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Dante C. Rohr

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DCRohr@mdwcg.com

Portrait of Dante C. Rohr

Dante concentrates his practice in complex litigation, with an emphasis on the defense of professionals, including lawyers, accountants, insurance brokers, real estate professionals and directors and officers in matters pertaining to malpractice, negligence and fraud. In addition, he has extensive experience defending architects and engineers, and construction defect matters. Dante also represents private companies as well as Housing Authorities in Florida in connection with employment, ADL, FHA, reasonable accommodation and discrimination claims made to state and federal agencies and courts. Dante additionally has extensive experience with insurance coverage and bad faith litigation, commercial litigation, and intellectual property matters. A trial attorney for over 20 years, Dante has litigated hundreds of cases in the state and federal courts of Florida, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, and has tried cases to verdict in all three states. 

Dante is registered to practice before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, and his practice includes Federal and state litigation involving patents, copyright, trademarks and trade secrets. He has represented many clients in intellectual property actions including claims for misappropriation of trade secrets and trademark infringement and has represented clients in Federal and State Courts and before the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board.

Dante also has significant admiralty and maritime law experience. As a member of the Maritime Litigation Practice Group, he has experience defending Jones Act claims, defending port facilities with regard to personal injury and property damage claims, maritime construction claims including pier and bulkhead collapses, cargo claims, vessel damage claims and limitation of liability actions.

Dante is admitted to the Bar in Florida, New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, the District of New Jersey and Eastern District of Pennsylvania, as well as in the Court of Appeals for the Third and Sixth Circuits. Dante received his Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering from Drexel University and his juris doctor from Rutgers School of Law - Camden, New Jersey. Before joining the firm, Dante worked as an electrical design and control systems engineer in the manufacturing and machine design fields.

    • Rutgers Law School (J.D., 1998)
    • Drexel University (B.S., 1992)
    • New Jersey, 1998
    • Pennsylvania, 1998
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 1998
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 1999
    • U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 2002
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 6th Circuit, 2005
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 2006
    • New York, 2021
    • Florida, 2022
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida, 2022
    • The Best Lawyers in America©, Commercial Litigation (2024-2027)
    • American Intellectual Property Law Association
    • Maritime Law Association
    • "The Need for Clarity in Counseling Customers," Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers, November 2018
    • Contributing Author, IP Claims Quarterly, 2017-present
    • Defense verdict after trial on the plaintiff’s statutory claims seeking recovery on an allegedly dishonored check issued by our client.
    • Defense verdict in legal malpractice action where the plaintiff alleged dissatisfaction with the settlement of an environmental and property lawsuit.
    • Obtained an involuntary dismissal at close of plaintiff's case in a trucking case arising out of the recovery of a wreck on the Pennsylvania Turnpike.
    • Successfully represented an insurance broker in a malpractice action arising out of Superstorm Sandy.  After a week of trial and the barring of testimony be plaintiff’s damages expert, the plaintiff accepted a settlement proposal on the client’s terms.
    • Successfully represented a solar energy contractor in a breach of contract suit involving the installation of solar panels on numerous public schools in the State of Hawaii. The matter was tried for over three weeks by a three person binding arbitration panel. After the conclusion of our case in chief, the plaintiff accepted a settlement upon our client’s terms.
    • Republic Franklin Ins. Co. v. Brethren Mut. Ins. Co., 824 Fed. Appx. 132 (3d Cir. 2020). The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of our client on the scope of additional insured coverage for liability arising out of the use of the leased premises.  Applying Pennsylvania’s “but for” causation standard, the court held that the customer would not have slipped in the parking lot but for her patronage of the gas station and store, thus finding the incident fell within the coverage provided by the additional insured endorsement.
    • Shirey v. Turner, 2017 WL 1709811 (E.D.Pa. 2017).  District Court granted our motion to dismiss for improper service and lack of personal jurisdiction.  Our client lived and worked in Las Vegas and never visited Pennsylvania.  The Court noted that even though our client admitted receiving faxes and calls from the plaintiff, those communications alone were irrelevant for purposes of establishing jurisdiction.  With no other relevant contacts to the forum, the Court found no jurisdiction to exist.
    • Mattson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 653 Fed. Appx. 145 (3d Cir. 2016).  Affirming dismissal of the plaintiffs’ action under the NJ Civil Rights Act alleging communications from the insurer following submission of hospital bills arising from an auto accident were improper requests for payment. The Court held that the NJ Collateral Source Statute and Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act were not meant to benefit insureds, and neither were actionable under the CRA which only provided a cause of action for deprivations of certain rights protected by state law.
    • Morse v. Kaplan, 468 Fed. Apx. 171 (3d Cir. 2012).  An attorney-debt collector was sued in a purported class action, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim arising from debt collection letters sent on behalf of her client. The District Court granted our motion for summary judgment finding no violation of the FDCPA which was affirmed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.  Plaintiff had contended that the debt collection letters were false and misleading in violation of the FDCPA. The Third Circuit, applying the "least sophisticated consumer" standard to the debt collection letters sent out by the attorney on behalf of her client agreed with our position that the letters at issue were neither false nor misleading because they were written in the first person "I shall" throughout, it was clear that it is the attorney-debt collector who will assume the debt is valid if there is no response to the letter within 30 days, and the letter is not required to inform the debtor that the debt collector will provide the debtor with the name of the original creditor when, as was the case here, the creditor is the original creditor.
    • Boro Construction, Inc. v. Lenape Reg. High School Dist. Bd. of Edu. v. Digeronimo/Mikula Assoc., 445 Fed. Appx. 498 (3d Cir. 2011).  General contractor on project to construct a 400-meter running track for school district filed suit against the district alleging breach of contract. The school district filed a third party complaint against our client, the track designer, alleging that track failed to meet specifications. Specifically that it was not 400 meters. On appeal after trial in the district court, the Third Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of our client. The trial court found that the school district’s expert made a surveying error from which it concluded that the track did not meet specifications. As a result, the district had the track resurfaced and relined. The trial court rejected the district’s expert and credited DiGeronimo's testimony that the track as originally laid out and lined was 400 meters and met all contract specifications.
    • West v. American Honda Motor Co., 2008 WL 4104683 (D.N.J. 2008).  The district court granted our motion to dismiss on behalf of Honda for insufficiency of services of process and because the plaintiff failed to set forth a claim under the NJ Product Liability Act.
    • Maiale v. Procaccino, 2005 WL 3675330 (Pa.Com.Pl. 2005).  Affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of our client after baring plaintiff from presenting testimony of any expert witnesses.

