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Jennifer M. Meyers

Portrait of Jennifer M. Meyers

Jennifer is a Shareholder in the firm's Casualty Department, where she handles all areas of general liability litigation. She has significant experience in a wide range of matters, including personal injury, premises liability, retail liability, and automobile liability. Jennifer has litigated a broad spectrum of cases, including slip and falls, property damage, motor vehicle accidents, dog bites, construction defects, mold exposure, and labor law. As a litigator, Jennifer passionately advocates for her clients in every case she handles and has brought her cases to successful resolution through trial, mediation and motion practice.  

Throughout her career, Jennifer has emphasized the importance of working closely with her clients to develop successful case strategies and effective litigation plans tailored to the unique issues presented by each case she works on. Jennifer also prides herself on her ability to develop good working relationships with her adversaries which ultimately benefit her clients and lead to greater success in the cases she handles.

Before joining the firm in 2015, Jennifer's practice was concentrated in professional liability insurance coverage with a focus on errors and omissions coverage for securities broker/dealers and registered representatives. In this role, Jennifer also assisted in the drafting of insurance policies.

Jennifer graduated from American University in Washington, DC in 2006, with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Public Communications and a minor in Business Administration. She received her juris doctor in 2010, graduating cum laude from Pace Law School.  During her time in law school, Jennifer served as president of the American Constitution Society, participated in Moot Court and volunteered with the Unemployment Action Center.

    • The Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University (J.D., cum laude, 2010)
    • American University (B.A., 2006)
    • New York, 2011
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of New York, 2016
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of New York, 2016
    • The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch©, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants (2022)
    • Hudson Valley Magazine, Top Lawyer (2022)
    • Westchester Women's Bar Association, January 2015
    • Pre-suit Litigation: How to Effectively Investigate Your Claim, Marshall Dennehey Client Presentation, January 25th, 2023
    • Best Billing Practices, CLE Client Seminar, May 2, 2014
    • "When is it Too Late to Change Your Theory of the Case?" New York Law Journal, Litigation Special Report, March 13, 2023
    • Obtained summary judgment dismissing third-party plaintiff's claims for contribution and indemnification on behalf of a snow removal contractor, in a case where parties failed to demonstrate any breach of duty owed by the snow removal contractor.
    • Won two appeals before the Appellate Division, Second Department. We represented an out-of-possession landlord in a personal injury action which became the subject to two appeals before the Appellate Division, Second Department. The plaintiff worked in retail and was allegedly injured due to a claimed defect to the front door. After we moved for summary judgment, the plaintiff opposed our motion and made an entirely new allegation of liability against our client. She also sought leave to amend her bill of particulars to assert this new claim. The plaintiff's motion to amend was granted, and our motion for summary judgment was denied with leave to renew after additional discovery relating to the plaintiff's new claim. We appealed this decision. The Appellate Court unanimously reversed the decision granting the plaintiff's motion to amend and reversed its order denying summary judgment, finding that our insured was an out-of-possession landlord. With respect to the second appeal, after the plaintiff was given leave to amend her bill of particulars, we conducted further discovery and moved for summary judgment a second time, and we won this motion. The court agreed with our position that our client was an out-of-possession landlord, and the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate notice. The plaintiff appealed this decision. The Appellate Court unanimously dismissed her appeal. 
    • Obtained summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's case on the grounds that plaintiff did not put forth sufficient evidence establishing her claim that she sustained a "Serious Injury" pursuant to New York State Insurance Law § 5102(d).
    • Obtained a defense verdict in a property damage trial, where the plaintiff was claiming ongoing flooding and damage to her condominium.
    • Obtained summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's case in a personal injury action where the plaintiff was a passenger on a school bus involved in an accident. Jennifer demonstrated that plaintiff did not put forth sufficient evidence establishing her claim that she sustained a "Serious Injury" pursuant to New York State Insurance Law § 5102(d).
    • Obtained summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's case in a slip and fall action, where the plaintiff failed to establish creation or notice, and therefore, could not prove any negligence on the part of the condominium.
    • Obtained summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims against an out of possession landlord following a workplace injury.
    • Obtained summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint in a personal injury action wherein the plaintiff claimed she fell on a defective sidewalk in Yonkers, New York.

Thought Leadership

Case Law Alerts

Federal Court Dismisses Portions of Plaintiff’s Claims Against Insurer for Failing to Pay UIM Benefits

October 1, 2023

The plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident and claims to have sustained serious personal injuries. The plaintiff had $600,000 in underinsured/uninsured motorist coverage with his insurer. The plaintiff settled his primary underinsured claim and the third-party bodily injury claim with the tortfeasor for the total policy limits and for the majority of the primary uninsured limits.  The plaintiff claimed that his insurer delayed in paying the UIM benefits. In its defense of USAA, Marshall Dennehey moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint, and we successfully knocked out a number of the plaintiff’s claims, including the claim for bad faith. Interestingly, the court determined that the plaintiff did not allege sufficient grounds as a matter of law to establish bad faith—noting that “negligence or bad judgment does not equate to bad faith.”  This determination appears to narrow the application of the second prong establishing bad faith, which requires that the insurer “knew or recklessly disregarded the lack of reasonable basis.”      Case Law Alerts, 4th Quarter, October 2023 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

Case Law Alerts

Federal District Court Finds that Mental Health Records Are Not Discoverable Under Ohio State Law

October 1, 2023

While the plaintiff claimed that, following his motor vehicle accident with the defendants’ semi-trailer truck, he suffered from “head pain, neck pain, headaches, sensitivity to light, sensitivity to sound, trouble concentrating, memory loss…and mental anguish,” the defendants were denied the right to obtain the plaintiff’s mental health records as they were deemed unrelated to the subject claim.      Case Law Alerts, 4th Quarter, October 2023 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.