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Jillian L. Dinehart

Portrait of Jillian L. Dinehart

Jillian is a member of the firm’s Professional Liability Department where she focuses her practice across a broad spectrum of professional liability matters, including but not limited to, the defense of municipalities and their employees, non profit directors and officers, real estate professionals, insurance agents and brokers, and employers. She has practiced in both state and federal courts, handles appeals, and has argued before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. 

Jillian has been defending municipalities and their employees since 2013 and she has continued this practice with Marshall Dennehey, now leading the Cleveland office’s professional liability practice.  Although varied, Jillian’s public-sector liability practice focuses on police practices, sovereign immunity issues as well as labor and employment claims. Her employment practice extends to private employers, defending claims before the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, the EEOC, Ohio and federal courts regarding discrimination, harassment and retaliation, including claims brought pursuant to Title VII, the ADA, ADEA, the FMLA, trade secret litigation, whistleblower actions, housing discrimination and related tort claims.   

In her real estate work, Jillian has a strong track record of obtaining favorable results for real estate agents, real estate brokers, title agents, and home inspectors in cases brought against them related to alleged negligence, misrepresentation, disclosure errors, and contract disputes.  Jillian also concentrates her practice on D&O liability defending condominium and homeowners associations, as well as their directors, officers, and property managers, in matters involving alleged breaches of fiduciary duty, declaration disputes, real property document issues, and FHA, HUD and Fair Housing claims.  Additionally, she routinely defends insurance agents and brokers and miscellaneous professionals in matters pertaining to negligence, errors and omissions.  Jillian also has lived experience in non-profit D&O liability as a volunteer president of the board to a local community development corporation.

Further, Jillian’s practice extends to privacy and data breach matters, where she helps clients manage cyber risk and navigate incident response, containment, and compliance obligations. She also has experience defending corporate and individual insureds in product liability, construction, premises liability, and personal injury claims. 

A native of New York’s Finger Lakes region, Jillian earned her Bachelor’s Degree in Political Science from SUNY Albany. She received her juris doctor from Case Western Reserve University School of Law, where she launched her litigation career as an award winning student in the Criminal Defense Clinic. Before joining the firm in 2017, she gained valuable public sector experience as a judicial staff attorney and assistant director of law—skills she continues to draw upon in her advocacy for political subdivision clients.

Outside the office, Jillian can often be found enjoying live music or exploring the Cleveland MetroParks with her husband and their dogs.

    • Case Western Reserve University School of Law (J.D., 2010)
    • State University of New York at Albany (B.A., magna cum laude, 2006)
    • Ohio, 2010
    • U.S. District Court Northern District of Ohio, 2014
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 6th Circuit, 2015
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan, 2026
    • The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch®, Health Care Law (2023)
    • The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch©, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants (2024)
    • The Best Lawyers in America©, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants (2026-2027)
    • American Bar Association
    • Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association
    • Ohio Personal Injury Litigation: Secrets Only the Top Attorneys Know, National Business Institute (NBI) Webinar, December 15, 2022
    • Political Subdivision Tort Liability, Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, August 2015
    • Brief Advice Clinic with Legal Aid Society of Greater Cleveland, 2009
    • Immigration Clinic with Catholic Charities, 2009
    • AmeriCorps Service Member benefitting Legal Aid of Western New York, 2009
    • Jillian’s Motion to Dismiss was affirmed on appeal after the Ninth District Court of Appeals found that Plaintiff had sued a non sui juris entity by suing a county department in a personal injury suit.  The Plaintiff initially filed suit against the department, and later dismissed without prejudice to allow more time to develop Plaintiff’s medical records.  When he refiled his suit, he again named a county department as the defendant.  Jillian filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that a county department does not have the capacity to be sued.  Plaintiff then filed a Motion to Amend the Complaint and named the county.  Jillian then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint arguing that the plaintiff was outside of the statute of limitations and that the change in defendant could not relate back to the originally filed suit.  Plaintiff’s argument that naming the department was merely a misnomer and that the Amended Complaint should relate back to the original filing failed and the trial court dismissed the case.  After oral argument, the appellate court affirmed the decision.
    • In 2023, Jillian went to trial in a motor-vehicle accident case in which she represented a driver that had died while the case was pending.  There was also a large, financially successful, corporate co-defendant represented by other counsel.  The plaintiff had sustained a broken arm in the accident that was surgically repaired.  Jillian’s client had admitted liability, so the case was solely to be heard on the value of the injury, and the liability of the corporate co-defendant.  Likely counting on the deep pockets of the co-defendant, the Plaintiff’s pre-suit demand was not rationally related to the injury or in the realm of similar verdicts in the region.  During the first day of trial, Jillian formed a clear rapport with the jury panel, often engaging in friendly banter with the potential jurors about their own experiences in car accidents, injuries similar to the plaintiff’s, and the social impact of surgical scars.  This rapport was in direct contrast to a very dry voir dire by plaintiff’s counsel and was bolstered by a similarly friendly voir dire by the co-defendant’s counsel.  The parties completed their opening statements and returned to court in the morning, at which time the plaintiff asked to engage in settlement discussions.  As a result of Jillian’s trial performance, the case settlement for $1.5 Million less than the plaintiff’s demand the day before trial.

