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Westchester

Marshall Dennehey established its Westchester County office - the firm's third office in New York State - in July 2014. Our key Westchester County location complements and expands upon the firm's existing offerings in Manhattan and Melville, Long Island.

Marshall Dennehey's expansion in New York is precipitated by the considerable growth of Westchester and the surrounding community as a regional commercial center over the past few decades. The county serves as a vibrant cross-section of business operations for numerous companies headquartered in Manhattan and across the Northeast corridor.

The Westchester office services clients in the county and throughout the entire New York Tri-State region. Staffed with attorneys in our Casualty, Health Care and Professional Liability Departments, the office's lawyers represent clients in all manner of civil defense litigation including premises, product and general liability; medical and dental malpractice defense; and professional liability matters.

Thought Leadership

Case Law Alerts

Virginia Federal Court Blocks U.S. DOT’s Attempt to Obtain 17 Million Commercial Driver Records from the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators

November 3, 2026

On August 13, 2026, in the Eastern District of Virginia, two coalitions of attorneys general from more than twenty states and the District of Columbia filed lawsuits seeking Temporary Restraining Orders against the the U.S. DOT, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration to stop the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) from turning over more than seventeen million commercial driver records. The AAMVA maintains the Commercial Driver’s License Information System (CDLIS) pursuant to its contract with the U.S. DOT. This system ensures that commercial driver’s license applicants only hold one driver’s license and possess only one complete driving record, which prevents the issuance of commercial driver’s licenses to applicants who have a recorded history of unsafe driving. The demand from the U.S. DOT sought the name, date of birth, state of record, license number, and Social Security Number for every driver in the CDLIS database for five years, as well as the date the Social Security Number was removed from the record if any record previously listed, but no longer had, a Social Security Number attached. Plaintiff states argue that the request violated privacy laws, while the federal government asserts that it is entitled to the records pursuant to the contract between the U.S. DOT and the AAMVA. The Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order on August 21, 2026. On September 17, 2026, the Court granted a preliminary injunction blocking the provision of the AAMVA records and ordered that the federal government is not permitted to take any adverse actions against the AAMVA, including previously threatened cancellation of grants and even the contract with the AAMVA to maintain the CDLIS. At present, without further action, the federal government does not and cannot have access to the AAMVA records sought.

Case Law Alerts

UPDATE: Supreme Court Issues Decision Exposing Freight Brokers to Liability For Negligent Hiring

November 3, 2026

In May 2026, with a unanimous 9-0 decision, the Supreme Court determined that the statutory protections provided by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA) did not bar state law claims against freight brokers for negligent hiring. The FAAAA expressly preempts state regulations affecting prices, routes, and various services provided by freight carriers and brokers. However, the decision notes that the FAAAA contains a specific carveout which permits such state law claims. Specifically, the FAAAA provides for the states to preserve their own safety regulatory authority regarding motor vehicles. The Supreme Court interpreted this language to mean that while states did not have the authority to interfere with business operations of freight carriers and brokers, carrier selection by a broker is not a matter of business operations. Rather, the states have the authority to regulate roadway safety, and negligent hiring falls squarely within the state’s authority.

Results

Summary Judgment Won in Nearly Decade-Long Slip and Fall Case

We won summary judgment on nine-year-old supermarket slip and fall case. The plaintiff claimed that she tripped and fell on the corner of a pallet/box of watermelons in the defendant's produce section in Newburgh, New York, where customers first walk in. The plaintiff admitted she did not see the pallet or its corner and was not looking where she was walking. After her fall, she underwent multiple surgeries, including cervical fusion. Her attorney’s demand was $4 million. The defense motion argued that the watermelon pallet was a temporary merchandise display which was open and obvious to all to be seen with common sense. Indeed, customers walked by the pallet display before and after the plaintiff’s accident at a rate of dozens per day. The store put the watermelons out in this manner as part of its display policy because the melons are delivered in cartons on pallets that cannot be taken apart. The plaintiff argued in opposition that the pallet was a hazardous defect the store created and had notice of. The plaintiff submitted an expert engineer, who claimed the display violated American Society of Testing Materials’ (ASTM) designation F1637-10 regarding safe walkway surfaces. We submitted a rebuttal engineer, who demonstrated the ASTM standard asserted by the plaintiff applied to permanent structures—like floors and buildings—not the temporary pallet, and that the standard did not exist on the day of the accident. In granting summary judgment, the court concluded that while a landowner must act reasonably in maintaining its property in a reasonably safe condition, it is not an insurer of ordinary obstacles that are readily apparent as a matter of common sense and visibility.

Emotional Distress Claims Barred in Case Where Dog Was Run Over by Delivery Truck

The plaintiff pet owners brought claims of emotional/bystander distress and recklessness against the delivery service after personally witnessing the incident that tragically killed their family dog. We filed a Motion to Strike (equivalent of 12b(6) in State of Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of Fairfield at Bridgeport), citing appellate authority that, because dogs are personal property and bystander distress arises out of human-to-human relationships, plaintiffs were barred from alleging and recovering any kind of emotional distress damages. Only the fair market value purchase cost of the pet should be permitted. The plaintiffs cited recent trial court decisions allowing such claims and going against the grain of older appellate cases. After oral argument the court sided with the defense, agreeing that for important policy concerns the plaintiff cannot prevail because the plaintiffs were asking the court to legislate and make law beyond its authoritative powers.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.