.

Robert A. Morton IV

Shareholder

RAMorton@mdwcg.com

Portrait of Robert A. Morton IV

Rob joined Marshall Dennehey as a member of the Casualty Department. He concentrates his practice in the areas of construction accident and construction defect litigation, premises liability, product liability, automobile and commercial motor carrier liability, and veterinary malpractice and licensure defense. Additionally, Rob has handled mold claims that were contained within larger construction-defect related claims. 

Rob received his B.A. from Saint Joseph's University, where he was a member of the Dean's List, and graduated with a degree in Criminal Justice. Following graduation from college, he attended Widener University School of Law. While at Widener, Rob was actively involved in the Veteran's Law Clinic and worked in the Complex Litigation Center of the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania.

Prior to joining the firm, Rob worked for a regional defense firm. Rob is admitted to practice in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and U.S. Tax Court.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., 2014)
    • Saint Joseph's University (B.S., 2011)
    • Pennsylvania, 2014
    • New Jersey, 2015
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2018
    • U.S. Tax Court
    • American Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association

Results

View all

Successful Trial Result Achieved in a Philadelphia Premises Liability Matter

We received a successful trial result in a premises liability matter in Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. The plaintiff’s expert projected future surgeries and extensive life-long medical care costs of $1.25 million. Much of our defense centered on damages and demonstrating that the projected future medical care was not supported by the actual medical treatment provided. Additionally, video of the incident was used to demonstrate that the plaintiff had actual/constructive knowledge of spilled water in the premises but proceeded to walk in that area anyway. Forty percent comparative negligence was assigned to the plaintiff, and despite the plaintiff’s introduction of the medical cost projection described above, only $50,000 in future medical care was awarded by the jury. The total award, after a molded verdict, was $118,800, which our client viewed as a victory in this venue. 

Defense Verdict Secured in a Seven-Day Defamation Jury Trial

We won a defense verdict in a seven-day jury trial in the Philadelphia Common Pleas court. The case involved a defamation claim based on an article published in a local community newspaper. The defendants were the local Community Council and the two individuals who wrote and published the article. According to the plaintiff, the article named him and implied he wrote an anonymous letter that threatened legal action, which was seen as contrary to the community’s interest. The demand had been $1.75 million, and the plaintiff was offered $50,000. After deliberating, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants.

Thought Leadership

View all

Defense Digest

Shoddy Home-Improvement Contracting? Grounds for Recovering Treble Damages and Attorneys Fees under Pennsylvania Home Improvement Consumer Protection Act and Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law

