.

Patrick J. Boland III

Portrait of Patrick J. Boland III

Patrick is a member of the Professional Liability Department where he focuses his practice in municipal liability, civil rights law, commercial litigation, homeowners association litigation, as well as the defense of architects and engineers and various professionals in errors and omissions cases.  Patrick also is experienced in representing non-profit organizations, including condominium, homeowner and property owners’ associations, as well as their Boards of Directors and individual Board Members.

Patrick has concentrated in civil litigation throughout his career, representing various insurance carriers and their insureds.  He also has experience litigating premises liability, and products liability matters.

In 1991, Patrick earned his B.S. from Saint Joseph's University in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He then went on to attain his juris doctor from Seton Hall University School of Law in Newark, New Jersey, in 1994.

Patrick is admitted to practice in Pennsylvania State courts as well as in the United States District Court for both the Middle and the Eastern Districts of Pennsylvania. In addition, he is admitted to practice in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 

Patrick is very active in his local community. He is a member of Scranton Tomorrow, a non-profit organization dedicated to the enhancement of a vibrant environment for Scranton residents, businesses, and visitors. He is also a volunteer for various charitable projects through his parish, The Church of St. Gregory. Additionally, Patrick served as a boys' basketball coach for over 25 years, including eight years at his alma mater, Scranton Preparatory School, where he previously served as a member of the Alumni Board of Governors.

    • Seton Hall University School of Law (J.D., 1994)
    • Saint Joseph's University (B.S., 1991)
    • Pennsylvania, 1995
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • Lackawanna County Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Scranton Preparatory School Alumni Board of Governors
    • Scranton Tomorrow
    • Remain Calm, All is Well! Keeping Your Head When Everyone Else is Losing Theirs, August 16, 2024, Scranton, PA
    • Ensuring Local Governments Comply with the Law, April 24, 2019, Scranton, PA
    • Handling the Police Liability Claim, February 22, 2011, Scranton, PA
    • “To Read or Not to Read (Insurance Policies), That is the Question," Legal Update for Insurance Agents & Brokers, August 1, 2024
    • Obtained summary judgment in federal court for a municipality and three of its police officers. This case involved claims of civil rights violations, malicious prosecution and failure by the municipality to properly train and supervise.  
    • ​Plaintiff 's wife reported to police that the plaintiff tried to kill her by firing a shotgun at her while she slept. Following a thorough investigation and witness interviews, police arrested plaintiff and charged him with attempted murder. The next day, plaintiff's wife recanted her story and told police that she was the one who fired a shotgun in the couple's home in an effort to frame her husband for attempted murder. Police immediately had plaintiff released from prison. Plaintiff's wife was later charged with, and pleaded guilty to, making false statements to authorities. Thereafter, plaintiff sued the police department and arresting officer claiming that defendants falsely arrested and imprisoned him and maliciously prosecuted him without probable cause in violation of his 4th and 14th Amendment rights. Following discovery, a motion for summary judgment was filed on behalf of defendants. The court found that the undisputed facts of record clearly showed the existence of probable cause at the time of arrest and summary judgment was granted in favor of defendants.
    • ​An insurance agency sued a real estate developer and another insurance agency for unfair competition, trade libel, and defamation following the revocation of an insurance contract. Plaintiff was one of several entities to submit a bid for a complete insurance package for the developer. The plaintiff was initially awarded the contract. However, a second insurance company sent two e-mail messages to several individuals involved in the decision to award the contract claiming that the bid by the plaintiff was improper, incomplete, and contained unsworn falsifications subjecting the plaintiff and its representative to possible criminal charges. The contract was then revoked and awarded to the second insurance company. Not surprisingly the plaintiff sued the second insurance company seeking damages for defamation and commercial disparagement. Nearly two years later, plaintiff named our client, the real estate developer, as a defendant. We filed preliminary objections and argued that all claims against the client were barred by application of the one-year Statute of Limitations under Pennsylvania law for defamation, trade libel, and commercial disparagement. The court sustained the preliminary objections finding the action against our client was commenced outside the limitation period. As such, the client was dismissed from the action.
    • Obtained summary judgment in the Pike County Court of Common Pleas in a defamation action brought against a property owners’ association and several of its board members. ​Plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages from the Association and its individual board members after three separate newsletters were mailed to property owners referring to Plaintiff as a "fool" and accusing him of acting in self-interest and being part of a "band of merry men." Following oral argument, the Judge found that the statements were made in the context of a volatile community election, and, as a matter of law, the statements at issue were entirely incapable of defamatory meaning. 

