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Eric Scott Thompson

Portrait of Eric Scott Thompson

As a member of the Casualty Department, Eric represents clients in catastrophic injury and damages claims across a range of areas, including product liability, construction defect, motor vehicle, premises liability, commercial and professional liability involving engineers, architects, and dentists. In addition, Eric is an experienced coverage attorney and handles a wide range of both commercial and personal lines coverage matters, including drafting coverage opinions, conducting examinations under oath as well as defending insurers in both breach of contract and bad faith litigation. His practice also encompasses some workers’ compensation matters and appeals, as well as appellate advocacy before the Delaware Superior Court and Supreme Court.

Throughout his twenty-year career litigating cases, Eric has also represented clients in the federal courts in Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey and on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Most notably, Eric is defending a client involved in the largest medical device recall in US history.     

When not representing clients, Eric is an active member of his local community having served on the Board of Elections for Elsmere, Delaware as its chairman as well as Mayor for the past eight years. He teaches at Wilmington University and has spent approximately twenty-four years officiating high school football in Cecil County, Maryland and Delaware. 

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., cum laude, 2002)
    • Central Michigan University (B.A., 1996)
    • New Jersey, 2003
    • Pennsylvania, 2003
    • Delaware, 2005
    • U.S. District Court District of Delaware, 2005
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 2018
    • Delaware State Bar Association

