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Wendy R.S. O'Connor

Wendy R.S. O’Connor, an attorney with 30+ years of experience in the defense litigation arena, has practiced in a variety of areas during the course of career, beginning with environmental insurance coverage and pharmaceutical products liability defense. After taking off time to raise her four daughters, one of whom is intellectually disabled, Wendy returned to the practice of law in the area of business litigation for five years before finding her “forever home” at Marshall Dennehey, where she focuses her practice in general casualty defense, retail premises liability and veterinary liability defense.

Representing local, regional, and national clients in trial and at the appellate level, Wendy has honed her written and oral advocacy over a lifetime of practice in the state and federal courts of Eastern Pennsylvania. Wendy is a prolific writer and presenter on litigation trends and has drafted scholarly articles on topics as diverse as the Peer Review Act and motorist cell phone usage as a basis for punitive damages claims. Wendy frequently writes about the practice of law from an interpersonal perspective and has authored articles focusing on client relations, collegiality in the profession, and the importance of mentorship.

Wendy views her role as counsel as both providing a sound, compelling defense as well as shepherding her clients through what can be a stressful and frightening experience. As a former parenting educator, Wendy attended an intensive, fifty-hour course for facilitators that concentrated on communication and has found this training to be an invaluable asset in her legal practice. From a philosophical standpoint, Wendy attributes her success to exhaustive preparation, humility, a hard-won thick skin, and her signature double string of pearls.

A voracious reader, Wendy also enjoys writing about non-legal issues and has authored over one hundred essays on current events, society, and culture. In 2002, Wendy wrote a story for her oldest daughter featuring a family not unlike her own; in the years since, she has penned twenty more such tales which, in addition to her annual scrapbooks, have become family heirlooms. Wendy loves to garden, her Newfoundland dog, Hattie; and her husband of 35 years, Michael, a family medicine physician. 
 

