.

Mark J. Kozlowski

Portrait of Mark J. Kozlowski

As a member of the Professional Liability Department, Mark focuses his practice on civil rights, constitutional law and municipal liability. 

Mark has represented a number of governmental agencies and municipalities over the years in matters ranging from police excessive force and wrongful arrest cases to premises liability lawsuits.  He represents public entities and officials in cases arising under state law, federal civil rights statutes and the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act. He has also handled the defense of Homeowner Associations and officers in matters involving challenges to voting procedures, changes to short-term rental policies, employment discrimination and retaliation. 

In addition, Mark publishes the Marshall Dennehey Municipal Law newsletter. Mark has experience in the areas of zoning appeals, administrative proceedings, and trial court and appellate practice. He has handled civil rights litigation at the trial court and appellate levels, including experience practicing before the Supreme Court of the United States on multiple occasions. In 2021, Mark was elected Greenfield Township (Lackawanna County) Judge of Election. In 2023, Mark became a certified mediator on the mediator panel for the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania Mediation Program.

Mark received his juris doctor from Michigan State University College of Law in 2010. While in law school, he served as editor-in-chief of the Journal of International Law and as an associate editor of Res Ipsa Loquitor, the College of Law's newspaper. Mark was a member of the Student Bar Association and spoke on several panels at the National Conference of Law Reviews relating to successful management of law reviews, budget considerations and leadership. He also interned for the Lackawanna County District Attorney's Office.

Following law school, Mark served as a law clerk for the Honorable Edwin M. Kosik of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Following his clerkship, Mark began his private legal career with a general civil practice firm in Maryland.

Mark received his Bachelor of Science degree from Kutztown University of Pennsylvania in business administration and majored in marketing and business management. He also completed a minor in political science. While completing his undergraduate degree at Kutztown University, Mark served as president of the Recreational and Sports Club Council and spent four seasons as a defensive player with the lacrosse team.

    • Michigan State University College of Law (J.D., 2010)
    • Kutztown University of Pennsylvania (B.S., 2007)
    • Pennsylvania, 2010
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2010
    • Maryland, 2011
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 2014
    • Supreme Court of the United States, 2018
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2019
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers Rising Star (2019-2023)
    • Lackawanna County Bar Association, Young Lawyers Division, Board of Directors, 2016-2018
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Civil Rights and the 14th Amendment, Marywood University’s The Courts and Our Community Lecture Series, October 1, 2025
    • FLSA – Wage and Labor Laws, Northeast Pennsylvania Chapter of Society for Human Resource Management, June 29, 2023
    • Recruitment and Selection, Northeast Pennsylvania Chapter of Society for Human Resource Management, March 30, 2023
    • Employment Law Basics: The Basis of OSHA, FLSA, ADA & More, Northeast Pennsylvania Chapter of Society for Human Resource Management, November 17, 2022
    • Performance Management & Record Retention: Avoiding Discrimination - What is Needed to Make a Hire and be Fired, Northeast Pennsylvania Chapter of Society for Human Resource Management, August 18, 2022
    • Pay & Benefits: Overtime, Minimum Wage, Compensable Time & Legally Required Benefits, Northeast Pennsylvania Chapter of Society for Human Resource Management, May 19, 2022
    • Recruitment & Selection: Where to Find Talent & the Do’s/Dont’s of Interviewing, Northeast Pennsylvania Chapter of Society for Human Resource Management, February 17, 2022
    • Local Government Immunity in Pennsylvania, client seminar, June 8, 2021
    • Essential Handbook Must-Haves and Updates, National Business Institute, October 18, 2017
    • Workplace Behavior and Privacy Issues, Human Resource Law: What You Need to Know Now, National Business Institute, December 2016
    • Hiring/Recruiting, Human Resource Law: What You Need to Know Now, National Business Institute, December 2016
    • Employment Law: Rights, Benefits, and Emerging Issues, Sterling Education Services, August 2, 2016
    • Employment Law: Beyond the Basics, Sterling Education Services, August 4, 2015
    • Legal Updates for Pennsylvania Municipal Law, contributor and editor, September 2019-present
    • “Third Circuit Reaffirms Ripeness Doctrine in Civil Rights Claim and Need to Exhaust State Remedies Before Pursuing a Fifth Amendment Takings Claim,” Defense Digest, Vol. 23, No. 3, September 2017
    • "The Fire Protection Engineer Expert," Fire Protection Contractor, April 2012
    • United States District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, Certified Mediator

Results

Summary Judgment Affirmed by Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court in Police Pursuit Case

We were affirmed the granting of summary judgment in favor of our client in a high-speed police pursuit case. The plaintiff was severely injured after a brief police pursuit involving the driver, who died as a result of the pursuit. The plaintiff then sued the local municipality for negligence, arguing that the officers caused the wreck by turning a traffic stop into a high-speed chase. Following discovery, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the Township, finding that the so-called vehicle exception to municipal liability found in the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act did not apply. The trial court reasoned that pursuant to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s holding in Sellers v. The Township of Abington, 106 A. 3d 679 (Pa. 2014), the defendants did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care because his existence or connection to the driver were unknown to the officers at the time of the pursuit. The Commonwealth Court issued an opinion affirming the trial court and held that the exception to the exception for vehicle liability involving high-speed police pursuits did not apply because the plaintiff was unable to establish the threshold requirement that the defendants owed him a duty of care.

Defense Obtains Dismissal of a Complex Federal Civil Rights Action

We obtained the dismissal of a federal civil rights action alleging that a municipality retaliated against a real estate developer after the sale of a large tract of local property.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.