA. The Supreme Court has agreed to decide whether the Superior Court erred in affirming the dismissal of the case or, instead, whether the MHPA does not apply to the case at all. See 310 A.3d 715 (Pa. 2023) (allocatur grant). Mental health treatment is often its own reward, and something many of us might rather not have a role in. But the General Assembly has enshrined in law a strict and strong policy of “assuring the availability of adequate treatment to those who are mentally ill.” Leight v. University of Pittsburgh Physicians, 243 A.3d 126, 130 (Pa. 2020) (citing 50 P.S. § 7102). The Supreme Court is again called upon to guide the bench, bar, and emergency department on the contours of civil liability for treatment providers for those suffering from mental illness. Matos and Wunderly will help define the rights and responsibilities of all involved in this inexact and sometimes thankless field. These are definitely two cases to keep an eye on.    The Quarterly Dose – November 2024, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

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Firm Highlights

Result

Summary Judgment Secured, Preserving $750,000 in Coverage for Insured in Major Trucking Liability Dispute

Ray Freudiger and Michael A. Roberts (both of Cincinnati) successfully obtained summary judgment on behalf of their client in a coverage dispute arising from a May 19, 2022, motor vehicle accident. A permissive driver operated a box truck for an interstate trucking company and caused severe injuries to two tort victims. Prior to the accident, the insured had procured a commercial auto policy for the trucking company with stated limits of $1,000,000. Following the accident, the insurer initiated a declaratory judgment action asserting that only reduced bodily injury limits of $25,000/$50,000 applied and later counterclaimed, alleging it would not have insured the driver had he been properly submitted for approval under the policy. After extensive discovery, briefing, and oral argument, the court rejected the insurer’s attempt to shift responsibility for the $750,000 in coverage it was legally required to provide for permissive drivers under Ohio law, granting summary judgment in favor of the insured and preserving $750,000 in liability exposure.

Thought Leadership

Congress Passes Financial Exploitation Prevention Act

On June 25, 2026, the House passed the Financial Exploitation Prevention Act of 2025 (“the Act”) by a vote of 414 to 2. The Act allows financial advisors and firms to delay suspicious transactions regarding the accounts of clients who are 65 or older, if they believe financial exploitation has occurred or is about to take place. With the advancement of technology and AI, the House’s overwhelming bipartisan passage of the Financial Exploitation Prevention Act represents an important step in strengthening the financial industry’s ability to combat the growing threat of elder financial exploitation. The Act recognizes what advisors have long known that financial professionals are often the first to detect suspicious behavior but have historically lacked clear legal authority to intervene before irreversible financial harm occurs. From the industry’s perspective, the bill accomplishes several important objectives, including the following: (1) Provides a practical “pause button” by allowing financial professionals to temporarily delay certain transaction requests when there is a reasonable belief that a senior or vulnerable adult is being financially exploited; (2) Empowers financial professionals to act by providing greater certainty that firms can act in good faith to protect clients without unnecessary legal risk; and (3) Strengthens investor protection without sacrificing client rights by allowing temporary delays based on a reasonable suspicion of exploitation, which is intended only to allow additional review and not to deny clients access to their money indefinitely. In sum, the Financial Exploitation Prevention Act will equip financial professionals with practical, carefully tailored tools to stop suspected financial exploitation before client assets are lost. By allowing firms to temporarily delay suspicious transactions under defined circumstances, Congress is recognizing the critical role advisors play as the first line of defense against increasingly sophisticated fraud schemes. The Act strikes an appropriate balance between protecting vulnerable investors and preserving individual financial autonomy, while reinforcing collaboration among advisors, families, and law enforcement to combat financial exploitation. The bill now awaits Senate action.

Casey Alan Coyle Joins Marshall Dennehey's PA Appellate Practice as a Shareholder in Harrisburg and Philadelphia

News

Marshall Dennehey Expands Leading Pennsylvania Appellate Practice With Addition of Shareholder Casey Coyle

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Expands Family Leave Protections Effective July 17, 2026

