Jacksonville
Our Jacksonville, Florida, office delivers strategic, well-prepared defense litigation through attorneys who are experienced, practical, and readily accessible. Serving clients throughout northern Florida, our attorneys defend clients in casualty, professional liability, health care and workers' compensation matters.
As a regional office of Marshall Dennehey, the Jacksonville office is backed by the resources of a 500-lawyer firm. It stands ready to assist every client—be they individuals, small businesses, large corporations or insurance carriers—by providing high-quality, result-oriented legal representation that is both innovative and cost-effective.
Thought Leadership
What's Hot in Workers' Comp
Employer/Carriers Must Explicitly Invoke Right to Deny Claim Under “Pay and Investigate” Statutory Provision; Employes Must Always Prove Medical Necessity of Treatment
July 15, 2026
Koren v. City of Kissimmee/PGCS, ___So.3d___(Fla 1st DCA 6/10/26) The majority opinion in Koren holds that the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) properly denied psychiatric treatment because the claimant did not challenge on appeal the JCC’s finding that the requested treatment was not medically necessary. However, Judge K. Thomas authored a detailed concurrence agreeing with the result on the ground that the claimant failed to meet his burden of proving medical necessity. In doing so, Judge K. Thomas also emphasized an important principle: employer/carriers must expressly invoke the 120-day pay-and-investigate provision under Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Act if they intend to preserve their right to deny compensability. Merely authorizing evaluations, without explicitly invoking the 120-day rule, may be insufficient to preserve the right to deny compensability of specific injuries. In Koren, the claimant sustained injuries to his upper lip, tooth, right knee, and right foot when a board gave way on a deck he was repairing for the employer/carrier. The accident was accepted as compensable, and multiple specialists were authorized to treat his physical injuries, including an ear, nose, and throat physician, dentist, orthopedist, and plastic surgeon. The claimant later sought psychiatric treatment and attended an independent medical examination (IME) with a psychiatrist. The IME diagnosed adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood, opining that the condition was caused by “the actual appearance of the scar” resulting from the industrial accident. The IME recommended continued medication, including an antidepressant, as well as follow-up care with a psychiatrist and psychologist. Critically, however, the IME did not offer an opinion regarding the medical necessity of this treatment. The claimant then filed a petition for benefits attaching the IME report and requesting authorization of psychiatric care. The employer/carrier responded by authorizing a psychiatrist, whom the claimant did, in fact, see. However, the employer/carrier neither denied the claim nor issued written notice invoking the 120-day pay-and-investigate provision. The authorized psychiatrist subsequently opined that the claimant’s psychiatric condition was unrelated to the industrial accident and instead attributable to prior employment as a law enforcement officer and volunteer firefighter. The psychiatrist further concluded that the work accident was not the major contributing cause of the condition. Although the employer/carrier stipulated to the authorization of the psychiatrist, it ultimately denied the claimant’s entitlement to psychiatric treatment. The JCC denied the requested benefit. The majority opinion affirmed on the narrow ground that medical necessity had not been established. Judge K. Thomas’s concurrence, however, expands on the legal framework. Under Florida law, an employer/carrier presented with a claim must “pay, pay and investigate, or deny.” To avail itself of the 120-day pay-and-investigate protection, the employer/carrier must affirmatively and explicitly invoke that option, typically through a written 120-day letter. The statutory investigative period does not arise automatically upon the provision of care. Furthermore, an attempt to characterize authorization as a “one-time evaluation” does not avoid waiver, as even a single evaluation may constitute the provision of a compensable benefit. By authorizing psychiatric care without invoking the 120-day provision, the employer/carrier in Koren effectively accepted compensability of the claimant’s PTSD condition. Nonetheless, it retained the ability to contest entitlement to ongoing treatment. While the employer/carrier failed to demonstrate a break in the causal chain, the claimant still bore the burden of proving that the requested treatment was medically necessary. Because the JCC found that the claimant failed to meet this burden, and the claimant did not challenge that finding either below or on appeal, the denial of psychiatric benefits was ultimately affirmed.
Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation
Florida Court Rejects Retroactive Application of Pre‑Suit Notice Requirement in Property Insurance Dispute
June 11, 2026
Priest v. State Farm, No. 1D2024-1577 (1ST DCA) Mary Priest entered into a homeowners insurance policy with State Farm Florida Insurance Company with a renewal policy period that began on January 6, 2021. Ms. Priest filed a claim with State Farm as she allegedly sustained wind and water damage to her property. When a dispute arose among the parties regarding coverage and the amount of the loss, the appellant filed suit for breach of contract and declaratory relief. The appellant did not file a pre-suit notice of intent to initiate litigation prior to filing suit, as her insurance policy existed before the statutory pre-notice requirement went into effect on July 1, 2021. The main issue in this case was whether the statutory pre-notice requirement applied retroactively. Under Section 627.70152 of the Florida Statute, “[a]s a condition precedent to filing a suit under a property insurance policy, a claimant must provide the department with written notice of intent to initiate litigation on a form provided by the department.” This notice is required to be given at least ten business days before suit can be brought. Subsection (1) of this statute states that it “applies exclusively to all suits arising under a residential or commercial property insurance policy.” Emphasis added. The courts have been split on the interpretation of this language. Specifically the 3rd DCA and 4th DCA believe the wording “all suits” demonstrated a clear intent for the statute to be applied retroactively; thus, encompassing insurance contracts that were already in existence at the time the statute went into effect. However, the 6th DCA did not agree with these opinions as it ruled “all suits” was not sufficient to conclude there was legislative intent for retroactivity. The 6th DCA ruling is currently pending before the Florida Supreme Court. Here, the court addresses the issue of retroactivity of the statutory provision by applying the two-pronged test in Mendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., Inc., 35 So. 3d 873, 876 (Fla. 2010). The first prong requires the court to determine whether the legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. The second prong requires the court to evaluate if the retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles if such intent is clearly expressed. When isolating the specific wording “all suits,” it could appear that it references all suits regardless of when the insurance policy was entered into. However, in context, it could mean the category of suit governed by the provision, namely residential and commercial policies. The appellee argued based on the legislative history of the statute, where the legislature removed the draft language “issued or renewed on or after July 1, 2021.” The court observed that the absence of statements in amendments does not constitute clear evidence of retroactive intent as bills are revised for many reasons during the legislative process. Thus, the court did not get past the first prong as they ruled there was no clear evidence expressing any legislative intent of retroactive application.
Results
Summary Judgment Obtained in a Vehicular Accident Case Involving Disputed Liability
We received summary judgment in a vehicular accident case involving disputed liability. Mr. Thurman was the third vehicle in a three-car collision in which the first vehicle admitted fault and was ticketed. Following the accident, the plaintiffs claimed they were in a fourth vehicle and alleged that Mr. Thurman caused the crash. When the claim was denied—and on the eve of the implementation of tort reform—the plaintiffs filed individual lawsuits against Mr. Thurman alone. We subpoenaed the repair shop that serviced Mr. Thurman’s vehicle and obtained records confirming that there was no front-end damage. When the plaintiffs failed to respond to discovery, we prepared motions for summary judgment in both cases. In response, only one plaintiff submitted an affidavit, while Mr. Thurman provided his own affidavit denying the allegations. We argued the motions, demonstrating that the evidence showed the plaintiffs were not involved in the collision and that Mr. Thurman bore no fault. The court ruled in our favor in both cases. Before the orders could be entered, however, the plaintiffs filed notices of voluntary dismissal with prejudice. Before moving for summary judgment, we had served Proposals for Settlement on the plaintiffs and their counsel. After the dismissals, we filed a motion establishing entitlement to attorney’s fees, and the parties ultimately reached an agreement resolving all fees and costs in both cases.
Exceptional Advocacy Leads to Indemnification Win
We were successful in having a motion for indemnification granted. Our client’s subcontractor did not secure workers’ compensation coverage as required by the statute. Therefore, our client—the contractor—became the statutory employer and accepted the claim as compensable, providing medical and indemnity benefits and reaching a settlement compromise with the injured worker. We filed a motion for indemnification, requesting that the subcontractor be ordered to reimburse our client for all monies paid on the claim. After an evidentiary hearing was held, where we presented evidence and called the vice president of claims to testify, the judge of compensation claims granted our motion.
News
Marshall Dennehey Announces 2026 Florida Super Lawyers & Florida Rising Stars
June 26, 2026
Marshall Dennehey Again Earns Recognition in Distinguished Chambers USA
June 4, 2026
Marshall Dennehey Promotes James Cole and Sunny Sparano to Lead The Firm’s Professional Liability Department and Announces New Board of Directors Appointments
January 5, 2026
