.

Jordan L. Mazzoni

Associate

JLMazzoni@mdwcg.com

Portrait of Jordan L. Mazzoni

Jordan is a member of the firm’s Professional Liability Department, where she represents public entities, employers, self-insured businesses, insurers, and licensed professionals in a broad range of high-exposure litigation and professional liability matters. Her practice is centered on strategic risk management, efficient resolution of disputes, and delivering practical counsel tailored to each client’s operational and legal needs.

Jordan’s Public Entity and Civil Rights practice includes the defense of municipalities, police departments, school districts, zoning officials, and public agencies in complex litigation involving constitutional claims, civil rights allegations, use of force claims, premises liability, and governmental liability issues. She regularly represents public-sector clients in matters arising under Section 1983 and other state and federal statutes, while navigating the unique procedural and immunity defenses available to governmental entities and officials.

In her Employment Law practice, Jordan defends employers against claims involving discrimination, retaliation, harassment, hostile work environment allegations, whistleblower claims, wrongful termination, and sexual assault allegations. She works closely with employers to assess litigation exposure, develop defense strategies, and address sensitive workplace matters with discretion and practical business insight.

Jordan also maintains active First-Party Property, Insurance Coverage, and Liquor Liability Defense practices. She represents insurers in coverage disputes, bad faith litigation, fraud investigations, and Special Investigations Unit (SIU) matters, including the analysis of complex insurance policies and advising carriers on coverage obligations. In her Liquor Liability Defense practice, Jordan represents bars, restaurants, taverns, distributors, and hospitality businesses in dram shop and liquor liability claims involving personal injury, assault, intoxication-related incidents, and wrongful death allegations. She works closely with insureds and carriers to evaluate exposure, develop defense strategies, and navigate the unique statutory and regulatory issues impacting licensed establishments.

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Jordan served as an Assistant District Attorney in the Lackawanna County District Attorney's Office, where she prosecuted criminal matters with a concentration in narcotics-related offenses as a member of the Narcotics Unit.

Jordan earned her Juris Doctor from Widener University Commonwealth Law School, where she was an active member of the Student Bar Association. She received her bachelor’s degree in Liberal Studies, with concentrations in pre-medicine and pre-law, from University of Scranton.

Results

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Successful Defense of Employer Alleged to Have Violated the Pennsylvania Medical Marijuana Act

The plaintiff sought employment as a fork lift operator in a manufacturing facility. He was extended a conditional offer of employment, contingent on passing a pre-employment drug test. His drug test showed a positive indication for the presence of marijuana, and his offer was rescinded. The plaintiff claimed that he notified the facility that he held a valid Medical Marijuana Identification Card, yet our client still rescinded its offer in violation of the Pennsylvania Medical Marijuana Act. The Act prohibits an employer from refusing to hire a person solely on the basis of that person’s status as a certified medical marijuana user. In response to the complaint, we filed preliminary objections arguing that the employment offer was expressly contingent upon passing a drug test. We also argued that fork lift operation is, by its very nature, an inherently dangerous job that, if done carelessly or under the influence of a narcotic, could result in injury or death to the plaintiff or others on the premises. The court held that the Medical Marijuana Act’s provisions do not require an employer to hire a medical marijuana user as a forklift operator and taking on a substantial risk of liability for injury to persons. Additionally, the court found that a medical marijuana user does not have a right to be hired by a prospective employer who, prior to such hiring, determines that the position for which the prospective employee would be hired would require his or her performance of tasks an employer deems life-threatening to the employee or any of its employees. The demurer was sustained, and the complaint was dismissed.

Thought Leadership

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Case Law Alerts

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

November 3, 2026

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

PLUS Blog

The Best Defense is Already in the File: Documentation in Civil Rights Litigation

July 27, 2026

Civil rights lawsuits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 often are filed long after the events in question. Witnesses may be unavailable, memories fade, and officers have handled countless other incidents. Yet courts and juries must still determine what transpired during a single encounter on a particular day. In many instances, the answer is already in the file. Read Jordan's article on the PLUS Blog: https://plusweb.org/news/the-best-defense-is-already-in-the-file-documentation-in-civil-rights-litigation/.

News

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Firm Highlights

Marshall Dennehey Welcomes Special Counsel David Farkouh and Michele P. Rannie to New York City Office

News

Marshall Dennehey Welcomes Special Counsel David Farkouh and Michele P. Rannie to New York City Office

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Result

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 Pennsylvania Super Lawyers and Rising Stars Honorees

News

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 Pennsylvania Super Lawyers and Rising Stars Honorees

business meeting photo

Result

Summary Judgment Obtained in Insurance Coverage Case

Four Marshall Dennehey Attorneys Selected 2026 “Top Lawyers” by Delaware Today Magazine

News

Four Marshall Dennehey Attorneys Selected 2026 “Top Lawyers” by Delaware Today Magazine

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Result

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.