.

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2026 New York Metro Super Lawyers and Rising Stars

April 27, 2026

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2026 New York Metro Super Lawyers and Rising Stars

Eight attorneys from Marshall Dennehey’s New York City, Long Island, and Westchester offices have been selected to the 2026 edition of New York Metro Super Lawyers magazine. A Thomson Reuters business, Super Lawyers is a rating service of lawyers from more than 70 practice areas who have attained a high degree of peer recognition and professional achievement.

Each year, no more than five percent of the lawyers in a state are selected as Super Lawyers and no more than 2.5 percent are selected for Super Lawyer Rising Stars. The selection process is multi-phased and includes independent research, peer nominations and peer evaluations. A description of the selection methodology can be found at http://www.superlawyers.com/about/selection_process.html.

2026 New York Metro Super Lawyers

Nicholas P. Chrysanthem, Professional Liability: Defense (NYC). An experienced trial attorney and litigator for over 30 years, Nicholas defends clients in matters involving legal malpractice, attorney disciplinary proceedings, employment litigation, real estate litigation, complex commercial litigation, class actions, and ADA public accommodation and ADA class action litigation. Nicholas has successfully tried cases in New York State and Federal Courts. He has experience practicing before the New York State Division of Human Rights and the New York City Human Rights Commission. Nicholas has successfully argued appeals in New York State’s Appellate Courts.

Christopher J. DiCicco, Transportation/Maritime. As Co-Chair of Marshall Dennehey’s Maritime Litigation and Aviation and Complex Litigation Practice Groups, Christopher handles maritime personal injury defense cases, including recreational boating cases, marine construction cases, maritime product liability matters, and cargo matters, as well as aviation matters. He is admitted to practice in New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania, and he actively handles litigation in all three states.

Matthew K. Flanagan, Professional Liability, Litigation (NYC and Melville). A highly skilled litigator with over 30 years of trial and appellate experience, Matthew serves as Co-Chair of the firm's Disciplinary Board Representation Practice Group. He primarily concentrates his practice on the defense of lawyers facing malpractice actions. He also defends other types of professionals and handles general litigation matters on behalf of corporate clients. Matthew has successfully tried cases in New York City and its surrounding counties and has secured dozens of victories in attorney liability cases in New York State’s appellate courts.

Allison A. Snyder, Appellate Law (NYC). Allison is a member of the firm's Appellate Advocacy and Post-Trial Practice Group. With nearly 30 years of legal writing and appellate experience, she represents clients in state and federal courts, handling appeals, dispositive motions, and post-trial matters. Allison has defended a wide range of general liability claims, including product liability, foodborne illness, aviation, and toxic tort cases, and has argued before the New York Court of Appeals and the Appellate Division, First and Second Departments.

2026 New York Metro Super Lawyer Rising Stars

Matthew A. Gray, Insurance Coverage (Melville). Matthew has multiple years of experience defending numerous insurance carriers in disputes involving New York Personal Injury Protection (PIP) claims. A member of the firm’s Fraud/Special Investigation Practice Group, he defends carriers against intentional/staged losses, as well as medical provider fraud.

Lindsay F. Korn, PI General, Defense (Melville). Lindsay represents clients in complex civil litigation, including professional liability, general liability, and personal injury defense. She handles high exposure matters involving nuanced liability issues, along with premises liability cases, including bodily injury claims, and insurance-related disputes involving PIP claims and fraud.

Lucinda E.C. James, PI General, Defense (New York City). Lucy represents clients in general liability, premises liability, NY Labor Law 240, and automobile litigation matters. Her clients include property owners, maintenance firms, construction contractors, and transportation companies. Lucy also defends insurance fraud cases involving fraud rings, staged accidents and exaggerated injuries, in addition to improper and fraudulent medical provider billing and reporting.

Charles L. Sutter, PI General, Defense (Purchase, NY). As a member of the firm’s Casualty Department, Charles defends high-exposure cases involving commercial and personal automobile liability, general liability, premises liability, and product liability. He has represented insurance carriers and their insureds in product liability subrogation and personal injury claims in both the federal and state courts.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Takes Up the Gist of the Action Doctrine

The gist of the action doctrine has been a hot topic in legal malpractice cases in Pennsylvania over the last several years.  Beginning in 2014, the Pennsylvania courts applied the gist of the action doctrine to professional liability actions, following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 106 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014).  In Bruno, the court applied the gist of the action doctrine to a professional negligence claim, and found that a negligence claim was not barred simply because the parties were in a contractual relationship where the gist of the claim sounded in negligence. Thereafter, courts in Pennsylvania applied the gist of the action doctrine to breach of contract claims as well, finding that where the allegations sounded in negligence, a plaintiff could not recast a negligence claim as one for breach of contract. This was important because of the distinction between statutes of limitations: negligence claims must be brought within two (2) years, while breach of contract claims can be brought within four (4) years.  Then, last year, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the gist of the action doctrine does not apply to breach of contract claims as seen through two opinions. These opinions were Swatt v. Nottingham Village, 342 A.3d 23 (Pa. Super. 2025) and Poteat v. Asteak, et al., 350 A.3d 198 (Pa. Super. 2025). That is, the gist of the action doctrine can bar a negligence claim but it cannot bar a breach of contract claim.  This month, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the petition for allowance of appeal in Poteat.  The Supreme Court phrased the issue for consideration as follows: Whether the Superior Court majority’s holding conflicts with this Court’s holding in Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co., 160 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014), as well as Superior Court opinions that applied Bruno, and departs from almost 200 years of controlling precedent that distinguishes between causes of action in contract and tort based upon the nature of the duty that was allegedly breached? Attorneys on both sides of legal malpractice matters no doubt look forward to clarification on these issues from our Supreme Court.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.