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Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation

Fourth District Court of Appeal Reinstates Insurer’s Prompt Notice Defense, Reverses Trial Court’s Waiver Finding

Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Yager, Fla. 4th DCA, No. 4D2023-2310, April 16, 2025

June 1, 2025

by Corey K. Setterlund

In a dispute over an alleged undervaluation of their insurance claim, the insureds sued for breach of contract. The defendant responded with an affirmative defense, asserting the insureds failed to comply with post-loss conditions by delaying notice of the loss for three months, thereby prejudicing Universal’s investigation. Although the insureds eventually replied, they did not specifically address the prompt notice defense. The trial court sided with the insureds, finding the defendant had waived the defense by accepting coverage and issuing partial payment. On appeal, however, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that waiver must be specifically pleaded and that the defendant’s partial payment did not constitute a waiver of its prompt notice defense.

In suing Universal for breach of contract, the insureds alleged their claim was undervalued. As an affirmative defense, Universal alleged that the insureds did not satisfy their post-loss conditions precedent to recover under the policy because they did not provide prompt notice of their loss—the insureds waited three months to report their loss—and the delay in reporting prejudiced Universal’s investigation. 

The insureds then did not timely reply to Universal’s affirmative defenses. But when they replied five months later, they did not directly respond to the allegation that they failed to provide prompt notice. Instead, they generally denied all affirmative defenses, demanded strict proof thereof and moved to strike all defenses as improperly asserted. The insureds moved for partial summary judgment on Universal’s lack of prompt notice defense, asserting Universal waived compliance of the prompt notice provision by confirming a covered loss had occurred and issuing a coverage determination in the insureds’ favor, i.e. accepting liability and issuing coverage on the claim. 

Universal argued that by tendering payment for some, but not all, claimed damages, it did not waive its right under the policy to require the insureds to comply with all post-loss obligations. Universal also argued the court should not consider the insureds’ waiver argument as it was not raised in a timely reply to Universal’s answer. The trial court ruled in favor of the insureds by finding Universal waived compliance by accepting liability and issuing coverage on the loss, i.e. acknowledgment of coverage and payment under the policy.

On appeal, Universal argued that the insureds failed to plead a waiver of their compliance with post-loss obligations to recover under the policy. The insureds argued that their assertion in their complaint was enough to plead waiver and that they did not need to raise the waiver argument in their reply. The Fourth District Court of Appeal found that the insureds’ argument was inconsistent with Florida law, which requires that waiver is a matter that must be specifically pleaded. The court noted that the Third District Court of Appeal, in Gamero v. Foremost Insurance Co., 208 So.3d 1195 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017), had already determined that the trial court correctly did not consider the argument that the insurer waived its right to rely on a particular policy exclusion asserted as an affirmative defense since the insured failed to reply or avoid the affirmative defense. 

Further, the Fourth District Court agreed with Universal’s alternate argument that Universal did not waive its prompt notice defense with its initial acceptance of coverage and partial payment under the policy, citing to their prior decision in Rodrigo v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 144 So.3d 690, 692 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) and the Third District Court’s decision in Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Horne, 314 So.3d 688, 692 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021). Both decisions found that an insurer does not waive an affirmative defense based on an insured’s failure to comply with post-loss conditions precedent by tendering payment. 

The Fourth District Court of Appeal remanded the case with instructions to allow Universal to proceed to trial with its prompt notice defense. 


 

Legal Update for Florida Coverage & Property Litigation – June 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Not So Fast. . . The Limitations of the Pennsylvania RELRA in Plaintiffs’ Civil Actions Against Real Estate Broker and Licensee Defendants

Much has been made of the importance and weight of the Pennsylvania Real Estate Licensing and Registration Act, 63 P.S. §§ 455.101, et. seq. (the “RELRA” or “Act”). After all, a real estate broker generally cannot recover any commission absent a signed agreement that complies with RELRA. But can a Plaintiff rely on RELRA as a distinct cause of action in a civil action as to a real estate broker or licensee defendant? The Superior Court has emphatically held that he or she cannot. In the unpublished opinion P. Perez Real Est. Holdings, LLC et. al. v. Home Sale Real Est. Servs., Inc., et al., No. 256 MDA 2025, 2025 WL 35389888 (Pa. Super. Ct. December 10, 2025), the Superior Court held that the act “does not contemplate private actions for money damages as an enforcement mechanism and consequently, does not create a private cause of action.” citing Schwarzwaelder v. Fox, 895 A.2d 614, 620 (Pa. Super. 2006). While the act authorizes the Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs, State Real Estate Commission, to regulate the conduct governed by RELRA, the act alone does not create a stand-alone legal cause of action as to a broker-defendant in a civil action. See P. Perez, citing Schwarwaelder at 620.  Nor can it be stated that RELRA creates or imposes any legally cognizable duties on real estate brokers or licensees. While the act contains and refers to general concepts of duty (e.g. the agent must “exercise reasonable professional skill and care which meets the practice standards required by this act” and “to deal honestly and in good faith” 63 P.S. §§606.1 (a)(1),(2), or the broker has a duty to the buyer of property to take “action that is consistent with the buyer’s interest in transaction.”  63 P.S. §§606.3 (1)), these general concepts are secondary to the duties imposed by the required written agreement between the broker and consumer. For example, in P. Perez, a case in which the buyers-plaintiffs argued that the real estate broker failed to investigate recent legislation that would affect buyer’s intentions to convert the property to commercial space, the agreement between buyer and broker contained the following provision in the “Buyer’s Due Diligence” clause: Buyer acknowledges that Brokers, their licensees, employees, officers or partners have not made an independent examination or determination of the structural soundness of the property, the age or condition of the components, environmental conditions, the permitted uses, nor of conditions existing in the locale where the property is situated. . . Accordingly, the broker defendants expressly disclaimed any duty to buyers to inform them or determine whether any applicable zoning classifications, laws, or ordinances in the township applied to the properties in question. Moreover, the Superior Court refused to read provisions of the act into the Agreement, citing Skiff re Buss, Inc. v. Buckingham Review, LP, 991 A.2d 956 (Pa. Super. 2010).  Accordingly, in defending civil actions it is important for the defense attorney to identify any causes of action predicated solely on RELRA. Preliminary objections may be warranted to the extent that the plaintiff asserts RELRA as a stand-alone cause of action for monetary damages, a position struck down by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in P. Perez.  Moreover, any attempt to create or heighten duties as to the broker defendants may be countered by the general proposition that the courts will not inject the vague concepts of “reasonable professional skill” or “good faith” where the written Agreement has express provisions regarding the duties of the parties. Ironically, although RELRA is an important act with which all realtors, brokers, and licensees should be familiar to guarantee that their commissions are in fact timely paid, the Act, is not a strong stand-alone mechanism for a plaintiff’s attempts to recover monetary damages in a civil action.

