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Jordan L. Mazzoni

Portrait of Jordan L. Mazzoni

Jordan is a member of the firm’s Professional Liability Department, where she represents public entities, employers, self-insured businesses, insurers, and licensed professionals in a broad range of high-exposure litigation and professional liability matters. Her practice is centered on strategic risk management, efficient resolution of disputes, and delivering practical counsel tailored to each client’s operational and legal needs.

Jordan’s Public Entity and Civil Rights practice includes the defense of municipalities, police departments, school districts, zoning officials, and public agencies in complex litigation involving constitutional claims, civil rights allegations, use of force claims, premises liability, and governmental liability issues. She regularly represents public-sector clients in matters arising under Section 1983 and other state and federal statutes, while navigating the unique procedural and immunity defenses available to governmental entities and officials.

In her Employment Law practice, Jordan defends employers against claims involving discrimination, retaliation, harassment, hostile work environment allegations, whistleblower claims, wrongful termination, and sexual assault allegations. She works closely with employers to assess litigation exposure, develop defense strategies, and address sensitive workplace matters with discretion and practical business insight.

Jordan also maintains active First-Party Property, Insurance Coverage, and Liquor Liability Defense practices. She represents insurers in coverage disputes, bad faith litigation, fraud investigations, and Special Investigations Unit (SIU) matters, including the analysis of complex insurance policies and advising carriers on coverage obligations. In her Liquor Liability Defense practice, Jordan represents bars, restaurants, taverns, distributors, and hospitality businesses in dram shop and liquor liability claims involving personal injury, assault, intoxication-related incidents, and wrongful death allegations. She works closely with insureds and carriers to evaluate exposure, develop defense strategies, and navigate the unique statutory and regulatory issues impacting licensed establishments.

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Jordan served as an Assistant District Attorney in the Lackawanna County District Attorney's Office, where she prosecuted criminal matters with a concentration in narcotics-related offenses as a member of the Narcotics Unit.

Jordan earned her Juris Doctor from Widener University Commonwealth Law School, where she was an active member of the Student Bar Association. She received her bachelor’s degree in Liberal Studies, with concentrations in pre-medicine and pre-law, from University of Scranton.

Results

Successful Defense of Employer Alleged to Have Violated the Pennsylvania Medical Marijuana Act

The plaintiff sought employment as a fork lift operator in a manufacturing facility. He was extended a conditional offer of employment, contingent on passing a pre-employment drug test. His drug test showed a positive indication for the presence of marijuana, and his offer was rescinded. The plaintiff claimed that he notified the facility that he held a valid Medical Marijuana Identification Card, yet our client still rescinded its offer in violation of the Pennsylvania Medical Marijuana Act. The Act prohibits an employer from refusing to hire a person solely on the basis of that person’s status as a certified medical marijuana user. In response to the complaint, we filed preliminary objections arguing that the employment offer was expressly contingent upon passing a drug test. We also argued that fork lift operation is, by its very nature, an inherently dangerous job that, if done carelessly or under the influence of a narcotic, could result in injury or death to the plaintiff or others on the premises. The court held that the Medical Marijuana Act’s provisions do not require an employer to hire a medical marijuana user as a forklift operator and taking on a substantial risk of liability for injury to persons. Additionally, the court found that a medical marijuana user does not have a right to be hired by a prospective employer who, prior to such hiring, determines that the position for which the prospective employee would be hired would require his or her performance of tasks an employer deems life-threatening to the employee or any of its employees. The demurer was sustained, and the complaint was dismissed.

Thought Leadership

PLUS Blog

The Best Defense is Already in the File: Documentation in Civil Rights Litigation

