.

Matthew J. Noble

Assistant Office Managing Attorney

MJNoble@mdwcg.com

Portrait of Matthew J. Noble

Matt joined Marshall Dennehey as a member of the Casualty Department defending claims involving product liability and product warranty and motor vehicle liability. He currently represents a major American automobile manufacturer in their product liability litigation.

Matt also frequently represents national and local retailers, recreational facilities, third-party management and security agencies against personal injury, assault, allegations of false arrest, malicious prosecution, negligent security and general negligence cases. His representation has included a national security agency for professional sporting venues.

Matt has experience with the successful use of multiple experts in defending cases. For example, in a recent motor vehicle matter, through the use of medical expert testimony in the areas of orthopedics and neurology, in combination with the testimony of a vocational expert, Matt was successful in bringing the settlement demand in that case down from $1.25 million to a final settlement before jury selection of $25,000.

Matt is a 1992 graduate of the University of Scranton. Upon graduation, he accepted a commission as a Second Lieutenant in the U.S. Marine Corps. He served in Virginia, California, Japan and Pennsylvania as a logistics officer. In 1999 while on active duty, he entered Rutgers School of Law - Camden. Matt graduated from Rutgers a semester early in 2002 with a juris doctor. In July 2003, he was mobilized with the Marine Corps for Operation Iraqi Freedom 2-II for eight months of service at Al Asad airbase in Iraq with Marine Wing Support Group 37 as the group's Logistics/Legal Officer.

In June 2020, Matt retired as a Lieutenant Colonel after 29 years of service in the United States Marine Corps and was awarded the Meritorious Service Medal.

    • Rutgers Law School (J.D., 2003)
    • University of Scranton (B.S., 1992)
    • Pennsylvania, 2003
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyer Rising Star (2012-2013)
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • An Overview of Pennsylvania Law for Auto Law & Premises Claims, Marshall Dennehey Virtual Client Presentation, February, 2021
    • Understanding and Navigating the Philadelphia Arbitration System, CLE 2011
    • "Can A Plaintiff Safely Walk and Chew Gum At The Same Time in Pennsylvania?" Defense Digest, Vol. 19, No. 4, December 2013, co-author
    • "Cracking the Concrete Corporation Veil," Defense Digest, Winter 2007
    • "Stolen Cars: If It Looks Like A Duck And Quacks Like A Duck, It's An 'Ugly Duck'," Defense Digest, Winter 2005
    • "Look Both Ways Before Crossing The Street: Limited Tort Selection And Its Effect On The Pedestrian," Defense Digest, Fall 2003
    • Volunteer, Veterans Mentor, Bucks County Veterans Court, assisting vetrans in working towards successful resolutions of criminal charges so future contact with the criminal justice system can be avoided
    • Secured a defense verdict in Delaware County after a four-day jury trial in a premises liability case against a local school. The plaintiff, a student, suffered an Achilles heel injury when cut by a door edge and claimed diminished leg function and Chronic Regional Pain Syndrome (CRPS). Despite undergoing two surgeries, neither her surgeons nor treating physicians diagnosed CRPS. During trial, Matt highlighted that the student returned the following year as undefeated captain of the school’s tennis team, winning at the state level. The case involved aggressive cross-examination of medical and liability experts, along with surveillance evidence of the plaintiff. Before trial, the demand was $1 million, while the school offered $200,000 at mediation—an offer the plaintiff rejected, walking out and refusing further negotiations. After just 2.5 hours of deliberation, the jury ruled in the school’s favor.
    • Successfully defended our client, a global automobile manufacturer in a contract dispute in Bucks County, PA. In 2021, amid the COVID-19 pandemic, the plaintiff purchased a new vehicle for $37,000. Seven months later, the car was involved in a crash caused by the plaintiff's daughter. Repairs for collision damage, which are not covered under the vehicle’s express written warranty, were delayed due to global supply chain disruptions caused by the pandemic. Despite the automobile manufacturer’s efforts to locate, obtain, and expedite delivery of repair parts to the collision repair shop, it took seven months to fully complete the repairs. The plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer violated the implied warranty of merchantability under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and breached the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, citing the repair delays as the basis for the claims. Ultimately, the court returned a defense verdict, rejecting the plaintiff’s claims.
    • A directed verdict for failure to prove negligence on behalf of a security company defendant at a professional sports stadium in an action brought by a patron who claimed to have her nose broken by the mother of one of the players.
    • A hung jury following a two-and-a-half day deliberation in a case against a defendant taxi driver in which plaintiff claimed the driver caused her neck and back strain after driving the wrong way up a one-way street, running a stop sign and into the side of plaintiff's car, but where defendant argued the alleged injuries were pre-existing.
    • A hospital defendant whose lost driver while making a u-turn was struck in the side by another driver with a passenger. In that case, the plaintiff passenger's case was dismissed before trial, and the driver plaintiff was awarded only nominal damages by a jury, even though it determined that plaintiff had pierced the limited tort threshold by showing that he had a serious injury with a serious impairment of a bodily function.

Results

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Successful Trial Outcome: Defense Prevails in Premises Liability Case

We secured a defense verdict in Delaware County after a four-day jury trial in a premises liability case against a local school. The plaintiff, a student, suffered an Achilles heel injury when cut by a door edge and claimed diminished leg function and Chronic Regional Pain Syndrome (CRPS). Despite undergoing two surgeries, neither her surgeons nor treating physicians diagnosed CRPS. During trial, the defense highlighted that the student returned the following year as undefeated captain of the school’s tennis team, winning at the state level. The case involved aggressive cross-examination of medical and liability experts, along with surveillance evidence of the plaintiff. Before trial, the demand was $1 million, while the school offered $200,000 at mediation—an offer the plaintiff rejected, walking out and refusing further negotiations. After just 2.5 hours of deliberation, the jury ruled in the school’s favor.

Defense Prevails in Contract Dispute

Obtained a defense verdict for our client, a global automobile manufacturer, in a contract dispute in Bucks County, PA. In 2021, amid the COVID-19 pandemic, the plaintiff purchased a new vehicle for $37,000. Seven months later, the car was involved in a crash caused by the plaintiff's daughter. Repairs for collision damage, which are not covered under the vehicle’s express written warranty, were delayed due to global supply chain disruptions caused by the pandemic. Despite the automobile manufacturer’s efforts to locate, obtain, and expedite delivery of repair parts to the collision repair shop, it took seven months to fully complete the repairs. The plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer violated the implied warranty of merchantability under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and breached the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, citing the repair delays as the basis for the claims. Ultimately, the court returned a defense verdict, rejecting the plaintiff’s claims.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

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Result

Summary Judgment Obtained in Insurance Coverage Case

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

News

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Result

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

News

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Result

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case