.

Patrick J. Boland III

Portrait of Patrick J. Boland III

Patrick is a member of the Professional Liability Department where he focuses his practice in municipal liability, civil rights law, commercial litigation, homeowners association litigation, as well as the defense of architects and engineers and various professionals in errors and omissions cases.  Patrick also is experienced in representing non-profit organizations, including condominium, homeowner and property owners’ associations, as well as their Boards of Directors and individual Board Members.

Patrick has concentrated in civil litigation throughout his career, representing various insurance carriers and their insureds.  He also has experience litigating premises liability, and products liability matters.

In 1991, Patrick earned his B.S. from Saint Joseph's University in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He then went on to attain his juris doctor from Seton Hall University School of Law in Newark, New Jersey, in 1994.

Patrick is admitted to practice in Pennsylvania State courts as well as in the United States District Court for both the Middle and the Eastern Districts of Pennsylvania. In addition, he is admitted to practice in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 

Patrick is very active in his local community. He is a member of Scranton Tomorrow, a non-profit organization dedicated to the enhancement of a vibrant environment for Scranton residents, businesses, and visitors. He is also a volunteer for various charitable projects through his parish, The Church of St. Gregory. Additionally, Patrick served as a boys' basketball coach for over 25 years, including eight years at his alma mater, Scranton Preparatory School, where he previously served as a member of the Alumni Board of Governors.

    • Seton Hall University School of Law (J.D., 1994)
    • Saint Joseph's University (B.S., 1991)
    • Pennsylvania, 1995
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • Lackawanna County Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Scranton Preparatory School Alumni Board of Governors
    • Scranton Tomorrow
    • Remain Calm, All is Well! Keeping Your Head When Everyone Else is Losing Theirs, August 16, 2024, Scranton, PA
    • Ensuring Local Governments Comply with the Law, April 24, 2019, Scranton, PA
    • Handling the Police Liability Claim, February 22, 2011, Scranton, PA
    • “To Read or Not to Read (Insurance Policies), That is the Question," Legal Update for Insurance Agents & Brokers, August 1, 2024
    • Obtained summary judgment in federal court for a municipality and three of its police officers. This case involved claims of civil rights violations, malicious prosecution and failure by the municipality to properly train and supervise.  
    • ​Plaintiff 's wife reported to police that the plaintiff tried to kill her by firing a shotgun at her while she slept. Following a thorough investigation and witness interviews, police arrested plaintiff and charged him with attempted murder. The next day, plaintiff's wife recanted her story and told police that she was the one who fired a shotgun in the couple's home in an effort to frame her husband for attempted murder. Police immediately had plaintiff released from prison. Plaintiff's wife was later charged with, and pleaded guilty to, making false statements to authorities. Thereafter, plaintiff sued the police department and arresting officer claiming that defendants falsely arrested and imprisoned him and maliciously prosecuted him without probable cause in violation of his 4th and 14th Amendment rights. Following discovery, a motion for summary judgment was filed on behalf of defendants. The court found that the undisputed facts of record clearly showed the existence of probable cause at the time of arrest and summary judgment was granted in favor of defendants.
    • ​An insurance agency sued a real estate developer and another insurance agency for unfair competition, trade libel, and defamation following the revocation of an insurance contract. Plaintiff was one of several entities to submit a bid for a complete insurance package for the developer. The plaintiff was initially awarded the contract. However, a second insurance company sent two e-mail messages to several individuals involved in the decision to award the contract claiming that the bid by the plaintiff was improper, incomplete, and contained unsworn falsifications subjecting the plaintiff and its representative to possible criminal charges. The contract was then revoked and awarded to the second insurance company. Not surprisingly the plaintiff sued the second insurance company seeking damages for defamation and commercial disparagement. Nearly two years later, plaintiff named our client, the real estate developer, as a defendant. We filed preliminary objections and argued that all claims against the client were barred by application of the one-year Statute of Limitations under Pennsylvania law for defamation, trade libel, and commercial disparagement. The court sustained the preliminary objections finding the action against our client was commenced outside the limitation period. As such, the client was dismissed from the action.
    • Obtained summary judgment in the Pike County Court of Common Pleas in a defamation action brought against a property owners’ association and several of its board members. ​Plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages from the Association and its individual board members after three separate newsletters were mailed to property owners referring to Plaintiff as a "fool" and accusing him of acting in self-interest and being part of a "band of merry men." Following oral argument, the Judge found that the statements were made in the context of a volatile community election, and, as a matter of law, the statements at issue were entirely incapable of defamatory meaning. 

Results

Defense verdict for PA Borough and Police Chief following a six-day jury trial.

The plaintiff, a part-time police officer, alleged that she told her Police Chief that she believed the hiring/promotions of three male police officers to full-time positions were illegal. After that meeting, the plaintiff claimed she was not assigned to higher-paying assignments like the male police officers in the department. She sued the borough and the police chief for First Amendment retaliation under Section 1983, and gender-based discrimination and retaliation pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. Following a six-day trial and five hours of deliberation, the jury returned a complete defense verdict on all counts against both defendants.