Results

Successfully Defended a Suburban Mayor in a Defamation Case

We successfully defended an appeal of a trial court decision dismissing a defamation claim against a suburban mayor. The plaintiff, a former police officer, brought actions against a former city mayor and related defendants, asserting defamation, false light and related claims. The plaintiff alleged that statements made during a press conference disparaged him and violated a non-disparagement clause in his separation agreement. The court ruled the defamation and false light claims were correctly barred by the one-year statute of limitations under R.C. 2305.11(A) where the saving statute, R.C. 2305.19(A), permitted refiling in federal court, but did not toll limitations for subsequent state filings after the federal court dismissal. The appellate court also found the former mayor’s statements, regarding police leaders who allegedly retaliated against her, were deemed truthful and, thus, not defamatory or disparaging.   

Summary Judgment Won in Slip and Fall Case Involving a Large Supermarket Chain

We won summary judgment in Franklin County, Ohio, for a large supermarket chain in a slip-and-fall case. The plaintiff alleged he slipped and fell in the parking lot on ice that remained more than two days after the most recent snow fall and after the lot had been plowed and salted by a co-defendant. The plaintiff’s expert opined that no amount of remaining snow or ice is acceptable and that the standard of care according to the Ohio Building Code requires complete removal in order to maintain a “slip-resistant” surface. However, in Ohio, a premises owner is not liable for natural accumulations of snow and ice because persons are expected to appreciate the danger. The plaintiff’s expert did not opine as to what the defendants should have done, other than to completely remove the snow and ice. The court struck the plaintiff’s expert’s untested opinion as being unhelpful to a jury and found that the Ohio Building Code did not apply to the plaintiff’s pleadings without a claim for negligence per se. In disregarding the expert opinions, the court also found that the remaining snow and ice was “natural,” even though there had been attempted removal.

