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Wendy R.S. O'Connor

Wendy R.S. O’Connor, an attorney with 30+ years of experience in the defense litigation arena, has practiced in a variety of areas during the course of career, beginning with environmental insurance coverage and pharmaceutical products liability defense. After taking off time to raise her four daughters, one of whom is intellectually disabled, Wendy returned to the practice of law in the area of business litigation for five years before finding her “forever home” at Marshall Dennehey, where she focuses her practice in general casualty defense, retail premises liability and veterinary liability defense.

Representing local, regional, and national clients in trial and at the appellate level, Wendy has honed her written and oral advocacy over a lifetime of practice in the state and federal courts of Eastern Pennsylvania. Wendy is a prolific writer and presenter on litigation trends and has drafted scholarly articles on topics as diverse as the Peer Review Act and motorist cell phone usage as a basis for punitive damages claims. Wendy frequently writes about the practice of law from an interpersonal perspective and has authored articles focusing on client relations, collegiality in the profession, and the importance of mentorship.

Wendy views her role as counsel as both providing a sound, compelling defense as well as shepherding her clients through what can be a stressful and frightening experience. As a former parenting educator, Wendy attended an intensive, fifty-hour course for facilitators that concentrated on communication and has found this training to be an invaluable asset in her legal practice. From a philosophical standpoint, Wendy attributes her success to exhaustive preparation, humility, a hard-won thick skin, and her signature double string of pearls.

A voracious reader, Wendy also enjoys writing about non-legal issues and has authored over one hundred essays on current events, society, and culture. In 2002, Wendy wrote a story for her oldest daughter featuring a family not unlike her own; in the years since, she has penned twenty more such tales which, in addition to her annual scrapbooks, have become family heirlooms. Wendy loves to garden, her Newfoundland dog, Hattie; and her husband of 35 years, Michael, a family medicine physician. 
 