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Pennsylvania Superior Court Confirms RESDL Claims Are Subject to a Two-Year Statute of Repose

The Pennsylvania Superior Court recently concluded that claims under the Real Estate Seller Disclosure Law (“RESDL”) are subject to a two-year statute of repose running from the settlement date. This decision will further assist defending errors and omission claims against real estate agents as it bars any RESDL action commenced more than two years after the settlement date regardless of when the defect was discovered.  In Hollinger v. Deitrich, 2026 Pa. Super. LEXIS 328 (June 23, 2026), the buyers entered into an agreement of sale in April of 2017 to purchase a residential property. The settlement occurred in June of 2017. The buyers reviewed the seller disclosures that revealed the property had a sump pump in working order and a sump pit. The disclosures further noted no water infiltration into the basement, but disclosed rehab, an addition to the property and prior sewage backup.  Shortly after the settlement and closing, the buyers experienced flooding in their basement. In March of 2020, the buyers filed suit against the seller, the buyers’ real estate agent and broker and the seller’s real estate agent and broker alleging various causes of action including a violation of RESDL. The buyers alleged that they sought assurances from the agent defendants that no water infiltration occurred on the property. They further alleged that both agents lived in the area and should have known about the neighborhood water infiltration issues. The trial court granted summary judgment for the seller and the seller’s agents and dismissed the RESDL violation.  Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Gidor v. Mangus d/b/a Mangus Inspections, 345 A.3d 629 (Pa. 2025), the court explained that a statute of limitation begins to run from the time of the injurious occurrence or a discovery of the same. However, a statute of repose runs for a statutorily determined period after a definitively established event. Notably, a statute of repose eliminates a cause of action regardless of when the claim accrues. Because of this, a plaintiff may not invoke the discovery rule or other equitable tolling considerations.  RESDL requires that an action for damages, as a result of a violation of this chapter, must be commenced within two years after the date of final settlement. The court found that Section 7311(b) was clear and unambiguous that an action for damages pursuant to this chapter must be commenced within a certain time after a definitely established event that is independent of any injury or discovery of any injury. Since the buyers sued over two years after closing on the property, their statutory claims were time-barred. The court explained that the seller disclosure statement could not support common law or consumer protection claims, as using it would improperly expand remedies beyond the statute’s terms. Accordingly, the court upheld the trial court’s summary judgment ruling that the buyers’ claims under RESDL were barred by the statute of repose.  Accordingly, defense counsel should scrutinize complaints involving RESDL claims to ensure that such claims have been timely brought within two-years of the settlement date. A plaintiff will no longer be able to invoke the discovery roll to expand the time frame.

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Commonwealth Court Holds That a Claimant Who Was Struck By a Car While Crossing the Street During an Unpaid Break Was In the Course and Scope of Employment

This case involved a claim petition filed by a claimant who sustained injuries after being struck by a vehicle while crossing the street in front of the employer’s premises. The employer denied the claim based on course and scope, as the accident occurred during one of two mandatory fifteen (15) minute breaks provided to the claimant. The claimant would punch out at the beginning of a break and punch back in when the break was over.  On the date of the incident, the claimant punched out and left the building to get lunch at a restaurant, which required her to cross the employer’s parking lot, and then a public street, where the injury occurred. The Workers Compensation Judge (WCJ) dismissed the petition, noting that that during the two mandatory fifteen-minute breaks per shift allowed by the employer, the claimant was free to leave the employer’s premises, and during breaks, permitted to engage in whatever activity she desired. The WCJ found that at the time of the accident, the claimant was on her own time, in the middle of the street, and going to get lunch.   The claimant filed an appeal with the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board (Board), and the Board reversed.  According to the Board, the claimant’s location was still on the employer’s premises, as the claimant was taking her customary route while using a reasonable ingress/egress from the employer.  Further, the Board found that the “Personal Comfort Doctrine” applied, as the claimant was on a momentary departure to take care of her personal comfort, within the window of time she was allotted for her break.  The Board remanded the case, and a WCJ granted the claim petition.  The Board affirmed, and the employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. Before the Court, the employer argued that the claimant was not in the course and scope of her employment, because the injury did not occur on its premises, and the claimant was outside the bounds of the Personal Comfort Doctrine. The Court, however, rejected these arguments, and dismissed the employer’s appeal.  The Court noted that the break given to the claimant was so cursory, when she set out to relieve her hunger for her own personal comfort,  she remained in the course of her employment when she sustained her injuries.  A Petition for Allowance of Appeal in the Supreme Court has been filed by the Employer, Giant Eagle.