.

Case Law Alerts

Examining the Limits of the State-Created Danger Doctrine

Cappel v. Aston Twp. Fire Dep’t, 693 F. Supp. 3d 467 (E.D. Pa. 2023)

April 1, 2025

by Jordan L. Mazzoni

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the decedent’s family urgently called 911 as she struggled to breathe and had dangerously low blood-oxygen levels. However, the responding EMTs allegedly refused to provide immediate medical care, citing concerns for their own safety. Despite eventually calling an advanced life support team, the decedent died the following day. Her family sued under § 1983, arguing that the EMTs’ actions violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights under the state-created danger doctrine. The court, while recognizing the EMTs’ disregard for serious harm, ultimately dismissed the claim, finding that their actions did not render the decedent more vulnerable than if they had not intervened at all.

This matter was brought by Ms. Jones’s survivors against the fire department, the township, the EMTs and others for violating Ms. Jones’s Fourteenth Amendment rights under the state-created danger doctrine pursuant to § 1983 and additional claims. 

In their motions to dismiss, the defendants argued that Ms. Jones had no constitutional right to emergency services as it is not a generally recognized constitutional right. Specifically, neither a special relationship nor state-created danger transforms the claim of “non-feasance” into a constitutionally guaranteed affirmative obligation on the state to rescue Ms. Jones, and the COVID-19 pandemic made Ms. Jones’s right to emergency services far from clearly established. 

The state-created danger doctrine includes four elements: (1) the harm caused was foreseeable and direct; (2) a state actor acted with a degree of culpability that shocks the conscience; (3) a relationship between the state and the plaintiff existed such that the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of the defendant’s actions; and (4) a state actor affirmatively used his authority in a way that created a danger to the citizen or rendered the citizen more vulnerable to danger than had the state not acted at all.
    
The court analyzed the second and fourth elements. The second element, shocking the conscience, is categorized in three ways. First, if the circumstances are highly pressurized, the intentional harm must be shown. Second, if the state actor is required to act within hours or minutes, they must have disregarded a great risk of serious harm. Third, where the actor has time to make an unhurried judgment, a plaintiff must show an inference that the official acted with a mental state of deliberate indifference. 

The court found the allegations demonstrated a situation in which the actor was required to act in a matter of hours or minutes in that the 911 call displayed immediacy when it was relayed that Ms. Jones was struggling to breathe. Specifically, an EMT had neglected two separate blood-oxygen readings which displayed unstable breathing, commenting, “She would be dead” if the oximeters were measured accurately. The other EMT declined to evaluate Ms. Jones’s condition, saying they had a wife and kids to think about. The court believed facts were put forth that demonstrated that the EMTs disregarded a great risk of serious harm.

The court found that the fourth element of the state-created danger exception, however, was not satisfied. There are three conditions necessary to satisfy this element, which include: (1) a state actor exercised their authority, (2) the state actor took an affirmative action, and (3) this act created a danger to the citizen or rendered the citizen more vulnerable to danger than if the state had not acted at all. The court found that the EMTs took affirmative acts by dismissing the ALS unit and reporting that no patient was assessed after evaluating Ms. Jones. However, these affirmative acts did not make Ms. Jones more vulnerable to danger than had the EMTs not acted at all. Therefore, the state-created danger claim was dismissed. 


 

Case Law Alerts, 2nd Quarter, April 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Ohio Supreme Court Holds That a Binding Appraisal Award May Not Be Set Aside Absent Specific Evidence of Manifest Mistake or Fraud

On July 23, 2026, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a rare opinion on the binding effect of an appraisal award in a property insurance policy.  The Court in One Church held: A binding appraisal award will not be set aside unless an error is so palpably wrong that it undermines the intent of the agreement, such as corruption or gross mistake, not a mere error of judgment—To plead a claim of mistake with particularity as required by Civ.R. 9(B), facts alleged in a complaint must constitute the elements of mistake—Allegation that additional, hidden damage was discovered after appraisal award failed to state a claim of mistake that could justify setting aside binding appraisal.  The case arose out of a claim brought by One Church against its insurer, Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company for roof damage from a storm. Pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, the parties agreed to submit the matter to appraisal. The two appraisers inspected the building, and both appraisers agreed that the damages were $313,271.98. The insurer paid the agreed appraised amount.  Thereafter, the insured submitted a claim for an additional $206,663.09 in damages. The insured argued that these additional damages were not discovered until after the repairs began, and that they should be permitted to submit an additional claim, even though there had already been a binding appraisal of damages. The insurer refused to pay the additional damages, and the insured sued for breach of contract and bad faith.  In the trial court, the insurer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the binding appraisal award barred any further claims. The insured took the position that additional hidden damages could not be discovered until after the repairs began, and therefore there was a mutual mistake. The trial court dismissed the case on the insurer’s motion, because there was no “evidence of fraud, misfeasance, or mistake”. The Court of Appeals agreed that appraisal awards are generally binding, but noted that an appraisal award can be set aside for fraud or manifest mistake. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, finding that the insured had pled mistake with sufficient particularity. The insurer appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the trial court decision dismissing the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court found that since the insured had already demanded appraisal, and the appraisal award was binding, “something more than error of judgement, such as corruption in the arbitrator, or gross mistake” must be pled with particularity, and proven for the insured to override the appraisal award. Since the complaint did not allege fraud or manifest mistake with sufficient particularity, something more than a mere error of judgment, the complaint was insufficient to state a claim.  The complaint in this case did not challenge the appraisal award. It pled that additional damages were discovered that were not apparent when the appraisal was done. It did not specify “who discovered the damages, how they were discovered, where they were found, why they were previously hidden, or why they rise to the level of a manifest mistake that the “appraiser would have corrected...had it been called to his attention”. Id at ¶22 citing Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970). Cases deciding the effect of appraisal awards are unusual. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in One Church relies primarily on 19th century case law for its conclusion. This emphasizes the fact that there is minimal case law deciding the effect of binding appraisal clauses in property insurance policies, and makes this case all the more significant. A lengthy dissent was written by Justice Fisher, who would have affirmed the Court of Appeals decision reversing and remanding the case for a decision on the merits. Of course, the decision works both ways, and an insurer dissatisfied with a binding appraisal award will likewise be without further recourse absent evidence of corruption, fraud, misfeasance, or manifest mistake, which must be pled with particularity. To constitute manifest mistake, “the mistake must be of such character that the arbitrator or appraiser would have corrected it had it been called to his attention.”  Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970).  The majority opinion does not specifically identify what would have been sufficient to plead mistake with particularity, or if the insured could have amended the complaint to overcome the deficiencies. The dissent argues that this was not really a case alleging mistake, but rather a question of contract interpretation. The insured did not challenge the appraisal, but argued that the hidden damage was not part of the appraisal, and the appraisal only covered the known damages.  However, this argument did not carry the day with the majority.  *Thomas F. Glassman, a shareholder in Marshall Dennehey’s Cincinnati office, filed a brief in the Ohio Supreme Court on behalf of the Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys, in support of the insurer’s position.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.