Shane Haselbarth

We convinced the Superior Court of Pennsylvania to vacate a $1.09 billion jury verdict and remand for a new trial.  The court held that the jury had not been properly instructed on the elements of a crashworthiness claim under Pennsylvania law. The court's ruling received press coverage in both The Legal Intelligencer and The Philadelphia Inquirer.

We succeeded in partially dismantling a complex claim against a major health care client. The family of a former in-patient resident who died as a result of complications from the COVID-19 virus filed suit, raising claims that the patient was sexually assaulted while in the care of the hospital and a subsidiary ambulance company. Asked to join the defense team shortly before trial, we effectively discredited the plaintiff’s witnesses throughout the plaintiff’s case-in-chief. At the nonsuit stage, we wholly extricated our client—sealing off any exposure to liability for the large, corporate parent company. Following the jury’s $3.5 million verdict against the remaining defendants, we were engaged as appellate counsel and succeeded in further winnowing the liability exposure. We convinced the trial judge to: (1) deny the plaintiff’s request to reinstate the punitive damages claim based on the trial record; (2) grant a partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict on one claim, lopping a full $700,000 off the jury’s verdict; and (3) outright deny the plaintiff’s motion for delay damages, which had sought to add $742,000 to the jury’s verdict.

We successfully obtained an order to move a sexual assault case to Chester County, Pennsylvania. At first, the venue appeared prima fascia good for Philadelphia until our attorneys more closely investigated and found the one defendant holding the case in the city was never served and could not be found. 

We secured a unanimous, precedential decision upholding a venue transfer from Philadelphia to Butler County under forum non conveniens, setting a new standard for defendants after a series of appellate reversals.

We prevailed in a unanimous, precedential decision in the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, which reconciled conflicting case law in the state. The plaintiffs were joined by 55 amici, and our client was joined by numerous construction organizations as amici. The court eventually applied Pennsylvania’s statute of repose to bar construction defect claims brought by homeowners.

Our appellate attorneys successfully convinced a Philadelphia trial judge to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict and nullify a $1.8 million jury verdict against a Philadelphia hospital. The case involved a fall in the hospital’s bathroom, and the trial judge determined that the plaintiff’s trial evidence failed to demonstrate that the hospital was responsible for the fall. 

By Order dated April 5, 2023, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania refused to review the Superior Court’s affirmance of a 2021 nonsuit obtained by Jack Delany in hotly contested litigation stemming from the death of a construction worker. John Hare and Shane Haselbarth handled the appeal along with Jack. The Supreme Court’s ruling ends more than five years of litigation that arose from the construction worker’s death while he was involved in the Pier 78 renovation project on the Delaware River in Philadelphia. The plaintiff sued the general contractor and others involved in the project and ultimately settled with the general contractor for $10.5 million. The general contractor then pursued a contractual indemnification claim against Jack Delany’s concrete subcontractor client on the Pier 78 project. The indemnification claim included the $10.5 million settlement plus approximately $1 million in attorneys’ fees.   The case proceeded to trial in 2021 and, at the close of the general contractor’s case-in-chief, Jack moved for and was granted a nonsuit on the basis that the general contractor was the deceased construction workers’ statutory employer pursuant to the five-element test set forth by the PA Supreme Court in McDonald v. Levinson Steel, 153 A. 424 (Pa. 1930). The case was especially notable because, rather than retaining an attorney to address the reasonableness of the amount of the underlying settlement, which is typical, Jack retained an economist to explain that, based upon his analysis of comparable cases, the settlement amount was excessive. The general contractor appealed the nonsuit. In an unanimous decision dated September 30, 2022, the Superior Court affirmed. The Supreme Court denial of allowance of appeal brings the lengthy litigation to an end.    