July 27, 2026

Case Law Alerts

Third Circuit Broadens CHRIA’s Scope in Pennsylvania Employment Law

April 1, 2026

The Third Circuit clarified the scope of Pennsylvania’s Criminal History Record Information Act (CHRIA), holding that the statute applies even when an employer learns of a criminal conviction directly from the job applicant. Plaintiff Rodney Phath applied for a truck driver position with Central Transport and received an interview because he had relevant experience, appeared to be a good candidate with a commercial driver’s license, and had federal clearance to access secure ports. During the hiring process, Central Transport said it would check his criminal record, so Phath voluntarily disclosed a 15-year-old armed robbery conviction for which he spent six years in prison. The employer immediately rejected his application based on that conviction. Phath sued, alleging violations of CHRIA, which limits how employers may consider history in hiring decisions. The district court dismissed the case, reasoning that CHRIA did not apply because the employer learned of the conviction from the applicant rather than from the state. Pennsylvania's Criminal History Record Information Act limits disclosure and use of “criminal history record information.” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 9101–9183. That includes “[i]nformation collected by criminal justice agencies” about a person's description, arrests, indictments, convictions, and the like, and prospective employers may request that information from state agencies. §§ 9102, 9113(e), 9121(b), 9125. The issue is whether the Act covered the plaintiff’s own disclosure. When an employer is in receipt of the information which is part of an employment applicant’s criminal history record information file, the employer may use the applicant’s prior convictions for the purpose of deciding whether or not to hire the applicant § 9125(a); but employers may use those convictions “only to the extent to which they relate to the applicant’s suitability” for the job. § 91125(b). If the employer rejects the applicant because of the criminal history information, it must give the applicant written notice of that decision. § 9125(c). The plaintiff alleged violations of subsections (b) and (c), but the dispute was over subsection (a), as Central Transport had not attempted to show that the plaintiff’s conviction made him unsuitable to drive their trucks, nor that they notified him of this rejection in writing. Central Transport argued the Act did not apply because it acquired the information from plaintiff, not from a state agency. The Third Circuit rejected this argument and reversed, holding that CHRIA applies whenever an employer is in receipt of criminal history information that is part of an applicant’s criminal history record, regardless of the source of that information.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Ohio Supreme Court Holds That a Binding Appraisal Award May Not Be Set Aside Absent Specific Evidence of Manifest Mistake or Fraud

On July 23, 2026, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a rare opinion on the binding effect of an appraisal award in a property insurance policy.  The Court in One Church held: A binding appraisal award will not be set aside unless an error is so palpably wrong that it undermines the intent of the agreement, such as corruption or gross mistake, not a mere error of judgment—To plead a claim of mistake with particularity as required by Civ.R. 9(B), facts alleged in a complaint must constitute the elements of mistake—Allegation that additional, hidden damage was discovered after appraisal award failed to state a claim of mistake that could justify setting aside binding appraisal.  The case arose out of a claim brought by One Church against its insurer, Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company for roof damage from a storm. Pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, the parties agreed to submit the matter to appraisal. The two appraisers inspected the building, and both appraisers agreed that the damages were $313,271.98. The insurer paid the agreed appraised amount.  Thereafter, the insured submitted a claim for an additional $206,663.09 in damages. The insured argued that these additional damages were not discovered until after the repairs began, and that they should be permitted to submit an additional claim, even though there had already been a binding appraisal of damages. The insurer refused to pay the additional damages, and the insured sued for breach of contract and bad faith.  In the trial court, the insurer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the binding appraisal award barred any further claims. The insured took the position that additional hidden damages could not be discovered until after the repairs began, and therefore there was a mutual mistake. The trial court dismissed the case on the insurer’s motion, because there was no “evidence of fraud, misfeasance, or mistake”. The Court of Appeals agreed that appraisal awards are generally binding, but noted that an appraisal award can be set aside for fraud or manifest mistake. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, finding that the insured had pled mistake with sufficient particularity. The insurer appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the trial court decision dismissing the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court found that since the insured had already demanded appraisal, and the appraisal award was binding, “something more than error of judgement, such as corruption in the arbitrator, or gross mistake” must be pled with particularity, and proven for the insured to override the appraisal award. Since the complaint did not allege fraud or manifest mistake with sufficient particularity, something more than a mere error of judgment, the complaint was insufficient to state a claim.  The complaint in this case did not challenge the appraisal award. It pled that additional damages were discovered that were not apparent when the appraisal was done. It did not specify “who discovered the damages, how they were discovered, where they were found, why they were previously hidden, or why they rise to the level of a manifest mistake that the “appraiser would have corrected...had it been called to his attention”. Id at ¶22 citing Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970). Cases deciding the effect of appraisal awards are unusual. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in One Church relies primarily on 19th century case law for its conclusion. This emphasizes the fact that there is minimal case law deciding the effect of binding appraisal clauses in property insurance policies, and makes this case all the more significant. A lengthy dissent was written by Justice Fisher, who would have affirmed the Court of Appeals decision reversing and remanding the case for a decision on the merits. Of course, the decision works both ways, and an insurer dissatisfied with a binding appraisal award will likewise be without further recourse absent evidence of corruption, fraud, misfeasance, or manifest mistake, which must be pled with particularity. To constitute manifest mistake, “the mistake must be of such character that the arbitrator or appraiser would have corrected it had it been called to his attention.”  Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970).  The majority opinion does not specifically identify what would have been sufficient to plead mistake with particularity, or if the insured could have amended the complaint to overcome the deficiencies. The dissent argues that this was not really a case alleging mistake, but rather a question of contract interpretation. The insured did not challenge the appraisal, but argued that the hidden damage was not part of the appraisal, and the appraisal only covered the known damages.  However, this argument did not carry the day with the majority.  *Thomas F. Glassman, a shareholder in Marshall Dennehey’s Cincinnati office, filed a brief in the Ohio Supreme Court on behalf of the Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys, in support of the insurer’s position.