Summary judgment on behalf of a local municipality and police sergeant.

The plaintiff’s wife reported to police that the plaintiff tried to kill her by firing a shotgun at her while she slept. Following a thorough investigation and witness interviews, police arrested the plaintiff and charged him with attempted murder. The next day, the wife recanted her story and told police that she was the one who fired a shotgun in the couple’s home in an effort to frame her husband for attempted murder. Police immediately had the plaintiff released from prison. The wife was later charged with, and pleaded guilty to, making false statements to authorities. Thereafter, the plaintiff sued the police department and arresting officer, claiming the defendants falsely arrested and imprisoned him and maliciously prosecuted him without probable cause in violation of his 4th and 14th Amendment rights. Following discovery, a motion for summary judgment was filed on behalf of the defendants. The court found that the undisputed facts of record clearly showed the existence of probable cause at the time of arrest, and summary judgment was granted in favor of the defendants.

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers

To Read or Not to Read (Insurance Policies)? That Is the Question

August 1, 2024

The rule throughout the Commonwealth has long been that an insured’s failure to read the language of an insurance policy does not prohibit them from relying on the representations of an insurance agent in securing insurance. Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court first made this finding in Rempel v. Nationwide Insurance Company, Inc., 471 Pa. 404 (1977), where the beneficiary under a mortgage protection life insurance policy alleged the agent of an insurer misrepresented the extent of coverage under the policy. There, the beneficiary/insured admittedly did not read the language of the policy, however, given the complicated nature of the insurance business as well as the trust that one generally has in their insurance agent, the court found it was not unreasonable for a consumer to rely on the representations of her agent. Thus, to an extent, the old adage, “never sign anything before you read it,” does not apply across the board in insurance context.  Subsequently, in Pressley v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Corp., 817 A.2d 1131 (Pa. Super. 2003), the Superior Court further lessened the duty of the consumer by finding an insured was not required to read the policy where they had requested a specific type of coverage and were told by the agent that it would be provided. In such a situation, the duty is on the agent to inform the insured that the policy differs from what was requested if, in fact, that is the case. Where the agent fails to discharge that duty, an insured is under no duty to read the policy to uncover the misrepresentation. Thus, insureds are allowed to presume the coverage they have requested is in place, unless they are told otherwise. Conversely, in matters where an insured received precisely the coverage they requested, courts have consistently enforced the plain language of the exclusions and limitations, despite an agent’s failure to inform the insured of the same.  The courts’ decisions in this context are all based on the “reasonable expectations of the insured.” In Pennsylvania, the traditional rules with respect to contracts do not always apply in the realm of insurance. Instead of the policy language being the guiding light, even where the terms of the policy are clear and unambiguous, the reasonable expectations of the insured are controlling. This “reasonable expectation” analysis is to be employed in matters where an insured alleges deceptive practices, whether it be the misrepresentation of the terms of the policy or the issuance of a policy different than that which was requested by the insured.       More recently, however, the protections afforded by the “reasonable expectations” standard and the insured’s lack of a duty to investigate were somewhat eroded. In Palek v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, 535 F. Supp. 3d 382 (W.D. Pa., April 4, 2021), the homeowners alleged the insurer’s agent misled them regarding the kinds of damages to their in-ground swimming pool that were covered under their homeowners’ insurance policy. In fact, the homeowners alleged the insurer’s agent specifically informed them the policy would “cover their in-ground pool in the event the [pool] was damaged from foreseeable types of harm.” After purchasing the policy, the homeowners’ pool suffered damage as a result of hydrostatic pressure, or a “pool pop.”  In analyzing the homeowners’ claim for justifiable reliance, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania observed the decisions throughout the Commonwealth, noting consumers do not possess a duty to investigate and read the underlying policy where there are allegations of fraud against an insurer or its agent. The Palek court, however, pointed out that, where there are no allegations of fraud, the duty of an insured to read the language of the policy depends on whether it would be unreasonable not to read the policy under the circumstances. As applicable in Palek, the insurer’s agent represented the policy would cover the “foreseeable” damages to the homeowners’ in-ground pool. It was the presence of this vague representation, or qualifier, that triggered the homeowners’ duty to read the language of the policy. The court noted that: It is objectively unreasonable for a consumer in [the homeowners’] position to rely, without further inquiry, on an unadorned representation that an insurance policy will provide coverage for ‘foreseeable’ types of harm from the simple reason that such a representation says nothing about what is or is not ‘foreseeable.’   While consumers are provided latitude with respect to their duty to read the language of an insurance policy, that does not permit cart blanche to claim they justifiably relied on the representations of the insurance company or its agents. As Palek establishes, there is a “reasonable under the circumstances” analysis that must be undertaken by the courts on this issue. While insureds may not have a definitive duty to read the policy language, such a duty can arise depending upon the extent and specifics of any alleged representation by the insurer, or its agent, upon which the insured relied.    Legal Update for Insurance Agents & Brokers, August 2024, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note tgventura@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.