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Westchester

Marshall Dennehey established its Westchester County office - the firm's third office in New York State - in July 2014. Our key Westchester County location complements and expands upon the firm's existing offerings in Manhattan and Melville, Long Island.

Marshall Dennehey's expansion in New York is precipitated by the considerable growth of Westchester and the surrounding community as a regional commercial center over the past few decades. The county serves as a vibrant cross-section of business operations for numerous companies headquartered in Manhattan and across the Northeast corridor.

The Westchester office services clients in the county and throughout the entire New York Tri-State region. Staffed with attorneys in our Casualty, Health Care and Professional Liability Departments, the office's lawyers represent clients in all manner of civil defense litigation including premises, product and general liability; medical and dental malpractice defense; and professional liability matters.

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers

New York Court Rejects Tolling Argument in Negligent‑Procurement Suit Filed After Coverage Litigation

May 7, 2026

Johnson v. Northeast Agencies, Inc., 242 A.D.3d 414 (1st Dep’t 2025) One of the recurring challenges in professional liability litigation—especially in claims against insurance brokers—is determining exactly when a claim “accrues” for purposes of the statute of limitations. The case of Johnson v. Northeast Agencies, Inc., 242 A.D.3d 414 (1st Dep’t 2025), presented a twist on this familiar issue. It raised the question of when the statute of limitations began to run on a negligent‑procurement claim against an insurance broker. In this case, a claim under a general liability policy was made in March 2018, following the commencement of a personal injury action against the owner of a rental property. A month later, the insurer issued a disclaimer of coverage, explaining that, among other reasons, the property where the injury occurred was not listed as an “insured location” under the policy. Ordinarily, such a disclaimer would start the clock on any negligent‑procurement claim against the broker, but here, despite disclaiming coverage, the insured was not immediately negatively impacted by the coverage disclaimer because the insurer agreed to provide a defense to the insured while the parties litigated the validity of the disclaimer in a separate declaratory judgment action. Eventually, the court in the declaratory judgment action upheld the insurer’s disclaimer, confirming that the property was indeed not an insured location under the policy. Only after that ruling—more than five years after the original disclaimer—did the insured file suit against the broker for negligent failure to procure the requested coverage.  However, the statute of limitations for negligent failure to procure claims in New York State is three years. The insured argued that the insurer’s continued defense during the declaratory judgment action effectively masked the significance of the disclaimer and should be treated as tolling the statute of limitations. The insured contended that it was reasonable to wait for the outcome of the coverage litigation before pursuing a claim against the broker, because the insurer’s defense created uncertainty about whether the disclaimer would ultimately stand. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected this argument. The courts held that the claim accrued when the disclaimer letter was issued, because that was the moment the insured was placed on notice of the broker’s alleged negligence. The insurer’s voluntary defense during the declaratory judgment action did not create ambiguity about the disclaimer or delay the accrual of the claim.  Going forward, insureds will likely not wait for a final coverage determination before pursuing a negligent‑procurement claim against insurance brokers. Insureds who prefer to wait for the outcome of a coverage dispute will need to secure tolling agreements to avoid losing their claims against brokers due to expired statute of limitations periods.

Case Law Alerts

Court Limits UIM Recovery to Named Insured After Plaintiff Seeks Additional Household Coverage

April 1, 2026

The plaintiff, a resident of Erie County, New York, was legally traversing a four-way stop intersection when his vehicle was struck by a tortfeasor after she ran a stop sign. As a result, the plaintiff sustained extensive and severe injuries requiring medical care for the rest of his life. This medical care was valued far in excess of the tortfeasor’s auto insurance policy, as well as the plaintiff’s own underinsured motorist coverage. After settling with the tortfeasor for her New York State minimum policy limits, the plaintiff attempted to collect underinsured motorist coverage under both his own auto policy and his parents’ auto policy, as he still lived in their home, despite that the vehicle involved in the collision was being insured only under his own policy. The defendant insurance company argued that the plaintiff was only entitled to the remining funds under his own underinsured motorist policy. Upon the refusal to pay out funds pursuant to the parents’ underinsured motorist policy, the plaintiff brought an insurance bad faith claim against the defendants. After extensive discovery, the plaintiff dropped his bad faith claim and accepted the funds remaining under his own underinsured motorist policy, thereby avoiding a trial and additional exposure of more than triple the ultimate settlement amount.

Results

Summary Judgment Won in Nearly Decade-Long Slip and Fall Case

We won summary judgment on nine-year-old supermarket slip and fall case. The plaintiff claimed that she tripped and fell on the corner of a pallet/box of watermelons in the defendant's produce section in Newburgh, New York, where customers first walk in. The plaintiff admitted she did not see the pallet or its corner and was not looking where she was walking. After her fall, she underwent multiple surgeries, including cervical fusion. Her attorney’s demand was $4 million. The defense motion argued that the watermelon pallet was a temporary merchandise display which was open and obvious to all to be seen with common sense. Indeed, customers walked by the pallet display before and after the plaintiff’s accident at a rate of dozens per day. The store put the watermelons out in this manner as part of its display policy because the melons are delivered in cartons on pallets that cannot be taken apart. The plaintiff argued in opposition that the pallet was a hazardous defect the store created and had notice of. The plaintiff submitted an expert engineer, who claimed the display violated American Society of Testing Materials’ (ASTM) designation F1637-10 regarding safe walkway surfaces. We submitted a rebuttal engineer, who demonstrated the ASTM standard asserted by the plaintiff applied to permanent structures—like floors and buildings—not the temporary pallet, and that the standard did not exist on the day of the accident. In granting summary judgment, the court concluded that while a landowner must act reasonably in maintaining its property in a reasonably safe condition, it is not an insurer of ordinary obstacles that are readily apparent as a matter of common sense and visibility.

Emotional Distress Claims Barred in Case Where Dog Was Run Over by Delivery Truck

The plaintiff pet owners brought claims of emotional/bystander distress and recklessness against the delivery service after personally witnessing the incident that tragically killed their family dog. We filed a Motion to Strike (equivalent of 12b(6) in State of Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of Fairfield at Bridgeport), citing appellate authority that, because dogs are personal property and bystander distress arises out of human-to-human relationships, plaintiffs were barred from alleging and recovering any kind of emotional distress damages. Only the fair market value purchase cost of the pet should be permitted. The plaintiffs cited recent trial court decisions allowing such claims and going against the grain of older appellate cases. After oral argument the court sided with the defense, agreeing that for important policy concerns the plaintiff cannot prevail because the plaintiffs were asking the court to legislate and make law beyond its authoritative powers.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.