Thought Leadership

Case Law Alerts

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

November 3, 2026

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Case Law Alerts

Sixth Circuit Recognizes Heckler’s Veto Theory in Limited Public Forum

July 21, 2026

The Sixth Circuit reversed the Southern District of Ohio and ordered the district court to grant a preliminary injunction finding a strong likelihood of success on the merits of the plaintiff’s free speech claim related to an attempted public comment at a school board meeting. The plaintiff began to offer public comment by reading a written statement at a school board meeting when the board president cut off the microphone and put the meeting into recess. The board’s reaction followed a comment that the school district was failing and that the superintendent was a coward for not addressing critical race theory in the school curriculum. Per board policy, the speakers were allocated five minutes to make a statement. The plaintiff began her statement citing her various public roles in the region, then began to voice her disapproval of the board’s reluctance to audit the school curriculum against critical race theory. At 28 seconds into her speech, the plaintiff stated that she “recently heard about the failing Xenia Board of Education and the cowardice (sic) superintendent who cannot perform adequately in his role…”  The board president interrupted the plaintiff, shouting over her and threatening to cut the mic. The plaintiff continued to calmly read her prepared statement. The crowd began to loudly boo the plaintiff after the board’s threat. Board President Grech then moved the meeting into a recess. The plaintiff continued to speak over the booing crowd. A few seconds later, Board President Grech took the microphone away from the plaintiff but she continued speaking loudly without a mic as the board left the room. Although others were allowed to speak after the meeting resumed, the plaintiff was not permitted to complete her five minutes of public comment.  The plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action asserting a First Amendment claim under a “heckler’s veto” theory and sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the board from enforcing its policy against her speech at future meetings. Board policy provided for five minutes of individual public comment but allowed the presiding officer to interrupt, warn, or terminate speech when the comments are repetitive, obscene, or constitute a true threat. The policy also allowed the presiding officer to request that an individual stop speaking or leave the meeting when the speaker is disruptive to the meeting, and should that fail, call for a recess or order the disorderly person removed. The board alleged that they halted the plaintiff’s speech because she was venturing down the path of name-calling, she was directly addressing the superintendent as opposed to the entire board, and that her conduct incited the crowd. In a hearing before the district court, Board President Grech agreed that she stopped the plaintiff from speaking because she was spreading baseless accusations and name calling. Notably, the board also chided another speaker for speaking just to the superintendent and not to the entire board, but did not take further action. That speaker spoke in favor of the superintendent. The plaintiff testified that despite her desire to speak again she felt threatened and a “little frightened” about speaking at a Xenia Board meeting without court intervention. Although the district court found that some of the plaintiff’s speech was protected, it found that the phrase “cowardice (sic) superintendent” was an unprotected ad hominem attack. The district court did not reach the question of whether the board’s regulation of the plaintiff’s speech was reasonable, finding that it was a fact question that could not be resolved at the hearing. The district court denied the injunction because the record at times favored each side of the dispute and therefore there was no clear indication that the plaintiff would succeed on the merits of the claim. Reversing the district court, the Sixth Circuit found that descriptors such as “failing” and “cowardice” are protected by the First Amendment, even in a limited public forum. The Circuit court stated that even if the plaintiff’s speech was offensive, the First Amendment protects that speech because anything less would allow the government to ban the expression of unpopular views. Regardless of the forum or the risk of offending some, viewpoint discrimination is impermissible. The court continued to state that it has never held that an ad hominem attack is per se unprotected speech, but further, that plaintiff’s speech was not an ad hominem attack (a personal dig or affront, or the criticism of an adversary’s character as opposed to the substance of the adversary’s arguments). As to the heckler’s veto arguments, for the first time the Circuit applied the Heckler’s Veto theory to a limited public forum and held that the board’s conduct amounted to a heckler’s veto. The First Amendment does not permit the government to curtail speech by succumbing to the crowd’s reaction to it. Removing a speaker due to crowd hostility will “seldom, if ever, constitute the least restrictive means available to serve a legitimate government purpose.” The court noted that in this case, not only did the board sanction the heckler’s veto, but in fact gave rise to it by threatening to turn off the microphone which only riled up the audience. Finally, the court also found that the equitable factors of a preliminary injunction – the likelihood to suffer irreparable harm – was satisfied with the possible curtailment of future speech. The court did not offer much analysis on this, but seems to imply that simply saying that there is a future intention to speak and that one is a “little frightened” to do so is enough. However, it seems most likely that the Court found the board’s action so distasteful that it did not put much analysis into this element and accepted the Plaintiff’s assertions without question. Aside from the ruling on speech protections – the court offers an interesting rebuke of the district court’s determination that the reasonableness of the board’s reaction was a question of fact, holding:  “A factual finding is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.  Here, the district court failed to make definitive credibility determinations, or probe into Grech’s testimony. Instead the district court framed the facts in the light most favorable to each side, and then determined it was too close to call. But courts have to make these calls, even the tough ones. The correct call here is that defendants provided no legitimate reason to regulate Boddy’s speech because Boddy shared views critical of the Board and Lofton.” There are a range of citable moments in this opinion, including Judge Bush’s own soapbox speech on the importance of protecting speech in the current political times in the concurrence!

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.