Thought Leadership

SIU Spotlight

Evaluating “Reasonable and Necessary” PIP Charges Under Delaware Law

May 15, 2026

When it comes to evaluating bills submitted to PIP carriers in Delaware, insureds often ask whether, pursuant to Delaware law, carriers are required to pay only those amounts billed/charged by medical practitioners that are “ordinary and customary.” Delaware law is unique when it comes to consideration of this issue.  Applicable Statute: 21 Del. C. § 2118(a) Delaware does not have a fee schedule for first party claims submitted for payment under a policy providing personal injury protection benefits. Pursuant to 21 Del. C. § 2118(a)(2)a.: No owner of a motor vehicle required to be registered in this State, other than a self-insurer pursuant to § 2904 of this title, shall operate or authorize any other person to operate such vehicle unless the owner has insurance on such motor vehicle providing the following minimum insurance coverage: (2)  a.  Compensation to injured persons for reasonable and necessary expenses incurred within two years from the date of the accident for: Medical, hospital, dental, surgical, medicine, x-ray, ambulance, prosthetic services, professional nursing and funeral services. Compensation for funeral services, including all customary charges and the cost of a burial plot for one person, shall not exceed the sum of $5,000. Compensation may include expenses for any nonmedical remedial care and treatment rendered in accordance with a recognized religious method of healing. Net amount of lost earnings. Lost earnings shall include net lost earnings of a self-employed person. Where a qualified medical practitioner shall, within two years from the date of an accident, verify in writing that surgical or dental procedures will be necessary and are then medically ascertainable but impractical or impossible to perform during that two-year period, the cost of such dental or surgical procedures, including expenses for related medical treatment, and the net amount of lost earnings lost in connection with such dental or surgical procedures shall be payable. Such lost earnings shall be limited to the period of time that is reasonably necessary to recover from such surgical or dental procedures but not to exceed 90 days. The payment of these costs shall be either at the time they are ascertained or at the time they are actually incurred, at the insurer’s option. Extra expenses for personal services which would have been performed by the injured person had they not been injured. “Injured person” for the purposes of this section shall include the personal representative of an estate; provided, however, that if a death occurs, the “net amount of lost earnings” shall include only that sum attributable to the period prior to the death of the person so injured.   The Insurance Commissioner, in Auto Bulletin No. 10, Amended October 15, 1998 interpreted 21 Del. C. § 2118(a)(2), as requiring insurers to pay “reasonable and necessary expenses” for PIP coverage. See attached. The commissioner noted that “[s]ome insurers are refusing to pay more than a portion of the medical, hospital, or other professional medical expenses on behalf of their insureds based upon what those carriers believe are “unreasonable” fees billed” and opined “PIP carriers must pay all of an insured’s PIP costs (less any applicable deductible) if those costs are reasonable and pertain to services that are necessarily required for the care of the insured” unless the  carrier and provider have previously agreed on a price for a specified service. The commissioner went on to state “[i]f a medical provider has charged [a]n ‘unreasonable fee’ for a necessary treatment, the unreasonableness of that fee does not render the treatment ‘unnecessary.’  That portion of the fee which is not in dispute shall be paid according to relevant law.  A dispute over the remaining amount of such a fee should remain a dispute between the carrier and the provider.  It is expected that carriers will make good faith efforts to resolve such disputes and not expose the insured party to harassment or legal action.  However, if a claim is made or legal action is filed by the provider against the insured party for the amount of the fee in dispute, the carrier must provide a defense for its insured against that claim or legal action.” Finally, the commissioner proclaimed, “[u]nder the Delaware Unfair Practice Act, Title 18 Delaware Code, Section 2304(16), it is an unfair trade practice to attempt with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice to settle a claim for less than the insurance policy requires. The Department will vigorously enforce the rights of insured to receive the benefits to which they are contractually entitled.  It will be considered a violation of 18 Delaware Code, Section 2304 if a carrier asserts that the provisions of this bulletin prohibit balance billing.” Case law The issue of unilateral reduction in payment of bills submitted by providers under a PIP policy has been a subject of several court cases in Delaware.  In Green v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 2018 WL 1956287 (Del. Super.), the plaintiffs sought to obtain class certification challenging Geico’s procedure for evaluating and paying for treatment as being in violation of 21 Del. Sec. 2118.  GEICO apparently evaluated utilizing two rules: the Geographic Reduction Rule (GRR) which set an arbitrary cap at the “80th percentile” of other claims submitted to GEICO within a particular geographic region and the Passive Modality Rule (PMR) under which GEICO automatically denied payment for certain “passive modalities” when treatment occurs more than eight weeks from the date of the automobile accident.  The plaintiffs argued under the GRR, 20% of bills submitted to GEICO for reimbursement were automatically deemed “unreasonable,” without inquiry into the facts giving rise to the claim or any factors that could impact pricing and the GRR was, in effect, a secret cap on what GEICO will pay. The court denied class certification but also denied GEICO’s motion to dismiss, finding insufficient discovery had occurred for it to render a dispositive ruling. A similar result had been found by the United States District Court for the District of Delaware in Johnson v. GEICO Casualty Co.  310 F.R.D. 246 (D. Del. 2015), aff'd, 672 Fed. Appx. 150 (3d Cir. 2016).  In Johnson, the USDC initially certified a class, however, later in litigation the court reviewed and found that the plaintiffs could not maintain the class based on a damage model which required significant individual inquiries. The Delaware District Court decertified the class because “even assuming that Geico's policies resulted in the classes' claims being systematically denied and reduced, ... individualized inquiries would be required to determine whether each class member's individual claim was actually medically necessary and their expenses reasonable.”  Id. at 251. The primary fight in the regarded decertification of the class, which the court agreed with and was affirmed by the 3rd Circuit.  In Wilmington, the Pain & Rehabilitation Center instituted litigation against USAA Gen. Indem. Ins. seeking class certification and declaratory judgment that USAA’s utilization of a computerized bill review system called “Reasonable Fee Methodology,” to determine the reasonableness of medical expenses was in violation of 21 Del. C. § 2118(a).  Wilmington Pain & Rehab. Ctr. V. USAA Gen. Indem. Ins. Co., 2017 WL 8788707 (Del. Super.).  Again, the sole issues decided by the court was class certification, which it again declined to certify. The court did not address the issue of declaratory judgment.   In 2019, First State Orthopedics sought class certification arguing Liberty Mutual Insurance Company’s policy of paying invoices more than 30 days after they were submitted for payment was in violation of 19 Del. C. § 2362, which mandates “[a]ll medical expenses shall be paid within 30 days after bills and documentation for said expenses are received by the employer or its insurance carrier for payment, unless the carrier or self-insured employer notifies claimant or the claimant's attorney in writing that said expenses are contested or that further verification is required.”  First State Orthopedics v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 2020 WL 764149 (Del. Super.).  The Court again denied class certification but allowed the merits to proceed. Conclusion In sum, this issue has yet to be presented in full to the court and a trial regarding the same has not yet been held before a fact finder in Delaware. Additionally, the Delaware Insurance Commissioner has not instituted litigation seeking a definitive determination regarding whether it is an “unfair trade practice to attempt with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice to settle a claim for less than the insurance policy requires” as is threatened in Auto Bulletin No. 10.  Nevertheless, the language of § 2118(a) and the Insurance Commissioners interpretation in Auto Bulletin No. 10 likely support a finding that a systemic practice of doing so violates § 2118(a). The bulletin was designed (and has been amended several times) in an effort to afford the insured the protection of having his/her bills for necessary treatment paid while protecting the carrier from a physician or practice attempting to take advantage of Delaware’s “dollar-for-dollar” PIP payment laws. However, it is delineated within the bulletin that same is not to be construed as authority for the carrier to engage in a repeated practice of not paying the total amount of bills submitted for payment. Therefore, it is expected that a systematic practice of not paying the total amount of bills submitted for payment without analysis on an individual basis as to the relationship of the treatment and corresponding bills to the condition being treated supported by an independent medical examination would lead to litigation that the practice violates the requirements of 21 Del. C. § 2118(a).  