On January 17, 2026, Governor Murphy signed into law legislation expanding the New Jersey Family Leave Act (NJFLA). Beginning July 17, 2026, significant amendments to the NJFLA will expand job-protected family leave to smaller businesses and more employees across the state. The new law broadens coverage by lowering the threshold for private employers from 30 employees to 15 employees, meaning many smaller businesses will now be subject to the NJFLA. Employees of state and local government agencies will continue to be covered regardless of the size of the employer. The amendments also make it easier for employees to qualify for leave. Under the revised law, an employee will be eligible after three months of employment and at least 250 hours worked during the preceding 12 months, replacing the previous requirement of 12 months of employment and 1,000 hours worked. Currently, New Jersey's Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) and Family Leave Insurance (FLI) programs provide eligible employees with wage replacement while they are on leave but do not independently guarantee job protection. The recent amendments to the New Jersey Family Leave Act (NJFLA) expand these protections by extending job-protected leave to additional employees. Under the amended law, employees receiving TDI or FLI benefits may be entitled to return to the same position they held before taking leave, or to an equivalent position with the same seniority, status, pay, and benefits. Although the legislation also states that it does not expand or modify an employee's reinstatement rights under the NJFLA, the amendments appear to provide job protection to eligible employees receiving TDI or FLI benefits without requiring them to separately satisfy the eligibility requirements of the NJFLA or the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). As a result, some employees may be entitled to longer periods of job-protected leave than were previously available under existing law. With these amendments, New Jersey continues to strengthen workplace protections by expanding access to job-protected family leave for eligible employees. These changes significantly expand access to job-protected family leave and may require employers to update their leave policies, employee handbooks, and HR practices. Notably, employers who were previously not required to administer NJFLA may need to amend their policies and/or create new protocols to come into compliance with the NJFLA. Failure to do so would prove costly, as the penalties for non-compliance are significant.

Portrait of Carolyn Schweizer, with text below: Philadelphia Office Managing Attorney

News

Marshall Dennehey Names Carolyn Schweizer New Philadelphia Office Managing Attorney

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

blue facade of a hospital sign against blue sky

Result

Defense Verdict in Complex Medical Malpractice Trial

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2026 Ohio Super Lawyers and Rising Stars

News

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2026 Ohio Super Lawyers and Rising Stars

empty courtroom photo

Result

Summary Judgment Secured for Life Insurance Agent

Thought Leadership

SIU Gets a Boost: NJ Supreme Court Affirms Insurers' Right to Litigate, Not Arbitrate, Fraud Claims

In a significant win for insurers' Special Investigation Units, the New Jersey Supreme Court clarified that statutory insurance fraud and racketeering claims may proceed in court rather than through PIP arbitration. At issue was whether insurance fraud claims brought under New Jersey's Insurance Fraud Prevention Act (IFPA) and the state's Anti-Racketeering Act (NJ RICO) are subject to mandatory arbitration under the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act’s (AICRA) PIP dispute-resolution framework. Allstate had sued a network of medical practices, physicians, and related corporate entities, alleging a scheme to extract more than $1.7 million in PIP benefits through fraudulent and misleading billing. The trial court dismissed Allstate's complaint and compelled arbitration, reading AICRA's arbitration clause — which covers "any dispute regarding the recovery of... benefits" under PIP coverage, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(a) — as sweeping in fraud and racketeering claims along with routine benefit disputes. The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division's reversal, adopting Judge Gilson's opinion below (480 N.J. Super. 566 (App. Div. 2025)) as its own reasoning. The Court held that IFPA and RICO claims fall outside the scope of AICRA's PIP arbitration mechanism because that "streamlined and specialized" process cannot grant the relief those statutes contemplate — treble damages, injunctive relief, broad discovery, and joinder of third parties — and because arbitrators lack authority to award compensatory or treble damages to an insurer. The Court also rejected the argument that Allstate's own Decision Point Review Plans independently compel arbitration, finding those plan provisions no broader than AICRA's own arbitration clause. Notably, the Court expressly disagreed with the Third Circuit's contrary holding in GEICO v. Mt. Prospect Chiropractic Center, 98 F.4th 463 (3d Cir. 2024), concluding it is not bound by that federal interpretation of New Jersey law. Insurers retain the right to pursue IFPA and RICO claims in the Law Division, with a jury trial. For SIU units and NJ insurance carriers, this decision is a significant win: it forecloses defense clinics' primary procedural tool for shunting fraud investigations into limited-scope PIP arbitration, where treble damages, RICO relief, and meaningful discovery were never realistically available. Carriers building cases against fraudulently structured clinics, straw-owned practices, or coordinated billing networks can now proceed with confidence that a well-pleaded IFPA/RICO complaint stays in the Law Division rather than being diverted to arbitration on a motion to compel. Practically, this strengthens SIU's leverage in settlement negotiations, preserves civil discovery tools (subpoenas, depositions, joinder of related corporate entities) critical to unwinding complex ownership and referral schemes, and resolves the split with the Third Circuit in favor of NJ insurers — at least as a matter of state law. Expect increased reliance on IFPA civil actions, rather than PIP arbitration demands, as SIU's primary enforcement vehicle going forward.