.

Darren M. Newberry

Portrait of Darren M. Newberry

Darren Newberry is a shareholder in the Casualty Department primarily handling multi-party catastrophic high-exposure matters involving products liability, premises liability, trucking liability, liquor liability and toxic tort litigation. Darren has handled high exposure matters involving chemical spills and mold exposure, pipeline explosions, construction defects, multi-vehicle trucking accidents, and other serious personal injury/property matters. As part of his practice, he also handles retail and premises liability cases involving slips and falls, design and construction defect and negligent security claims. Additionally, Darren has experience defending organizations in claims involving allegations of sexual assault and sexual misconduct, including those involving minors in institutional settings.  

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Darren worked for a defense firm handling similar matters as well as medical malpractice claims.  Prior to that, he served as an Assistant District Attorney for Washington County, Pennsylvania, where he prosecuted criminal cases.  In that capacity, Darren tried a number of jury cases to verdict, many of which involved serious felony offenses, including criminal homicide.

Before serving as an Assistant District Attorney, Darren was a law clerk for the Honorable (Ret.) Janet Moschetta Bell, of the Washington County Court of Common Pleas, and served as a judicial intern for two (2) years for the Honorable Nora Barry Fischer of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.

Born in Oregon, Darren was raised in Pittsburgh after his family relocated to the area in 1987. He earned his law degree at the Duquesne University School of Law in 2009. 

Darren is a member of the American Bar Association, the Pennsylvania Bar Association, and the Allegheny County Bar Association.

    • Thomas R. Kline School of Law of Duquesne University (J.D., 2009)
    • Ithaca College (B.A., 2005)
    • Pennsylvania, 2009
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania, 2012
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 2014
    • Allegheny County Bar Association
    • American Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Obtained a defense verdict after a six-week jury trial in a $279 million dollar property damage claim involving the rupture of a railcar containing chlorine.
    • Successfully defended a multi-fatality lawsuit involving exposure to toxic chemicals and significant issues regarding workplace hazards. 
    • Successfully defended a multi-million dollar liquor liability case involving a shooting outside a nightclub involving significant issues of joint and several liability and the criminal conduct of third parties.
    • Successfully defended a multi-million dollar liquor liability case involving an automobile accident in which a third-party was significantly injured by a driver traveling on the wrong side of the roadway.
    • Successfully defended a national automobile service chain in a multi-million dollar negligence action involving significant injuries to a minor-occupant of a vehicle in a roll-over accident.
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of a steel manufacturing facility in a lawsuit seeking significant damages arising out an incident involving a crush injury from a steel beam and involving issues related to worker’s compensation and statutory employer immunity.
    • Successfully defended a national ride-share company in a multi-million dollar lawsuit arising out of injuries sustained by an unrestrained back-seat passenger. 
    • Successfully defended a natural gas drilling company in a claim arising out an explosion of certain property based on the alleged migration of natural gas during gas transmission activities. 
    • Successfully defended a fire subrogation case involving the destruction of an upscale downtown restaurant and significant issues related to the fire's cause and origin.

Results

Marshall Dennehey Successfully Represents Client in Multi-Million Dollar Chemical Spill Case

In a lawsuit seeking $279 million in alleged property damages, Marshall Dennehey attorneys successfully defended their client, a subcontractor of a railroad repair shop, against any and all liability.  The case involved the August 2016 rupture of a railroad tank car containing 178,000 lbs. of liquefied chlorine at the plaintiff’s chlorine manufacturing plant in West Virginia. The tank car had recently been returned to the plaintiff after undergoing extensive repairs in the spring of 2016. The chemical producer-plaintiff filed suit against three parties as a result of the chlorine release: its fleet maintenance manager, the railcar repair shop that performed the 2016 repairs to the tank car and our client, a subcontractor of the railroad repair shop involved in the aspect of the repairs which the plaintiff claimed were performed negligently.  At the time of the 2016 repairs, the tank car was 37 years old and had several characteristics associated with it that were known in the railroad industry to cause cracks in the tank’s shell. It was undisputed at trial that there was a small, pre-existing crack in the tank shell prior to the 2016 repairs at issue, and that, but-for this pre-existing crack, the tank car would not have ruptured in August of 2016, which was the first time the tank car was loaded with chlorine since the repairs were completed. Allegations of comparative negligence were asserted by all of the defendants against the plaintiff for its decision to repair, rather than scrap, the tank car in 2016.  During trial, the plaintiff asserted it was entitled to $278 million in replacement-value property damage associated with alleged damage to its equipment at its 500-acre chlorine manufacturing plant. The plaintiff requested, and the trial judge granted, a jury instruction providing that the jury could award replacement value damages. The nearly six-week trial encompassed over 30 witnesses and 10 expert witnesses. After deliberations, the jury awarded only $12.8 million in damages, assessing the railcar repair shop with 40% of liability, the plaintiff’s fleet maintenance manager with 20% of liability, and the plaintiff itself with the remaining 40% of liability. No liability was assessed to our client.   

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.