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Case Law Alerts

3rd District Analyzes Liquidated Damages Provision, Contingency Risk Multiplier in Context of Construction Contract

Alan Kent Little v. Bath & Kitchen Boutique, LLC, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D1073 (Fla. 3rd DCA, May 27, 2026)

July 21, 2026

by Nathan R. Woods

Alan Little and Bath & Kitchen Boutique, LLC (BKB) entered into an agreement wherein BKB would design and renovate Little’s master bathroom. A portion of BKB’s work failed to pass city inspections, after which the parties executed a contract amendment giving BKB additional time to pass final inspection and establishing that BKB would owe Little $1,000 per day for each day it went beyond this additional time. The amendment also contained a provision requiring BKB to pay 100% of Little’s legal fees for preparing the amendment and enforcing it. BKB’s work ultimately passed final inspection 67 days beyond the amendment’s completion date.

Little then filed suit against BKB alleging breach of contract and seeking $67,000 in liquidated damages. BKB filed countersuit alleging it was entitled to a judgment declaring the $1,000 per day fine to be an unenforceable penalty, and that Little had breached the agreement by failing to pay BKB for its work. Both parties alleged entitlement to attorneys’ fees based on the fee provision in the amendment, with BKB alleging the provision was reciprocal pursuant to Fla. Stat. 57.105(7).

Little obtained the issuance of a $35,000 prejudgment writ of garnishment. BKB moved to dissolve the writ. Two hearings were held on BKB’s motion, but the court never issued final adjudication. Little then filed a notice extending the writ for an additional six months.

BKB filed a petition for writ of certiorari challenging the lower court’s discovery order, which was granted. Both parties filed motions for appellate level fees based on the fee provision, and the appeals court then denied Little’s appellate fees motion and conditionally granted BKB’s, provided BKB prevailed in the trial court action and the trial court found the fee provision valid.

Both parties then filed competing summary judgment motions in the lower court, which entered partial summary judgment in BKB’s favor, concluding the daily fine was unenforceable. The parties entered a settlement agreement as to BKB’s remaining counterclaim seeking payment for its work, with Little stipulating to BKB’s entitlement to attorney’s fees and costs and requesting an evidentiary hearing to set the amount of fees and costs.

A two-day evidentiary hearing was held with the court considering live testimony from BKB’s owner, trial attorney, and fees expert. The court then awarded BKB attorney’s fees for the time spent litigating issues relating to the prejudgment writ of garnishment, at both trial and appellate levels, pursuant to Fla. Stat. 77.032(3) and 57.105(7). It applied a 1.5 contingency risk multiplier. Little then appealed.

On appeal, the court analyzed Fla. Stat. 57.105(7), and specifically its use of the language “with respect to the contract,” through the lens of the FL Supreme Court’s opinion in Ham v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC. The Ham court found that even actions that are not “based on” or “pursuant to” the underlying contract may still have a clear and direct relationship so as to fit the statute’s language. Here, the court similarly found there was a clear and direct relationship between the proceedings on Little’s writ and the parties’ contract litigation.

However, as to the contingency risk multiplier, the court found that BKB did not offer any direct evidence that, absent availability of a contingency risk multiplier, BKB would have faced substantial difficulty finding an attorney to represent it. BKB merely argued that construction attorneys in the relevant market rarely took on breach of contract actions under a contingency fee. As such, the contingency fee instituted by the trial court was not supported by the requisite evidence and thus improper.

The court therefore affirmed the award of costs and fees to BKB, but reversed the application of the contingency risk multiplier to the fees award and remanded for amended judgment consistent with this opinion.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.