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Results

  • Summary Judgment Affirmed by Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court in Police Pursuit Case

    We were affirmed the granting of summary judgment in favor of our client in a high-speed police pursuit case. The plaintiff was severely injured after a brief police pursuit involving the driver, who died as a result of the pursuit. The plaintiff then sued the local municipality for negligence, arguing that the officers caused the wreck by turning a traffic stop into a high-speed chase. Following discovery, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the Township, finding that the so-called vehicle exception to municipal liability found in the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act did not apply. The trial court reasoned that pursuant to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s holding in Sellers v. The Township of Abington, 106 A. 3d 679 (Pa. 2014), the defendants did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care because his existence or connection to the driver were unknown to the officers at the time of the pursuit. The Commonwealth Court issued an opinion affirming the trial court and held that the exception to the exception for vehicle liability involving high-speed police pursuits did not apply because the plaintiff was unable to establish the threshold requirement that the defendants owed him a duty of care.

  • Defense Obtains Dismissal of a Complex Federal Civil Rights Action

    We obtained the dismissal of a federal civil rights action alleging that a municipality retaliated against a real estate developer after the sale of a large tract of local property.

  • Successful Defense of Employer Alleged to Have Violated the Pennsylvania Medical Marijuana Act

    The plaintiff sought employment as a fork lift operator in a manufacturing facility. He was extended a conditional offer of employment, contingent on passing a pre-employment drug test. His drug test showed a positive indication for the presence of marijuana, and his offer was rescinded. The plaintiff claimed that he notified the facility that he held a valid Medical Marijuana Identification Card, yet our client still rescinded its offer in violation of the Pennsylvania Medical Marijuana Act. The Act prohibits an employer from refusing to hire a person solely on the basis of that person’s status as a certified medical marijuana user. In response to the complaint, we filed preliminary objections arguing that the employment offer was expressly contingent upon passing a drug test. We also argued that fork lift operation is, by its very nature, an inherently dangerous job that, if done carelessly or under the influence of a narcotic, could result in injury or death to the plaintiff or others on the premises. The court held that the Medical Marijuana Act’s provisions do not require an employer to hire a medical marijuana user as a forklift operator and taking on a substantial risk of liability for injury to persons. Additionally, the court found that a medical marijuana user does not have a right to be hired by a prospective employer who, prior to such hiring, determines that the position for which the prospective employee would be hired would require his or her performance of tasks an employer deems life-threatening to the employee or any of its employees. The demurer was sustained, and the complaint was dismissed.

  • Defense prevails in case involving a high-speed police pursuit.

    During early morning hours, a vehicle was observed by police officers driving straight through a turning lane. The officers attempted a traffic stop, but the driver took off and led police onto an interstate highway. A high-speed pursuit ensued, reaching speeds in excess of 115 mph. The plaintiff was a passenger in the vehicle. Due to the high speed and an upcoming construction zone, officers broke off the chase. The driver attempted to exit the interstate via an off ramp, but turned too fast and crashed. Although the driver died on impact, the plaintiff-passenger was thrown from the rear of the vehicle and wedged under the dashboard. The plaintiff sued several municipalities under a negligence theory. Following discovery, Mark filed motion for summary judgment on behalf of our client, arguing that the plaintiff’s claim was barred and the township was immune from suit pursuant to the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act. Following oral argument, the court granted our motion.

  • Defense verdict for PA Borough and Police Chief following a six-day jury trial.

    The plaintiff, a part-time police officer, alleged that she told her Police Chief that she believed the hiring/promotions of three male police officers to full-time positions were illegal. After that meeting, the plaintiff claimed she was not assigned to higher-paying assignments like the male police officers in the department. She sued the borough and the police chief for First Amendment retaliation under Section 1983, and gender-based discrimination and retaliation pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. Following a six-day trial and five hours of deliberation, the jury returned a complete defense verdict on all counts against both defendants.

  • School district immune under the PA Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

    We obtained summary judgment in Carbon County, Pennsylvania in a negligence action brought against a local school district. The plaintiff, a former high school athlete, was working out in the District’s weight lifting facility when a cable snapped on a leg curl machine, striking his head and causing significant injury. The plaintiff sued the district, alleging negligence in the operation, inspection, and maintenance of the gym and, more specifically, the leg curl machine. Following discovery, the district moved for summary judgment, arguing that the leg curl machine at issue was personalty and not part of the District’s real property and, accordingly, the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA) prevented recovery. The court agreed and concluded the District was immune under the PSTCA since all evidence showed that the leg curl machine was not a fixture of the building and, therefore, the “real property” exception to local governmental immunity did not apply.

