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Rachael Snyder von Rhine

Portrait of Rachael Snyder von Rhine

Rachael practices in our Casualty Department in the areas of premises liability, motor vehicle liability, dram shop liability, products liability and other personal injury matters. Rachael has represented a broad range of individuals in a wide variety of law suits, including many high exposure cases involving commercial vehicles, trucking matters and fleet vehicles. Rachael has also defended large, complex products liability matters in both state and federal court. As an experienced trial lawyer, Rachael has obtained defense verdicts throughout New Jersey.

Additionally, Rachael handles insurance fraud and Special Investigation Unit (SIU) litigation. In this area of fraud investigation, she works closely with our clients assessing and analyzing fraud by both medical providers and falsified claims brought by her client's insureds. She has broad experience in New Jersey Personal Injury Protection (PIP) litigation and appears regularly before the courts and administrative bodies. 

Graduating in the top 25 percent of her class, Rachael received her law degree from Rutgers Law School in 2004. While there, Rachael was the new developments editor for the Rutgers Journal of Law and Religion. She had the opportunity to clerk for Camden County Superior Court Judge Michael J. Kassel from 2004-2005.

Rachael is an active member of the Milton H. Allen Elementary School’s APAC and volunteers her time with various sport teams for the Medford Youth Athletic Association and Shawnee Ice Hockey Club. Rachael also spent several years as a volunteer for Habitat for Humanity, serving on the Mercer County chapter’s fundraising committee.

    • Rutgers Law School (J.D., 2004)
    • Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey (B.A., 2001)
    • New Jersey, 2004
    • Pennsylvania, 2004
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2004
    • American Bar Association
    • Camden County Bar Association
    • New Jersey Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Defense verdict in a lawsuit filed against a homeowner for significant property damage caused by a natural disaster. Rachael was able to successfully argue that the damage caused by the storm was not foreseeable.
    • Favorable settlement in a complex products liability matter involving 12 separately filed actions, which bundled over 250 claims. The alleged damages totalled over $8.65m. Rachael was able to successfully prevent the actions from being classified as a Mass Tort and was able to ultimately resolve the matter for pennies on the dollar.
    • Defense verdict in a lawsuit filed by a homeowner for significant property damage to the plaintiff’s condominium.  Rachael was able to successfully argue that the property damage was not caused by common area plumbing, but by the negligence of the plaintiff’s neighbor.
    • Summary Judgment obtained in a wrongful death matter, involving an alleged drowning in a Whirlpool, filed against a health club. Rachael was able to successfully argue that the health club’s lifeguards’ actions exceeded industry standards and that the plaintiff did not in fact drown, but actually suffered a cardiac event that she could not have recovered from, regardless of where the cardiac event took place.

Results

Arbitration Victory Secured in Excessive Testing Case

We successfully defended an insurance carrier in a New Jersey no-fault arbitration matter. The claimant, a pain management provider, filed an arbitration demand in the amount of $125,218 in connection with a baseline urine toxicology screen and subsequent presumptive and confirmatory testing performed on a monthly basis to monitor a patient’s medication regimen. We successfully argued that the extensive testing was being performed without regard to the needs of the patient. After arguments were heard, the arbitrator issued an award in favor of our client, finding that the excessive testing was not medically necessary, saving our client more than $100,000.

Summary Judgment for Spa in Wrongful Death Case Involving Whirlpool.

We obtained summary judgment in a wrongful death case arising from an alleged drowning in a whirlpool at a spa. The decedent, a 73-year-old woman, was found unresponsive by a lifeguard in the client’s whirlpool. There was no evidence as to how long the decedent had been submerged in the hot tub before she was found. The Medical Examiner conducted an autopsy and listed the decedent’s primary cause of death as hypertensive and arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease, with cardiomegaly. Drowning was listed as a significant contributing factor. The plaintiff argued that our client was negligent by positioning the lifeguard in such a manner that the lifeguard would not have a direct line of sight to the bottom of the whirlpool from the lifeguard station, and that, had the plaintiff been discovered earlier, she could have been resuscitated. The defense produced an expert liability report stating that the client was in compliance with all applicable codes and standards. The defense also presented an expert medical report from a cardiologist who opined that the plaintiff suffered sudden cardiac death and could not have been resuscitated. Plaintiff’s counsel relied upon the Medical Examiner’s conclusions to prove medical causation and did not serve a liability report. Without reaching the issue of liability, the court found that the plaintiff did not meet the burden of proof on medical causation. The plaintiff could not simply rely upon the Medical Examiner’s conclusions as to the cause of death as he is not an expert in cardiology.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.