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Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers

To Read or Not to Read (Insurance Policies)? That Is the Question

Legal Update for Insurance Agents & Brokers – August 2024

The rule throughout the Commonwealth has long been that an insured’s failure to read the language of an insurance policy does not prohibit them from relying on the representations of an insurance agent in securing insurance. Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court first made this finding in Rempel v. Nationwide Insurance Company, Inc., 471 Pa. 404 (1977), where the beneficiary under a mortgage protection life insurance policy alleged the agent of an insurer misrepresented the extent of coverage under the policy. There, the beneficiary/insured admittedly did not read the language of the policy, however, given the complicated nature of the insurance business as well as the trust that one generally has in their insurance agent, the court found it was not unreasonable for a consumer to rely on the representations of her agent. Thus, to an extent, the old adage, “never sign anything before you read it,” does not apply across the board in insurance context. 

Subsequently, in Pressley v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Corp., 817 A.2d 1131 (Pa. Super. 2003), the Superior Court further lessened the duty of the consumer by finding an insured was not required to read the policy where they had requested a specific type of coverage and were told by the agent that it would be provided. In such a situation, the duty is on the agent to inform the insured that the policy differs from what was requested if, in fact, that is the case. Where the agent fails to discharge that duty, an insured is under no duty to read the policy to uncover the misrepresentation. Thus, insureds are allowed to presume the coverage they have requested is in place, unless they are told otherwise. Conversely, in matters where an insured received precisely the coverage they requested, courts have consistently enforced the plain language of the exclusions and limitations, despite an agent’s failure to inform the insured of the same. 

The courts’ decisions in this context are all based on the “reasonable expectations of the insured.” In Pennsylvania, the traditional rules with respect to contracts do not always apply in the realm of insurance. Instead of the policy language being the guiding light, even where the terms of the policy are clear and unambiguous, the reasonable expectations of the insured are controlling. This “reasonable expectation” analysis is to be employed in matters where an insured alleges deceptive practices, whether it be the misrepresentation of the terms of the policy or the issuance of a policy different than that which was requested by the insured. 
    
More recently, however, the protections afforded by the “reasonable expectations” standard and the insured’s lack of a duty to investigate were somewhat eroded. In Palek v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, 535 F. Supp. 3d 382 (W.D. Pa., April 4, 2021), the homeowners alleged the insurer’s agent misled them regarding the kinds of damages to their in-ground swimming pool that were covered under their homeowners’ insurance policy. In fact, the homeowners alleged the insurer’s agent specifically informed them the policy would “cover their in-ground pool in the event the [pool] was damaged from foreseeable types of harm.” After purchasing the policy, the homeowners’ pool suffered damage as a result of hydrostatic pressure, or a “pool pop.” 

In analyzing the homeowners’ claim for justifiable reliance, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania observed the decisions throughout the Commonwealth, noting consumers do not possess a duty to investigate and read the underlying policy where there are allegations of fraud against an insurer or its agent. The Palek court, however, pointed out that, where there are no allegations of fraud, the duty of an insured to read the language of the policy depends on whether it would be unreasonable not to read the policy under the circumstances. As applicable in Palek, the insurer’s agent represented the policy would cover the “foreseeable” damages to the homeowners’ in-ground pool. It was the presence of this vague representation, or qualifier, that triggered the homeowners’ duty to read the language of the policy. The court noted that:

It is objectively unreasonable for a consumer in [the homeowners’] position to rely, without further inquiry, on an unadorned representation that an insurance policy will provide coverage for ‘foreseeable’ types of harm from the simple reason that such a representation says nothing about what is or is not ‘foreseeable.’  

While consumers are provided latitude with respect to their duty to read the language of an insurance policy, that does not permit cart blanche to claim they justifiably relied on the representations of the insurance company or its agents. As Palek establishes, there is a “reasonable under the circumstances” analysis that must be undertaken by the courts on this issue. While insureds may not have a definitive duty to read the policy language, such a duty can arise depending upon the extent and specifics of any alleged representation by the insurer, or its agent, upon which the insured relied. 


 

Legal Update for Insurance Agents & Brokers, August 2024, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note tgventura@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

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Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.