    • Penn State Dickinson Law (J.D., 1989)
    • Mount Holyoke College (A.B., magna cum laude, 1986)
    • Pennsylvania, 1989
    • New Jersey, 1990
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 1990
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 1990
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 1990
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2008
    • Supreme Court of the United States, 2019
    • American Veterinary Medical Law Association
    • Lehigh County Bar Association
    • Northampton County Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Hills and Ridges:  Defending the Snow and Ice Slip and Fall Case in Pennsylvania, Marshall Dennehey Client Presentation, 2019
    • Limited Tort v. Full Tort/Verbal Threshold v. Zero Threshold – Which Option Applies? Marshall Dennehey Client Presentation, 2018
    • A Primer on Legal Malpractice Claims in Pennsylvania, Marshall Dennehey Client Presentation, 2017
    • Blitz on Damages:  Reducing the Plaintiff's Economic Damages Claim, Marshall Dennehey Client Presentation, 2016 
    • The Whittling Away of Protection Afforded Under the Pennsylvania Peer Review Protection Act, Health Care and Health Law Seminar, Marshall Dennehey, November 5, 2015
    • Documenting Your Care: Good for You; Good for Your Patient, Pocono Medical Center Nursing Staff, October 2015
    • Informed Consent After Brady v. Urbas – Taking Another Look, Bar Association of Lehigh County, September 23, 2015
    • Mock Deposition of a Nurse, Pocono Medical Center Nursing Staff, May 2015
    • Beyond Barrick v. Holy Spirit: Guidelines for Expert Witness Communications, Northampton County Bar Association, March 2015
    • Anatomy of a Lawsuit and the Impact of the Internet, October 2014
    • Grievance or Dispute Resolution Clauses, September 9, 2014
    • Oh, What a Tangled Web We Weave: How the Internet Can Make or Break the Medical Professional Negligence Case, 63rd Annual Joint Meeting of the Lehigh County Bar Association and Lehigh County Medical Society, September 9, 2014
    • EMR and Electronic Communications with Patients: When is it Okay to Hit Send?, Pocono Medical Center Grand Rounds, December 2013
    • Litigation Issues Arising From the Use of Electronic Medical Records, Northampton County Medical Society, September 2013
    • Federal Discovery Abuses: Was That Wrong?
    • Getting Paid in a Recession Economy: Tips for the Small Business Owner
    • Documenting the Job: A Guide to AIA Forms for the Construction Manager
    • The Importance of Patient Communication, Sacred Heart Hospital Family Practice Residents, Winter 2012
    • Nursing Care Best Practices, Moravian Village of Bethlehem, Spring 2011
    • Recent Updates from Pennsylvania's Appellate Court: Civil Litigation, 2005
    • Support for Child Advocates, Philadelphia, PA, 1990-1994
    • Obtained a defense verdict at jury trial on behalf of an arts and crafts supply store with respect to its sale of a candle which was left burning unattended and burned down Plaintiff’s home, successfully defending against claims of product defect where candle manufacturer had obtained a joint tort release prior to trial.
    • Obtained a verdict in subrogation action at jury trial on behalf of a commercial trucking company with respect to a tanker truck explosion which occurred during the loading of lubricating oil.
    • Authored brief and argued before Superior Court of Pennsylvania to obtain affirmation of trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of sellers accused of failure to disclose defects of residential property.
    • Authored brief and argued before Superior Court of Pennsylvania to obtain affirmation by Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania of trial court’s dismissal of settlement agreement in action by members of duck hunting club where agreement was found to be ambiguous. 
    • Authored brief and argued before Superior Court of Pennsylvania to obtain affirmation by Superior Court of trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of land development company against former partner demanding share of profits.
    • Obtained defense verdict for roofing materials manufacturer against claims by plaintiff for improper installation where plaintiff failed to adduce any evidence that he roofing materials were defective; that roofing contractor was agent of the manufacturer; or that contractor was trained by the manufacturer as to proper installation procedures.
    • Obtained defense verdict on behalf of homeowner where family friend assisting in moving tripped and fell on sidewalk crack where plaintiff admitted to being aware of crack long before moving day and that stepping on crack while carrying large, heavy boxes could be dangerous.
    • Obtained defense award on behalf of home oil heating contractor in case involving allegations of failure to timely deliver fuel oil, resulting in cracked pipes and water leakage.
    • Obtained defense award on behalf of restaurant/bar in case where plaintiff, who began an altercation with an ex-boyfriend, claimed to have been assaulted by bartender/employee.
    • Obtained defense award on behalf of cinema in case where plaintiff claimed to have sustained injury to knee after sitting on allegedly defective movie seat.
    • Obtained defense verdict on behalf of dentist in case where plaintiff claimed to have suffered damage as the result of alleged negligent performance of root canal procedure.
    • Obtained defense verdict on behalf of veterinarian and animal hospital where plaintiff claimed that dog with bradycephalic airway disease died while in hospital’s care.
    • Obtained defense verdict in favor of fast-food restaurant in case where Plaintiff claimed to have chipped a tooth due to presence of a pebble in hamburger.
    • Obtained judgment of non pros due to plaintiff’s failure to prosecute action against attorney sued in malpractice.
    • Obtained summary judgment in a premises liability case where the Plaintiff claimed her mobility scooter tipped over after encountering a pothole in a city street which, she claimed, was caused by our client’s installation of an ADA-accessible ramp on the adjoining sidewalk. Judgment was sought and granted based upon the lack of evidence to show that any act or omission on the part of our client caused or contributed to the formation of the pothole.
    • Obtained summary judgment in favor of janitorial service in slip and fall case against retail bookseller.
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of retail grocery store where plaintiff slipped on vendor’s delivery tray, which was sitting on floor, while reaching for loaf of bread on shelf.
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of an out-of-possession landlord where door-dash driver slipped and fell on ice while delivering food to tenant.
    • Obtained dismissal of retail grocer in case where plaintiff claimed to have been injured while walking in store parking lot. 
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of boxing gym where visiting coach fell from boxing ring.
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of entity accused of defamation against candidate for public office by means of alleged internet postings concerning candidate’s alleged conduct.
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of landowner in case where plaintiff claimed to have tripped over sidewalk displaced by tree roots.

Results

Summary Judgment Secured in Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Case

We won summary judgment in a motor vehicle case before the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County, Pennsylvania. The plaintiff was in the course and scope of her employment at the time of the vehicle collision. She filed a workers’ compensation claim, and the workers’ compensation judge ultimately determined that her alleged injuries were not related to the motor vehicle accident. The plaintiff appealed that decision to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, which affirmed. In her civil action against the driver and owners of the other vehicle, we asserted that the decision of the workers’ compensation judge acted as collateral estoppel with regard to all claims, thus barring recovery by the plaintiff against our client. The plaintiff argued that the right to a jury trial, as guaranteed under the Pennsylvania Constitution, precluded application of collateral estoppel. The trial court disagreed, finding ample case law to support the application of collateral estoppel in such circumstances, and granted our motion for summary judgment.

Defense Knocks-Out Plaintiff

We obtained summary judgment on behalf of a boxing gym. ​The plaintiff, a seasoned boxing coach, claimed to have been injured when he fell out of a boxing ring during a sparring match at the defendant’s gym. The plaintiff asserted that while standing on the apron with his back to the ring, he was struck by one of the fighters and propelled out and onto the floor. He alleged the defendant was negligent because the boxing ring was “too high” and the flooring surface “too hard.” In granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the court found first that the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff because Pennsylvania law imposes no duty on sports facilities to protect spectators from risks that are common, frequent, and expected, and that the circumstances surrounding the incident eliminate any duty on the part of the defendant. The court also held that there was no evidence to support the plaintiff’s contentions that the boxing ring was too high or that the lack of padding on the surrounding floor was a deviation from an established custom. In fact, the evidence established that the boxing ring complied with national boxing regulations. Accordingly, summary judgment was granted, and the plaintiff did not appeal the decision.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.