Oswald is an associate in the firm's Casualty Department, where he focuses his practice on defending products liability matters, including automobile design cases, industrial equipment, appliances, and many other consumer goods. He also represents clients in premises liability actions, workplace and construction accidents, as well as motor vehicle accident cases. He previously worked in the firm’s Healthcare Department representing emergency room physicians, physician’s assistants, nursing homes, dentists, podiatrists, chiropractors, and other healthcare providers. That experience has given him an acuity for analyzing complex medical records, which is essential for rebutting potentially uncorroborated damages claims.
Oswald received his Bachelor of Arts from the University of Pittsburgh, majoring in Philosophy. After graduation, he took post-graduate classes at Villanova University focusing on communication theory. While attending Drexel Law, Oswald taught constitutional law to local high students through the Marshall-Brennan Constitutional Literacy Project. In addition to teaching the weekly classes, he coached selected students to compete in a moot court competition, arguing a case incorporating the First and Fourth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Oswald was also a Leadership Fellow at Drexel, serving as a mentor to first year students transitioning into the law school curriculum.
Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey as a summer law clerk in May of 2017, Oswald was a student law clerk for the Honorable Anne Lazarus of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, where he performed research assignments and drafted memorandum opinions on a number of criminal and civil cases.
Results
Defense Verdict Obtained in Philadelphia Arbitration Matter
We were successful in a Philadelphia arbitration matter, obtaining a defense verdict as to the plaintiff’s claims and an order requiring the co-defendant to reimburse attorneys’ fees. It was undisputed that a motor vehicle accident occurred involving a third-party independent contractor of our client, a prominent homebuilding company. The plaintiff claimed he was a passenger in the vehicle and, accordingly, brought a negligence action against our client, who tendered its defense to the independent contractor based on a contractual provision requiring defense and indemnification. The independent contractor denied the tender. During discovery, it was revealed that the plaintiff falsely claimed he was a passenger in the vehicle. The independent contractor again denied the tender, claiming that its duty to defend was never triggered. The case proceeded to an arbitration where the panel found neither defendant was liable but disagreed with the co-defendant’s arguments regarding defense and indemnity. Accordingly, the arbitration panel entered a judgment in favor of our client and ordered the co-defendant to reimburse all reasonable attorneys’ fees expended defending the action.
Multimillion Dollar Default Judgment Successfully Struck Down by Appellate Court
We succeeded in striking a $4.1 million default judgment entered in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas by a plaintiff who alleged defective residential construction. We convinced the court that Pennsylvania Prothonotaries and Clerks of Court lack authority to accept a praecipe to enter a default judgment in a specified amount unless the amount is approved by a judge or is a sum certain, meaning that the amount is ascertainable from a confessed judgment or a contract that specifies the amount due. The default judgment had spawned significant coverage litigation by and against the defendant’s insurer.
Thought Leadership
Case Law Alerts
In One Fell Swoop, Federal Court Clarifies Pleading Standards for Product Misuse Defense
January 1, 2026
Thomas Donnelly brought suit in Greene County, Pennsylvania, against Defendants, General Electric Company and Joenic Steel, LLC, claiming he was injured while participating in the lift of a specially fabricated expansion joint. The plaintiff’s claims sounded in negligence, strict product liability, and breach of warranty. General Electric properly removed the case to the Western District of Pennsylvania based on diversity jurisdiction. Both defendants raised the affirmative defense of product misuse, pursuant to Reott v. Asia Trend, Inc., 55 A.3d 1088 (Pa. 2012), which held that “a defendant in a Section 402A action must plead and prove, as an affirmative defense, that the plaintiff acted in a highly reckless manner, if such conduct is asserted.” However, the words used in each defendants’ responsive pleadings were significantly different. In particular, Joenic Steel pled that the “plaintiff may have failed to exercise that degree of care and caution requiring attempting to assist in lifting a section of the expansion joint, and as such, the plaintiff’s injuries and damages were due to the conduct and actions of the plaintiff,” and that the “plaintiff assumed a known risk of harm by engaging in the means, methods and manner by which the expansion joint was being erected, and as such, Joenic Steel, Inc. cannot be found liable to the plaintiff.” Conversely, General Electric pled, among other things, that the “plaintiff’s claims against defendant GE are barred to the extent plaintiff’s conduct was the sole cause of the alleged incident,” and that the allegedly defective condition of the product “may have been the result of misuse, abuse or neglect, or substantial alteration, modification and/or change in the product between the time it left the custody, possession and/or control of defendant GE.” Donnelly moved for summary judgment on both of the defendants’ product misuse defenses. Judge Horan granted the plaintiff’s motion as to Joenic Steel but denied the motion as to General Electric based on the language that each defendant used in pleading the defense. In particular, Judge Horan found that Joenic Steel’s pleading failed to plead either product misuse or highly reckless conduct as mandated under Reott, while General Electric’s pleading stated both terms “misuse” and “sole cause,” thereby properly preserving the defense. Accordingly, the court found that Joenic Steel waived its defense of product misuse, while General Electric was permitted to proceed on the theory. This case highlights that answers to complaints are neither boilerplate nor form documents, and that words matter. It is clear from Joenic Steel’s pleading that it intended to pursue a product misuse defense, but by failing to use the specific words required in Reott, the legitimate and dispositive defense was deemed waived. Pleading requirements, especially in federal court, cannot be taken lightly. Attorneys must take extra care to follow them at all times or risk waiving important defenses for their clients.
Case Law Alerts
Court Dismisses Claims in Electrocution Death, Citing Shotgun Pleading and Immunity for Decedent’s Employer
July 1, 2025
Carlos Melendez was working on a “transmission tower painting crew” for one of several named defendants when he was electrocuted and killed while working in the course and scope of his employment. After his death, Mr. Melendez’s parents settled a workers’ compensation claim against his employer, Morris Painting, and subsequently brought suit against Morris, several electrical utility entities linked to the transmission tower painting project, and three of those entities’ employer who allegedly were involved in the project. After the plaintiffs’ original complaint was dismissed as an improper “shotgun pleading,” they filed an amended complaint, lumping together the utility corporations, making allegations that: they “or any one of them ... owned the electricity that killed ... Melendez”; they “or any one of them ... had substantial control over the electricity that killed ... Melendez”; they “or any one of them ... owned the transmission tower and/or the associated equipment that ... Melendez came in contact with when he was killed”; they “or any one of them ... had a possessory interest in the transmission tower and/or the associated equipment that ... Melendez came in contact with when he was killed.” The amended complaint contained several other allegations similar to the ones above with no specificity directed toward the individual defendants, including some general averments against Morris, as well. The court granted several motions to dismiss, paring down the complaint significantly. In particular, the court dismissed all claims against the decedent’s employer, with prejudice, because it determined that any amendments to the complaint by the plaintiffs would be futile. As for the so-called “utility defendants” improperly lumped together, the court dismissed all claims without prejudice, providing the plaintiffs another opportunity to amend the complaint with more specific allegations of negligence. Plaintiffs will often plead complaints in a similar fashion, lumping several defendants together and lobbing general averments of negligence against all of the defendants. This case highlights that defendants must move aggressively to strike improperly pled cases, especially in federal court, where dispositive motions are more likely to be granted. Case Law Alerts, 3rd Quarter, July 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.
