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Nicholas P. Chrysanthem

Portrait of Nicholas P. Chrysanthem

Nicholas is a member of the Professional Liability Department where his practice is focused on the representation of law firms, attorneys, employers and agents and brokers, in state and federal courts.

An experienced trial attorney and litigator for over 30 years, Nicholas defends clients in matters involving legal malpractice, employment litigation, real estate litigation, complex commercial litigation, ADA public accommodation and ADA class action litigation. Nicholas has experience practicing before the New York State Division of Human Rights and the New York City Human Rights Commission. He has also been retained by clients to consult on risk avoidance matters and as a trial expert. Nicholas has lectured on evidence and trial practice at various continuing legal education seminars.

Nicholas has significant experience defending owners and contractors in actions arising out of New York Labor Law and New York Industrial Code violations. His experience in litigating commercial and tort disputes provides clients with the ability to understand a variety of underlying matters that are often the basis of legal malpractice actions.

Nicholas graduated with his Bachelor of Arts in Communication Arts from Iona College in 1982. In 1988, he earned his juris doctor from Fordham University School of Law and received the American Jurisprudence Award in Torts.

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Nicholas was a member of a New York firm where he focused his practice on the defense of law firms and attorneys in legal malpractice actions, commercial and corporate litigation, and cases brought under New York’s Labor Law.

    • Fordham University School of Law (J.D., 1988)
    • Iona University (B.A., 1982)
    • New York, 1989
    • New Jersey, 1988
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of New York
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of New York
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 2nd Circuit
    • New York Metro Super Lawyers (2021-2026)
    • American Bar Association, Trial Evidence Committee; Employment Law Section; Tort Trial and Insurance Practice Section; and Section of Litigation
    • DRI, Employment and Labor Law Section, Professional Liability Section, and Commercial Litigation Section
    • New York State Bar Association, Law Practice Management Committee 2013-Present, Labor and Employment Law Section
    • New York Trial Notebook Editorial Advisory Board, 2005
    • Professional Responsibility, Columbia University School of Law, Guest Speaker,  June 2021
    • Employment Law Seminar, ACEC, Albany, New York, Presenter, January 2019
    • Legal Malpractice: How to Avoid it, What to do If You Can't, Lecturer 
    • Legal Malpractice and Ethics, Brooklyn Law School, Solo Practice Seminar, Lecturer
    • ESI For Dummies, What Every Legal Team Should Know, The Lawyers Guide to ESI Forensics 101, New York State Bar Association, Moderator 
    • Obtained summary judgment in a legal malpractice case alleging failure to properly cancel a real estate contract and alleging loss of a $175,000 security deposit and unspecified loss of opportunity income.
    • Successfully had a pre-answer motion to dismiss granted. The plaintiff, a practicing attorney, sued our client, an insurance broker, alleging that she was an additional insured under an insurance policy for her contractor, who ruined her kitchen. The motion was granted unopposed.
    • Successfully had a motion to dismiss a legal malpractice case pre-answered granted. The plaintiff used our client as an attorney because his associate neglected to oppose a threshold motion in the underlying auto case. The underlying court granted that motion in-part and denied it, in-part. The plaintiff retained a new attorney without firing our client. The new attorney commenced a malpractice action against our client and refused to substitute as attorney of record in the underlying action. We moved to dismiss the case on a number of issues pre-answer, but primarily because it was premature and the plaintiff could not prove that but for the failure to oppose the motion, he would have prevailed in overcoming the threshold.
    • Successfully had a pre-answer motion to dismiss granted as the court declined to apply supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Plaintiffs commenced this action against our client for violation §1983 and other state law tort and discrimination claims. Our motion to dismiss the first complaint was granted and plaintiffs were given the opportunity to amend, which they did. We moved to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6), which was granted by the court.
    • Was granted a motion to dismiss a legal malpractice case where the plaintiff claimed that the settlement she entered into at trial was the result of our client not being prepared. Plaintiff allocuted on the record, yet she claimed, in opposition to our motion to dismiss that she had a condition that forced her to answer “yes” instead of “no” when she is under stress. Plaintiff submitted a note from a psychiatrist that backed up her claim. We successfully argued that the plaintiff was properly allocuted on the record before the court. The presiding judge asked the questions and determined that her condition was manufactured subsequent to her allocution.  We convinced the judge that if a client could make up a condition because she was unhappy with a settlement, there would be no more settlements.
    • Successfully obtained dismissal on a Rule 12(b)(6) pre-answer motion to dismiss of a 42 U.S.C. §1983 civil rights case against our clients. Plaintiff claimed that our clients acted under color of state law in having her arrested for harassment. Plaintiff alleged various causes of action for false arrest, abuse of process, malicious prosecution, conspiracy, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court rejected plaintiff’s claims even though our client was a retired police officer with significant contracts with the police department and DA’s office.
    • Obtained defense verdict after jury trial in U.S. Dist. Court, S.D.N.Y in the matter of Flushing Bank v. AGCS Marine Insurance Company, 16-CV-2638 (RJS) in breach of contract action arising out of a claim by a loss payee.
    • Obtained Multiple "No Probable Cause" determinations from New York State Division of Human Rights in favor of Employer-Clients
    • Obtained favorable resolutions of Federal ADA Class Action lawsuits
    • Obtained pre-answer dismissal of adversary proceeding against law firm-client arising out of underlying bankruptcy proceeding
    • Obtained a defense verdict after a five-day jury trial in a legal malpractice action arising out of an underlying divorce case
    • Obtained reversal of a denial of summary judgment from the New York Appellate Division, Second Department in a legal malpractice action
    • Obtained voluntary dismissal with prejudice of action against attorneys based on underlying commercial real estate matter
    • Obtained favorable result in complex software copyright infringement case
    • Obtained reversal of a decision re-instating a lead poisoning case after dismissal from the New York Appellate Division, Second Department
    • Obtained favorable settlement including millions of dollars' worth of real estate in connection with resolution of complex shareholder litigation

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability

Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability - CASE LAW UPDATE

February 1, 2025

An attorney cannot be liable for failing act outside the scope of the retainer agreement. Kohler v. Polsky, 219 AD3d 821, 822 (2d Dept 2023) The plaintiff had retained the defendant-attorney for representation in a workers’ compensation claim. The retainer agreement explicitly excluded the possibility that the defendant was representing him in other types of claims.  The plaintiff alleged the defendant committed malpractice by failing to advise him of potential personal injury claims against other third parties. The defendant subsequently moved for summary judgment, arguing that advising the plaintiff of potential personal injury actions was beyond the scope of the retainer agreement.  Looking to Rule 1.2(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the court noted that a lawyer cannot be liable for failing act outside the scope of their retainer.    Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability – February 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability

Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability - CASE LAW UPDATE

February 1, 2025

Venue and Retainer Agreements  Price v. Kohn, Swift & Graf, P.C., 24-CV-04720 (JMW), 2024 WL 4528928 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2024) In this case, argued by Nicholas P. Chrysanthem of tour New York City and Long Island offices, the plaintiff filed a myriad of claims that mainly sounded in legal malpractice.  After the plaintiff’s meditation business attracted the attention of the FBI for, inter alia, forced labor, the plaintiff retained the defendants for representation in the criminal proceedings. The retainer agreement contained a forum selection clause for Philadelphia. The plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to argue the retainer agreement was procured by fraud. Accordingly, the court transferred the action to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.    Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability – February 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.