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Perlmutter Provides Predictability for Punitive Damages Claims in Florida

In a much anticipated decision, the Florida Supreme Court provided clarity for the standards of proof for punitive damages claims in Perlmutter v. Federal Insurance Company, SC2024-0058 (Fla. June 11, 2026). Litigants and trial judges must be mindful of the standards laid out by the Court. And, defense practitioners must be prepared to alter their strategies to defend against such claims. Perlmutter came to the Court from the Fourth District, based on conflict jurisdiction with decisions from the Second and Fifth District and on certification of a question of great public importance as to the standard of proof for punitive damages claims at the pleading stage. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Perlmutter, 376 So. 3d 24, 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). In the underlying case, the Fourth District made two conclusions. First, it held that a “trial court must consider the evidentiary showing by all parties at the hearing on the motion to amend, that is, evidence ‘in the record’ and evidence ‘proffered by the claimant.’”  376 So. 3d at 33. Second, the Fourth held that it “interpreted section 768.72(1) and (2) to require the trial court to make a preliminary determination of whether a reasonable jury, viewing the totality of proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the movant, could find by clear and convincing evidence that punitive damages are warranted.  Id. at 34 (underscoring in the original). In making these conclusions, the court cautioned trial courts that the “preliminary determination” analysis did not entitle the trial court to decide whether the evidence is clear and convincing and noted that the trial court should not weigh evidence and should not determine witness credibility. Id. The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction and answered the certified question in the negative. It quashed the decision below and remanded the case for application of the following standards: The trial court should consider only the evidence identified or proffered by the claimant; it should not entertain an evidentiary counter-submission from the opponent. The trial court should consider whether a reasonable person could conclude based on the claimant’s evidence, that the defendant committed “intentional misconduct” or “gross negligence” as defined in section 768.72(2) or section 768.72(3). The trial court must review the request for punitive damages in the context of the underlying claims. The trial court should not apply the clear and convincing standard of proof in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence at the pleading stage. The trial court does not act as a fact-finder; the trial court must not weigh the claimant’s evidence—it cannot decide the truth of the matter. The trial court must consider the record evidence and the proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but the allegations in the proposed amended complaint are not themselves evidence. Perlmutter, SC2024-0058 at 13-15 (emphasis added). In explaining these standards, the Court interpreted the text of the statute and compared it to a related statute which governs punitive damages in the nursing home context. The nursing home statute expressly calls for evidentiary submissions by “the parties” and expressly tells the trial court to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant could satisfy the “clear and convincing evidence” standard at trial. Id. at 17-18 (comparing the text of section 768.72(1), Florida Statutes, with section 400.0237, Florida Statutes). Without that express language in section 768.72, the statute could not be applied in the same manner. With these standards specially delineated for the trial courts, the Court is “confident that its interpretation of section 768.72(1) will not frustrate the effectiveness of the statute in accomplishing the Legislature’s textually evident purposes.” Id.  at 22 (cleaned up). This remains to be seen. While Perlmutter provides predictability and clarity for trial courts when reviewing the evidentiary submissions in support of a punitive damages claim, the decision will not likely impact the numbers of punitive damages motions filed. Rather, these new parameters will change the way claims are defended, reminiscent of a time when rulings on punitive damages were only subject to certiorari review and appellate courts were limited in reviewing procedural errors. This decision will likely deflate the level-playing field that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(G) addressed by allowing appeals of orders granting and denying punitive damages amendments. Further, Perlmutter may have impliedly created a call to action for the Legislature to amend section 768.72(1) in the same manner it amended section 400.0237 to allow the courts to analyze “admissible evidence submitted by the parties” and determine at a hearing whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant at trial would be able to demonstrate by “clear and convincing evidence” that the recovery of punitive damages is warranted. Until then, defendants must adjust their strategies. To adapt to these new standards, defense practitioners will need to tailor their strategy for defending punitive damages claims since they can no longer submit a counter-proffer or urge a court to apply the clear and convincing standard at the pleading phase. Instead, defendants will need to attack the deficiencies in the claimant’s pleadings and proffer. If the trial court fails to serve as a gatekeeper, and does not apply the above standards, then defendants can pursue an interlocutory appeal under Rule 9.130(a)(3)(G). If a nonfinal appeal is taken, then defendants should move to stay any intrusive financial discovery while the appellate court analyzes the issues on appeal. Finally, defendants should utilize Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510 to serve as a screening device to allow the trial court to analyze all evidence and prevent nonmeritorious punitive damages claims from proceeding to a jury.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Holds Self-Referral Prohibition Does Not Cover Prescriptions Written by Physicians with Ownership Interests in Dispensing Pharmacies