    • Penn State Dickinson Law (J.D., 1989)
    • Mount Holyoke College (A.B., magna cum laude, 1986)
    • Pennsylvania, 1989
    • New Jersey, 1990
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 1990
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 1990
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 1990
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2008
    • Supreme Court of the United States, 2019
    • American Veterinary Medical Law Association
    • Lehigh County Bar Association
    • Northampton County Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Hills and Ridges:  Defending the Snow and Ice Slip and Fall Case in Pennsylvania, Marshall Dennehey Client Presentation, 2019
    • Limited Tort v. Full Tort/Verbal Threshold v. Zero Threshold – Which Option Applies? Marshall Dennehey Client Presentation, 2018
    • A Primer on Legal Malpractice Claims in Pennsylvania, Marshall Dennehey Client Presentation, 2017
    • Blitz on Damages:  Reducing the Plaintiff's Economic Damages Claim, Marshall Dennehey Client Presentation, 2016 
    • The Whittling Away of Protection Afforded Under the Pennsylvania Peer Review Protection Act, Health Care and Health Law Seminar, Marshall Dennehey, November 5, 2015
    • Documenting Your Care: Good for You; Good for Your Patient, Pocono Medical Center Nursing Staff, October 2015
    • Informed Consent After Brady v. Urbas – Taking Another Look, Bar Association of Lehigh County, September 23, 2015
    • Mock Deposition of a Nurse, Pocono Medical Center Nursing Staff, May 2015
    • Beyond Barrick v. Holy Spirit: Guidelines for Expert Witness Communications, Northampton County Bar Association, March 2015
    • Anatomy of a Lawsuit and the Impact of the Internet, October 2014
    • Grievance or Dispute Resolution Clauses, September 9, 2014
    • Oh, What a Tangled Web We Weave: How the Internet Can Make or Break the Medical Professional Negligence Case, 63rd Annual Joint Meeting of the Lehigh County Bar Association and Lehigh County Medical Society, September 9, 2014
    • EMR and Electronic Communications with Patients: When is it Okay to Hit Send?, Pocono Medical Center Grand Rounds, December 2013
    • Litigation Issues Arising From the Use of Electronic Medical Records, Northampton County Medical Society, September 2013
    • Federal Discovery Abuses: Was That Wrong?
    • Getting Paid in a Recession Economy: Tips for the Small Business Owner
    • Documenting the Job: A Guide to AIA Forms for the Construction Manager
    • The Importance of Patient Communication, Sacred Heart Hospital Family Practice Residents, Winter 2012
    • Nursing Care Best Practices, Moravian Village of Bethlehem, Spring 2011
    • Recent Updates from Pennsylvania's Appellate Court: Civil Litigation, 2005
    • Support for Child Advocates, Philadelphia, PA, 1990-1994
    • Obtained a defense verdict at jury trial on behalf of an arts and crafts supply store with respect to its sale of a candle which was left burning unattended and burned down Plaintiff’s home, successfully defending against claims of product defect where candle manufacturer had obtained a joint tort release prior to trial.
    • Obtained a verdict in subrogation action at jury trial on behalf of a commercial trucking company with respect to a tanker truck explosion which occurred during the loading of lubricating oil.
    • Authored brief and argued before Superior Court of Pennsylvania to obtain affirmation of trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of sellers accused of failure to disclose defects of residential property.
    • Authored brief and argued before Superior Court of Pennsylvania to obtain affirmation by Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania of trial court’s dismissal of settlement agreement in action by members of duck hunting club where agreement was found to be ambiguous. 
    • Authored brief and argued before Superior Court of Pennsylvania to obtain affirmation by Superior Court of trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of land development company against former partner demanding share of profits.
    • Obtained defense verdict for roofing materials manufacturer against claims by plaintiff for improper installation where plaintiff failed to adduce any evidence that he roofing materials were defective; that roofing contractor was agent of the manufacturer; or that contractor was trained by the manufacturer as to proper installation procedures.
    • Obtained defense verdict on behalf of homeowner where family friend assisting in moving tripped and fell on sidewalk crack where plaintiff admitted to being aware of crack long before moving day and that stepping on crack while carrying large, heavy boxes could be dangerous.
    • Obtained defense award on behalf of home oil heating contractor in case involving allegations of failure to timely deliver fuel oil, resulting in cracked pipes and water leakage.
    • Obtained defense award on behalf of restaurant/bar in case where plaintiff, who began an altercation with an ex-boyfriend, claimed to have been assaulted by bartender/employee.
    • Obtained defense award on behalf of cinema in case where plaintiff claimed to have sustained injury to knee after sitting on allegedly defective movie seat.
    • Obtained defense verdict on behalf of dentist in case where plaintiff claimed to have suffered damage as the result of alleged negligent performance of root canal procedure.
    • Obtained defense verdict on behalf of veterinarian and animal hospital where plaintiff claimed that dog with bradycephalic airway disease died while in hospital’s care.
    • Obtained defense verdict in favor of fast-food restaurant in case where Plaintiff claimed to have chipped a tooth due to presence of a pebble in hamburger.
    • Obtained judgment of non pros due to plaintiff’s failure to prosecute action against attorney sued in malpractice.
    • Obtained summary judgment in a premises liability case where the Plaintiff claimed her mobility scooter tipped over after encountering a pothole in a city street which, she claimed, was caused by our client’s installation of an ADA-accessible ramp on the adjoining sidewalk. Judgment was sought and granted based upon the lack of evidence to show that any act or omission on the part of our client caused or contributed to the formation of the pothole.
    • Obtained summary judgment in favor of janitorial service in slip and fall case against retail bookseller.
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of retail grocery store where plaintiff slipped on vendor’s delivery tray, which was sitting on floor, while reaching for loaf of bread on shelf.
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of an out-of-possession landlord where door-dash driver slipped and fell on ice while delivering food to tenant.
    • Obtained dismissal of retail grocer in case where plaintiff claimed to have been injured while walking in store parking lot. 
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of boxing gym where visiting coach fell from boxing ring.
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of entity accused of defamation against candidate for public office by means of alleged internet postings concerning candidate’s alleged conduct.
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of landowner in case where plaintiff claimed to have tripped over sidewalk displaced by tree roots.

Results

Summary Judgment Secured in Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Case

We won summary judgment in a motor vehicle case before the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County, Pennsylvania. The plaintiff was in the course and scope of her employment at the time of the vehicle collision. She filed a workers’ compensation claim, and the workers’ compensation judge ultimately determined that her alleged injuries were not related to the motor vehicle accident. The plaintiff appealed that decision to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, which affirmed. In her civil action against the driver and owners of the other vehicle, we asserted that the decision of the workers’ compensation judge acted as collateral estoppel with regard to all claims, thus barring recovery by the plaintiff against our client. The plaintiff argued that the right to a jury trial, as guaranteed under the Pennsylvania Constitution, precluded application of collateral estoppel. The trial court disagreed, finding ample case law to support the application of collateral estoppel in such circumstances, and granted our motion for summary judgment.

Defense Knocks-Out Plaintiff

We obtained summary judgment on behalf of a boxing gym. ​The plaintiff, a seasoned boxing coach, claimed to have been injured when he fell out of a boxing ring during a sparring match at the defendant’s gym. The plaintiff asserted that while standing on the apron with his back to the ring, he was struck by one of the fighters and propelled out and onto the floor. He alleged the defendant was negligent because the boxing ring was “too high” and the flooring surface “too hard.” In granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the court found first that the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff because Pennsylvania law imposes no duty on sports facilities to protect spectators from risks that are common, frequent, and expected, and that the circumstances surrounding the incident eliminate any duty on the part of the defendant. The court also held that there was no evidence to support the plaintiff’s contentions that the boxing ring was too high or that the lack of padding on the surrounding floor was a deviation from an established custom. In fact, the evidence established that the boxing ring complied with national boxing regulations. Accordingly, summary judgment was granted, and the plaintiff did not appeal the decision.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.