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Christopher J. Conrad

Co-Chair, Special Education Law Practice Group

CJConrad@mdwcg.com

Portrait of Christopher J. Conrad

Legal Updates for Special Education Law

Legal Update for Special Education Law – Case Law Update

Legal Update for Special Education Law – January 2026

January 1, 2026

by Christopher J. Conrad

Court Upholds Hearing Officer’s Decision and Grants Full Attorneys’ Fees After School Misses IDEA Appeal Deadline    
A.L.L., A.L. v. Laboratory Charter School, 2025 WL 3269941 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 2025)

The parent, A.L., filed a special education due process complaint against Laboratory Charter School, alleging the school failed to provide her child, A.L.L., with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) during the student’s third and fourth grade years and related Extended School Years. Following a two-day hearing, the hearing officer found in favor of the parent, agreeing the school violated the child’s right to a FAPE, and awarded compensatory education in the amount of five hours for each school day the school was in session during this time period.

Three months later, A.L. and her child filed a complaint in federal court, asserting they were the “prevailing party” at due process for purposes of the IDEA, and sought an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. In its answer, the school raised affirmative defenses and asked the court to overturn the hearing officer’s decision in its entirety.

One day after the plaintiffs filed their federal complaint—and one day past the 90-day deadline under IDEA § 1415(i)(2)(B)—the school separately filed its own complaint in federal court in the nature of an appeal from the hearing officer’s decision. The school affirmatively asked the court to overturn the hearing officer’s decision, contending it did not deny the child a FAPE and asserting the hearing officer erred in finding there was a denial of a FAPE. The court promptly granted the plaintiffs’ Rule 12 motion to dismiss the school’s complaint because it was untimely. 

The court directed the parties to confer on a briefing schedule concerning the plaintiffs’ request for prevailing party fees and costs, and the court thereafter issued a scheduling order. The plaintiffs filed a motion for fees and costs. Rather than responding substantively to the plaintiffs’ motion, however, the school instead filed its own motion seeking leave of the court to amend its answer and, specifically, to include a counterclaim to challenge the validity of the hearing officer’s decision—effectively the same affirmative relief the school sought on appeal. The school also asked the court to defer ruling on the plaintiffs’ motion as premature.

In resolving the competing motions, the court first denied the school’s motion and its request to amend its answer. In rejecting the school’s arguments, the court noted the school’s intended counterclaim was essentially a verbatim copy of the amended complaint it had filed in its untimely appeal: “So, Lab Charter asks us to permit it to file, as an amended answer, exactly what it filed as its amended complaint in its unsuccessful appeal before us…” The court found it would be futile to allow the amendment under the circumstances: “We dismissed Lab Charter’s appeal … under Rule 12(b)(6) because it was untimely. It thus would be futile to permit Lab Charter’s counterclaims—which we already dismissed in the other case—to move forward in this case.”

The court also granted the plaintiffs’ motion, concluding they were the “prevailing party” under the IDEA for purposes of their affirmative claims. In its reasoning, the court once again highlighted the school’s untimely appeal from the hearing officer’s decision: “Lab Charter lost its opportunity to seek modified de novo review of the administrative record below by failing to timely appeal the hearing officer’s decision. Accordingly, we are faced with a situation where we are adjudicating only whether petitioners are entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs arising out of their IDEA claims, but we are not doing so in the context of a … substantive challenge to the administrative decision.” 

The court went on to state: “This [hearing officer] decision is final and, because Lab Charter did not timely appeal it, we cannot effectively override the statutorily imposed 90-day deadline by now conducting modified de novo review of the administrative record. At this point, the only question properly before us is what, if any, attorneys’ fees and costs should be awarded to petitioners.” The plaintiffs sought $164,173.84 in fees and costs incurred in the administrative due process hearing and in the two federal cases relating to that hearing. The court granted this request in its entirety: “Petitioners prevailed at the administrative due process proceeding, sought fees and costs related to their work from that proceeding, and defended their victory in that proceeding when Lab Charter attempted to appeal its outcome. All this work was reasonably expended in furtherance of the outcome achieved by petitioners.”

Legal Update for Special Education Law – January 2026 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2026 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.
 

