Jillian is a member of the firm’s Professional Liability Department where she focuses her practice across a broad spectrum of professional liability matters, including but not limited to, the defense of municipalities and their employees, non profit directors and officers, real estate professionals, insurance agents and brokers, and employers. She has practiced in both state and federal courts, handles appeals, and has argued before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Jillian has been defending municipalities and their employees since 2013 and she has continued this practice with Marshall Dennehey, now leading the Cleveland office’s professional liability practice. Although varied, Jillian’s public-sector liability practice focuses on police practices, sovereign immunity issues as well as labor and employment claims. Her employment practice extends to private employers, defending claims before the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, the EEOC, Ohio and federal courts regarding discrimination, harassment and retaliation, including claims brought pursuant to Title VII, the ADA, ADEA, the FMLA, trade secret litigation, whistleblower actions, housing discrimination and related tort claims.
In her real estate work, Jillian has a strong track record of obtaining favorable results for real estate agents, real estate brokers, title agents, and home inspectors in cases brought against them related to alleged negligence, misrepresentation, disclosure errors, and contract disputes. Jillian also concentrates her practice on D&O liability defending condominium and homeowners associations, as well as their directors, officers, and property managers, in matters involving alleged breaches of fiduciary duty, declaration disputes, real property document issues, and FHA, HUD and Fair Housing claims. Additionally, she routinely defends insurance agents and brokers and miscellaneous professionals in matters pertaining to negligence, errors and omissions. Jillian also has lived experience in non-profit D&O liability as a volunteer president of the board to a local community development corporation.
Further, Jillian’s practice extends to privacy and data breach matters, where she helps clients manage cyber risk and navigate incident response, containment, and compliance obligations. She also has experience defending corporate and individual insureds in product liability, construction, premises liability, and personal injury claims.
A native of New York’s Finger Lakes region, Jillian earned her Bachelor’s Degree in Political Science from SUNY Albany. She received her juris doctor from Case Western Reserve University School of Law, where she launched her litigation career as an award winning student in the Criminal Defense Clinic. Before joining the firm in 2017, she gained valuable public sector experience as a judicial staff attorney and assistant director of law—skills she continues to draw upon in her advocacy for political subdivision clients.
Outside the office, Jillian can often be found enjoying live music or exploring the Cleveland MetroParks with her husband and their dogs.
Results
Successfully Defended a Suburban Mayor in a Defamation Case
We successfully defended an appeal of a trial court decision dismissing a defamation claim against a suburban mayor. The plaintiff, a former police officer, brought actions against a former city mayor and related defendants, asserting defamation, false light and related claims. The plaintiff alleged that statements made during a press conference disparaged him and violated a non-disparagement clause in his separation agreement. The court ruled the defamation and false light claims were correctly barred by the one-year statute of limitations under R.C. 2305.11(A) where the saving statute, R.C. 2305.19(A), permitted refiling in federal court, but did not toll limitations for subsequent state filings after the federal court dismissal. The appellate court also found the former mayor’s statements, regarding police leaders who allegedly retaliated against her, were deemed truthful and, thus, not defamatory or disparaging.
Summary Judgment Won in Slip and Fall Case Involving a Large Supermarket Chain
We won summary judgment in Franklin County, Ohio, for a large supermarket chain in a slip-and-fall case. The plaintiff alleged he slipped and fell in the parking lot on ice that remained more than two days after the most recent snow fall and after the lot had been plowed and salted by a co-defendant. The plaintiff’s expert opined that no amount of remaining snow or ice is acceptable and that the standard of care according to the Ohio Building Code requires complete removal in order to maintain a “slip-resistant” surface. However, in Ohio, a premises owner is not liable for natural accumulations of snow and ice because persons are expected to appreciate the danger. The plaintiff’s expert did not opine as to what the defendants should have done, other than to completely remove the snow and ice. The court struck the plaintiff’s expert’s untested opinion as being unhelpful to a jury and found that the Ohio Building Code did not apply to the plaintiff’s pleadings without a claim for negligence per se. In disregarding the expert opinions, the court also found that the remaining snow and ice was “natural,” even though there had been attempted removal.
