As an associate attorney in the firm’s Casualty Department, Adam concentrates his practice on general liability litigation and also includes automobile liability, trucking & transportation, construction injury, rideshare liability and product liability. He defends corporations, organizations, and their employees in contract and tort matters, including workplace and construction accidents, motor vehicle claims, and wrongful death actions.
Adam earned his J.D., magna cum laude, from Cleveland State University College of Law, where he served as Executive Editor of the Cleveland State Law Review and participated in the Entrepreneurial Law Organization and the Entertainment and Sports Law Association. He also gained probate experience through an internship at a boutique firm, drafting wills, trusts, and memoranda on a range of estate-related issues.
Before law school, Adam completed his Bachelor of Arts in political science, with a minor in philosophy, at The Ohio State University. During his undergraduate years, he contributed to the Do Good Be Great Organization, helping raise funds for cancer research.
Adam first joined Marshall Dennehey in February 2024 as a law clerk in the Cleveland office, later advancing into the firm’s summer law clerk program before transitioning to his current associate role. In addition to his professional work, Adam is actively involved in community service across Ohio, volunteering with the Center of Hope Food Pantry, Eastwoods Elementary School as a classroom assistant, and the Akron-Canton Regional Foodbank.
Thought Leadership
Case Law Alerts
Linking Riders, Not Liability: Limits on Duty for Rideshare Platforms
April 1, 2026
In Cooper, the Second District Court of Appeals addressed whether a transportation network company (TNC) owes a duty of care to a driver harmed while using its platform. The plaintiff argued that a TNC owes a duty to its drivers based on its control over the rideshare platform, its safety policies, and its role in matching drivers with riders. The court, however, analyzed duty through traditional Ohio negligence principles governing entities that engage independent contractors, emphasizing that a hiring entity is generally not liable for injuries arising from the contractor’s work absent specific exceptions. Central to the court’s reasoning was the “active participation” doctrine, which limits when a company who hires an independent contractor assumes a duty of care. Under Ohio law, active participation requires more than general oversight, arising only when the hiring entity directs the injury-causing activity, gives or denies permission for the critical act, or retains control over a key variable in the work. Applying this framework, the court rejected the argument that Lyft’s operation of its platform—such as allowing users to create accounts or assigning ride requests—constituted active participation. The court also clarified that a TNC’s general safety measures, policies, and monitoring capabilities do not, standing alone, create a duty. Consistent with longstanding precedent, retaining authority to enforce safety standards or coordinate activity does not rise to active participation. The decision is particularly relevant because it suggests that platform-based controls—such as algorithmic dispatch, account verification, or general safety rules—are analogous to supervisory functions traditionally insufficient to impose a duty on a company hiring independent contractors. Thus, even where a TNC has superior knowledge or implements safety-related systems, those features must be tied directly to the injury-producing act to establish duty. Finally, Cooper reinforces the importance of the independent-contractor relationship in limiting negligence liability for TNCs. By treating drivers as independent contractors, it restricts when a hiring entity owes a duty for injuries arising from the contractor’s work. The ruling signals that, absent evidence of control over the specific conduct causing harm, courts are unlikely to expand duty based solely on a TNC’s platform design or contractual safety commitments. For negligence claims against TNCs, generally, Cooper underscores that liability will turn not on the existence of platform-level control in the abstract, but on whether the company meaningfully controlled—or actively participated in—the precise risk that resulted in the plaintiff’s injury.
Case Law Alerts
From Wedding Celebration to Courtroom Litigation: The Eighth District Examines Pleading Requirements for Food-Based Negligence Claims
January 1, 2026
On the eve of her wedding day, Tiffany Fauvel visited the defendant sushi restaurant, Pacific East, with her soon-to-be husband, Alexander Cohen. While dining there, Fauvel was injured after ingesting several one-inch-long bones contained in the sushi she purchased. Fauvel and Cohen subsequently brought suit against the restaurant, alleging negligence and loss of consortium. The trial court initially stayed discovery pending the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Berkheimer v. REKM L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-2787, recognizing that Berkheimer would establish the applicable standard of care for Fauvel’s food-based negligence claim. After Berkheimer was released, Pacific East moved for judgment on the pleadings, which the trial court granted; the plaintiffs appealed. In Berkheimer, the Ohio Supreme Court clarified that, when confronted with food-based negligence claims, courts must apply a blended analysis incorporating both the “reasonable expectation test” and the “foreign-natural test” to determine whether a supplier breached its duty of care. Under this blended framework, a court must assess: (1) whether a reasonable consumer would expect to encounter and, thus, would guard against the injurious substance; and (2) whether the injurious substance found in the food was foreign to or natural to the food. Upon review, the Eighth District Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred by granting Pacific East’s judgment on the pleadings because the complaint and answer did not contain sufficient factual detail to conduct the blended analysis contemplated in Berkheimer. The court explained that Berkheimer requires consideration of case-specific evidence, such as the type of food consumed, the preparation methods and how the substance relates to a consumer’s reasonable expectations, before determining whether a supplier breached its duty. Because the complaint and answer in Fauvel lacked that key factual context, a proper blended inquiry could not be performed, and it was inappropriate to resolve the case by judgment on the pleadings. Accordingly, the Eighth District reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with Berkheimer. In so holding, the Eighth District emphasized that, in light of Berkheimer’s fact sensitive inquiry, food-based negligence is not an issue that is typically appropriate for judgment on the pleadings. However, the Eighth District also noted that nearly every Ohio case that applied the rules from Berkheimer in favor of the defendant resolved in summary judgment. Thus, Fauvel highlights that, while early dismissal is rarely available in food-based negligence cases, defendants now have a clear, fact-specific framework to guide defense strategy and challenge claims at later stages.