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Holds That a Claimant Who Was Struck By a Car While Crossing the Street During an Unpaid Break Was In the Course and Scope of Employment

This case involved a claim petition filed by a claimant who sustained injuries after being struck by a vehicle while crossing the street in front of the employer’s premises. The employer denied the claim based on course and scope, as the accident occurred during one of two mandatory fifteen (15) minute breaks provided to the claimant. The claimant would punch out at the beginning of a break and punch back in when the break was over.  On the date of the incident, the claimant punched out and left the building to get lunch at a restaurant, which required her to cross the employer’s parking lot, and then a public street, where the injury occurred. The Workers Compensation Judge (WCJ) dismissed the petition, noting that that during the two mandatory fifteen-minute breaks per shift allowed by the employer, the claimant was free to leave the employer’s premises, and during breaks, permitted to engage in whatever activity she desired. The WCJ found that at the time of the accident, the claimant was on her own time, in the middle of the street, and going to get lunch.   The claimant filed an appeal with the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board (Board), and the Board reversed.  According to the Board, the claimant’s location was still on the employer’s premises, as the claimant was taking her customary route while using a reasonable ingress/egress from the employer.  Further, the Board found that the “Personal Comfort Doctrine” applied, as the claimant was on a momentary departure to take care of her personal comfort, within the window of time she was allotted for her break.  The Board remanded the case, and a WCJ granted the claim petition.  The Board affirmed, and the employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. Before the Court, the employer argued that the claimant was not in the course and scope of her employment, because the injury did not occur on its premises, and the claimant was outside the bounds of the Personal Comfort Doctrine. The Court, however, rejected these arguments, and dismissed the employer’s appeal.  The Court noted that the break given to the claimant was so cursory, when she set out to relieve her hunger for her own personal comfort,  she remained in the course of her employment when she sustained her injuries.  A Petition for Allowance of Appeal in the Supreme Court has been filed by the Employer, Giant Eagle.

blue facade of a hospital sign against blue sky

Result

Defense Verdict in Complex Medical Malpractice Trial

Thought Leadership

Not So Fast. . . The Limitations of the Pennsylvania RELRA in Plaintiffs’ Civil Actions Against Real Estate Broker and Licensee Defendants

Much has been made of the importance and weight of the Pennsylvania Real Estate Licensing and Registration Act, 63 P.S. §§ 455.101, et. seq. (the “RELRA” or “Act”). After all, a real estate broker generally cannot recover any commission absent a signed agreement that complies with RELRA. But can a Plaintiff rely on RELRA as a distinct cause of action in a civil action as to a real estate broker or licensee defendant? The Superior Court has emphatically held that he or she cannot. In the unpublished opinion P. Perez Real Est. Holdings, LLC et. al. v. Home Sale Real Est. Servs., Inc., et al., No. 256 MDA 2025, 2025 WL 35389888 (Pa. Super. Ct. December 10, 2025), the Superior Court held that the act “does not contemplate private actions for money damages as an enforcement mechanism and consequently, does not create a private cause of action.” citing Schwarzwaelder v. Fox, 895 A.2d 614, 620 (Pa. Super. 2006). While the act authorizes the Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs, State Real Estate Commission, to regulate the conduct governed by RELRA, the act alone does not create a stand-alone legal cause of action as to a broker-defendant in a civil action. See P. Perez, citing Schwarwaelder at 620.  Nor can it be stated that RELRA creates or imposes any legally cognizable duties on real estate brokers or licensees. While the act contains and refers to general concepts of duty (e.g. the agent must “exercise reasonable professional skill and care which meets the practice standards required by this act” and “to deal honestly and in good faith” 63 P.S. §§606.1 (a)(1),(2), or the broker has a duty to the buyer of property to take “action that is consistent with the buyer’s interest in transaction.”  63 P.S. §§606.3 (1)), these general concepts are secondary to the duties imposed by the required written agreement between the broker and consumer. For example, in P. Perez, a case in which the buyers-plaintiffs argued that the real estate broker failed to investigate recent legislation that would affect buyer’s intentions to convert the property to commercial space, the agreement between buyer and broker contained the following provision in the “Buyer’s Due Diligence” clause: Buyer acknowledges that Brokers, their licensees, employees, officers or partners have not made an independent examination or determination of the structural soundness of the property, the age or condition of the components, environmental conditions, the permitted uses, nor of conditions existing in the locale where the property is situated. . . Accordingly, the broker defendants expressly disclaimed any duty to buyers to inform them or determine whether any applicable zoning classifications, laws, or ordinances in the township applied to the properties in question. Moreover, the Superior Court refused to read provisions of the act into the Agreement, citing Skiff re Buss, Inc. v. Buckingham Review, LP, 991 A.2d 956 (Pa. Super. 2010).  Accordingly, in defending civil actions it is important for the defense attorney to identify any causes of action predicated solely on RELRA. Preliminary objections may be warranted to the extent that the plaintiff asserts RELRA as a stand-alone cause of action for monetary damages, a position struck down by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in P. Perez.  Moreover, any attempt to create or heighten duties as to the broker defendants may be countered by the general proposition that the courts will not inject the vague concepts of “reasonable professional skill” or “good faith” where the written Agreement has express provisions regarding the duties of the parties. Ironically, although RELRA is an important act with which all realtors, brokers, and licensees should be familiar to guarantee that their commissions are in fact timely paid, the Act, is not a strong stand-alone mechanism for a plaintiff’s attempts to recover monetary damages in a civil action.

