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Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers

To Read or Not to Read (Insurance Policies)? That Is the Question

Legal Update for Insurance Agents & Brokers – August 2024

The rule throughout the Commonwealth has long been that an insured’s failure to read the language of an insurance policy does not prohibit them from relying on the representations of an insurance agent in securing insurance. Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court first made this finding in Rempel v. Nationwide Insurance Company, Inc., 471 Pa. 404 (1977), where the beneficiary under a mortgage protection life insurance policy alleged the agent of an insurer misrepresented the extent of coverage under the policy. There, the beneficiary/insured admittedly did not read the language of the policy, however, given the complicated nature of the insurance business as well as the trust that one generally has in their insurance agent, the court found it was not unreasonable for a consumer to rely on the representations of her agent. Thus, to an extent, the old adage, “never sign anything before you read it,” does not apply across the board in insurance context. 

Subsequently, in Pressley v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Corp., 817 A.2d 1131 (Pa. Super. 2003), the Superior Court further lessened the duty of the consumer by finding an insured was not required to read the policy where they had requested a specific type of coverage and were told by the agent that it would be provided. In such a situation, the duty is on the agent to inform the insured that the policy differs from what was requested if, in fact, that is the case. Where the agent fails to discharge that duty, an insured is under no duty to read the policy to uncover the misrepresentation. Thus, insureds are allowed to presume the coverage they have requested is in place, unless they are told otherwise. Conversely, in matters where an insured received precisely the coverage they requested, courts have consistently enforced the plain language of the exclusions and limitations, despite an agent’s failure to inform the insured of the same. 

The courts’ decisions in this context are all based on the “reasonable expectations of the insured.” In Pennsylvania, the traditional rules with respect to contracts do not always apply in the realm of insurance. Instead of the policy language being the guiding light, even where the terms of the policy are clear and unambiguous, the reasonable expectations of the insured are controlling. This “reasonable expectation” analysis is to be employed in matters where an insured alleges deceptive practices, whether it be the misrepresentation of the terms of the policy or the issuance of a policy different than that which was requested by the insured. 
    
More recently, however, the protections afforded by the “reasonable expectations” standard and the insured’s lack of a duty to investigate were somewhat eroded. In Palek v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, 535 F. Supp. 3d 382 (W.D. Pa., April 4, 2021), the homeowners alleged the insurer’s agent misled them regarding the kinds of damages to their in-ground swimming pool that were covered under their homeowners’ insurance policy. In fact, the homeowners alleged the insurer’s agent specifically informed them the policy would “cover their in-ground pool in the event the [pool] was damaged from foreseeable types of harm.” After purchasing the policy, the homeowners’ pool suffered damage as a result of hydrostatic pressure, or a “pool pop.” 

In analyzing the homeowners’ claim for justifiable reliance, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania observed the decisions throughout the Commonwealth, noting consumers do not possess a duty to investigate and read the underlying policy where there are allegations of fraud against an insurer or its agent. The Palek court, however, pointed out that, where there are no allegations of fraud, the duty of an insured to read the language of the policy depends on whether it would be unreasonable not to read the policy under the circumstances. As applicable in Palek, the insurer’s agent represented the policy would cover the “foreseeable” damages to the homeowners’ in-ground pool. It was the presence of this vague representation, or qualifier, that triggered the homeowners’ duty to read the language of the policy. The court noted that:

It is objectively unreasonable for a consumer in [the homeowners’] position to rely, without further inquiry, on an unadorned representation that an insurance policy will provide coverage for ‘foreseeable’ types of harm from the simple reason that such a representation says nothing about what is or is not ‘foreseeable.’  

While consumers are provided latitude with respect to their duty to read the language of an insurance policy, that does not permit cart blanche to claim they justifiably relied on the representations of the insurance company or its agents. As Palek establishes, there is a “reasonable under the circumstances” analysis that must be undertaken by the courts on this issue. While insureds may not have a definitive duty to read the policy language, such a duty can arise depending upon the extent and specifics of any alleged representation by the insurer, or its agent, upon which the insured relied. 


 

Legal Update for Insurance Agents & Brokers, August 2024, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note tgventura@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

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Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.