700 Pharmacy v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office (State Workers’ Insurance Fund); Nos. 97, 98, 99, 100, 101 MAP 2024; decided June 16, 2026; by Justice Mundy.   In this case, Drs. Miteswar Purewal and Shailen Jalali, treating physicians for workers’ compensation claimants, wrote prescriptions for various medications that were filled by 700 Pharmacy. The worker’s compensation insurer refused to pay for the prescriptions on the basis that they were illegal self-referrals under the Act. 700 Pharmacy subsequently filed fee review applications with The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Medical Fee Review Office. At a fee review hearing, both physicians stipulated they had a financial interest in the pharmacy.  The physicians argued that the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act does not bar self-referrals on prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services, since the provision does not specifically identify prescription drugs. The Fee Review Hearing Officer rejected this argument and found that prescriptions for medications are prohibited under the “goods or services” language included in the provision. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Commonwealth Court, and the court affirmed, agreeing with the Hearing Officer’s interpretation of “goods and services” as encompassing prescriptions. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Hearing Officer and the Commonwealth Court, holding that the term “goods and services” in the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act did not include prescriptions. According to the Court, “goods and services” was not a catch-all, but simply explanatory as to the eight enumerated categories in the provision. The provision (Section 306(f.1)(3)(iii)) reads, in pertinent part: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it is unlawful for a provider to refer a person for laboratory, physical therapy, rehabilitation, chiropractic, radiation oncology, psychometric, home infusion therapy  or diagnostic imaging, goods or services pursuant to this section if the provider has a financial interest with the person or in the entity that receives the referral. The Court said that if the General Assembly wanted to specifically include prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services in the Anti-Referral Provision, they would have done so. They pointed out that prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services were included by the legislature in Section 306 (f.1)(3)(vi) of the Act as to reimbursement, and claimed that their omission from the Anti-Referral Provision supports the conclusion that those services are not included in the Anti-Referral Provision’s self-referral prohibition.

News

Marshall Dennehey’s John J. Hare Brings Home Attorney of the Year Honors; Firm Named Litigation Department of the Year in Two Categories