Thought Leadership
Case Law Alerts
Sixth Circuit Recognizes Heckler’s Veto Theory in Limited Public Forum
July 21, 2026
The Sixth Circuit reversed the Southern District of Ohio and ordered the district court to grant a preliminary injunction finding a strong likelihood of success on the merits of the plaintiff’s free speech claim related to an attempted public comment at a school board meeting. The plaintiff began to offer public comment by reading a written statement at a school board meeting when the board president cut off the microphone and put the meeting into recess. The board’s reaction followed a comment that the school district was failing and that the superintendent was a coward for not addressing critical race theory in the school curriculum. Per board policy, the speakers were allocated five minutes to make a statement. The plaintiff began her statement citing her various public roles in the region, then began to voice her disapproval of the board’s reluctance to audit the school curriculum against critical race theory. At 28 seconds into her speech, the plaintiff stated that she “recently heard about the failing Xenia Board of Education and the cowardice (sic) superintendent who cannot perform adequately in his role…” The board president interrupted the plaintiff, shouting over her and threatening to cut the mic. The plaintiff continued to calmly read her prepared statement. The crowd began to loudly boo the plaintiff after the board’s threat. Board President Grech then moved the meeting into a recess. The plaintiff continued to speak over the booing crowd. A few seconds later, Board President Grech took the microphone away from the plaintiff but she continued speaking loudly without a mic as the board left the room. Although others were allowed to speak after the meeting resumed, the plaintiff was not permitted to complete her five minutes of public comment. The plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action asserting a First Amendment claim under a “heckler’s veto” theory and sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the board from enforcing its policy against her speech at future meetings. Board policy provided for five minutes of individual public comment but allowed the presiding officer to interrupt, warn, or terminate speech when the comments are repetitive, obscene, or constitute a true threat. The policy also allowed the presiding officer to request that an individual stop speaking or leave the meeting when the speaker is disruptive to the meeting, and should that fail, call for a recess or order the disorderly person removed. The board alleged that they halted the plaintiff’s speech because she was venturing down the path of name-calling, she was directly addressing the superintendent as opposed to the entire board, and that her conduct incited the crowd. In a hearing before the district court, Board President Grech agreed that she stopped the plaintiff from speaking because she was spreading baseless accusations and name calling. Notably, the board also chided another speaker for speaking just to the superintendent and not to the entire board, but did not take further action. That speaker spoke in favor of the superintendent. The plaintiff testified that despite her desire to speak again she felt threatened and a “little frightened” about speaking at a Xenia Board meeting without court intervention. Although the district court found that some of the plaintiff’s speech was protected, it found that the phrase “cowardice (sic) superintendent” was an unprotected ad hominem attack. The district court did not reach the question of whether the board’s regulation of the plaintiff’s speech was reasonable, finding that it was a fact question that could not be resolved at the hearing. The district court denied the injunction because the record at times favored each side of the dispute and therefore there was no clear indication that the plaintiff would succeed on the merits of the claim. Reversing the district court, the Sixth Circuit found that descriptors such as “failing” and “cowardice” are protected by the First Amendment, even in a limited public forum. The Circuit court stated that even if the plaintiff’s speech was offensive, the First Amendment protects that speech because anything less would allow the government to ban the expression of unpopular views. Regardless of the forum or the risk of offending some, viewpoint discrimination is impermissible. The court continued to state that it has never held that an ad hominem attack is per se unprotected speech, but further, that plaintiff’s speech was not an ad hominem attack (a personal dig or affront, or the criticism of an adversary’s character as opposed to the substance of the adversary’s arguments). As to the heckler’s veto arguments, for the first time the Circuit applied the Heckler’s Veto theory to a limited public forum and held that the board’s conduct amounted to a heckler’s veto. The First Amendment does not permit the government to curtail speech by succumbing to the crowd’s reaction to it. Removing a speaker due to crowd hostility will “seldom, if ever, constitute the least restrictive means available to serve a legitimate government purpose.” The court noted that in this case, not only did the board sanction the heckler’s veto, but in fact gave rise to it by threatening to turn off the microphone which only riled up the audience. Finally, the court also found that the equitable factors of a preliminary injunction – the likelihood to suffer irreparable harm – was satisfied with the possible curtailment of future speech. The court did not offer much analysis on this, but seems to imply that simply saying that there is a future intention to speak and that one is a “little frightened” to do so is enough. However, it seems most likely that the Court found the board’s action so distasteful that it did not put much analysis into this element and accepted the Plaintiff’s assertions without question. Aside from the ruling on speech protections – the court offers an interesting rebuke of the district court’s determination that the reasonableness of the board’s reaction was a question of fact, holding: “A factual finding is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Here, the district court failed to make definitive credibility determinations, or probe into Grech’s testimony. Instead the district court framed the facts in the light most favorable to each side, and then determined it was too close to call. But courts have to make these calls, even the tough ones. The correct call here is that defendants provided no legitimate reason to regulate Boddy’s speech because Boddy shared views critical of the Board and Lofton.” There are a range of citable moments in this opinion, including Judge Bush’s own soapbox speech on the importance of protecting speech in the current political times in the concurrence!
Case Law Alerts
Aw Heck, As-Applied Challenges do not Implicate a Conviction
April 1, 2026
A new ruling from SCOTUS gives a lesson in Greek mythology, but more importantly makes it a near certainty that civil-rights plaintiffs will be able to run their malicious prosecution suit through summary judgment, despite a conviction. The oral argument led many to believe that the justices felt this was a complicated case, but in Olivier v. City of Brandon, a unanimous Court found that a suit that seeks prospective relief from arrest is not barred by the previous ruling in Heck v. Humphrey. Heck holds that a civil suit cannot invalidate a criminal conviction and is most often cited in cases arguing dismissal of a malicious prosecution claim because the plaintiff had been found guilty of the relevant charge. However, under Olivier, if the same plaintiff pleads prospective injunctive relief, the case may continue without an ad damnum request for damages. The result is an as-applied constitutional challenge of the law under which the plaintiff was convicted. There is no question that there is merit in reviewing the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances – but the as-applied challenge comes with significant expense and limited functional results. The Court even acknowledges that for Olivier to succeed in his suit for prospective relief, a court would find “something past should not have occurred” – that “something past” being a conviction in most cases. To come to this conclusion and avoid the implications of Heck, Justice Kagan drew a parallel to a citizen that seeks to enjoin enforcement of an ordinance that would prevent the plaintiff from exercising his free speech in the manner he desires – of course before the exercise actually occurs. There is no question that Heck does not apply in the case of a preliminary injunction, but Olivier presents an interesting glance into a criminal justice system that allows an accused to challenge the constitutionality during the criminal trial, get convicted, then challenge the constitutionality again in a civil suit. Practitioners should consider a request for prospective relief as an as-applied constitutional challenge that will likely need to be briefed at the summary judgment stage, therefore requiring discovery into the circumstances of the arrest.
News
106 Marshall Dennehey Attorneys Recognized in the 2027 Editions of The Best Lawyers in America® and the Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch® in America
August 20, 2026
98 Marshall Dennehey Attorneys Recognized in the 2027 Editions of The Best Lawyers in America® and the Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch® in America
August 20, 2025