Results

Defense verdict for PA Borough and Police Chief following a six-day jury trial.

The plaintiff, a part-time police officer, alleged that she told her Police Chief that she believed the hiring/promotions of three male police officers to full-time positions were illegal. After that meeting, the plaintiff claimed she was not assigned to higher-paying assignments like the male police officers in the department. She sued the borough and the police chief for First Amendment retaliation under Section 1983, and gender-based discrimination and retaliation pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. Following a six-day trial and five hours of deliberation, the jury returned a complete defense verdict on all counts against both defendants.

Summary judgment on behalf of a local municipality and police sergeant.

The plaintiff’s wife reported to police that the plaintiff tried to kill her by firing a shotgun at her while she slept. Following a thorough investigation and witness interviews, police arrested the plaintiff and charged him with attempted murder. The next day, the wife recanted her story and told police that she was the one who fired a shotgun in the couple’s home in an effort to frame her husband for attempted murder. Police immediately had the plaintiff released from prison. The wife was later charged with, and pleaded guilty to, making false statements to authorities. Thereafter, the plaintiff sued the police department and arresting officer, claiming the defendants falsely arrested and imprisoned him and maliciously prosecuted him without probable cause in violation of his 4th and 14th Amendment rights. Following discovery, a motion for summary judgment was filed on behalf of the defendants. The court found that the undisputed facts of record clearly showed the existence of probable cause at the time of arrest, and summary judgment was granted in favor of the defendants.

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers

To Read or Not to Read (Insurance Policies)? That Is the Question

August 1, 2024

The rule throughout the Commonwealth has long been that an insured’s failure to read the language of an insurance policy does not prohibit them from relying on the representations of an insurance agent in securing insurance. Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court first made this finding in Rempel v. Nationwide Insurance Company, Inc., 471 Pa. 404 (1977), where the beneficiary under a mortgage protection life insurance policy alleged the agent of an insurer misrepresented the extent of coverage under the policy. There, the beneficiary/insured admittedly did not read the language of the policy, however, given the complicated nature of the insurance business as well as the trust that one generally has in their insurance agent, the court found it was not unreasonable for a consumer to rely on the representations of her agent. Thus, to an extent, the old adage, “never sign anything before you read it,” does not apply across the board in insurance context.  Subsequently, in Pressley v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Corp., 817 A.2d 1131 (Pa. Super. 2003), the Superior Court further lessened the duty of the consumer by finding an insured was not required to read the policy where they had requested a specific type of coverage and were told by the agent that it would be provided. In such a situation, the duty is on the agent to inform the insured that the policy differs from what was requested if, in fact, that is the case. Where the agent fails to discharge that duty, an insured is under no duty to read the policy to uncover the misrepresentation. Thus, insureds are allowed to presume the coverage they have requested is in place, unless they are told otherwise. Conversely, in matters where an insured received precisely the coverage they requested, courts have consistently enforced the plain language of the exclusions and limitations, despite an agent’s failure to inform the insured of the same.  The courts’ decisions in this context are all based on the “reasonable expectations of the insured.” In Pennsylvania, the traditional rules with respect to contracts do not always apply in the realm of insurance. Instead of the policy language being the guiding light, even where the terms of the policy are clear and unambiguous, the reasonable expectations of the insured are controlling. This “reasonable expectation” analysis is to be employed in matters where an insured alleges deceptive practices, whether it be the misrepresentation of the terms of the policy or the issuance of a policy different than that which was requested by the insured.       More recently, however, the protections afforded by the “reasonable expectations” standard and the insured’s lack of a duty to investigate were somewhat eroded. In Palek v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, 535 F. Supp. 3d 382 (W.D. Pa., April 4, 2021), the homeowners alleged the insurer’s agent misled them regarding the kinds of damages to their in-ground swimming pool that were covered under their homeowners’ insurance policy. In fact, the homeowners alleged the insurer’s agent specifically informed them the policy would “cover their in-ground pool in the event the [pool] was damaged from foreseeable types of harm.” After purchasing the policy, the homeowners’ pool suffered damage as a result of hydrostatic pressure, or a “pool pop.”  In analyzing the homeowners’ claim for justifiable reliance, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania observed the decisions throughout the Commonwealth, noting consumers do not possess a duty to investigate and read the underlying policy where there are allegations of fraud against an insurer or its agent. The Palek court, however, pointed out that, where there are no allegations of fraud, the duty of an insured to read the language of the policy depends on whether it would be unreasonable not to read the policy under the circumstances. As applicable in Palek, the insurer’s agent represented the policy would cover the “foreseeable” damages to the homeowners’ in-ground pool. It was the presence of this vague representation, or qualifier, that triggered the homeowners’ duty to read the language of the policy. The court noted that: It is objectively unreasonable for a consumer in [the homeowners’] position to rely, without further inquiry, on an unadorned representation that an insurance policy will provide coverage for ‘foreseeable’ types of harm from the simple reason that such a representation says nothing about what is or is not ‘foreseeable.’   While consumers are provided latitude with respect to their duty to read the language of an insurance policy, that does not permit cart blanche to claim they justifiably relied on the representations of the insurance company or its agents. As Palek establishes, there is a “reasonable under the circumstances” analysis that must be undertaken by the courts on this issue. While insureds may not have a definitive duty to read the policy language, such a duty can arise depending upon the extent and specifics of any alleged representation by the insurer, or its agent, upon which the insured relied.    Legal Update for Insurance Agents & Brokers, August 2024, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note tgventura@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Mitigating Long-Tail Liability: Delaware Court Reaffirms Five-Year Workers’ Compensation Deadline