Portrait of Carolyn Schweizer, with text below: Philadelphia Office Managing Attorney

News

Marshall Dennehey Names Carolyn Schweizer New Philadelphia Office Managing Attorney

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Superior Court Confirms RESDL Claims Are Subject to a Two-Year Statute of Repose

The Pennsylvania Superior Court recently concluded that claims under the Real Estate Seller Disclosure Law (“RESDL”) are subject to a two-year statute of repose running from the settlement date. This decision will further assist defending errors and omission claims against real estate agents as it bars any RESDL action commenced more than two years after the settlement date regardless of when the defect was discovered.  In Hollinger v. Deitrich, 2026 Pa. Super. LEXIS 328 (June 23, 2026), the buyers entered into an agreement of sale in April of 2017 to purchase a residential property. The settlement occurred in June of 2017. The buyers reviewed the seller disclosures that revealed the property had a sump pump in working order and a sump pit. The disclosures further noted no water infiltration into the basement, but disclosed rehab, an addition to the property and prior sewage backup.  Shortly after the settlement and closing, the buyers experienced flooding in their basement. In March of 2020, the buyers filed suit against the seller, the buyers’ real estate agent and broker and the seller’s real estate agent and broker alleging various causes of action including a violation of RESDL. The buyers alleged that they sought assurances from the agent defendants that no water infiltration occurred on the property. They further alleged that both agents lived in the area and should have known about the neighborhood water infiltration issues. The trial court granted summary judgment for the seller and the seller’s agents and dismissed the RESDL violation.  Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Gidor v. Mangus d/b/a Mangus Inspections, 345 A.3d 629 (Pa. 2025), the court explained that a statute of limitation begins to run from the time of the injurious occurrence or a discovery of the same. However, a statute of repose runs for a statutorily determined period after a definitively established event. Notably, a statute of repose eliminates a cause of action regardless of when the claim accrues. Because of this, a plaintiff may not invoke the discovery rule or other equitable tolling considerations.  RESDL requires that an action for damages, as a result of a violation of this chapter, must be commenced within two years after the date of final settlement. The court found that Section 7311(b) was clear and unambiguous that an action for damages pursuant to this chapter must be commenced within a certain time after a definitely established event that is independent of any injury or discovery of any injury. Since the buyers sued over two years after closing on the property, their statutory claims were time-barred. The court explained that the seller disclosure statement could not support common law or consumer protection claims, as using it would improperly expand remedies beyond the statute’s terms. Accordingly, the court upheld the trial court’s summary judgment ruling that the buyers’ claims under RESDL were barred by the statute of repose.  Accordingly, defense counsel should scrutinize complaints involving RESDL claims to ensure that such claims have been timely brought within two-years of the settlement date. A plaintiff will no longer be able to invoke the discovery roll to expand the time frame.

Result

Summary Judgment Secured, Preserving $750,000 in Coverage for Insured in Major Trucking Liability Dispute

Ray Freudiger and Michael A. Roberts (both of Cincinnati) successfully obtained summary judgment on behalf of their client in a coverage dispute arising from a May 19, 2022, motor vehicle accident. A permissive driver operated a box truck for an interstate trucking company and caused severe injuries to two tort victims. Prior to the accident, the insured had procured a commercial auto policy for the trucking company with stated limits of $1,000,000. Following the accident, the insurer initiated a declaratory judgment action asserting that only reduced bodily injury limits of $25,000/$50,000 applied and later counterclaimed, alleging it would not have insured the driver had he been properly submitted for approval under the policy. After extensive discovery, briefing, and oral argument, the court rejected the insurer’s attempt to shift responsibility for the $750,000 in coverage it was legally required to provide for permissive drivers under Ohio law, granting summary judgment in favor of the insured and preserving $750,000 in liability exposure.

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2026 Ohio Super Lawyers and Rising Stars

News

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Event

Pennsylvania Appellate Update 2025-2026

On August 21, 2026, Casey will serve as a panelist for the live webcast program, “Pennsylvania Appellate Update 2025-2026” presented by the Appellate Advocacy Committee of the Pennsylvania Bar Association and Pennsylvania Bar Institute. The program is divided into three parts—Criminal, Civil, and Administrative. Casey will serve as a panelist for the Civil portion, along with Christina McKinley of Blank Rome, Ben Baer of Injury Law Partners, John Masslon of Keller Postman, Jonathan Bruno of Bruno Litigation LLC, and moderator, Ezza Ahmed of Buchanan Ingersoll.  Registration and more information: https://www.pbi.org/product/pennsylvania-appellate-update-2025-2026/

empty courtroom photo

Result

Summary Judgment Secured for Life Insurance Agent

Jason Banonis Holds PDI Attorney of the Year Award with the PDI President

News

Jason Banonis Named Attorney of the Year by the Pennsylvania Defense Institute