A unanimous panel of the the Third Circuit affirmed an order of the U.S.E.D. Pa., which had granted a Rule 12 motion to dismiss in favor of a former Assistant District Attorney. The plaintiff had plead guilty to murder and other offenses in 1990 after shooting a man in the back four times. In 1993, the plaintiff filed a petition under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The crux of his argument being his counsel failed to object when the court incorrectly stated the meaning of life imprisonment. According to the original transcript, the court said, “Life implies 17 ½ to 35 years.” Our client, a former Assistant District Attorney, worked on the opposition to the plaintiff’s PCRA petition and contacted the court stenographer about that line in the transcript. The stenographer admitted the transcripts contained an error and filed a certified copy of the corrected page to reflect that the court said, “Life plus 17 ½ to 35 years.” The PCRA petition was denied. Then, in 2019, the plaintiff obtained a handwritten note by our client which referenced needing a “new and improved version” of the transcript. The plaintiff filed another PCRA petition. The current administration of the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office and the plaintiff reached a stipulated agreement to resolve the case. The plaintiff’s 1990 guilty plea was vacated, he re-pleaded to third-degree murder and robbery, and was sentenced to 17 ½ to 35 years’ imprisonment, and was then released for time served.  The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against our client under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that our client’s ex parte communication with the stenographer violated his right to due process and to a jury trial. We moved for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), arguing our client’s actions were protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity and qualified immunity. The District Court agreed and dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice. The plaintiff appealed. Writing for a unanimous panel, the Judge concluded the claims asserted by the plaintiff “lack merit[.]” Affirmance was decided solely on the issue of qualified immunity. The court concluded the claims were “fatally deficient” because: (1) the plaintiff defined his right to due process and jury trial at too high a level of generality; and (2) the plaintiff failed to cite authority establishing that his rights to due process and a jury trial entitled him to protection from our client’s ex parte communication with a court stenographer. Thus, our client was entitled to qualified immunity, as argued by us in the District Court.   

Our appellate attorneys were victorious in the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and nullified a $5.6 million judgment in a construction accident case. In a unanimous, precedential opinion, the court ruled that the general contractor represented by our attorneys was the plaintiff’s statutory employer and, thus, immune from suit. Yoder v. McCarthy Constr., Inc., 2023 PA Super 13 (Pa. Super. 2023).

Our appellate attorneys were victorious in the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and nullified a $5.6 million judgment in a construction accident case. In a unanimous, precedential opinion, the court ruled that our client, a general contractor, was the plaintiff’s statutory employer and thus immune from suit.  

We successfully obtained from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmance of a district court order granting a township’s Rule 12 motion to dismiss. The panel agreed with the appellees and concluded the District Court exercised proper discretion in dismissing the complaint since the plaintiffs failed to assert under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 plausible claims of federal constitutional violations.

We convinced the Superior Court of Pennsylvania to unanimously reverse a Philadelphia trial court’s refusal to compel arbitration of a claim against a nationally recognized online coupon marketing platform. The plaintiff claimed the company was responsible for an alleged sexual assault during a massage that the plaintiff’s son purchased on the coupon platform and gifted to the plaintiff. The Superior Court ruled that the plaintiff was a third-party beneficiary of the agreement between her son and the company and she was, therefore, bound by the arbitration clause in the agreement.

The decision, which reversed the trial court and Superior Court, reinstated a jury verdict in favor of our clients. Following a defense verdict, the trial court awarded a new trial based on a question posed by defense counsel, who was not a Marshall Dennehey attorney. The Superior Court affirmed the award of a new trial, but the Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the defense verdict on the basis that defense counsel’s question was neither improper nor prejudicial.

Our clients specialize in identifying and reclaiming lost property for consumers who are unaware that such lost property exists. The plaintiff brought claims under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL) and for fraudulent inducement, arguing that the business model was deceptive because consumers could recover their own property without paying for the ease and convenience of having the defendant business work on their behalf. Not surprisingly, the district court found that the plaintiff’s serial complaints failed to allege anything “more than Defendants’ expertise,” and that there was no factual basis to support the notion that consumers are unduly influenced or misled. On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal, expressly noting that the defendants made no misrepresentation at any time, and the UTPCPL and fraud claims were dismissed without merit. 

We obtained a dismissal of a consumer fraud class action against our clients, a national firm and its principal, who specialize in identifying and reclaiming lost property for consumers who are unaware that such lost property exists. The plaintiff brought claims under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL) and for fraudulent inducement, arguing that the business model was deceptive because consumers could recover their own property without paying for the ease and convenience of having the defendant business work on their behalf.  Not surprisingly, the district court found that the plaintiff’s serial complaints failed to allege anything “more than Defendants’ expertise,” and that there was no factual basis to support the notion that consumers are unduly influenced or misled.  On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal, expressly noting that the defendants made no misrepresentation at any time, and the UTPCPL and fraud claims were dismissed as without merit.  DeSimone v. U.S. Claims Servs., Inc., 2020 WL 2556949 (E.D. Pa. May 20, 2020), aff’d 2021 WL 1662779 (3d Cir. Apr. 28, 2021).

We secured a dismissal of a civil rights action against a Pennsylvania children and youth agency and several of its caseworkers and staff attorneys. ​The plaintiff parents brought their five-month-old baby to the hospital with a spiral fracture mid-shaft on his right humerus. The hospital team collectively concluded that the injury was probably accidental in nature, but a nurse reported the injury to the agency, concerned that it might have been caused by abuse. By law the agency is bound to investigate suspected child abuse and did so. A judge approved the request for a safety plan that required a chaperone to be with the parents and child, even in the home, while the merits of the abuse investigation continued. At the end of the investigation, the judge concluded the injury was accidental, and the safety plan was terminated. The plaintiffs then filed an action, alleging the safety plan violated their Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights. The federal district court dismissed the case, concluding the plaintiffs’ allegations of interference with the family unit, even if true, do not rise to the level of “shocking to the conscience” necessary for a due process violation. On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed, stating that the nurse’s report of possible child abuse, in conjunction with other evidence to support suspicion of the same, make the defendants’ actions not “shocking to the conscience,” and so no substantive due process claim was stated. Dismissal was affirmed.

Our appellate attorneys succeeded in convincing the Pennsylvania Superior Court to vacate a $40.2 million medical malpractice verdict and remand for a new trial. ​In its unanimous, precedential decision, the Superior Court ruled that the trial court had erroneously allowed plaintiffs’ counsel to utilize hearsay medical literature as substantive evidence. The case involved a spinal cord birth injury and was tried in Delaware County.

This was a high-stakes FINRA arbitration case, motion to vacate the defense award in federal district court, and a precedential decision in the First Circuit following oral argument. The claimant retired early with a pension and 401(k) and rolled the funds into a securities account in 2002. On a tip from a friend, he invested his nest egg with a registered representative who years later was charged by the SEC and convicted of securities violations. Through the registered representative’s bad advice and improper conduct between 2002 and 2016, the claimant’s retirement account was drained to zero, though the total amount was distributed to the claimant himself. The claimant sued the registered representative and the rep’s former broker-dealers through whom the representative was affiliated (prior to his residency with the Bureau of Prisons). The FINRA arbitration panel granted a complete defense award in favor of our broker-dealer client, seeing no improper or negligent conduct on the broker dealer’s part, and finding all improper conduct of the registered representative to be outside the scope of his affiliation with the broker-dealer. The claimant then moved to vacate the award in favor of our broker-dealer client in federal district court in Boston, which was denied. He then appealed that decision to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. In both courts, Shane briefed and orally argued the case. The First Circuit handed down a published opinion even stronger than the district court victory, adopting word-for-word many of the arguments Shane made so as to secure confirmation of the FINRA award in its entirety for the benefit of our client.

Marshall Dennehey’s appellate attorneys filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the Pennsylvania Defense Institute and Pennsylvania Association of Defense Counsel in a case pending in the Pennsylvania Superior Court that involved interpretation of a “regular use” exclusion that commonly appears in underinsured motorist coverage in automobile policies. The Superior Court enforced the exclusion, as PDI and PADC had requested. The plaintiff regularly used a company vehicle for his daily work. But one or two days before the accident, the specific vehicle he had been driving was taken out of service for repairs, and his employer rented a replacement vehicle for the plaintiff’s use. The insurer denied the UIM claim, based on the “regular use” exclusion, because the plaintiff was driving a company vehicle, which was his regular practice. The plaintiff countered that the vehicle he was operating at the time of the accident had not, in fact, been made “regularly” available to him because he only began using it a day or two prior. Relying on its prior decision in Brink v. Erie Ins. Group, 940 A.2d 528 (Pa. Super. 2008), which held that the “regular use” exclusion properly barred coverage for a plaintiff injured in a “fleet vehicle,” even though the plaintiff may have driven a different specific vehicle each day, the Rawl court held that the employer’s temporary rental of a replacement vehicle triggered application of the “regular use” exclusion and barred coverage. “Stated simply,” Rawl explains, “it does not matter whether Mr. Rawl had regular use of a particular vehicle furnished by his employer, but whether he regularly used a vehicle supplied by his employer.” The court, therefore, affirmed the trial court’s award of summary judgment to the carrier.

Our appellate attorneys were retained shortly before trial. While driving our client’s truck, an employee struck a car from behind that had stopped in the middle of the road after its hood flew open. The collision injured three members of a family and killed a six-year-old child. The Superior Court vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial on the basis that the trial judge had improperly granted summary judgment to several vehicle repair shops, all of whom knew of but failed to repair the condition that made the car’s hood fly open.