Williamson v. Donald F. Deaven, Inc., No. N25A-07-004 FWW, 2026 LX 252526 (Del. Super. Ct. June 2, 2026) Claimant was involved in a compensable industrial work accident on May 12, 1995, for a low back injury.  Following this, he received compensation for temporary total disability benefits from July 1996 to September 1996 and for sustaining a permanent impairment in 1997 and 1998. For the next 23 years, the claimant continued treatment and paid his own medical bills without submitting them to the employer’s insurer. In November 2021, the claimant filed a petition seeking payment for medical expenses, including prospective surgery and a resulting period of total disability. The employer moved to dismiss the petition, arguing it was barred by Delaware’s five-year statute of limitations (19 Del. C. § 2361(b)). Pursuant to 18 Del. C. § 3914, insurers must provide prompt written notice of the applicable statute of limitations to invoke the five-year deadline. Due to the age of the case, neither party had a comprehensive file of the claim and the Board had archived its file of the matter. The carrier’s computer system retained only bare information indicating that payments occurred and agreements and receipts were filed with the Board in 1997. While the claimant argued that the employer could not prove it provided the mandatory statutory notice, the Hearing Officer recovered the archived file, which contained two “Receipts for Compensation Paid” signed by the claimant. The receipts explicitly contained the required five-year limitation language, which the claimant testified to signing at the hearing. The claimant also attempted to introduce evidence of payments he claimed the employer made, which would have extended the statute of limitations. As a preliminary matter, the hearing officer excluded the testimony about the payments because the claimant did not produce them to the employer. The Board found in favor of the employer and dismissed the claimant’s petition as time-barred. The claimant appealed the Board’s decision, arguing that he never received adequate notice of the statute of limitations and that the hearing officer’s evidentiary ruling was an abuse of discretion. The Court held that the archived, signed receipts constituted substantial evidence that the insurer fulfilled its statutory notice requirements. Therefore, the claimant’s petition was time-barred under the statute of limitations provisions of 19 Del. C. § 2361(b). Furthermore, the Court reinforced strict procedural compliance: it rejected the claimant’s attempts to introduce evidence of payment on appeal, ruling the argument was waived for failure to preserve it while the matter was still before the Board. This recent ruling by the Court underscores the importance and necessity of robust data preservation and precise compliance with notice requirements. For risk managers, employers, and insurers, the decision highlights how tight administrative execution protects against catastrophic long-tail liability.