Marshall Dennehey took home top honors in three categories at the The Legal Intelligencer’s 2026 Pennsylvania Legal Awards, held June 11 in Philadelphia. The first place awards include: Attorney of the Year: John J. Hare, Chair of the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post-Trial Practice Group and Executive Committee member, together with Charles “Chip” Becker of Kline & Specter Litigation Department of the Year, Appellate – Third Win in a Row! Litigation Department of the Year, Product Liability/Mass Torts “There is no one more deserving of Attorney of the Year honors than John. This award is a testament to his exceptional skill, dedication, and leadership—qualities that truly exemplify the very best of our firm,” said G. Mark Thompson, Marshall Dennehey’s President & CEO. “These honors also reflect the strength and depth of our product liability, mass torts, and appellate practices across Pennsylvania and beyond, underscoring our ongoing commitment to delivering outstanding results for our clients.” Attorney of the Year – John J. Hare, Marshall Dennehey, together with Charles “Chip” Becker, Kline & Specter Over the past year, John and Charles were opposing counsel in many of the highest-profile civil appeals in Pennsylvania. John is renowned as a preeminent appellate lawyer on the defense side, and Chip on the plaintiff's side. They have opposed each other repeatedly, exhibiting peerless professionalism and exceptional civility, while zealously litigating under the unremitting pressure of high-profile litigation and record-setting verdicts totaling more than $3.5 billion. They have also collaborated, outside of litigation, on many commissions, committees, and projects of importance to the Pennsylvania judiciary and legal community. Litigation Department of the Year – Appellate Law, Winner (previous winner, 2025 and 2024) 2025 was another standout year for the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post‑Trial Practice Group, led by John J. Hare, which was retained to challenge many of Pennsylvania’s “nuclear” verdicts—awards exceeding $10 million. Notably, the department persuaded the Pennsylvania Superior Court to reverse a Philadelphia judgment of $1.09 billion, the largest judgment ever overturned by a Pennsylvania appellate court. The group’s 11 full‑time Pennsylvania‑based appellate lawyers are at the center of Pennsylvania’s most high-profile matters, bringing more than 150 years of combined appellate experience. They routinely handle post‑trial and appellate matters and are frequently engaged to participate in and monitor trials in high‑exposure cases to ensure that critical legal issues are properly raised and preserved for appeal. Litigation Department of the Year – Product Liability/Mass Torts, Winner This marks the first win for the firm’s Pennsylvania Product Liability and Mass Torts practices, which operate within our Casualty Department, managed by Matthew Schorr and Jeff Rapattoni. For almost five decades, Fortune 500 product manufacturers/distributors and their insurers have turned to these groups to defend their litigation. Led by Bradley D. Remick and Vlada Tasich, our Product Liability group’s success can be attributed to its commitment to keeping abreast of ever-changing legal theories, judicial viewpoints, and evolving technology impacting the product liability landscape. Our attorneys have successfully handled thousands of product liability matters in all jurisdictions across the state. Likewise, our mass tort litigation practice – divided into Asbestos & Mass Tort, and Environmental & Toxic Tort Litigation –  has defended manufacturers, distributors, contractors, and premises owners in thousands of personal injury and other claims. Led by Kevin E. Hexstall and Patrick T. Reilly, most attorneys in these groups have more than 20 years of experience, and our seasoned trial team has tried hundreds of cases to verdict, consistently achieving strong results through both trials and settlements. In addition to these awards, Marshall Dennehey was a Litigation Department of the Year finalist for Professional Liability.

Thought Leadership

Unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court Holds That Personal Emails of Public Employees and Officials are Subject to OPRA

In Rosetti v. Ramapo-Indian Hills Regional High School Board of Education, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held that government-related emails, which are contained within personal email accounts, are government records under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), and a log of those emails must be produced when requested. In reaching this decision, the court conducted an analysis of the OPRA and cited previous cases that held that emails do in fact fall within OPRA’s definition of a record and must be produced when requested pursuant to the Act. The court in Rosetti then had to answer the question as to whether public officials’ personal email accounts that are used for government purposes are subject to OPRA, and found that they are. Rosetti made an OPRA request to the Board of Education seeking email logs from Board members’ personal email accounts. The Board refused to produce the logs and indicated that it was not under any obligation to produce personal email account logs, only from government-related email accounts. The issue was whether a log had to be produced for Board members’ personal email accounts, which they used to conduct Board business. The Board argued that while it was possible to create a log for government-related email accounts through its IT Department, it was not possible to do so for personal email accounts. The court rejected this argument and ruled that Board members are required to search their personal email accounts and create a log of government-related emails housed in those accounts. Once completed, each Board member then must submit a certification detailing the searches that were conducted. The court went one step further with a suggestion to government employees and officials, stating, “[g]overnment agencies should strongly advise their employees, elected officials, and others engaged in government-related business to refrain from using their personal email accounts when conducting government-related business.”  Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions regarding this case and others pertaining to the OPRA.