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Amara Benitez Rodriguez

Portrait of Amara Benitez Rodriguez

Amara is an associate in the Casualty Department where she represents defendants in third-party insurance defense matters concerning negligence, automobile liability, premises liability, construction defect, personal injury and defamation/ libel. Additionally, she has experience handling litigation involving insurance fraud and Special Investigation Unit (SIU) with particular emphasis on large loss fraud and medical provider fraud.  Amara has practiced before both federal and state court judges.

Amara received her juris doctor, cum laude, with a concentration in advocacy from Stetson University College of Law. While in law school, Amara was a member of the nation’s top ranked advocacy program as a member of the Trial Team. During her two years on the team, Amara learned the fundamental skills for advocating in a jury trial and is proud to be a two-time regional champion of the American Association for Justice’s Mock Trial Competition. Her exceptional skills in oral advocacy earned her the invitation for induction into The Order of the Barristers in 2018. Amara was also a member of the Student Bar Association, where she served as vice-president, and Phi Delta Phi.

During law school, Amara worked as a summer associate for the Department of the Navy’s Office of the General Counsel’s Naval Litigation Office. In this role, Amara worked out of the Pentagon and Washington DC Naval Yard defending the United States Navy and Marine Corp in matters concerning breach of military contracts, employment law and environmental law. Amara also interned at the Department of Veterans Affairs Office of General Counsel and the Veterans Law Institute at Stetson. Amara was selected to contribute to an Amicus Brief on Veterans’ Due Process rights to the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims due to her dedication to Veterans’ Advocacy.

Prior to law school, Amara attended the University of South Florida, where she earned a B.S. in Health Sciences with concentrations in Biological Health and Mental and Behavioral Health.

Amara is admitted to practice in the State of Florida and Middle District of Florida.

    • Stetson University College of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2018)
    • University of South Florida (B.S., 2014)
    • Florida, 2018
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida, 2019
    • Florida Super Lawyers, Rising Stars (2024-2026)
    • A Proposal for Settlement for All Seasons: Effective Use of the PFS in Florida’s New Legal Landscape, Florida Liability Claims Conference, Lake Buena Visit, FL, June 18, 2025
    • Successfully argued a Motion to Dismiss; a client was accused of negligently supervising an employee, resulting in molestation of a minor. We settled the federal defamation/ libel matter for $11,500 when Plaintiff was demanding $250,000.

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Plaintiff Does Not Have to Pay for It and Neither Should You: Preventing Plaintiff’s Introduction of Past Medical Expenses that Have Been Adjusted and/or Written Off by Collateral Source Payments

June 1, 2023

Key Points: Evidence of past medical bill charges that have been paid, adjusted, or written off are not relevant.  Florida case law establishes that Medicare/Medicaid recipients are precluded from showing evidence of medical damages above the Medicare/Medicaid subrogation/lien amount. The principles for limiting evidence of medical damages that have been paid, adjusted, or written off should apply regardless of the source of payment. It is the eve of trial, and evidentiary issues are being evaluated. For attorneys trying personal injury cases, one issue that must be evaluated involves the damages that the plaintiff will be able to present to the jury. Plaintiff’s counsel will inevitably try to present every single last penny charged by medical providers, irrespective of any payments, adjustments, or write-offs. On the other hand, defense counsel is undoubtedly crunching the numbers, trying to determine what bills should be excluded. Everyone knows that the decisions on this issue will have a significant impact on the verdict. Everyone understands what is on the line.  Until recently, Florida plaintiffs essentially had free reign to present to the jury medical bills and charges that were already paid, already adjusted, or even written off. In such a scenario, a jury would award a verdict based on numbers that were more than the amount paid by the insurer, Medicare/Medicaid, or any collateral source, and the verdict amount would be set-off after the fact. However, in 2022, the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Dial v. Calusa Palms Master Ass’n, Inc., 337 So. 3d 1229, 1232 (Fla. 2022) changed the playing field. The court established that it is proper to prevent the plaintiff from presenting the full charges for past medical expenses that Medicare already paid or were adjusted or written off based on a Medicare/Medicaid payment.  The holding in Dial is founded upon the principle that:  [T]he touchstone for admissibility of medical bills under Florida law is an individual’s obligation to pay them… [w]here a Plaintiff is not obligated to pay the full amount of the medical bills, the full amount of the medical bills becomes irrelevant and should be excluded.  Sensini v. MTD Sw. Inc., 2019 WL 2015957, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan 7, 2019). The court explained that Florida Statute 768.76 prohibits any set-off of Medicare/Medicaid benefits and, therefore, a post-verdict set-off for Medicare/Medicaid recipients is not an option.  And so, when a plaintiff is a Medicare/Medicaid recipient, defense attorneys can now successfully argue: The medical providers are prohibited by federal and/or state statute from seeking additional payment after accepting payment from Medicare/Medicaid.  The plaintiff will only ever be liable for the Medicare/Medicaid subrogation/lien amount that corresponds to the payments actually made to the medical providers. The difference between the initial gross charge and the payment amount is not relevant to any issue because the plaintiff will never have to pay that difference and the provider cannot seek payment of that difference from any person or entity.  The plaintiff should be precluded from presenting any evidence of the full charges submitted by providers and should only be allowed to present evidence of the amount Medicare has paid and which the plaintiff may ultimately be responsible for paying. Defense counsel should not be timid in their quest to push for additional limitations on evidence of payments, adjustments, and write-offs that medical providers accept from other collateral sources. Florida policy is clear that “a Plaintiff… is not entitled to recover compensatory damages in excess of the amount which represents the loss actually inflicted by the action of the Defendant.” Dial, 337 So. 3d at 1232. This is a fundamental principle for the recovery of compensatory damages and should apply regardless of the source of the payment.  For cases filed after March 24, 2023, defense counsel will rely on House Bill 837, “Civil Remedies,” which establishes that the evidence offered to prove the amount of damages for past medical bills that have already been satisfied is limited to the evidence of the amount actually paid, regardless of the source of payment. However, for all those very-many cases filed before this monumental tort reform, defense counsel should consider the following: To be admissible, evidence must be relevant; it must tend to prove or disprove a material fact. Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 402.1, at 222 (2021 ed.).  The inflated gross amount of a charge is irrelevant as a proper measure of compensatory damages because it was subsequently paid by the plaintiff’s collateral source or adjusted and/or written off.  The original charge does not tend to prove or disprove that the claimant has suffered any loss by reason of the charge. Dial, 337 So. 3d at 1232 (citing Thyssenkrupp Elevator Corp. v. Lasky, 868 So. 2d 547, 551 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)).  Therefore, the plaintiff should be limited to presenting evidence of the amount actually paid.  Whether Florida’s courts will take up the issue of limiting evidence of past medical bills, regardless of the source of payment, for cases filed before House Bill 837 is unknown…after all, the days of it being an issue appear to be numbered. But, Florida courts are inundated with cases that are not subject to House Bill 837, and defense attorneys need to gear up with every tool available to advocate for their clients and prevent excessive awards. *Amara is an associate in our Tampa, Florida, office. She can be reached at 813.898.1820 AXRodriguez@mdwcg.com.       Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 2, June 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.