Results

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Summary Judgment Obtained in Contractual Indemnity and Defense Case

We obtained summary judgment in favor of our client on the plaintiff’s general contractor’s contractual indemnity and defense claims. The general contractor claimed it was owed defense and indemnity under its subcontract with our client. In a prior proceeding, the court entered judgment in favor of the owner against the general contractor for breach of contract and breach of warranty but rejected the owner’s claims of negligence and violation of the Florida Building Code. The court agreed with our arguments that the general contractor was estopped from bringing its contractual defense and indemnity claims against the subcontractor because there was a prior judicial determination that neither the general contractor nor our client was negligent, and the general contractor’s liability was based on its breach of contract and warranties. The court further agreed that the general contractor could not show that the subcontractor was negligent, where it had taken the position that there was no negligence in the construction and it did not present any affirmative evidence to support a claim of negligence on the part of the subcontractor.   

Florida Court Affirms Arbitrator’s Decision in Construction Defect Case

We successfully upheld an arbitrator’s ruling in a $13 million construction defect case, defeating claims that our client negligently recommended windows and doors for a coastal Florida home. The owners’ direct claims against the general contractor and our client, the window and door supplier and installer, were arbitrated. The owners claimed the window company misrepresented the fitness of the windows and doors for use in Florida’s coastal environment. We argued that the windows and doors were specified by the owner and architect and that our client performed proper due diligence by visiting the manufacturing facility and consulting with the manufacturer’s engineers with regard to the application. The arbitrator found no liability as to our client because there was no evidence it was negligent in its recommendation of the product.

Thought Leadership

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Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability

Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability - CASE LAW UPDATE

July 1, 2024

Florida Court of Appeal Holds that Illinois Law Firm Subject to Jurisdiction of State of Florida in Connection with Legal Malpractice Lawsuit Brought by Personal Representatives of Deceased Father’s Florida Estate Neal Gerber & Eisenberg, LLP v. Lamb-Ferrara, --- So.3d --- (Fla. 3d DCA 2024) In 2008, Matthew Lamb and his wife retained the Illinois law firm of Neal Gerber to prepare their wills and estate plans. Mr. Lamb, a prominent artist owning considerable property and assets around the world, designated Florida as his domicile in his will and estate plans. He passed away in 2012, and his widow as executor of the will, retained Neal Gerber in connection with the Estate. On Neal Gerber’s advice, she retained Florida counsel to commence probate proceedings in Florida. Mrs. Lamb resigned as executor and personal representative and was replaced by her daughter, Sheila Lamb-Gabler, pursuant to the terms of the will. Neal Gerber continued its engagement after Ms. Lamb-Gabler became the Estate’s personal representative and did not formally terminate its engagement until 2019.  The Lambs’ two other daughters, as successor personal representatives of the estate, brought a malpractice suit against Neal Gerber alleging negligence in drafting the estate documents and handling the probate action. On appeal, the court upheld jurisdiction over Neal Gerber on the basis that Florida’s Long-Arm Statute may extend to non-resident defendants that perform estate services for an estate probated in Florida even where legal services may have been performed outside of Florida. The court rejected Neal Gerber’s arguments that its work was performed in Illinois; it never filed a notice of appearance or appeared as counsel of record in Florida; and had no office or presence in Florida when it admitted that is was retained by the Estate, which was probated in Florida, and drafted, reviewed and approved filings in the Florida probate action. The court further found that constitutional due process was satisfied based on the firm’s rendering estate planning services to Mr. Lamb with full awareness that he was domiciled in Florida and his will would be probated in Florida. Neal Gerber directed local counsel’s actions and prepared and filed the majority of filings in the Probate Action.  Accordingly, the Appellate Court held that Illinois counsel should have reasonably foreseen being hauled into court in Florida for issues arising from the activities it directed into Florida.    Legal Update for Lawyers’ Professional Liability – July 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

News

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Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Marshall Dennehey Welcomes Special Counsel David Farkouh and Michele P. Rannie to New York City Office

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Marshall Dennehey Welcomes Special Counsel David Farkouh and Michele P. Rannie to New York City Office

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Result

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

Four Marshall Dennehey Attorneys Selected 2026 “Top Lawyers” by Delaware Today Magazine

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Four Marshall Dennehey Attorneys Selected 2026 “Top Lawyers” by Delaware Today Magazine

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 Pennsylvania Super Lawyers and Rising Stars Honorees

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Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 Pennsylvania Super Lawyers and Rising Stars Honorees

business meeting photo

Result

Summary Judgment Obtained in Insurance Coverage Case

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Result

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter