Jacksonville
Our Jacksonville, Florida, office delivers strategic, well-prepared defense litigation through attorneys who are experienced, practical, and readily accessible. Serving clients throughout northern Florida, our attorneys defend clients in casualty, professional liability, health care and workers' compensation matters.
As a regional office of Marshall Dennehey, the Jacksonville office is backed by the resources of a 500-lawyer firm. It stands ready to assist every client—be they individuals, small businesses, large corporations or insurance carriers—by providing high-quality, result-oriented legal representation that is both innovative and cost-effective.
Thought Leadership
Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation
Florida Court Rejects Retroactive Application of Pre‑Suit Notice Requirement in Property Insurance Dispute
June 11, 2026
Priest v. State Farm, No. 1D2024-1577 (1ST DCA) Mary Priest entered into a homeowners insurance policy with State Farm Florida Insurance Company with a renewal policy period that began on January 6, 2021. Ms. Priest filed a claim with State Farm as she allegedly sustained wind and water damage to her property. When a dispute arose among the parties regarding coverage and the amount of the loss, the appellant filed suit for breach of contract and declaratory relief. The appellant did not file a pre-suit notice of intent to initiate litigation prior to filing suit, as her insurance policy existed before the statutory pre-notice requirement went into effect on July 1, 2021. The main issue in this case was whether the statutory pre-notice requirement applied retroactively. Under Section 627.70152 of the Florida Statute, “[a]s a condition precedent to filing a suit under a property insurance policy, a claimant must provide the department with written notice of intent to initiate litigation on a form provided by the department.” This notice is required to be given at least ten business days before suit can be brought. Subsection (1) of this statute states that it “applies exclusively to all suits arising under a residential or commercial property insurance policy.” Emphasis added. The courts have been split on the interpretation of this language. Specifically the 3rd DCA and 4th DCA believe the wording “all suits” demonstrated a clear intent for the statute to be applied retroactively; thus, encompassing insurance contracts that were already in existence at the time the statute went into effect. However, the 6th DCA did not agree with these opinions as it ruled “all suits” was not sufficient to conclude there was legislative intent for retroactivity. The 6th DCA ruling is currently pending before the Florida Supreme Court. Here, the court addresses the issue of retroactivity of the statutory provision by applying the two-pronged test in Mendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., Inc., 35 So. 3d 873, 876 (Fla. 2010). The first prong requires the court to determine whether the legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. The second prong requires the court to evaluate if the retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles if such intent is clearly expressed. When isolating the specific wording “all suits,” it could appear that it references all suits regardless of when the insurance policy was entered into. However, in context, it could mean the category of suit governed by the provision, namely residential and commercial policies. The appellee argued based on the legislative history of the statute, where the legislature removed the draft language “issued or renewed on or after July 1, 2021.” The court observed that the absence of statements in amendments does not constitute clear evidence of retroactive intent as bills are revised for many reasons during the legislative process. Thus, the court did not get past the first prong as they ruled there was no clear evidence expressing any legislative intent of retroactive application.
Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation
Court Reaffirms That Actual Cash Value Includes Labor and Overhead, Not Just Materials
June 11, 2026
Greenaker v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., Case No. 2D2024-1964, (Fla. 2nd DCA May 8, 2026). The plaintiffs filed a breach of contract suit against Universal for refusal to pay for all of plaintiffs’ damages from a storm in November 2020. Universal filed a motion in limine to prevent the plaintiffs from introducing evidence concerning both actual cash value and replacement cost value of the loss. They argued that the plaintiffs did not complete repairs or incur any expenses in repairing the damaged property, thus being limited to actual cash value as their measure of damage and the plaintiffs’ submitted estimate of damages contained labor costs necessary for repair and, therefore, not an actual cash value estimate. Universal further asked for a directed verdict at the hearing because the plaintiffs would have no evidence to support the claim for damages. The trial court agreed and granted Universal’s motion, entering a final judgment in Universal’s favor. The plaintiffs filed a motion for rehearing and reconsideration due to the court improperly converting Universal’s motion in limine to a motion for final summary judgment. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion and the plaintiffs appealed. The Second District Court of Appeal agreed with the plaintiffs and determined that the trial court improperly entered a final judgment based on a pretrial ruling in limine, advising there was recognized procedures, including summary judgment, judgment on the pleadings, and default judgment that could have been exercised. Further, the court continued that the improper procedure was not the only reason for the judgment to be reversed. They noted the insurance policy did not provide a definition of actual cash value nor how to calculate it, and the parties disputed the definition and calculation of such. Universal argued that actual cash value is defined as the value of the property that suffered the direct physical loss less depreciation and deductible, i.e. costs of physical materials that were damaged. The plaintiffs argued that actual cash value includes the amount of repair costs in addition to the value of the property that suffered direct physical loss because it is calculated as the replacement cost minus depreciation. The court agreed with the plaintiffs, noting that Universal’s definition was not supported by the insurance contract, the statute governing replacement value insurance contracts, nor decisional authority. The court noted that Universal “cherry-picked” the phrase “direct physical loss” from the perils insured against provision and applied it to the loss settlement provision, which doesn’t state “direct physical loss,” but instead states “insured loss.” Further, the court conveyed that application of “direct physical loss” would be used on both actual cash value and replacement cost value, as they are both present in the loss settlement provision, which would mean insureds never got payments beyond costs of physically damaged material, which is contradictory to the replacement cost value definition. The court advised that the Florida Supreme Court had approved the court’s interpretation of actual cash value as including costs other than damaged physical property, including overhead and profit, noting that these costs can be included in actual cash value to which a portion, like all other costs, could be depreciated. The court noted the difference between actual cash value and replacement cost value is not between types of costs, i.e. materials vs. labor, but between the valuation of the costs with the distinction of being a depreciated vs. undepreciated value. The court refused to exclude intangible costs such as labor, profit and overhead from actual cash value, finding these costs inclusions were consistent with statutory and contractual language as well as Florida Supreme Court precedent. The court reversed the judgment and remanded the case back to the trial court.
Results
Summary Judgment Obtained in a Vehicular Accident Case Involving Disputed Liability
We received summary judgment in a vehicular accident case involving disputed liability. Mr. Thurman was the third vehicle in a three-car collision in which the first vehicle admitted fault and was ticketed. Following the accident, the plaintiffs claimed they were in a fourth vehicle and alleged that Mr. Thurman caused the crash. When the claim was denied—and on the eve of the implementation of tort reform—the plaintiffs filed individual lawsuits against Mr. Thurman alone. We subpoenaed the repair shop that serviced Mr. Thurman’s vehicle and obtained records confirming that there was no front-end damage. When the plaintiffs failed to respond to discovery, we prepared motions for summary judgment in both cases. In response, only one plaintiff submitted an affidavit, while Mr. Thurman provided his own affidavit denying the allegations. We argued the motions, demonstrating that the evidence showed the plaintiffs were not involved in the collision and that Mr. Thurman bore no fault. The court ruled in our favor in both cases. Before the orders could be entered, however, the plaintiffs filed notices of voluntary dismissal with prejudice. Before moving for summary judgment, we had served Proposals for Settlement on the plaintiffs and their counsel. After the dismissals, we filed a motion establishing entitlement to attorney’s fees, and the parties ultimately reached an agreement resolving all fees and costs in both cases.
Exceptional Advocacy Leads to Indemnification Win
We were successful in having a motion for indemnification granted. Our client’s subcontractor did not secure workers’ compensation coverage as required by the statute. Therefore, our client—the contractor—became the statutory employer and accepted the claim as compensable, providing medical and indemnity benefits and reaching a settlement compromise with the injured worker. We filed a motion for indemnification, requesting that the subcontractor be ordered to reimburse our client for all monies paid on the claim. After an evidentiary hearing was held, where we presented evidence and called the vice president of claims to testify, the judge of compensation claims granted our motion.
News
Marshall Dennehey Again Earns Recognition in Distinguished Chambers USA
June 4, 2026

Marshall Dennehey Promotes James Cole and Sunny Sparano to Lead The Firm’s Professional Liability Department and Announces New Board of Directors Appointments
January 5, 2026
Marshall Dennehey Announces 2026 Shareholder Class and Special Counsel Promotions
December 15, 2025