June 1, 2023

Key Points: Trial courts are determined to protect the individual consumer from bad-acting contractors, including with the award of treble damages and attorneys fees under the HICPA and URPCPL. Home improvement contractors must ensure that they are familiar with the provisions of both HICPA and the UTPCPL and that they perform their home improvement renovations in a workmanlike manner. As home improvement projects have sky-rocketed in Pennsylvania in the COVID and post-COVID era, thanks to the continued “work from home” model or some form thereof, so have claims against home improvement contractors under both the Pennsylvania Home Improvement Consumer Protection Act, otherwise known as HICPA, and the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL). HICPA arose, at least in part, out of the need to protect consumers from unscrupulous home improvement contractors. To combat the deceptive practices of such actors, HICPA places certain requirements on these contractors, including that they register with the state, and dictates the terms and provisions which must be included in a contract with a homeowner, while also precluding certain terms and provisions that would act to limit a homeowner’s right to recover against such contractors. While the aim is to protect consumers, both HICPA’s and UTPCPL’s requirements can sometimes appear arbitrary and onerous to home improvement contractors. However, contractors must ensure compliance with the statutes, as violations of HICPA and/or UTPCPL, even for seemingly minor technical violations, can form the basis of an award of treble damages or attorneys fees. This article addresses certain scenarios under HICPA and the UTPCPL where Pennsylvania Courts have awarded treble damages or attorney fees for violations of the statutes. Per the UTPCPL, “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce” are unlawful. 73 P.S. § 201-3. “Unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” include, under § 201-2(4)(xvi), “making repairs, improvements or replacements on tangible, real or personal property, of a nature or quality inferior to or below the standard of that agreed to in writing.” Additionally, any violation of the HICPA is deemed a violation of the UTPCPL. 73 P.S. § 517.10.  Any person who purchases services for personal, family, or household purposes and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of an unlawful act under UTPCPL may bring a private action to recover actual damages. 73 P.S. § 201-9.2(a). Additionally, the court may, in its discretion, award up to three times the actual damages sustained and may provide such additional relief as it deems necessary or proper.  A trial court has broad discretion to award treble damages for any violation of the UTPCPL, including violations of the HICPA. Johnson v. Hyundai Motor America, 698 A.2d 631, 639-640 (Pa. Super. 1997). An abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but requires manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous. Grady v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 839 A.2d 1038, 1046 (Pa. 2003). The court’s discretion as to treble damages under the UTPCPL should not be closely constrained by the common-law requirements associated with the award of punitive damages. Schwartz v. Rockey, 932 A.2d 885, 898 (Pa. 2007). Nevertheless, the discretion of courts of original jurisdiction is not limitless, and awards of treble damages may be reviewed by the appellate courts for rationality. Courts of original jurisdiction should focus on the presence of intentional or reckless, wrongful conduct as to which an award of treble damages would be consistent with, and in furtherance of, the remedial purposes of the UTPCPL.  In actions for violations for the UTPCPL, the court may award to the plaintiff, in addition to other relief, costs and reasonable attorneys fees. 73 P.S. § 201-9.2(a). The trial court has discretion in awarding attorneys fees, and an appellate court will not disturb such an award unless the trial court abuses that discretion. Skurnowicz v. Lucci, 798 A.2d 788, 796 (Pa. Super. 2002) (superseded on other grounds). In exercising its discretion, the trial court must consider:  (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill requisite properly to conduct the case; (2) the customary charges of the members of the bar for similar services; (3) the amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client or clients from the services, and (4) the contingency or certainty of the compensation. Neal v. Bavarian Motors, Inc., 882 A.2d 1022, 1030-31 (Pa. Super. 2005). The trial court must link the fee award to the amount of damages the plaintiff sustained under the UTPCPL and eliminate from the award of attorneys fees the efforts of counsel to recover on non-UTPCPL theories. Courts have acknowledged the difficulty of parsing out the time between UTPCPL claims and other causes of action where plaintiffs are proceeding on multiple theories of relief. See e.g. Krishnan v. Culter Group, Inc., 171 A.3d 856 (Pa. Super. 2017); Boehm v. Riversource Life Inc. Co., 117 A.3d 308 (Pa. Super. 2015). In addition, a strict liability standard is now applied to all claims brought under the “catch-all” provision of the UTPCPL for conduct that has the potential to deceive a consumer. As a result, courts may impose an award of treble damages and attorneys fees for such a violation even without considering the state of mind of the actor. The following summarizes a few factual scenarios that have warranted awards of treble damages or attorneys fees in UTPCPL and/or HICPA cases. In Brandt v. Master Force Construction Corp., 236 A.3d 1112 (Pa. Super. 2020), the homeowners contracted with a home improvement contractor to replace a roof. However, the roof leaked after replacement. After the contractor claimed to have fixed the leak, the leaks persisted, and the homeowners decided to hire another contractor to actually fix the leaky roof. The Pennsylvania Superior Court ultimately upheld a trial court’s award of treble damages and attorneys fees because the court applied the Neal factors and only awarded fees and expenses for which counsel had prepared invoices and which Plaintiffs had actually paid. In Bennett v. A.T. Masterpiece Homes at Broadsprings, LLC, 40 A.3d 145 (Pa. Super. 2012), the buyers of a newly-constructed home were guaranteed by the builders that the roof, flooring, and foundational issues would be fixed, but issues persisted after construction was completed. The trial court ultimately awarded the plaintiffs double damages, and the appellate court found such award was soundly within the discretion of the trial court based on violation of the UTPCPL.  In Krishnan, supra, home purchasers discovered chronic water infiltration issues due to construction failures committed by the defendant home builder. The trial court awarded attorneys fees, expert fees, and related costs. All were upheld. In short, it is apparent that trial courts are determined to protect the individual consumer from bad-acting contractors, including with the award of treble damages and attorneys fees. Appellate courts will uphold such awards absent a significant overreach by the trial court. With that in mind, home improvement contractors must ensure that they are familiar with the provisions of both HICPA and the UTPCPL and that they perform their home improvement renovations in a workmanlike manner.      Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 2, June 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

News

View all

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Ohio Supreme Court Holds That a Binding Appraisal Award May Not Be Set Aside Absent Specific Evidence of Manifest Mistake or Fraud

