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Case Law Alerts

Pennsylvania Court Dismisses Several Defendants from Product Liability Action Where Plaintiff Pled “More Likely Than Not” the Seller and/or Distributor of the Allegedly Defective Product

Jamie McKnight v. Amazon.com, Inc., et al., No. 23-1449, 2024 WL 2156223 (E.D. Pa. May 14, 2024)

July 1, 2024

by Oswald P. Clark

The plaintiff alleged he suffered injuries to his scalp from the application of a defective mole removal cream. His complaint alleged specific facts that the cream had been purchased from Amazon.com, but, in the alternative, if he did not purchase the cream from Amazon.com, he purchased it at Walmart, Target or eBay. Specifically, the only facts pled regarding entities other than Amazon.com were: “[T]o the extent Amazon was not the seller of the subject product, it is averred that Defendant [WalMart, Target, or eBay] is more likely than not the seller and distributor of the Amada Pure Skin Tag and Mole Removal Cream....” All four defendants filed motions to dismiss, arguing, in part, that it was logically impossible that all four retailers sold the subject cream that was applied to the plaintiff’s scalp. The court, citing to the specific facts pled by the plaintiff regarding Amazon.com, including that his barber told him it was purchased from Amazon.com and that it was delivered on an Amazon truck, denied Amazon’s motion to dismiss. However, as to WalMart, Target and eBay, the court took issue with the fact that the plaintiff simply pled that if Amazon did not sell it, then it must have been sold by WalMart, Target or eBay. As there were no specific facts pled about any of these entities, and Pennsylvania courts are reluctant to apply market share liability, the court dismissed the claims against those three entities.

This case highlights that, while there is a “relatively low” bar to the federal notice pleadings requirements, it is not without limits. Where a plaintiff’s complaint in federal court lacks any factual averments leading to the plausibility of the plaintiff’s cause of action, defense counsel must file a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 


 

Case Law Alerts, 3rd Quarter, July 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.