Thought Leadership

Congress Passes Financial Exploitation Prevention Act

On June 25, 2026, the House passed the Financial Exploitation Prevention Act of 2025 (“the Act”) by a vote of 414 to 2. The Act allows financial advisors and firms to delay suspicious transactions regarding the accounts of clients who are 65 or older, if they believe financial exploitation has occurred or is about to take place. With the advancement of technology and AI, the House’s overwhelming bipartisan passage of the Financial Exploitation Prevention Act represents an important step in strengthening the financial industry’s ability to combat the growing threat of elder financial exploitation. The Act recognizes what advisors have long known that financial professionals are often the first to detect suspicious behavior but have historically lacked clear legal authority to intervene before irreversible financial harm occurs. From the industry’s perspective, the bill accomplishes several important objectives, including the following: (1) Provides a practical “pause button” by allowing financial professionals to temporarily delay certain transaction requests when there is a reasonable belief that a senior or vulnerable adult is being financially exploited; (2) Empowers financial professionals to act by providing greater certainty that firms can act in good faith to protect clients without unnecessary legal risk; and (3) Strengthens investor protection without sacrificing client rights by allowing temporary delays based on a reasonable suspicion of exploitation, which is intended only to allow additional review and not to deny clients access to their money indefinitely. In sum, the Financial Exploitation Prevention Act will equip financial professionals with practical, carefully tailored tools to stop suspected financial exploitation before client assets are lost. By allowing firms to temporarily delay suspicious transactions under defined circumstances, Congress is recognizing the critical role advisors play as the first line of defense against increasingly sophisticated fraud schemes. The Act strikes an appropriate balance between protecting vulnerable investors and preserving individual financial autonomy, while reinforcing collaboration among advisors, families, and law enforcement to combat financial exploitation. The bill now awaits Senate action.

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Expands Family Leave Protections Effective July 17, 2026

On January 17, 2026, Governor Murphy signed into law legislation expanding the New Jersey Family Leave Act (NJFLA). Beginning July 17, 2026, significant amendments to the NJFLA will expand job-protected family leave to smaller businesses and more employees across the state. The new law broadens coverage by lowering the threshold for private employers from 30 employees to 15 employees, meaning many smaller businesses will now be subject to the NJFLA. Employees of state and local government agencies will continue to be covered regardless of the size of the employer. The amendments also make it easier for employees to qualify for leave. Under the revised law, an employee will be eligible after three months of employment and at least 250 hours worked during the preceding 12 months, replacing the previous requirement of 12 months of employment and 1,000 hours worked. Currently, New Jersey's Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) and Family Leave Insurance (FLI) programs provide eligible employees with wage replacement while they are on leave but do not independently guarantee job protection. The recent amendments to the New Jersey Family Leave Act (NJFLA) expand these protections by extending job-protected leave to additional employees. Under the amended law, employees receiving TDI or FLI benefits may be entitled to return to the same position they held before taking leave, or to an equivalent position with the same seniority, status, pay, and benefits. Although the legislation also states that it does not expand or modify an employee's reinstatement rights under the NJFLA, the amendments appear to provide job protection to eligible employees receiving TDI or FLI benefits without requiring them to separately satisfy the eligibility requirements of the NJFLA or the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). As a result, some employees may be entitled to longer periods of job-protected leave than were previously available under existing law. With these amendments, New Jersey continues to strengthen workplace protections by expanding access to job-protected family leave for eligible employees. These changes significantly expand access to job-protected family leave and may require employers to update their leave policies, employee handbooks, and HR practices. Notably, employers who were previously not required to administer NJFLA may need to amend their policies and/or create new protocols to come into compliance with the NJFLA. Failure to do so would prove costly, as the penalties for non-compliance are significant.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.