  • Successful defense of civil rights appeal.

    We successfully defended a civil rights appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The plaintiff filed a federal civil rights complaint against a police sergeant and a local municipality following his arrest and release. The plaintiff was charged with the attempted murder of his wife, who later recanted her statement to police. After the plaintiff was released from custody, he filed suit, claiming that police failed to conduct an adequate criminal investigation into the charges against him. At the district court, it was found that probable cause existed based on information known to officers at the time of the plaintiff’s arrest. Therefore, our defense motion for summary judgment was granted. The plaintiff appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, claiming that the district court failed to weigh the evidence in the light most favorable to him, and ignored relevant evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision finding probable cause.

  • Dismissal of lawsuit against a municipal client.

    The plaintiffs contracted with a builder to construct a 5,000 sq. ft. home. In accordance with the Uniform Construction Code, the local township contracted with a privately-owned company to serve as a code enforcement and permit officer. The company issued a building permit, inspected the home at several points during construction, and eventually issued a certificate of occupancy. However, the plaintiffs claimed that the home had significant structural and aesthetic defects, and the code enforcement officer failed to conduct proper inspections during the construction process. The plaintiffs sued their builder, the code enforcement officer and the township. The township was alleged to have negligently hired and/or negligently supervised the code enforcement officer. Preliminary objections were filed in response, raising governmental immunity as a clear defense to the negligence claims against the township. Following oral argument, the court sustained the preliminary objections and dismissed the township from the action, finding there were no plausible claims for negligence based upon application of the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

  • Summary judgment on behalf of a local municipality and police sergeant.

    The plaintiff’s wife reported to police that the plaintiff tried to kill her by firing a shotgun at her while she slept. Following a thorough investigation and witness interviews, police arrested the plaintiff and charged him with attempted murder. The next day, the wife recanted her story and told police that she was the one who fired a shotgun in the couple’s home in an effort to frame her husband for attempted murder. Police immediately had the plaintiff released from prison. The wife was later charged with, and pleaded guilty to, making false statements to authorities. Thereafter, the plaintiff sued the police department and arresting officer, claiming the defendants falsely arrested and imprisoned him and maliciously prosecuted him without probable cause in violation of his 4th and 14th Amendment rights. Following discovery, a motion for summary judgment was filed on behalf of the defendants. The court found that the undisputed facts of record clearly showed the existence of probable cause at the time of arrest, and summary judgment was granted in favor of the defendants.

  • Successful Representation of a School District Faced with a Pennsylvania Sunshine Act Claim

    The plaintiff, a suspended high school principal, claimed that the Pennsylvania Sunshine Act had been violated when the doors to the administration building had been locked at the start of the first day of her termination hearing. The court considered the issues of whether a plaintiff is denied a right under the Pennsylvania School Code when access to the hearing room by the public is barred, and whether a public hearing qualifies as “official action” within the meaning of the Sunshine Act. The court found that the public hearing required by the school code is not concurrently a “meeting” within the meaning of the Sunshine Act and subject to its provisions. Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district.

  • Summary Judgment for Town and Its Police Officers.

    We obtained summary judgment in favor of a town and several of its police officers in an excessive force and malicious prosecution case in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff and his family were in Bloomsburg the night before his daughter’s graduation when he got into a fist fight with a bar owner. The owner suffered significant injuries and the plaintiff fled the scene. He was spotted a short time later by one of the defendant officers, pursued and arrested. The plaintiff was charged with disorderly conduct, harassment, simple assault and aggravated assault. Following the criminal trial, the plaintiff was found not guilty. He then sued our clients—the town and several officers—for excessive force and malicious prosecution. The plaintiff’s wife also sued, alleging loss of consortium and emotional distress. The wife’s claims were dismissed via a motion to dismiss. Following the close of discovery, motions for summary judgment were filed on behalf of our clients. The court granted our motions, finding the existence of probable cause as a defense to claims for malicious prosecution and wrongful arrest. The court also found that the arresting officer acted reasonably during the pursuit and detention of the plaintiff.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.