On July 23, 2026, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a rare opinion on the binding effect of an appraisal award in a property insurance policy.  The Court in One Church held: A binding appraisal award will not be set aside unless an error is so palpably wrong that it undermines the intent of the agreement, such as corruption or gross mistake, not a mere error of judgment—To plead a claim of mistake with particularity as required by Civ.R. 9(B), facts alleged in a complaint must constitute the elements of mistake—Allegation that additional, hidden damage was discovered after appraisal award failed to state a claim of mistake that could justify setting aside binding appraisal.  The case arose out of a claim brought by One Church against its insurer, Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company for roof damage from a storm. Pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, the parties agreed to submit the matter to appraisal. The two appraisers inspected the building, and both appraisers agreed that the damages were $313,271.98. The insurer paid the agreed appraised amount.  Thereafter, the insured submitted a claim for an additional $206,663.09 in damages. The insured argued that these additional damages were not discovered until after the repairs began, and that they should be permitted to submit an additional claim, even though there had already been a binding appraisal of damages. The insurer refused to pay the additional damages, and the insured sued for breach of contract and bad faith.  In the trial court, the insurer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the binding appraisal award barred any further claims. The insured took the position that additional hidden damages could not be discovered until after the repairs began, and therefore there was a mutual mistake. The trial court dismissed the case on the insurer’s motion, because there was no “evidence of fraud, misfeasance, or mistake”. The Court of Appeals agreed that appraisal awards are generally binding, but noted that an appraisal award can be set aside for fraud or manifest mistake. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, finding that the insured had pled mistake with sufficient particularity. The insurer appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the trial court decision dismissing the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court found that since the insured had already demanded appraisal, and the appraisal award was binding, “something more than error of judgement, such as corruption in the arbitrator, or gross mistake” must be pled with particularity, and proven for the insured to override the appraisal award. Since the complaint did not allege fraud or manifest mistake with sufficient particularity, something more than a mere error of judgment, the complaint was insufficient to state a claim.  The complaint in this case did not challenge the appraisal award. It pled that additional damages were discovered that were not apparent when the appraisal was done. It did not specify “who discovered the damages, how they were discovered, where they were found, why they were previously hidden, or why they rise to the level of a manifest mistake that the “appraiser would have corrected...had it been called to his attention”. Id at ¶22 citing Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970). Cases deciding the effect of appraisal awards are unusual. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in One Church relies primarily on 19th century case law for its conclusion. This emphasizes the fact that there is minimal case law deciding the effect of binding appraisal clauses in property insurance policies, and makes this case all the more significant. A lengthy dissent was written by Justice Fisher, who would have affirmed the Court of Appeals decision reversing and remanding the case for a decision on the merits. Of course, the decision works both ways, and an insurer dissatisfied with a binding appraisal award will likewise be without further recourse absent evidence of corruption, fraud, misfeasance, or manifest mistake, which must be pled with particularity. To constitute manifest mistake, “the mistake must be of such character that the arbitrator or appraiser would have corrected it had it been called to his attention.”  Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970).  The majority opinion does not specifically identify what would have been sufficient to plead mistake with particularity, or if the insured could have amended the complaint to overcome the deficiencies. The dissent argues that this was not really a case alleging mistake, but rather a question of contract interpretation. The insured did not challenge the appraisal, but argued that the hidden damage was not part of the appraisal, and the appraisal only covered the known damages.  However, this argument did not carry the day with the majority. 

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2026 Ohio Super Lawyers and Rising Stars

News

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2026 Ohio Super Lawyers and Rising Stars

empty courtroom photo

Result

Summary Judgment Secured for Life Insurance Agent

Result

Summary Judgment Secured, Preserving $750,000 in Coverage for Insured in Major Trucking Liability Dispute

Ray Freudiger and Michael A. Roberts (both of Cincinnati) successfully obtained summary judgment on behalf of their client in a coverage dispute arising from a May 19, 2022, motor vehicle accident. A permissive driver operated a box truck for an interstate trucking company and caused severe injuries to two tort victims. Prior to the accident, the insured had procured a commercial auto policy for the trucking company with stated limits of $1,000,000. Following the accident, the insurer initiated a declaratory judgment action asserting that only reduced bodily injury limits of $25,000/$50,000 applied and later counterclaimed, alleging it would not have insured the driver had he been properly submitted for approval under the policy. After extensive discovery, briefing, and oral argument, the court rejected the insurer’s attempt to shift responsibility for the $750,000 in coverage it was legally required to provide for permissive drivers under Ohio law, granting summary judgment in favor of the insured and preserving $750,000 in liability exposure.

