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Results

  • Successful Trial Outcome: Defense Prevails in Premises Liability Case

    We secured a defense verdict in Delaware County after a four-day jury trial in a premises liability case against a local school. The plaintiff, a student, suffered an Achilles heel injury when cut by a door edge and claimed diminished leg function and Chronic Regional Pain Syndrome (CRPS). Despite undergoing two surgeries, neither her surgeons nor treating physicians diagnosed CRPS. During trial, the defense highlighted that the student returned the following year as undefeated captain of the school’s tennis team, winning at the state level. The case involved aggressive cross-examination of medical and liability experts, along with surveillance evidence of the plaintiff. Before trial, the demand was $1 million, while the school offered $200,000 at mediation—an offer the plaintiff rejected, walking out and refusing further negotiations. After just 2.5 hours of deliberation, the jury ruled in the school’s favor.

  • Defense Prevails in Contract Dispute

    Obtained a defense verdict for our client, a global automobile manufacturer, in a contract dispute in Bucks County, PA. In 2021, amid the COVID-19 pandemic, the plaintiff purchased a new vehicle for $37,000. Seven months later, the car was involved in a crash caused by the plaintiff's daughter. Repairs for collision damage, which are not covered under the vehicle’s express written warranty, were delayed due to global supply chain disruptions caused by the pandemic. Despite the automobile manufacturer’s efforts to locate, obtain, and expedite delivery of repair parts to the collision repair shop, it took seven months to fully complete the repairs. The plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer violated the implied warranty of merchantability under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and breached the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, citing the repair delays as the basis for the claims. Ultimately, the court returned a defense verdict, rejecting the plaintiff’s claims.

  • Socially-distanced trial produces defense verdict for auto manufacturer.

    After a masked and socially distanced two-day trial in Bucks County, we obtained a defense verdict in favor of an automotive manufacturer. ​The plaintiff purchased a new 2018 vehicle on March 10, 2018. Approximately one year after the purchase, the plaintiff complained several times that the start/stop function shut off and would not restart. The manufacturer identified the problem and was working on a solution. Meanwhile, the dealership told the plaintiff to turn off the start/stop function until a software update came out. The software update came out in early May of 2019, less than 80 days after the plaintiff’s first complaint. The plaintiff asserted claims under the Pennsylvania Automobile Lemon Law, Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, Uniform Commercial Code, and the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law that the vehicle’s repair history was all related to an intermittent and still unrepaired start/stop issue with the car. The defense successfully proved through witness and expert testimony that the vehicle’s mechanical problems were fixed in a timely fashion. The repair work done by the dealership under the warranty was effective and reliable, and the problem was permanently repaired. After trial, the judge requested that each side provide a memorandum with findings of fact and closing arguments. Upon review of same, a ruling was issued in our client’s favor.

  • Plaintiff's "Rail Dust" Car Paint Claim Bites the Dust.

    Obtained a defense verdict after a three-day trial in Philadelphia County in favor of an automobile manufacturer. The plaintiffs claimed their new truck was purchased with a defect in the truck’s paint called “rail dust.” The plaintiff asserted claims under the Pennsylvania Lemon Law, Magnuson Moss Warranty Act, and Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection law that the “rail dust” either occurred in the manufacturing process or during transportation of the truck by the manufacturer to the dealership. The defense proved through witnesses and expert testimony that the truck was inspected several times during the transportation process by third-party inspectors. Additionally, the vehicle arrived at the dealership and was inspected again, with no problems found. Both the plaintiff and his son inspected the vehicle prior to purchase, and neither of them saw any problems with the vehicle. It was not until the truck was in the plaintiff’s possession for one month when the first spots of “rail dust” were discovered.

  • Defense Proves Plaintiff Caused Car Damage at Heart of Lawsuit.

    We obtained a defense verdict after a three-day trial in Philadelphia County in favor of a regional automobile franchise. The plaintiffs purchased a used 2011 Chevrolet Cruze from the defendant. They then claimed that their vehicle was purchased with the undisclosed fact that it had been involved in a flood. They asserted claims under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law that the vehicle’s prior history was not identified and the vehicle was sold having mud, rust and dirt all over the car. The defense proved, through witness and expert testimony, that the plaintiffs drove the vehicle through high water and mud after purchase, causing the vehicle’s damage. 

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.