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Legal Updates for Insurance Services

Consumer Fraud: It’s Not a Matter of Intent in Pennsylvania Anymore

Legal Updates for Insurance Services - March 9, 2021

March 9, 2021

by Todd J. Leon and Dana A. Gittleman

On February 17, 2021, a 4-3 majority of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania handed down its decision in Gregg v. Ameriprise Financial, Inc., et al., holding that a strict liability standard would be applied to claims brought under the “catch-all” provision of the Unfair Trade Practices Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL). The decision likely has far-reaching consequences for insurers, insurance brokers, financial advisors and real estate brokers, any of whom may now find themselves exposed to liability for conduct that has the potential to deceive without a showing of state of mind or intent.

Gregg arose from purported misrepresentations by a broker/financial advisor for Ameriprise to his clients, the Greggs, regarding the purchase of life insurance policies and, more specifically, the manner in which monies the Greggs contributed would be used to fund their account. By way of oversimplification, instead of doing what he told the Greggs he would do in conjunction with funding the policies and the Greggs’ accounts, the broker performed different transactions, which increased the commissions he was paid.

After learning that Ameriprise was the subject of a class action claim involving some of its other clients, the Greggs sued their insurance broker/financial advisor and Ameriprise for negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, violation of the catch-all provision of UTPCPL, breach of fiduciary duty and negligent supervision. Subsequent to the dismissal of some of the claims, the jury found in favor of Ameriprise on the fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation counts. However, the Greggs prevailed on the UTPCPL claim. Ameriprise appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, and ultimately to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, contending that a finding that it violated the UTPCPL was precluded by the jury’s finding in its favor on the fraud and misrepresentation claims.

The trial court disagreed with Ameriprise’s contention, noting that, while claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation require findings of a defendant’s state of mind (intent to deceive) or negligence, respectively, claims under the UTPCPL “catch-all” provision required no such state of mind determination. The Superior Court agreed.

In its recent opinion, Supreme Court affirmed the rulings below and found that an actor’s state of mind is immaterial under the plain statutory language of the “catch-all” provision of the UTPCPL, which was amended in 1996 to include liability for both “fraudulent or deceptive conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding.” The key issue for the Supreme Court was the legislature’s addition of the word “deceptive” in the “catch-all” clause, so that liability was no longer moored to a requirement that fraud needed to be shown in order to trigger liability under the statute.

In examining what the word “deceptive” means in this context, the Supreme Court held that the statute imposes “liability upon commercial vendors who engage in conduct that has the potential to deceive and which creates a likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding.” Simply put, the focus moving forward on claims under the “catch-all” provision will be on words and actions that have the tendency or capacity to deceive, as opposed to whether the actor has the intent to deceive.

In disagreeing with the majority’s construction of the statute, the three-justice dissent focused upon the absence of any language indicating a legislative intent to impose strict liability under the “catch-all” provision of the UTPCPL. Additionally, the dissenters noted that reading the “fraudulent” prong of the “catch-all” clause to require a showing of intent, while reading the “deceptive” prong to be a strict liability provision requiring no state of mind in order to impose liability, was nonsensical. Instead, the minority suggested that the legislature’s addition of the word “deceptive” into the “catch-all” provision was intended to create a negligence standard that would be applicable in the situation where a “vendor is aware, or should be aware, that his statements are capable of being interpreted in a misleading way by a consumer, regardless of the vendor’s belief regarding the truth or falsity of the statements.”

Gregg, thus, holds that, moving forward, a claim for “deceptive conduct during a consumer transaction that creates a likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding … upon which the consumer relies to his or her financial detriment does not depend upon the actor’s state of mind.” How courts will apply this new standard, particularly in the context of the historical divide between claims for “misfeasance” (an improper performance of a contractual obligation), which are actionable under the UTPCPL, and “nonfeasance” (the failure to perform a contractual duty), which are not actionable, will be just one of many fertile areas of litigation.

With all of the above in mind, it is critical that, at minimum, businesses adopt clear, comprehensive, and accurate disclosures capable of consumer comprehension and understanding in order to combat against the anticipated widening of liability under the court’s adoption of a “strict liability” standard for UTPCPL “catch-all” claims.

 

Legal Updates for Insurance Services - March 9, 2021, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments, and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.