Casey Alan Coyle Joins Marshall Dennehey's PA Appellate Practice as a Shareholder in Harrisburg and Philadelphia

News

Marshall Dennehey Expands Leading Pennsylvania Appellate Practice With Addition of Shareholder Casey Coyle

Thought Leadership

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Holds That Public Policy Does Not Prevent Insurance Coverage for Sex Trafficking Claims

On July 21, 2026, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an opinion emphasizing the limited circumstances in which courts may invoke public policy to bar insurance coverage, holding in Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (U.S. Branch) v. RI Settlement Trust that Pennsylvania public policy does not preclude coverage for claims alleging that insureds enabled or profited from human sex trafficking. The decision rejects a line of federal district court decisions predicting otherwise and reinforces that Pennsylvania courts will invoke the public policy doctrine only in the clearest of circumstances. RI Settlement is particularly significant because it arose on certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, giving the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve an issue on which federal courts had predicted Pennsylvania law differently. RI Settlement arose out of four separate civil complaints in which the underlying plaintiffs alleged that, as minors, they were the victims of human sex trafficking at various hotels in Philadelphia. The plaintiffs claimed that the hotel owners were negligent in failing to stop the sex trafficking from happening at their hotels. After the filing of the lawsuits, the hotel owners sought coverage under their Commercial General Liability policies. The insurers initially defended the hotels under Reservation of Rights letters, though the carriers later filed Declaratory Judgment actions seeking declarations that they did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify. In short, the insurers argued in the alternative that they did not owe any obligation to provide coverage based upon Pennsylvania public policy (because the claims violated the Human Trafficking Law – 18 Pa.C.S. § 3011) and the terms and conditions of the policy. On motions for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court found for the insurers on the basis of public policy: There is no duty to defend or indemnify against actions arising out of an insured's criminal conduct related to the sex trafficking of minors. The Court appreciates that it may make public policy the basis of a judicial decision only in “the clearest of cases.” See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 589 A.2d 854, 868 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1994)). Yet, the Court strains to imagine a clearer case than the one presented here in which the facts alleged indicate that Policyholders engaged in criminal conduct in violation of Pennsylvania's Human Trafficking Law. The hotel owners appealed the matter to the Third Circuit, which petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to grant review of two certified questions of law: (1) whether Pennsylvania law had an “overriding public policy” against sex trafficking, such that an insurer’s duty to defend and/or indemnify is abrogated when an insured is alleged to have enabled or profited from such trafficking; and (2) if yes, is that duty abrogated whenever the insured’s alleged conduct would constitute a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Trafficking statute. Importantly, the certified questions did not ask the Supreme Court to determine whether the policies afforded coverage under their terms. Rather, the court was asked only whether Pennsylvania public policy independently barred coverage. As a result, the court assumed for purposes of answering the certified questions that the insurers otherwise owed a duty to defend and addressed only the public policy issue, leaving all policy-based coverage defenses for further proceedings. Because the court concluded that the answer to the first certified question was “no”, it did not reach the second issue. In reaching its determination that Pennsylvania public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for sex trafficking claims, the court limited the impact of its decision in Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A. 2d 854, 855 (Pa. 2004), which the RI Settlement opinion emphasized as having been an “Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court” – or a plurality opinion. In Greenfield, the insured homeowner was sued by the estate of his houseguest who overdosed from heroin that he sold to her. The matter wound its way to the Supreme Court, which determined that the insurer did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify based upon Pennsylvania public policy, which criminalized the sale and use of heroin as a Schedule I narcotic. In RI Settlement, the court “decline[d] the invitation” to extend the rationale of the three-justice plurality in Greenfield beyond cases involving Schedule I controlled substances. In so holding, the justices in RI Settlement refused to “divine an overriding public policy pronouncement by the General Assembly by virtue of its enactment of the Human Trafficking Law.” The opinion further states that it is not “within the purview of this Court to rank the magnitude of the public policy underlying the various crimes defined in the Crimes Code. It is sufficient for the work of the courts to know that the General Assembly has identified conduct it deems harmful and dangerous to the maintenance of an orderly society and criminalized it.” While the court declined to declare that Pennsylvania public policy prohibits coverage for sex trafficking claims, the opinion in RI Settlement expressly states that insurers are free to include appropriate exclusionary language for such causes of actions in their policies if they desire to do so. It will certainly be interesting to see whether the insurance industry accepts the court’s invitation, or perhaps whether the Pennsylvania legislature steps in to clarify that sex trafficking claims are indeed of the type or magnitude that they should not be covered by insurance. In any event, we will, of course, continue to monitor this and other insurance coverage issues that arise before courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and throughout our firm’s geographic footprint and around the country.

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.

Portrait of Carolyn Schweizer, with text below: Philadelphia Office Managing Attorney

News

Marshall Dennehey Names Carolyn Schweizer New Philadelphia Office Managing Attorney

blue facade of a hospital sign against blue sky

Result

Defense Verdict in Complex Medical Malpractice Trial